15 Vt. Stat. Ann. § 751

Section 751 gives a divorce court broad discretion to divide property as it deems just, whether held separately, jointly, or by the entirety.

Lafko v. Lafko · filed 1969-06-19

Upon the granting of a divorce, the trial court has a wide judicial discretion. It may decree the property as it deems just, whether held separately, jointly or by the entirety. 15 V.S.A. §751; ... The facts presented show no abuse of the court’s discretion in decreeing the property to the parties as tenants in common.

Section 751 gives the trial court broad discretion to divide property justly and equitably, considering the parties’ circumstances and the property’s source and burdens.

Segalla v. Segalla · filed 1971-06-01

The statute providing for the disposition of property of the parties is found in 15 V.S.A. § 751 and states that in granting a divorce the court "* * * shall decree such disposition of the property owned by the parties separately, jointly, or by the entirety, as shall appear just and equitable, having regard to the respective merits of the parties, to the condition in which they shall be left by such divorce, to the party through whom the property was acquired and to the burdens imposed upon it for the benefit of the children." ... In divorce cases the court has wide discretion in making property awards. Unless it appears on review, that such discretion has been withheld or abused, the decree as made must stand.

Section 751 gives the trial court wide discretion to divide property held separately, jointly, or by entirety, subject to review for abuse of discretion.

LaFarr v. LaFarr · filed 1974-02-05

The disposition of property in divorce proceedings is governed by 15 V.S.A. § 751, and the awarding of alimony by 15 V.S.A. § 754. The division of property is a matter of wide discretion in the trial court and it may decree such property as it deems just, whether held separately, jointly or by entirety. Unless it appears upon review that such discretion has been withheld or abused, the decree, as made, must stand.

Section 751 gives the trial court discretion to divide property in a divorce, and its division stands unless that discretion was withheld or abused.

Peisch v. Peisch · filed 1974-06-04

The matter of division of property in a divorce case is a matter of discretion vested in the trial court. Unless it appears on review that such discretion has been withheld or abused, the decree as made must stand.

Section 751 permits an equitable division of marital property without requiring precise mathematical equality.

Sweeney v. Sweeney · filed 1978-06-06

However, the division of marital property does not always lend itself to a precise mathematical formula; the record discloses compliance by the court with the principles enunciated by 15 V.S.A. § 751 and our case law. To require precise division would entail liquidation of the marital assets in every contested case, a result often highly disadvantageous to the parties.

Section 751 gives the trial court broad discretion to divide property in a divorce, provided the disposition is just and reasonable in light of the parties’ circumstances.

Condosta v. Condosta · filed 1978-09-11

We have repeatedly upheld the wide range of discretion given the trial court in regard to property disposition in a divorce action. 15 V.S.A. § 751; ... The ultimate test is that the disposition be just and reasonable, and an important factor to be considered is the condition in which the divorce leaves the parties.

Section 751 gives the divorce court broad discretion to divide property, and its decree stands unless that discretion was withheld, abused, or exercised on clearly untenable or unreasonable grounds.

Whitcomb v. Whitcomb · filed 1979-02-06

The statute confers upon the court a great degree of discretion. Unless it appears on review that such discretion has been withheld, abused, or exercised on grounds clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable, the decree must stand.

Section 751 permits a court to divide property as it deems just and equitable, subject to review for abuse of discretion.

Palmer v. Palmer · filed 1980-06-03

The court may decree the property in a manner it deems just and equitable, and unless abuse is demonstrated, its decree will stand. 15 V.S.A. § 751; White v. White, 133 Vt. 614, 349 A.2d 894 (1975).

Section 751 gives the trial court discretion to divide property in a divorce; its decree stands unless that discretion was abused.

Graziano v. Graziano · filed 1981-04-07

15 V.S.A. § 751 states that the court shall “decree such disposition of the property ... as shall appear just and equitable, having regard to the respective merits of the parties, to the condition in which they shall be left by such divorce, to the party through whom the property was acquired and to the burdens imposed upon it for the benefit of the children.” ... Unless an abuse of discretion is demonstrated the trial court’s decree must stand. ... Upon a review of the record here, the trial court’s discretion was neither abused nor withheld.

Section 751 requires a just and equitable division of the parties’ property.

Jackson v. Jackson · filed 1981-06-02

But liability here needs no evidence to support its imposition; it is a creature of statute. That statute is 15 V.S.A. § 751, requiring “just and equitable” division of the property of the parties.

Section 751 gives trial courts wide discretion in dividing property after a divorce, including discretion to defer payment of a spouse’s share.

Costello v. Costello · filed 1982-11-02

As regards the order deferring payment of defendant’s share of the equity, this Court has consistently held that within the bounds of 15 V.S.A. § 751, the disposition of property pursuant to a divorce decree is a matter of wide discretion for the trial court. ... Upon a review of the record before us, we cannot say that the court’s discretion was either abused or withheld.

Section 751 leaves division of marital property to the trial court’s discretion, and the decree stands unless that discretion is abused.

Baird v. Baird · filed 1982-11-02

This Court has repeatedly held that the division of marital property under 15 V.S.A. § 751 is a matter for the discretion of the trial court, and that the decree must stand unless an abuse of discretion has occurred.

Section 751 calls for an equitable division of property that considers the parties’ circumstances and how the property was acquired, while giving the trial court broad discretion.

Ruhe v. Ruhe · filed 1983-02-07

We note that 15 V.S.A. § 751, as in effect at the time of judgment, provides for the distribution of property upon decree as appears just and equitable, having regard to the respective merits of the parties, to the condition in which they shall be left by such decree, and to the party through whom the property was acquired. Again, the trial court has broad discretion and unless it is shown that such discretion was abused, withheld, or exercised on grounds clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable, the decree will stand.

Section 751 gives trial courts broad discretion to divide marital property, and a property decree stands absent an abuse of that discretion.

Philburt v. Philburt · filed 1987-07-24

It is well settled that the trial court has broad discretion under 15 V.S.A. § 751 in the division of property, and in the absence of an abuse of discretion, the decree will stand.

Section 751 requires a just and equitable distribution of property under statutory criteria and gives the trial court wide discretion.

Hogel v. Hogel · filed 1978-06-06

Such decisions must be made with reference to 15 V.S.A. §§ 751 and 754. These sections direct the court to distribute property and award alimony justly and equitably. They also provide certain criteria which a court should take into account in making these decisions. We have often held that a trial court has wide discretion, within the limits set by sections 751 and 754, in its awards of property •and alimony.

Section 751(b) allows an equal division of marital property when the court considers the relevant factors, including fault and homemaking contributions, even if one spouse also receives maintenance.

Johnson v. Johnson · filed 1990-08-10(b)

Here, the court made extensive findings with respect to the relevant factors enumerated in 15 V.S.A. § 751(b) and in its conclusions of law stated that it had considered each of these factors in arriving at an equitable distribution. We realize that the court had to balance numerous factors, including the fault of the plaintiff and the contributions she had made as homemaker to the property and the earnings that were spent on the property. In the end, the court struck a balance that provided each party with approximately 50% of the marital estate. Again, we find no abuse of discretion.

Section 751 gives the trial court broad discretion to divide marital property equitably after considering the statutory factors, but requires a clear explanation of its decision.

Cabot v. Cabot · filed 1997-05-23

Division of marital property is governed by 15 V.S.A. § 751, which grants the court authority to "equitably divide and assign the property" and sets out a number of factors that the court may consider in making its decision. ... The court must, however, provide a clear statement as to what was decided and why. ... The court's decision, which is well-explained and supported by the findings, is not an abuse of discretion.

Section 751 gives trial courts broad discretion to divide marital property equitably under its factors; the shares need not be equal.

Turner v. Turner · filed 2004-01-16

The division of marital property is governed by 15 V.S.A. § 751, which grants the court authority to "equitably divide and assign the property," and sets out a number of factors that the court may consider in making its decision. Cabot v. Cabot, 166 Vt. 485, 500, 697 A.2d 644, 654 (1997). The trial court has broad discretion to consider the statutory factors and fashion an appropriate order, but it must provide a clear statement as to what was decided and why. Id. We have noted that the distribution of property is not an exact science and, therefore, all that is required is that the distribution be equitable. Lalumiere v. Lalumiere, 149 Vt. 469, 471, 544 A.2d 1170, 1172 (1988).

Section 751(b) provides a nonexclusive list of factors for equitable division of marital property, leaving the family court broad discretion in weighing them.

Gamache v. Smurro · filed 2006-07-14(b)

The statute contains a nonexclusive list of factors that the court may consider in reaching its decision. ... The trial court made detailed findings in this case, and considered many of the statutory factors. ... We conclude that it fell within the broad discretion of the family court.

Section 751(b) allows a court to divide marital property equitably after considering all relevant factors, without assigning a fixed weight to each factor.

Molleur v. Molleur · filed 2012-03-09(b)

We conclude that the court's property award does not fall outside its broad discretion. Section 751 of Title 15 gives the court the authority to equitably divide marital assets after considering all relevant factors, including those listed therein.

Section 751 permits an unequal division of marital property when the family court considers the statutory factors and makes findings supported by the evidence.

O'Neil v. O'Neil · filed 2014-10-31(b)

Contrary to wife’s assertion, the family court is not required to make an equal division of property.

Section 751 directs courts to equitably divide marital assets after considering all relevant factors, with findings sufficient to review the division.

Hobson v. Hobson · filed 2016-08-19(a), (b)

The court’s statutory authority and responsibility is to “equitably divide” the marital assets considering “all relevant factors.” 15 V.S.A. § 751(a), (b). ... We cannot determine whether the court’s findings are supported by the evidence, or whether the court’s conclusions and ultimate property division are supported by its findings, without clearer findings concerning the value of the receivables.

Section 751(b) requires the family court to consider all relevant factors, including the twelve statutory factors, when equitably dividing marital property.

Jaro v. Jaro · filed 2018-09-14(b)

In making an equitable distribution of marital property, the family court considers all relevant factors, including the twelve factors set forth in 15 V.S.A. § 751(b).

Section 751 permits an unequal division of marital property based on the parties’ respective merits.

Davin v. Davin · filed 2020-02-07

The court’s evaluation of the parties’ testimony alone amply supports its findings as to the respective merits of the parties and supports its decision to award wife 60% of the marital estate. This distribution is equitable without any consideration of the therapist’s testimony, which, as reflected above, was minimally considered in any event.

Section 751 permits an equal division of marital property when both spouses made significant contributions during a lengthy marriage, even if one spouse contributed more money.

Babcock v. Richard N. Babcock, Sr. · filed 2022-09-16(b)

In a divorce proceeding, the court is required to “equitably divide and assign” marital property, and it may consider various statutory factors in rendering its decision. 15 V.S.A. § 751; see also Cabot v. Cabot, 166 Vt. 485, 500 (1997). ... Under these circumstances, we cannot say that it was an abuse of discretion for the court to equally divide the relatively limited amount of equity remaining in the marital home.

Section 751(b) allows a court dividing marital property to consider a pet’s welfare and its emotional connection with each spouse.

Hament v. Baker · filed 2014-04-25(b)

The family division is not limited to considering the factors enumerated in § 751(b). ... In the case of pets, we hold that the family division may consider other factors not set out in the statute: the welfare of the animal and the emotional connection between the animal and each spouse.

Section 751(b) allows an equitable division of marital property without requiring a credit for one spouse’s improvements to a home before marriage.

Battis v. Battis · filed 2023-12-15(b)

The court was not required to either value or distribute the equity in the home in the way outlined by husband in his brief, nor was it obligated to credit husband for any pre-marriage improvements to the home.

Section 751 requires a court dividing property after divorce, when no minors are involved, to consider the parties’ respective merits, their circumstances after divorce, and how the property was acquired.

Young v. Young · filed 1975-12-09

Nor are either among those factors set forth in 15 V.S.A. § 751. Under that statute, in disposing of the property subsequent to the granting of a divorce, when there are no minors involved, the court should consider the respective merits of the parties, the condition in which a divorce would leave them, and the party through whom the property was acquired.

Section 751 gives the trial court discretion to divide property equitably, considering the source of the property, the parties’ circumstances, the children’s needs, and other relevant factors.

Kinley v. Kinley · filed 1981-09-01

15 V.S.A. § 751 provides for disposition of property in divorce matters and indicates that among the factors to be considered in making the decision are the source of the property, the respective merits of the parties, the condition with which each would be left by the divorce, the needs of the children and a general equitable result. ... All that is required is that it be equitable. From a review of the record it appears that the trial court’s discretion was neither withheld nor abused.

Section 751(b)(10) allows a court dividing marital property to consider the party through whom the property was acquired.

Belanger v. Belanger · filed 1987-06-26(b)(10)

The court valued the property at $12,500, “[took] into account the fact that this property was a pre-marital asset of defendant in considering the equities of the parties in marital property,” and awarded the property to defendant. This was not error. See 15 V.S.A. § 751(b)(10) (“party through whom the property was acquired” is a factor the court may consider).

Section 751 treats a spouse’s contribution of property to the marriage as one of several factors in dividing marital property.

Plante v. Plante · filed 1987-07-10

The division of property in a divorce proceeding “is not an exact science,” Hogel v. Hogel, 136 Vt. 195, 197, 388 A.2d 369, 370 (1978), and one party’s contribution of property to the marriage is only one of numerous factors to be considered in distributing property under 15 V.S.A. § 751.

Section 751 gives the trial court discretion to equitably divide marital property after considering relevant statutory factors.

Lalumiere v. Lalumiere · filed 1988-03-18

In this case we find no abuse of discretion. It appears from the record that plaintiff was awarded approximately 70% of the marital assets. Findings were made as to many of the factors set out in § 751. We find no indication that the trial court’s discretion was either withheld or abused.

Section 751(b) permits an unequal property division when the statutory factors support an equitable result.

Myott v. Myott · filed 1988-04-29(b)

Many of the statutory factors — including those relating to the custody award and the need of the plaintiff to establish a new home for the younger child — support the division. Accordingly, we can find no abuse of discretion.

Section 751 permits a court dividing property on divorce to consider its enumerated factors when relevant evidence has been presented.

Ellis v. Ellis · filed 1988-07-21

Pursuant to 15 V.S.A. § 751 a court may consider certain enumerated factors when distributing property upon divorce where relevant evidence has been presented on those issues. In this case, the court made findings relevant to all of the factors set out in § 751 to which evidence had been presented.

Section 751(b) requires consideration of all listed property distribution factors but leaves the weight of each factor to the trial court’s discretion.

Kingsbury v. Kingsbury · filed 1987-01-23(b)

Our instruction to trial courts to consider all of the factors enumerated in § 751(b) leaves the weight given to each separate factor within the court’s sound discretion.

Section 751 does not require findings on every property division factor; the findings need only clearly explain what the court decided and why.

Semprebon v. Semprebon · filed 1991-07-19

It makes no sense to impose such a requirement where, as here, use of any particular statutory factor is optional within the discretion of the trial court. Thus, we have required only that the findings “provide a clear statement as to what was decided and why.”

Section 751(b) requires the family court to consider the statutory factors when dividing marital property and permits an equal division when equitable.

Gravel v. Gravel · filed 2009-07-24(b)

The family court did not abuse its discretion in dividing the value of the parties’ assets equally. The court considered the statutory factors, including the length of the marriage, the parties’ ages, health, occupations, sources and amounts of income, vocational skills, and employability.

Section 751(b) gives courts discretion in weighing the property division factors, subject to review for a failure to exercise discretion or clearly untenable reasons.

Narwid v. Narwid · filed 1993-07-21(b)

The court has discretion in considering the § 751(b) factors, and unless the court fails to exercise its discretion or exercises its discretion for clearly untenable reasons, its decision will be upheld.

Section 751(b) gives the family court discretion to divide marital property after considering its listed factors; the award stands if it has a reasonable basis.

Soutiere v. Soutiere · filed 1995-02-17(b)

The family court based this award on a careful consideration of each of the factors specified in 15 V.S.A. § 751(b). ... The court has considerable discretion in making a property award, reversible only on a showing there is no reasonable basis to support it.

Section 751 does not require a court to specify the weight given to each property division factor, but it must clearly state what it decided and why.

Jakab v. Jakab · filed 1995-06-23

The court need not specify the weight given to each factor, but is required only to provide a clear statement as to what was decided and why.

Section 751(b) requires courts dividing marital property to consider all relevant factors, including the property's source, the length of the marriage, and each spouse's contributions.

Putnam v. Putnam · filed 1996-12-20(b)

Under § 751, the court is required to consider all relevant factors, twelve of which are listed. ... In examining the statutory factors, the court acknowledged that the marital home was given to the parties by husband’s parents. ... The court then awarded the marital home to husband and ordered him to pay wife a sum equal to only one third of the equity in the property. We find no abuse of discretion and hold that the court did not err in making its property disposition.

Section 751(b) allows the family court to give greater weight to some property-division factors when the evidence supports its decision and it adequately explains a disproportionate award.

Wade v. Wade · filed 2005-07-01(b)

We recognize that wife received approximately ninety percent of the parties' assets. Had the family court failed to explain in detail the reasons for the facially disproportionate property distribution, the outcome of this case would likely be different. But the family court carefully explained why it weighed factors (10) and (11) more heavily in reaching its decision. As trier of fact, the family court was in the best position to assess the merits of the parties' contentions, and its decision addresses the relevant statutory factors. Therefore, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in fashioning the property award in this case.

Section 751(b)(11) makes a spouse’s nonmonetary contributions to the parties’ estates a factor in dividing marital property.

Bell v. Bell · filed 1994-05-20(b)(11)

Wife correctly points to evidence in the record of her nonmonetary contribution as spouse and homemaker to the “acquisition, preservation, and. . . appreciation in value of the respective estates.” 15 V.S.A. § 751(b)(ll). ... The property division was well within the court’s discretion and should not be disturbed on appeal.

Section 751 requires the family court to consider the statutory factors and explain its property division, particularly when the awards are highly unequal.

Mangini v. Hardie · filed 2014-04-25

In distributing the marital property, the court made few findings, did not consider the statutory factors set forth in 15 V.S.A. § 751, and provided no rational for its decision. For this reason alone, its decision must be reversed.

Section 751(b) gives the family court wide discretion to weigh the statutory factors when dividing marital property.

Covey v. Adnrea Covey · filed 2015-10-21(b)

As noted, the court has wide discretion in weighing the statutory factors and dividing the marital property. We find no abuse of that wide discretion in this regard.

Section 751 gives the trial court broad discretion to weigh the statutory factors when dividing marital property.

Mangini v. Hardie · filed 2016-01-07(a)

As noted earlier, however, the division of marital property is not an exact science, and the trial court enjoys broad discretion in determining the weight to be accorded the pertinent factors.

Section 751(b)(8) permits courts to consider likely future inheritances and trust assets when dividing marital property.

Billings v. Billings, Sr. · filed 2011-10-14(b)(8)

We conclude that consideration of likely receipt of future inheritances and trust assets or proceeds may be considered under § 751(b)(8).

Section 751(b) gives the family court broad discretion to weigh property division factors, including the origin of assets, each spouse’s contributions, and their financial circumstances.

Dobrynski v. Dobrynski · filed 2013-02-14(b)

Third, husband argues that the court abused its discretion in weighing the relevant statutory factors contained in 15 V.S.A. § 751(b) for distributing the marital property. ... The court concluded, however, that other factors—such as wife’s contribution to maintaining the parties’ property over more than a decade and her financial circumstances—warranted giving her a substantial portion of the property. Husband has failed to demonstrate that the court abused its wide discretion in making such a judgment.

Section 751 does not require a court to specify the weight it gives each property division factor.

Hanson-Metayer v. Hanson-Metayer · filed 2013-04-12

15 V.S.A. § 751 contains a number of factors the court may consider in making the division. The court need not specify the weight given to each factor.

Section 751 permits a court to weigh how property was acquired and each spouse’s contributions against other factors, including a spouse’s need for income, when dividing marital property.

Geraw v. Geraw · filed 2014-07-24(a)

The record shows, however, that the court expressly acknowledged these factors but concluded that “the combination of the other factors, especially [wife]’s need for additional income and cash resources in lieu of maintenance, is stronger still and outweighs those two specific considerations.” (Emphasis added).

Section 751(b) gives family courts discretion to weigh the property division factors and award one spouse more marital property than the other.

Stephanie (Allen) Casavant v. Allen · filed 2016-08-19(b)

Nonetheless, the court acted within its discretion to assign more weight to some factors than others and ultimately to conclude that wife was entitled to more of the marital property than husband.

Section 751(11) requires courts to consider each spouse’s contributions to acquiring and preserving marital property, including financial and other contributions.

Proia v. Julius Proia , Jr. · filed 2013-04-10(11)

In light of these facts, the court’s decision to evenly split the equity in the home was well within its discretion and not erroneous. Although wife may have contributed more to the household expenses, husband also contributed financially and in other ways to the property.

Section 751(a) permits a divorce court to determine whether relatives’ contributions were gifts or loans when valuing marital property, even while the relatives pursue a separate collection action.

Paine v. Buffa · filed 2014-01-31(a)

We do not agree with mother’s argument that in dividing the equity in the marital home, the family court impermissibly adjudicated the rights of nonparties to the action. The family court examined the nature of the parties’ contributions to the marriage and their financial arrangements in order to value the marital estate, a matter that is within its jurisdiction.

Under the version of § 751(b)(8) applied here, a court may give no practical weight to a speculative future property expectancy when dividing marital assets.

Zarfati v. Eirmann · filed 2013-07-11(b)(8)

The court properly exercised its discretion. Considering the speculative nature of any interest wife might eventually obtain in the properties, it was within the court’s discretion to place no practical value, or weight, to the Israel properties in its distribution of assets.

Section 751(b)(8)(A) permits a court to consider a party’s potential future benefits when dividing property if competent evidence supports their value.

Roberts v. Roberts · filed 2016-11-04(b)(8)(A)

She contends the court’s consideration of the potential benefit from her father’s estate was unduly speculative, but such potential benefits may be considered by a court in determining a party’s opportunity for acquisition of future assets and income, so long as there is competent evidence of the value of the potential benefits, and the evidence here was sufficient to support the court’s consideration.

Section 751(b) requires the court to consider each party’s opportunity for future acquisition of capital assets and income when dividing marital property, including potential rental income.

Diaz III v. Diaz · filed 2023-05-05(b)

The court was required to consider each party’s opportunity for future acquisition of capital assets and income in dividing the marital property. 15 V.S.A. § 751(b). Its discussion of the potential rental income from the marital home was part of this analysis, and the court acknowledged that the availability of such income was contingent on a number of factors.

Section 751(b)(8) allows a court dividing marital property to consider a spouse’s opportunity to acquire property in the future, even when the spouse’s present interest is only an expectancy.

Coburn v. Cook · filed 2014-05-02(b)(8)

That does not mean, however, that husband’s expectancy interest is irrelevant in the distribution of the marital estate. As in Billings, this interest can be considered with respect to husband’s opportunity to acquire future assets and income. ... We thus reverse and remand the court’s decision to allow it to consider the Danby property under the appropriate statutory provision, although we recognize that consideration under § 751(b)(8) does not mean that the distribution of marital property will necessarily change as a result.

Section 751(b)(8)(A) permits a court to consider an expected inheritance in dividing property but requires competent evidence before assigning it a value.

Finlayson v. Finlayson · filed 2015-01-09(b)(8)(A)

Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in considering the testamentary trust in assigning the retirement assets without placing a specific value, current or otherwise, on the trust corpus.

Section 751(b) does not require a court to consider every listed factor, and a court may account for homemaking contributions without expressly labeling its findings as such.

Frazer v. Olson · filed 2015-06-26(b)(11)

Although 15 V.S.A. § 751 does not require the court to consider all the factors enumerated therein, the court considered mother’s contributions without specifically labeling those findings as homemaking.

Section 751(b)(1) permits, but does not require, a court to consider premarital cohabitation when weighing the length of the marriage.

Johnson-Condon v. Condon · filed 2026-04-10(b)(1)

The court may consider the entire length of the parties’ relationship in weighing the first statutory factor, but is not required to do so.

Section 751 governs equitable property division regardless of the grounds for divorce, including in a no-fault divorce.

Allen v. Allen · filed 1974-02-05

Defendant’s evidence on the paternity of the two adopted children, as well as the post-filing conduct of the plaintiff with Mr. Cote, was specifically limited to the question of property disposition. What is an appropriate disposition of property in divorce actions is governed by the principles of equity regardless of the grounds of divorce. A decision as to an equitable division of property is separate and apart from that portion of the decree which grants the divorce. The authority for the decree of property in this case is found in 15 V.S.A. § 751, and the standard governing its award is judicial.

Section 751 requires the court to divide the parties’ property even when neither party is at fault.

Boone v. Boone · filed 1975-02-04

Fault may be relevant in the attainment of an equitable division, Peisch v. Peisch, 132 Vt. 514, 518, 321 A.2d 67 (1974), but lack of fault does not avoid the duty of the court to make the appropriate division of the property of the parties as required by 15 V.S.A. § 751; Allen v. Allen, 132 Vt. 182, 186, 315 A.2d 459 (1974).

Section 751 permits fault to be considered in dividing marital property, but separation alone is not grounds for a finding of fault.

Emmons v. Emmons · filed 1982-08-09

We are simply holding that the mere act of separation by itself cannot be grounds for a finding of fault under 15 V.S.A. § 751 in such cases.

Section 751(b)(12) permits a court dividing marital property to consider the parties’ conduct during the marriage as part of their respective merits.

Daitchman v. Daitchman · filed 1984-09-14(b)(12)

These contentions all ignore the meaningful expression of legislative concern in 15 V.S.A. § 751 (b) (12): “the respective merits of the parties.” This is not a “no-fault” divorce; the decree is grounded on adultery, and, in that respect, is unchallenged. The findings, also unchallenged, report that situation to be frequent, long-standing and continuing, without the knowledge of the plaintiff. The statute is designed to call the court’s attention to the fact that the award should take into account the equities as measured in connection with the parties’ conduct during coverture.

Section 751(b)(12) permits courts to consider fault when dividing marital property, but leaving the marital home without advance warning does not by itself establish abandonment.

Cleverly v. Cleverly · filed 1986-06-20(b)(12)

In the division of property pursuant to a divorce, the fault of the parties is one factor among many which may be considered. ... Although the trial court also found the plaintiff did not give the defendant any prior warning that he wanted a divorce and was moving out, this behavior does not constitute abandonment under Emmons. Because the court’s findings as to fault based on abandonment are erroneous, we reverse the court’s division of the property.

Section 751(b)(12) permits a court to consider fault as one factor in an equitable division of marital property.

Lewis v. Lewis · filed 1987-12-04(b)(12)

Under 15 V.S.A. § 751(b)(12), fault is one of the factors that may be considered by the trial court in making an equitable distribution of property. ... As we have previously noted, in this case the judge took into account many relevant factors, only one of which was the respective fault of the parties. There is no evidence that the court abused its discretion in making its award, and we find that plaintiffs claims of error are therefore without merit.

Section 751(b)(12) makes the parties’ relative merits a factor in property distribution, not in determining maintenance.

Naumann v. Kurz · filed 1989-08-25(b)(12)

Whether or not defendant was irresponsible or somehow at fault for the decrease in her earnings is not at issue in determining the maintenance award. Cf. 15 V.S.A. § 751(b)(12) (relative merits of the parties is part of the property distribution scheme only). The trial court made no finding of fault in determining the property distribution, and the divorce was granted on no-fault grounds. Therefore, the property in lieu of maintenance award cannot be used to punish defendant or reflect fault.

Section 751(b)(12) permits a court dividing marital property to consider a spouse’s conduct during the marriage, including an extramarital relationship.

Weaver v. Weaver · filed 2001-11-09(b)(12)

In dividing marital property, the court may consider the respective merits of the parties. 15 V.S.A. § 751(b)(12). A family court does not abuse its discretion by including a party’s conduct during coverture, including involvement in an extra-marital relationship, as one of the factors influencing a property award.

Section 751(b)(12) allows the family court to consider a spouse’s fault when dividing marital property and leaves the weight of that fault to its discretion.

Slade v. Slade · filed 2005-03-23(b)(12)

What weight to assign husband’s fault in fashioning the overall property award is an issue only the family court may decide.

Section 751(b)(12) permits consideration of marital fault, including extramarital affairs, when dividing property.

Brinckerhoff v. Brinckerhoff · filed 2005-07-15(b)(12)

Consistent with this mandate, the arbitrators here carefully reviewed each of the statutory factors governing the division of property, including § 751(b)(12) (“the respective merits of the parties”), which permits consideration of fault, including extramarital affairs.

Section 751(b)(12) permits a court to consider the parties’ fault when dividing marital property equitably.

Jenike v. Jenike · filed 2004-08-03(b)(12)

As noted, a court may consider the parties’ respective merits — or fault — when establishing the equitable property division the statute contemplates.

Section 751(b)(12) permits a court to consider post-separation conduct when assessing the parties’ respective merits in dividing marital property.

Viskup v. Viskup · filed 2011-08-31(b)(12)

The plain language of the statute does not limit the court’s analysis to a party’s conduct during the marriage, and we have never so held.

Section 751(b)(12) permits a court to consider a spouse’s sexual abuse of the other spouse and their child when dividing marital property, even if fault is not the ground for divorce.

Orost v. Orost · filed 2024-07-12(b)(12)

The property-division statute lists “the respective merits of the parties” as a factor that the court may consider in dividing the marital estate. 15 V.S.A. § 751(b)(12). Evidence that one spouse sexually abused the other and their child falls within this category and is relevant to the property distribution even if fault is not the ground asserted for the divorce.

Section 751 allows a court to consider whether a spouse shared proceeds from a premarital home sale when weighing the equities in property division.

Sullivan v. Sullivan · filed 1979-11-05

The accuracy of the finding is not questioned, and the fact is indeed important, not because of any claim of right to participate in such proceeds, but because such participation, had it existed, would have been an important factor in establishing equities in the defendant under 15 V.S.A. § 751.

Section 751 makes the original source of property a factor in dividing real estate after divorce.

Field v. Field · filed 1981-02-03

The original source of property is one factor to be considered under 15 V.S.A. § 751 in disposing of real estate after a divorce. ... There is no support for the court’s conclusion that defendant “inherited” the entire amount. Such a conclusion is clear error.

Section 751 permits a court to consider a spouse’s vested pension when making an equitable property distribution without treating the pension as a marital asset.

Victor v. Victor · filed 1982-11-02

Instead the court below merely treated it as one factor among many in arriving at a just and equitable distribution of property pursuant to 15 V.S.A. § 751, much as it might treat a vested trust fund of one of the parties. ... Thus, we find that the court below did not treat the defendant’s pension plan as a marital asset, but rather properly considered it as a factor in arriving at an equitable property distribution.

Section 751 requires courts dividing marital property to consider each party’s property interests, including a share of an undistributed inheritance.

Osborn v. Osborn · filed 1986-11-14

Under 15 V.S.A. § 751 the trial court was required to settle the rights of the parties to all of their property, and in so doing to consider the value of the property interests of each party, including the defendant’s share of the undistributed inheritance.

Section 751(a) treats property in a trust created by a spouse who retains the power to revoke it as marital property subject to equitable distribution.

Lynch v. Lynch · filed 1987-01-09(a)

We therefore hold that property in a trust created by a spouse who retains a power of revocation is marital property subject to equitable distribution.

Section 751(b)(10) permits a court to consider which party acquired the property, but that factor does not give it unlimited discretion in dividing the assets.

Dreves v. Dreves · filed 1993-06-11(b)(10)

Although § 751(b)(10) allows the court to give weight to “the party through whom the property was acquired,” there are limits to the court’s discretion.

Increased earning capacity is not property subject to division under § 751, but a spouse’s contribution to that earning power may affect the division.

Downs v. Downs · filed 1990-04-06(b)(5)

Thus, the trial court erred in treating Kevin’s increased earning potential as an asset to be disposed of under the property settlement statute. Indeed, under § 751 “the contribution by one spouse to the education, training, or increased earning power of the other” is one of the factors to be considered in making a property settlement, 15 V.S.A. § 751(b)(5); hence, it is logical to conclude that increased earning power itself is not marital property.

Section 751(a) places marital property within the divorce court’s jurisdiction even when title is held by a nominee.

Nevitt v. Nevitt · filed 1990-11-30(a)

Under 15 V.S.A. § 751(a), all marital property “shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the court. . . whether in the names of the husband, the wife, both parties, or a nominee.” The court concluded that Bertha was a nominee based on its finding that Stephen had put title to the marital homestead in Bertha’s name in order to “unfairly]” avoid distribution of the property at the time of the divorce, as well as to continue to hide the asset from creditors. This Court will not condone such actions when taken with intent to deprive one’s spouse of a fair portion of the marital assets.

Section 751(a) covers marital property acquired after the spouses separate.

Nuse v. Nuse · filed 1991-11-07(a)

The applicable statute requires division of marital property “however and whenever acquired” and is broad enough to cover property acquired after the parties separated.

Section 751(a) includes property acquired by a spouse after separation in the marital property subject to equitable distribution.

Clapp v. Clapp · filed 1994-11-04(a)

15 V.S.A. § 751(a) provides for the equitable distribution of marital property, including “[a]U property owned by either or both of the parties, however and whenever acquired.” The section is broad enough to bring within the jurisdiction of the family court property acquired by a spouse after the parties have separated.

Section 751(a) allows property acquired after separation, including stock options, to be included in the marital estate for division.

Golden v. Cooper-Ellis · filed 2007-03-02(a)

Nothing in the statutory wording suggests that the court's jurisdiction to divide property of the parties extends only to property owned as of the date the parties separated. Thus, the family court acted within its discretion in considering stock options received by husband after the date of separation and including them in the marital estate for division.

Section 751(a) includes a spouse’s contingent interest in an irrevocable trust as marital property subject to distribution.

Chilkott v. Chilkott · filed 1992-03-20(a)

We conclude that husband's interest in the trust was marital property subject to distribution under § 751(a).

The source of marital property is relevant to its division, but it cannot alone justify awarding one spouse only a small share of the assets.

Harris v. Harris · filed 1994-06-03(b)(10)

The only tenable reason the court gave for its minimal award to the mother is that most of the parties’ marital assets came from the paternal grandfather. While this is certainly a relevant factor, 15 V.S.A. § 751(b)(10) (court may consider party through whom property was acquired), it cannot, standing alone, justify the instant award.

Section 751(a) includes property owned by either spouse in the marital estate regardless of when or how it was acquired.

Drumheller v. Drumheller · filed 2009-03-06(a)

Moreover, the fact that the money came originally from husband’s father, a fact of significance to the court, is irrelevant to whether it is marital property under 15 V.S.A. § 751 (establishing jurisdiction over all property of either or both of the parties “however and whenever acquired”).

Section 751 permits division of existing marital property but does not authorize a money judgment for property that has not been shown to exist.

Schwartz v. Seldin-Schwartz · filed 1996-10-11(a)

We hold that the trial court does not have authority to award a money judgment as part of a property settlement where the evidence fails to demonstrate that the amount awarded exists.

Section 751 treats a spouse’s income as a factor in dividing property, but income itself is not property subject to equitable distribution.

Stalb v. Stalb · filed 1998-09-04(b)(3)

Both our property distribution and our maintenance statute use the terms “property” and “income” in ways inconsistent with wife’s position that income is a form of property. See 15 V.S.A. §§ 751(b)(3) (factor in dividing property is “source and amount of income of each of the parties”), 752(a)(1) (requirement for maintenance is that spouse seeking it “lacks sufficient income, property or both”). Indeed, if income were a form of marital property to be distributed between the parties, there would be no need for maintenance.

Section 751(a) subjects all property owned by either spouse to equitable division, so the homestead exemption does not prevent a divorce court from placing a lien on a spouse’s home.

Pearson v. Pearson · filed 1999-01-29(a)

If the homestead exemption were to apply to the division of marital property, the language of § 751, that “[a]ll property owned by either ... or both of the parties, however and whenever acquired, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the court” for division, regardless of ownership or title, would be contravened. The homestead exemption does not apply in the context of a divorce and, accordingly, the court did not err in its division of martial property by placing a $15,000 lien on mother’s real estate.

Section 751(b) requires a court to consider the statutory factors and explain its decision when awarding retirement account funds accumulated before marriage or after separation to one spouse.

Hayden v. Hayden · filed 2003-10-10(b)

Section 751 of Title 15 V.S.A. requires -that the trial court explain its rationale for awarding funds placed in a retirement account before the marriage and following separation to the employee spouse rather than dividing these funds equally. The trial court’s decision contains no discussion of the factors that § 751 requires the court to consider in formulating a property settlement. On remand, the trial court must consider the factors laid out in 15 V.S.A. § 751(b) in making an equitable property settlement.

Section 751(a) allows a court dividing marital property to look beyond deed title when deciding what property a spouse owns.

Mizzi v. Mizzi · filed 2005-10-24(a)

The statute, however, instructs courts not to rely on title alone in dividing marital property. ... The court did not abuse its discretion by looking behind the deeds and refusing to award any portion of these properties to husband.

Section 751 excludes a nonparty cotenant’s interest from the marital estate when calculating the parties’ equity in a home.

DeLeonardis v. Page · filed 2010-06-04(a)

In so doing, it erroneously incorporated into its analysis property that falls outside of the marital estate: defendant’s mother’s property.

Section 751(a) permits a court to return spent marital assets to the estate for equitable distribution if it finds financial misconduct, such as intentional waste or selfish financial impropriety, coupled with a purpose unrelated to the marriage.

Felis v. Felis · filed 2013-05-24(a)

In addressing the first part of the issue, we emphasize that the applicable statute provides a broad definition of marital property subject to the jurisdiction of the superior court: “All property owned by either or both parties, however and whenever acquired, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the court.” 15 Y.S.A. § 751(a). ... Thus, the answer to our first question is that the trial court could return the disputed assets to the marital estate for purposes of equitable distribution if it found the expenditures involved financial misconduct, such as intentional waste or selfish financial impropriety, coupled with a purpose unrelated to the marriage.

Section 751(a) excludes anticipated Social Security retirement benefits from marital property because they are not owned property and their value is speculative; courts may not divide, offset, or consider them in distributing the marital estate.

Manning v. Schultz · filed 2014-02-21(a)

Under 15 V.S.A. § 751(a), “[a]ll property owned by either or both of the parties, however and whenever acquired, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the court” for “equitable distribution.” (Emphasis added.) As we have seen, however, it is well settled that Social Security retirement benefits are neither owned in any proprietary sense nor are they marital “property” subject to division.

Section 751 gives the divorce court jurisdiction over property owned by either spouse, but does not give either spouse title to a particular property.

Brattleboro Savings and Loan Association v. Hardie · filed 2014-03-21

The statute does not establish title or ownership in either party to a divorce; indeed it explicitly operates irrespective of title.

Section 751(b)(6) allows a court to consider the parties’ property interests, liabilities, and needs as they existed at the time of divorce, but not a later inheritance when dividing marital property on remand.

Mangini v. Hardie · filed 2017-03-24(b)(6)

The court was correct in taking this approach. The parties’ property interests, liabilities, and needs could have been considered by the superior court in dividing marital property, but only as they existed at the time of the divorce.

Section 751(a) requires deferred compensation earned during the marriage, including after separation, to be considered for distribution even if it has not vested.

Mackenzie v. Mackenzie · filed 2017-12-01(a)

On remand, the superior court must identify and value any deferred compensation earned by husband during the marriage, including after the date of separation, apportion it in an equitable manner, and explain the basis for the apportionment. For purposes of determining what is marital property, the court must focus on when the deferred compensation was earned, rather than when it will vest. But as long as it was earned during the marriage for present or past services, it must be considered part of the marital estate subject to distribution even if it is unvested.

Section 751(a) places all property owned by either spouse within the family division’s jurisdiction in a divorce, including property designated as separate in a premarital agreement.

Christopher Gade · filed 2025-12-26(a)

Consequently, given the plain language in 4 V.S.A. § 33(a)(4) and 15 V.S.A. § 751(a), divorce proceedings—including premarital agreements and marital property allocated therein—are squarely within the family court’s jurisdiction.

Section 751 permits an unequal division of marital property, but the division must be just and equitable and supported by complete findings.

Hendrick v. Hendrick · filed 1982-12-27

While such an order is not per se violative of § 751, it causes us to examine both the transcript and the order of the lower court most closely. ... Clearly, not all the parties’ assets were evaluated by the trial court, and thus an incomplete and unreviewable division was made. Therefore, we must remand for reconsideration of an appropriate division of the marital estate which is just and equitable and is supported by complete findings.

Section 751 gives trial courts broad discretion to divide marital property, but a division based on speculation about whether parcels can be subdivided and sold abuses that discretion.

Atwood v. Atwood · filed 1983-09-06

Trial courts have wide discretion within the limits of 15 V.S.A. § 751, the statute governing disposition of marital property, in formulating awards of property upon divorce. ... The court’s order is not supported by the evidence and as a result is incapable of performance. As such, we hold that it constitutes an abuse of discretion.

Section 751 gives trial courts broad discretion to divide marital property, but an apparently inequitable division may be reversed when findings do not support it.

Paquette v. Paquette · filed 1987-10-02

In distributing marital property under 15 V.S.A. § 751, the trial court possesses wide discretion which will not normally be disturbed by this Court “ ‘without a showing of abuse or withholding of that discretion.’ ” ... Because the result on its face is unsupportable, as a matter of law, without findings to justify it, we must reverse the trial court’s decision and remand for a new hearing.

Section 751 requires an equitable division of marital property supported by findings that value major marital assets.

Sullivan v. Sullivan · filed 1986-10-24

The disposition of marital assets upon divorce is governed by 15 V.S.A. § 751, which requires that the property be “equitably” divided. ... Where the trial court has failed to find a value for the single largest marital asset, we will reverse and remand.

Section 751(a) requires an equitable property division based on asset valuations that are not outdated.

Cleverly v. Cleverly · filed 1989-04-14(a)

An “equitable” distribution of property, as mandated by 15 V.S.A. § 751(a), cannot be achieved by reliance on stale valuation data.

Section 751(a) calls for marital assets to be valued as close to the date of trial as possible when the court equitably divides property.

Albarelli v. Albarelli · filed 1989-06-30(a)

As a general proposition, marital assets should be valued as close to the date of trial as possible. ... We think that this principle is the one most consistent with the mandate of 15 V.S.A. § 751(a) that the trial court “equitably divide and assign the property,” and the one that best promotes fairness in the imprecise task of setting valuations.

Section 751 gives trial courts discretion to divide marital property, but their findings must be adequate for appellate review.

Burr v. Burr · filed 1987-06-26

It is true that a trial court’s discretion under 15 V.S.A. § 751 is not so broad that inadequate findings of fact will evade review.

Section 751(b)(6) requires courts dividing marital property to consider whether purported transfers to others genuinely reduced a spouse’s property interests.

Clayton v. Clayton · filed 1989-11-17(b)(6)

It was the court’s duty to consider the bona fides of the transfers from plaintiff to his parents in assessing “the financial resources ... of the noncustodial parent” under 15 V.S.A. § 659(a)(7) and “the value of all property interests ... of each party” under 15 V.S.A. § 751(b)(6).

Section 751(a) calls for marital property to be valued as close to trial as possible; an unexplained choice of an older separation-date value requires a new valuation.

Ward v. Ward · filed 1990-10-05(a)

Although the court chose the date of separation as the proper date for valuing the property, it gave no reason for its choice. ... On remand, the trial court should obtain as current a valuation as possible and amend its order accordingly.

Section 751 does not permit a hypothetical sales commission to reduce a spouse’s share of home equity when the home will be refinanced and no sale is contemplated.

MacCormack v. MacCormack · filed 2015-04-17(a)

Thus, it was beyond the discretion of the trial court to consider a sales commission in the refinancing scenario.

Section 751(b) permits an unequal property division in a long-term marriage, but the court must explain how the statutory factors justify the division.

Lee v. Ogilbee · filed 2018-09-07(b)

As noted above, while the court was not required to divide the property equally, the court was required to explain the basis for weighting the property division in favor of the spouse with the greater monetary contributions and earning potential.

Section 751(b)(7) allows a court dividing property to consider whether the property settlement is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance.

DeGrace v. DeGrace · filed 1986-12-01(b)(7)

Under Vermont’s statutory scheme, the property division and maintenance award are closely related. The determination of whether the property settlement is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance is a factor the court may consider when dividing the property. 15 V.S.A. § 751(b)(7). There is nothing to indicate how the maintenance award bears upon the property division, and it therefore cannot be determined whether vacating the maintenance award will affect the property settlement. Under these circumstances, the property division must be vacated to give leave to the trial court to revise it, if necessary, when revising the maintenance award.

Section 751(b)(7) requires the court to consider how its property division relates to its maintenance determination.

Klein v. Klein · filed 1988-10-21(b)(7)

Both this factor and one of the factors to be considered on property settlement, 15 V.S.A. § 751(b)(7), require the court to look at the interrelationship of its property disposition and maintenance determination.

Section 751 requires a divorce award to be equitable in light of the parties’ available resources.

Cleary v. Cleary · filed 1976-02-04

On its face, that support and alimony order appears to be inequitable and perhaps impossible of compliance, in view of the available resources, contrary to 15 V.S.A. § 751.

When a court enforces the parties’ property division agreement, it need not consider § 751’s distribution factors unless it sets aside the agreement.

Bendekgey v. Bendekgey · filed 1990-04-13

In analyzing these two claims, we emphasize that the trial court had to consider the statutory factors for property distribution and the updated evidence of value only if it set aside the agreement. ... Finally, plaintiff contends that the court made insufficient findings because it failed to make specific findings regarding the relevant criteria set forth in 15 V.S.A. § 751, because there were no findings that the 1987 agreement was reasonable, and because it did not render findings as to the value of any of the parties’ assets. ... The remaining questions on which plaintiff desires findings became irrelevant once the court decided to follow the agreement.

A property interest held by either spouse, individually or together, is part of the marital estate and subject to the divorce court’s jurisdiction.

Bassler v. Bassler · filed 1991-04-19(a)

If either George or Linda, or the two of them together, have an interest in the property, that interest is part of the marital estate and subject to the jurisdiction of the court. See 15 V.S.A. § 751(a), (b)(6).

Section 751(a) subjects property owned by either spouse, regardless of when it was acquired or how it is titled, to division in divorce.

In Re Farrar · filed 1998-04-02(a)

Under Vermont law, each spouse has an interest in all marital property as defined by 15 V.S.A. § 751(a). In this case, the Family Court exercised its discretion to allocate the marital estate between Debtor and Creditor, awarding the house to Debtor, subject to Creditor’s lien. The Family Court’s decree extinguished the marital interest each party had in all the property in the marital estate, and redistributed the property, creating new interests in place of the old.

Section 751 permits a family court to reject a challenged property division stipulation before the final hearing or divorce order without requiring grounds to overturn a contract, but the court must make adequate findings.

Pouech v. Pouech · filed 2006-05-12(a)

Accordingly, we hold that in a situation such as the instant case, when parties have executed a stipulation in anticipation of divorce regarding maintenance or the division of marital property, but one or both of the parties challenge the stipulation before the family court has held a final hearing or incorporated the stipulation into a final divorce order, the court may reject the stipulation even if the challenging party fails to demonstrate grounds sufficient to overturn a contract. Of course, it is imperative that the court provide adequate findings as to why it has chosen to reject or accept the stipulation.

Section 751(a) makes an initial property division final, so an enforcement proceeding generally cannot change the division set by the order.

Youngbluth v. Youngbluth · filed 2010-05-28(a)

Our decision in Mason represented an exception; the general rule is that enforcement proceedings should not disturb the plain language of the original property division order. As noted earlier, one reason that we must stick to the plain language of the original property division order is that property division orders are meant to be final. Here, the trial court correctly recognized that "a property settlement is meant to happen once." Under Vermont law, the initial property division order "shall settle the rights of the parties to their property." 15 V.S.A. § 751(a). Parties should not have to bring further litigation whenever future actions affect the division of benefits.

Section 751(b)(7) requires courts to consider property division and maintenance together, so vacating a maintenance award also requires vacating the property division to permit revision.

Justis v. Rist · filed 1992-09-18(b)(7)

Because our law requires the court to consider the property division and maintenance in conjunction with each other, see 15 V.S.A. § 751(b)(7) and § 752(a)(1), the property division must be vacated to allow the court leave to revise it, if necessary, and fashion an appropriate order consistent with the circumstances of this case.

Retirement accounts held by one spouse are marital property subject to division, including when that spouse has liquidated them.

Milko v. Milko · filed 2011-03-03(a)

Yet these accounts did not belong to husband—they were marital property. 15 V.S.A. § 751(a) (“All property owned by either or both of the parties, however and whenever acquired, [is] subject to the jurisdiction of the court.”).

Section 751 permits a court to consider a spouse’s fault when equitably dividing marital property.

Davis v. Davis · filed 2011-12-21

Therefore, the court did not err in considering husband’s fault in its property division.

Section 751(a) places all property owned by either or both spouses, whenever acquired, within the divorce court’s jurisdiction for property division.

In re Patterson · filed 2012-11-13(a)

Indeed, the relevant statute regarding property settlement in divorce states, “[a111 property owned by either or both of the parties, however and whenever acquired, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the court.” See 15 V.S.A. § 751(a) (emphasis added). This Court presumes the state court exercised its jurisdiction over an allocation of all of the marital property and effectuated a comprehensive distribution of those assets in its judgment.

Section 751(a) authorizes property division in annulment proceedings, including when the marriage was void from the outset.

Cameron v. Rollo · filed 2014-04-25(a)

In the same way, the Legislature extended the remedy of property division to the parties to an annulment when it provided for property division in all cases filed under chapter 11 of Title 15.

Section 751(a) requires an equitable division of property and a clear explanation of the decision; ordinary expenses paid from joint funds need not be charged against the spouse who paid them.

White v. White · filed 2014-10-31(a)

Pursuant to statute, the family court is required to “equitably divide and assign the property.” 15 V.S.A. § 751(a). “The trial court has broad discretion to consider the statutory factors and fashion an appropriate order, but it must provide a clear statement as to what was decided and why.” Turner v. Turner, 2004 VT 5, ¶ 7, 176 Vt. 588 (mem.). ... This argument fails for two reasons. First, the court did make findings concerning the funds. The court stated that the money was used to pay for regular expenses, such as the mortgage, car payments, groceries, taxes and insurance, and therefore should not be credited against wife in the property division. ... In light of this agreement, the court did not err in excluding the money from the property settlement.

Section 751(b) permits an unequal property division when the court weighs the statutory factors and gives a reasoned explanation for the award.

Dixon v. Dixon · filed 2014-10-31(b)

The court considered all of the statutory factors and provided a reasonable explanation for its decision to award wife a larger share of the marital estate.

Section 751 permits a court reconsidering a property division on remand to revise personal property awards when appropriate to accomplish the statute’s goals.

Bushey v. Bushey · filed 2015-01-09

The trial court is not constrained to revisiting the property division solely as it relates to real property, but may in its discretion revise the property division relating to personal property if it concludes that doing so is appropriate to accomplish the goals of 15 V.S.A. § 751.

Section 751 does not require a court to state the weight given to each property division factor or address every factor, so long as it clearly explains its decision.

Hanson-Metayer v. Hanson-Metayer · filed 2015-02-06

In reaching its decision, the court need not specify the weight given to each factor set forth in 15 V.S.A. § 751, or even specifically address each statutory factor; we require only that the court “provide a clear statement as to what was decided and why.” Molleur v. Molleur, 2012 VT 16, ¶ 15, 191 Vt. 202 (quotation omitted).

Section 751(a) requires the family division to settle the parties’ property rights without delaying division until an incarcerated spouse is released.

Snyder v. Snyder · filed 2016-04-14(a)

There is no authority under the statute to grant this latter request. The family division is directed to “settle the rights of the parties to their property,” 15 V.S.A. § 751(a), and cannot delay this for the period of time until defendant is released.

Section 751’s property-division factors do not require a court to redistribute property after a final divorce decree absent grounds to set aside the judgment.

Johnson v. Johnson · filed 2016-04-14

Defendant is incorrect that the family court had an obligation to distribute the personal property pursuant to § 751 factors. “Vermont law is clear that the [family] court cannot modify the property disposition aspects of a divorce decree absent circumstances, such as fraud or coercion, that would warrant relief from a judgment generally.” Boisselle v. Boiselle, 162 Vt. 240, 242 (1994). Here, there is no claim of fraud, coercion, or any other basis for overturning the property division of the final divorce order.

In dividing property, a court must consider the relationship between the property award and spousal maintenance; when it awards one spouse a pension, it must approximate the pension’s value to assess whether the division is equitable.

Rawls v. Rawls · filed 2017-02-09(b)(7)

We cannot properly evaluate wife’s claim to more spousal maintenance without considering the court’s property division, and vice versa. ... Whether the property division was equitable in light of the modest spousal maintenance award depends generally on the value of the pension, especially given that the court awarded the pension as part of its property division analysis. A remand is required to evaluate the value of this asset.

Section 751(a) places all property owned by either or both spouses within the family division’s authority in a divorce, regardless of when it was acquired or how it is titled.

Noel v. Owen · filed 2018-04-09(a)

“All property owned by either or both of the parties [to the divorce], however and whenever acquired, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the [family] court. Title to the property, whether in the names of either or, both parties, or a nominee, shall be immaterial.” 15 V.S.A. § 751(a) (emphasis added). It is the family court’s role in a divorce to determine the rightful possession of the parties’ property. ... The issues Mr. Noel is attempting to raise here were presented to and resolved by the family division. This case is an impermissible collateral attack of the family division’s final order of divorce.

Section 751(b) permits a court to consider whether a property settlement is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance; a property division tied to a reversed maintenance award may be reconsidered on remand.

Leffler v. Leffler · filed 2023-10-13(b)

This conclusion necessitates remand of the property division because it is closely related to the maintenance award. ... The court found that the property division favored wife by $44,761, which represented approximately one year of spousal maintenance at $3500 per month and was therefore “not a full substitute for spousal maintenance,” suggesting that the court awarded property in lieu of maintenance. See 15 V.S.A. § 751(b) (providing that in making a property settlement, court may consider “[w]hether the property settlement is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance”).

Section 751(b) allows the family division to weigh statutory factors when equitably dividing marital property.

Henry v. Carrara · filed 2025-12-05(b)

Section 751 of Title 15 requires the family division to “equitably divide and assign” marital property and sets forth twelve factors the court may consider. ... We see no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to award wife the Route 103 property. The court weighed the statutory factors, including the fact that husband was the party through whom all real property had been acquired, and the fact that he had abused the parties’ child.

Section 751(b) requires the family division to explain its property award but does not require it to state the weight given to each factor.

Shepard v. Douglas Shepard, Jr. · filed 2026-04-10(b)

We reject husband’s argument that the court failed to adequately explain its decision for awarding the marital home and New York rental properties to wife. In considering the § 751(b) factors, “[t]he court need not specify the weight given to each factor, but is required only to provide a clear statement as to what was decided and why.” Jakab, 163 Vt. at 585.

Section 751 authorizes the family court to equitably divide marital property and consider statutory factors when allocating assets and debts.

Spaulding v. Spaulding · filed 2026-05-08

The family court is authorized to equitably divide and assign marital property, and it may consider various statutory factors in making its decision. Cabot v. Cabot, 166 Vt. 485, 500 (1997); 15 V.S.A. § 751. ... The court did not err in dividing the marital estate.

Section 751(b)(7) allows the court to consider whether a property settlement replaces or supplements maintenance, but a maintenance award alone does not justify excluding marital pension rights from property distribution.

Clifford v. Clifford · filed 2025-03-14(b)(7)

It is true that under § 751(b)(7), the court may consider “[w]hether the property settlement is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance.” However, the court’s decision to exclude wife’s pension from the marital estate— notwithstanding that a significant portion of it was earned during the parties’ long marriage—is not adequately supported by its conclusion that husband was entitled to an award of spousal maintenance on entirely separate grounds.

Section 751 requires a court dividing marital property to consider the benefit of the children and to justify conditions imposed on the division.

VanLoon v. VanLoon · filed 1974-02-05

In addition, as the plaintiff points out in her brief, ordering the immediate sale of the homestead without the right of the plaintiff, who was awarded custody of the children, to purchase the homestead appears to be inconsistent with the welfare of the children, which the trial court is required by law to consider. 15 V.S.A. § 751; Tabakin v. Tabakin, 131 Vt. 234, 240-241, 303 A.2d 816 (1973).

Section 751(b) allows courts to consider the length of the marriage, each spouse’s contributions, and custody of a child when dividing marital property.

Roberts v. Roberts · filed 1986-01-17(b)

The desirability of awarding the home to the custodial parent is one factor trial courts may consider in making property settlements upon divorce. 15 V.S.A. § 751(b)(9). In sum, the length of the marriage, the contribution of the parties, and the award of custody to the plaintiff provide sufficient support for the trial court’s order.

Section 751(b)(9) permits the court to consider the children's continued residence in the marital home when dividing property, even if the other spouse receives no compensation for an interest in the home, so long as the overall distribution is reasonable.

Stafford v. Stafford · filed 1993-11-19(b)(9)

The court made a thorough examination of the property distribution factors specified in 15 V.S.A. § 751(b). It awarded the house to plaintiff primarily so that the minor children, whose custody was awarded to plaintiff, could continue to reside there. See 15 V.S.A. § 751(b)(9). Although defendant did not receive compensation for his interest in the house, the distribution overall was reasonable. We find no abuse of the broad discretion of the court in this decision.

Section 751(b) permits a court to consider custody and parent-child contact when dividing marital property.

Gazo v. Gazo · filed 1997-05-23(b)

Nothing in § 751(b) suggests that the court cannot consider its award of parental rights and responsibilities, or parent-child contact, in fashioning a property award.

Section 751(a) excludes assets owned by children's trusts from the marital estate when the spouses agree that the trusts will not be invaded.

Kasser v. Kasser · filed 2006-01-06(a)

The parties agreed that the trusts would not be invaded. Thus, by agreement, the children retained ownership of these assets. The assets were therefore not "marital property" subject to distribution by the court.

Section 751(b)(9) permits a court deciding who receives the family home to consider a spouse’s plan to care for a disabled adult child there.

Boisvert v. Boisvert · filed 2011-06-07(b)(9)

As for the parties’ son, while the statute refers to the “desirability of awarding the family home . . . to the spouse having custody of the children,” 15 V.S.A. § 751(b)(9), the statutory factors are not exclusive, and we discern no reason why the court could not consider the uncontroverted evidence of father’s plan to continue to care for the parties’ disabled adult son in the family home.

Section 751(b)(9) makes the desirability of awarding the family home to the spouse with custody a property division factor that may carry little weight when the minor child is nearly seventeen.

Tetreault v. Tetreault · filed 2013-03-13(b)(9)

Regarding § 751(b)(9), the trial court concluded that the specific facts of the case—most particularly the age of the minor child, who was two months short of his seventeenth birthday at the time the court issued the final order—did not weigh heavily in determining who should be awarded the marital home. ... All in all, the record does not indicate an abuse of discretion with respect to the trial court’s decision to award the marital home to wife.

Section 751 requires marital property to be disposed of between the spouses absent a contrary stipulation; a court cannot award the homestead’s fee to their children.

Senesac v. Senesac · filed 1976-12-23

The statute provides that the marital property, absent stipulation to the contrary, is to be disposed of between the parties. The trial court erred when it decreed the fee in the homestead to the children, and that portion of the order must be reversed.

A division of real estate under § 751 is final and is not subject to the modification rules for alimony orders.

Ellis v. Ellis · filed 1977-02-01

The division of the real estate was, therefore, a final division of property made under 15 V.S.A. § 751. Under the rule of Robinson v. Robinson, 130 Vt. 558, 561-62, 298 A.2d 556 (1972), such a determination is not subject to the modification provisions applicable to alimony orders.

Section 751(a) permits a property division that leaves each spouse with their own property and awards one spouse a cash payment when the evidence supports an equitable result.

Helm v. Helm · filed 1987-08-14(a)

The court left each party in possession of his or her own property, then awarded the $6,000 already noted to the defendant. Nothing has indicated that this was not an equitable division supported by the testimony.

Section 751 requires a divorce court to independently determine whether a division of marital property is equitable, even if the parties have stipulated to it.

Poulin v. Upham · filed 1987-12-04

Even if there had been a stipulation between the parties the court would have to make an independent determination of whether the distribution is equitable.

Section 751 permits a divorce court to distribute marital assets as it finds just and equitable, regardless of prior ownership, without separately compensating the former owner.

Condosta v. Condosta · filed 1982-11-02

There is no requirement in any law brought to our attention which mandates that compensation must be paid to the former owner before title is vested in the judgment beneficiary of a divorce order. Indeed, any such requirement would render meaningless the court’s power to distribute the marital assets in whatever manner it finds just and equitable, regardless of the prior owner. 15 V.S.A. § 751.

Section 751 does not authorize a property award that creates an educational trust for children beyond the age of majority.

Milligan v. Milligan · filed 1992-05-15

The order involved is one that distributes marital property pursuant to 15 V.S.A. § 751, and not one that establishes an obligation to support the parties’ children during their college years. ... The court has no power to order creation of an educational trust for use beyond the age of majority of the children.

A fixed-dollar lien securing a spouse’s share of marital equity may be inequitable when payment is deferred for many years without protection against inflation.

Williams v. Williams · filed 1992-06-26

While we have no difficulty with the division arrived at by the court or with the award of title to plaintiff, we agree with defendant that giving him a lien for a specific amount -without some protection against the likely erosion by inflation over a period as long as fourteen years is inequitable and an abuse of discretion.