S.D. Codified Laws § 15-2-14

Section 15-2-14 requires a personal-injury action to be commenced within three years after accrual; the court treated this claim as accruing on June 15, 1967, and as barred on June 16, 1970 absent a statutory extension.

Arbach v. Gruba · filed 1972-08-02

SDCL 15-2-14 provides an action for personal injury "can be commenced only within three years after the cause of action shall have accrued". ... Plaintiff's complaint alleges he received personal injuries from an accident on June 15, 1967, which is the date his cause of action accrued; his action was therefore barred on June 16, 1970 unless SDCL 15-2-31 was complied with and so extended that time.

Section 15-2-14 supplies a three-year limitations period for personal-injury claims, subject to the separate abrogation rules for construction-defect claims.

McMacken v. State · filed 1982-06-28

The statute must be read in conjunction with other statutes of limitation. It does not create a new six-year statute of limitations as to a cause of action for personal injuries accruing prior to the expiration of the sixth year after completion. The three-year statute of limitations for personal injuries, SDCL 15-2-14, is still applicable, so far as, it is not limited by the abrogation provisions of the statute. A cause of action that accrues within the first three years after substantial completion must be commenced within the three-year statute. A cause of action that accrues in the fourth and fifth years must be commenced before the attachment of the abrogation provision and a cause of action accruing in the sixth year must be commenced within one year of accrual and in no event later than seven years from substantial completion.

Section 15-2-14 is South Dakota’s personal-injury statute of limitations and provides a three-year limitations period when used as the analogous state period for a federal claim lacking its own limitations period.

Oti Kaga, Inc. v. South Dakota Housing Development Authority · filed 2002-02-08

Where a federal statute does not specify a statute of limitations, a court is to utilize the most analogous state statute of limitations. ... In this case, defendants are correct in pointing to South Dakota’s personal injury statute of limitations, SDCL 15-2-14, and South Dakota’s statute of limitations regarding civil rights actions, SDCL 15-2-15.2. Both employ a three year statute of limitations. Thus, Oti Kaga's time period expired in 1999, well before this case was instituted.

Section 15-2-14(3)'s three-year limitations period for personal-injury actions does not apply to a bad-faith insurance claim because the claim vindicates property rights rather than personal rights.

Harms v. Cigna Insurance Companies · filed 2006-03-13(3)

Accordingly, § 15-2-14(3), which covers claims vindicating personal rights, does not apply to Harms’s bad faith claim.

Subsection (3) gives three years for personal-injury actions, running from the last occurrence of tortious conduct rather than discovery of the harm; minority tolling under § 15-2-22 applies.

Bernie v. Blue Cloud Abbey · filed 2012-09-05(3)

“[T]he three year period [in SDCL 15-2-14(3)] starts to run from the last occurrence of tortious conduct, rather than three years from the discovery of the harm.” ... Although SDCL 15-2-22 tolled the three-year period until one year after each of the students turned eighteen, the youngest student turned nineteen in 1981 and all suits were commenced in and after 2004. Therefore, none of the students commenced his or her cause of action until more than twenty years after the time for filing suit had expired.

Section 15-2-14(3) requires a personal-injury action to be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues.

Good v. Sugar Creek Packing Co. · filed 2018-02-28(3)

The road collision giving rise to plaintiff’s negligence claim occurred on August 6, 2014. (Docket 1 at p. 2). Under South Dakota law, the three-year statute of limitations accrued on that date. See SDCL § 15-2-14 (providing that “an action for personal injury” “can be commenced only within three years after the cause of action shall have accrued”). To be timely, plaintiff must have “commenced” his lawsuit on or before August 6, 2017. See id.

Section 15-2-14(3) provides a three-year limitations period for personal-injury actions.

Bourassa v. United States of America · filed 2022-01-24(3)

South Dakota’s limitations period for personal injury actions is also 3 years. SDCL § 15-2-14(3). As discussed more fully below, the Court finds in applying either statute, Plaintiff's Bivens claim is barred by the statute of limitations. ... Plaintiff's Bivens claim is therefore dismissed as being barred by the statute of limitations.

Subsection (2) does not govern an equitable injunction action, particularly where the alleged violation is ongoing rather than a one-time forfeiture.

Brown County v. Meidinger · filed 1978-10-26(2)

This court rejects appellant’s contention that this is a forfeiture action or that SDCL 15-2-14(2) applies to this action. An injunction is essentially an equitable action and, since SDCL 21-8, which contains the statutory law on injunctions, does not contain any statute of limitations. Further, in the present matter, it would appear that the violation is an ongoing daily violation rather than a one-time violation upon which a limitation of action could run.

Section 15-2-14(3) applies its three-year limitation period to loss-of-consortium actions because “personal injuries” includes injuries to personal rights.

Titze v. Miller · filed 1983-08-03(3)

An action for loss of consortium is derivative in nature. Bitsos v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., supra; Budahl v. Gordon & David Associates, 287 N.W.2d 489 (S.D.1980); Wilson v. Hasvold, 86 S.D. 286, 194 N.W.2d 251 (1972). When separate actions have their origin in the same operative facts it logically follows that they both be subject to the same statute of limitations, unless a contrary legislative intent clearly appears. SDCL 15-2-14(3) indicates no intention to restrict the term “personal injuries” to exclude personal rights.

Section 15-2-14(3) provides a three-year limitations period for IIED claims, so claims accruing before January 3, 1986 were not actionable here.

Shippen v. Parrott · filed 1993-08-25(3)

Under 15-2-15(1), only those assaults and batteries occurring two years prior to filing are actionable. A three-year limitations period is possible for IIED. SDCL 15-2-14(3). Sexual contacts between Parrott and Shippen ceased in 1984, well outside the applicable limitations period, and did not resume until 1987. Hence, no claims occurring prior to January 3, 1986 under an IIED theory— January 3, 1987 for assault and battery — are actionable, i.e., only those sexual contacts occurring during May and June of 1987 fall inside the statutory period.

Section 15-2-14(3) gives a personal-injury plaintiff three years after accrual to commence the action; when the plaintiff was a minor, the action may instead be brought within one year after majority if that is the longer period.

Crisp v. Schultis · filed 1993-11-03(3)

As in McKee, Crisp, having reached majority more than one year before the three-year statute of limitations found in SDCL 15-2-14(3) expired, was required to commence his action either before the expiration of that period (July 4, 1992) or within one year after he attained majority (September 6, 1990), whichever was the longer period.

Section 15-2-14(3) gives personal-injury plaintiffs three years after accrual to sue; the period runs from the last tortious occurrence, but fraudulent concealment may toll it.

Koenig v. Lambert · filed 1995-02-08(3)

Therefore, under this statute, Koenig had three years in which to bring this suit from the time the cause of action accrued. ... However, this Court has held that the three year period starts to run from the last occurrence of tortious conduct, rather than three years from the discovery of the harm.

Section 15-2-14(3) imposes a three-year statute of limitations on personal-injury actions.

Marshall v. Warwick · filed 1998-12-04(3)

This action was time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to actions for personal injury. S.D. Codified Laws § 15-2-14(3) (Michie 1984).

Section 15-2-14(3) requires an action to recover for personal injury to be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues.

Openhowski v. Mahone · filed 2000-06-14(3)

Pursuant to SDCL 15-2-14(3), Openhowski’s action to recover for an alleged personal injury must be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues.

Section 15-2-14 requires a personal-injury action to be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues; invalid service that does not commence the action within that period bars the claim.

Lekanidis v. Bendetti · filed 2000-07-05

It is well settled that “an action is commenced in this jurisdiction by the service of a summons” on the defendant. See Meisel v. Piggly Wiggly Corp., 418 N.W.2d 321, 323 (S.D.1988) (citing SDCL 15-2-30). The applicable statute of limitations in this case is SDCL 15-2-14. The statute requires that for “[a]n action for personal injury,” the civil action “can be commenced only within three years after the cause of action shall have accrued.” The motorcycle accident occurred on August 7, 1995 and the case was not dismissed until December 3, 1998. By the time of the dismissal, the statute of limitations had since expired. Due to the invalid service of process on Bendetti, Lekanidis did not commence his personal action within the applicable three year statute of limitations; therefore, Lekanidis’ claim against Bendetti is now barred and the action was properly dismissed with prejudice.

Section 15-2-14 provides a three-year limitation period for personal injury actions.

Gross v. Weber · filed 2000-08-28

At that time, the period of limitations for personal injury actions was three years. SDC 1960 Supp. 33.0232(5), now SDCL 15-2-14. Assuming plaintiff was under the age of 21 years when the action accrued, her infancy extended the time in which it could be brought for one year after she attained that age. SDC 1960 Supp. 33.0204, now SDCL 15-2-22. Clearly, the statute of limitations ran on this action more than 25 years ago. Plaintiffs cause of action cannot be revived by the passage in 1991 of SDCL 26-10-25.

Section 15-2-14(3) provides a three-year limitations period for actions for personal injury, but it does not apply when the underlying claim is based on a contract, obligation, or liability.

Corner Construction Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. · filed 2002-01-09(3)

The underlying claim appears to be based upon a contract, obligation, or liability and the six-year statute of limitation should apply. This is clearly not an action for personal injury.

Section 15-2-14(3) imposes a three-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims.

Novak v. McEldowney · filed 2002-12-23(3)

We find that the alleged 1995 incident is outside the applicable statute of limitations, and it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude it. See SDCL 15-2-14(3) (providing for a three-year statute of limitations for personal injury); SDCL 20-13-31 (providing for filing of any charge of discrimination within one hundred and eighty days of thq alleged practice); SDCL 15-2-15(1) (providing for a two-year statute of limitations for battery).

Section 15-2-14 provides a three-year statute of limitations for personal-injury claims, and the court applied it to claims arising from the denial of tax credits.

Oti Kaga, Inc. v. South Dakota Housing Development Authority William Earley Darlys Baum John Rothstein Kevin… · filed 2003-10-21

Alternatively, the district court held Oti Kaga's claims relating to denial of the tax credits were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. We agree. The district court, citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985), concluded South Dakota's three-year statutes of limitations governing personal injury actions, S.D. Codified Laws § 15-2-14, and civil rights actions, S.D. Codified Laws § 15-2-15.2, governed all of Oti Kaga's claims arising from denial of the tax credits. Oti Kaga did not dispute the applicability of these statutes. Instead, it argued the claims were not barred because SDHDA's actions constituted an ongoing tort, thereby tolling the limitations period. The district court disagreed, finding the alleged discriminatory conduct ended in October 1996 when the tax credits were awarded. The district court concluded Oti Kaga's period for bringing claims based on the denial of tax credits expired in October 1999, and Oti Kaga did not file suit until February 2000, approximately four months after the statute of limitations expired.

Section 15-2-14(3) requires a personal-injury action to be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues.

Blackmoon v. Charles Mix County · filed 2005-09-08(3)

Regarding their statute of limitations argument, Defendants contend that all of Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by South Dakota’s general statute of limitations for personal injury. South Dakota law provides that a personal injury action must be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues. See SDCL § 15-2-14(3). Because the voting district boundaries in Charles Mix County were last changed in 1968, Defendants claim Plaintiffs would have had to commence an action not later than 1971. Like the laches defense, the statute of limitations defense fails because Plaintiffs do not claim the boundaries as they existed in 1968 were unconstitutional or in violation of the VRA. Rather, the Defendants’ failure to redistrict in February 2002 is the basis of their claim, and this action was filed within three years of that conduct. Moreover, each time an election occurs with the current boundaries for commissioner districts, Plaintiffs suffer an alleged injury.

Section 15-2-14(3) requires a plaintiff to commence a personal-injury action within three years; the period is calculated under § 15-6-6(a), excluding the day of injury and including the last day.

Toben v. Jeske · filed 2006-06-28(3)

Second, SDCL 15-6-6(a) unquestionably applies to SDCL 15-2-14(3). Our rules in SDCL Title 15 govern the procedures for all civil suits in the circuit courts of South Dakota. See SDCL 15-6-1. SDCL 15-2-14(3) requires a plaintiff to commence an action within three years, and SDCL 15-6-6(a) prescribes how those three years are to be calculated. Toben was injured on July 2, 2001. The three years began on July 3, 2001, and ended on July 2, 2004. Because Toben commenced his action on July 2, 2004, within three years, the circuit court did not err when it held that Toben’s claim was timely.

Section 15-2-14(3) bars a personal-injury claim not commenced within three years by service or timely delivery to county officials.

Wisland v. Admiral Beverage Corporation Paul James Mayer IV · filed 1997-07-16(3)

Under South Dakota law an action is commenced when the summons is served on the defendants, and service on the defendants within the statutory period prevents the limitations period from barring an action.

Section 15-2-14(3) treats a personal-injury counterclaim as an action subject to the three-year limit; an affirmative counterclaim served after expiration is time-barred.

Murray v. MANSHEIM · filed 2010-02-24(3)

Because Man-sheim did not bring his action (via the counterclaim) until October 9, 2006, nearly a month after the statute of limitations expired, his compulsory counterclaim for affirmative relief was time-barred.

Section 15-2-14(3) sets a three-year period for personal-injury actions.

Zahrbock v. Star Brite Inn Motel · filed 2010-09-08(3)

SDCL 15-2-14(3) provides a three-year statute of limitations for an action resulting from a personal injury.

Section 15-2-14(3) governs personal-injury claims without a statutory discovery rule; fraudulent concealment is the asserted exception to the three-year period.

Eagleman v. Diocese of Rapid City · filed 2015-04-15(3)

With liability under SDCL 26-10-25 not established, plaintiffs’ personal injury claims are governed by SDCL 15-2-14(3), which provides that a suit for personal injury must be commenced “within three years after the cause of action shall have accrued[.]” ... Unlike SDCL 26-10-25, no statutory discovery rule applies to SDCL 15-2-14(3).

Section 15-2-14(3)'s three-year personal-injury limitations period may not be raised when equitable estoppel is supported by factual questions about conduct that induced detrimental reliance.

Sander v. Wright · filed 1986-10-22(3)

Under certain circumstances, a defendant may be estopped from raising the statute of limitations defense. ... We hold that the trial court erred in awarding Partial Summary Judgment, because jury questions exist as to equitable estoppel.

Section 15-2-14 provides a shorter three-year limitation period that can bar a negligence claim arising from the alleged conduct.

Gilbert v. United National Bank · filed 1989-02-08

CLM’s causes of action against UNB, including any claim of negligence, arose in 1979, and would be subject to the six-year limitation period under SDCL 15-2-13, or the shorter three-year limitation period under SDCL 15-2-14. UNB’s motion for summary judgment or dismissal asserted that “any purported claims ... would be time barred by the statute of limitations.” This motion was sufficient to challenge any claim of negligence. Therefore, CLM’s negligence claim is barred for failing to plead it within the above limitation periods.

Section 15-2-14(3) applies a three-year limitations period to negligence claims against an employer for its employee’s acts and for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention, running from termination of the employment relationship.

Rehm v. Lenz · filed 1996-05-08(3)

The claims based on respon-deat superior and failure to exercise care in hiring, supervising, and retaining Lenz are plainly based on negligence, to which the longer three-year limitation period applies. SDCL 15-2-14(3). ... The limitation period for an employer’s liability for acts of its employee and for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention commences when the employment relationship terminates. Thus, the only material fact is the date the employer-employee relationship ended. Here, it is undisputed that Lenz left West River in September, 1988. Thus, it was proper for the trial court to grant summary judgment based on the expiration of the three-year statute of limitation for negligence because Lenz left West River in September, 1988 and Rehms did not commence this action against them before September, 1991.

Section 15-2-14(3)'s three-year limitations period bars a negligence action filed more than three years after accrual; for a claim arising from a forged endorsement, accrual occurs when the instrument is negotiated, not when the forgery is discovered.

Wang v. Farmers State Bank of Winner · filed 1989-11-01(3)

Wang’s second cause of action alleges negligence against Bank for failure to determine whether RFCU had authority to negotiate the checks payable to Wang. The trial court held the negligence action was barred by the limitation of actions. Wang discovered the alleged wrong in November 1984, and the action against Bank was not commenced until December 1987. Applying the three year limitation of actions under SDCL 15-2-14(3), the trial court held the action was barred even assuming the date of discovery by Wang was the date the action accrued. ... Since this court has now determined that the date an action accrued on a forged endorsement is when the instrument is paid, the negligence action necessarily fails as being time barred by the statute of limitations, regardless of whether the three year or six year limitation of actions is applicable. Irrespective of any theory Wang attempts to argue, i.e., conversion, negligence, or contract, he simply did not begin the action within the time period allowed by any of the above statutes since the date of accrual begins on the date of the negotiation of the instrument bearing the forged endorsement and not at the time of discovery of the forgery.

Section 15-2-14 is a statute of limitations and does not itself create a cause of action.

Olson v. Equitable Life Assurance Co. · filed 2004-05-26

Olsons note that SDCL 3-21-2 only applies when the claim against the government is tort-based. They contend that their negligence claim against Sheriff Jung was based on SDCL 15-2-14. However, that statute is clearly a statute of limitation. It does not create any cause of action. Clearly, Olsons’ negligence claim was tort-based.