S.D. Codified Laws § 15-2-13

Section 15-2-13(1) gives six years to bring an action on a fire insurance contract unless another statute prescribes a different limitation period.

Leuning v. Dornberger Insurance, Inc. · filed 1977-02-10(1)

It did not adopt a statutory standard policy nor is it a “different limitation * * * prescribed by statute” to except fire insurance policies from the six-year statute of limitation of SDCL 15-2-13.

Section 15-2-13(1) supplies a six-year limitation period for an action on a promissory note governed by UCC Article 3.

O'NEILL v. Steppat · filed 1978-09-28(1)

We must then determine what statute of limitations applies to actions on a note under UCC Article three. Since Article 3 has no statute of limitations, we refer to SDCL 15-2-13(1), which provides a six-year limitation on actions “upon a contract, obligation, or liability, express or implied . . .” The action was therefore timely.

The six-year limitations period for contract actions applies to a suit on a surety performance bond when the bond’s shorter contractual limitations period is void.

Sheehan v. Irrigation · filed 1987-08-12(1)

The contractual two year limitations period is void. The suit against defendant United Pacific was timely begun under the six year statute of limitations for contracts.

Section 15-2-13 supplies a six-year limitations period for an action based on contract and fraud.

Pinson v. Depco, Inc. · filed 1985-01-10

The Court concludes that SDCL 15-2-8(4) does not apply, and that the proper statute of limitations is six years, because it appears at this point in time, that the Plaintiff’s action is based on contract and fraud. SDCL 15-2-13.

Section 15-2-13 provides the six-year limitations period for an action based on breach of an agent’s duties to the principal.

Tisdall v. Tisdall · filed 1988-04-13(1)

However, the bulk sales statute of limitations provision does not apply because the basis of Hauxes’ claim is a breach of the agency relationship created between Laib and Hauxes. The six-month statute of limitations in SDCL 57A-6-111 controls the period in which unpaid creditors can sue the transferee. This statute of limitations does not bar an action based on a breach of Laib’s duties as an agent to Hauxes.

Section 15-2-13 supplies a six-year limitations period for an action to void a municipal land-sale contract when no special limitations statute applies.

City of Aberdeen v. Rich · filed 2001-05-02

SDCL 15-2-13 provides the relevant statute of limitations in this case. The trial court found that City had failed to show any fraud or deceit that would toll the six year statute of limitations. Therefore, the statute of limitations had run at the time that City commenced this action.

The six-year limitation period applies to a claim based upon a contract, obligation, or liability, including a claim arising from an insurance agent’s alleged misrepresentation about coverage.

Corner Construction Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. · filed 2002-01-09(1)

The underlying claim appears to be based upon a contract, obligation, or liability and the six-year statute of limitation should apply.

Section 15-2-13(1) provides a six-year limitation period for a claim whose dominant cause of action is contract, even when attorney-malpractice allegations are inextricably intertwined with it.

Morgan v. Baldwin · filed 1990-01-24(1)

This court must emphasize that the determination to apply the contract limitation period is not based on the length of that limitation period; rather it is based solely upon the dominant or pervading cause of action (contract) which is inextricably intertwined with the attorney malpractice claim. ... Having thus decided, we find the applicable statute of limitation to be the one applied to contracts, which is six years (SDCL 15-2-13).

Section 15-2-13 gives six years to bring a contract action after accrual, which occurs when the plaintiff has actual or constructive notice of the claim.

Wissink v. Van De Stroet · filed 1999-07-21(1)

An action accrues when “the plaintiff has actual notice of a cause of action or is charged with notice.”

Section 15-2-13(1) gives a plaintiff six years to bring a breach of fiduciary duty claim.

Pinnacle Pizza Co. v. Little Caesar Enterprises, Inc. · filed 2008-06-05(1)

Under South Dakota law, a claim for breach of fiduciary duty is subject to a six-year statute of limitations.

Section 15-2-13 gives breach of contract claims a six-year limitation period; for an installment loan without an acceleration clause, the period runs separately for each payment when it becomes due.

Wichman v. Shabino · filed 2014-07-09

With Mary Ann unable to enforce Sandra and Brian’s divorce decree, her remaining claim against Brian is for breach of contract, subject to a six-year statute of limitations under SDCL 15-2-13. ... Because the loan agreement did not contain an acceleration clause, the court was correct in determining that Mary Ann could recover only the last seven unpaid installments on the loan. The right to sue on all the earlier installments had expired under the statute of limitations, and therefore the court did not err in ruling that Mary Ann could not recover those installments.

Section 15-2-13(1) gives six years to bring a breach-of-contract action, with the period running when the claimant has notice of the breach.

In Re the Estate of Cullum · filed 2015-11-04(1)

An action for a breach of contract has a six-year statute of limitations. SDCL 15-2-13(1). ... Thus, in approximately 2003 or 2004, Pankratz was on notice that a breach occurred, and the clock started running on the statute of limitations. ... Because Pankratz failed to bring his claim within six years of 2004, the circuit court did not err when it granted the Estate summary judgment.

Section 15-2-13 gives a claimant six years from accrual to bring a breach of contract action.

Johnson v. Johnson · filed 2024-11-20

A breach of contract action is subject to a six-year statute of limitations, which begins when the cause of action accrues.

Section 15-2-13 supplies a six-year limitations period for a claim alleging breach of an intrastate tariff sanctioned by state law when the alleged wrong exists independently of federal law.

Midcontinent Communications v. MCI Communications Services, Inc. · filed 2018-03-16

Thus, the alleged wrong was not created by federal law and the six-year statute of limitations imposed by SDCL § 15-2-13 is applicable to Verizon’s counterclaim for breach of state tariff.

Section 15-2-13(1) sets a six-year limitation period for contract-based claims.

Deiter v. XL Specialty Insurance Co. · filed 2022-12-20(1)

The statute of limitations on contract-based claims in South Dakota is six years. SDCL § 15-2- 13(1).

Section 15-2-13(1) gives independent contractors six years to bring contract claims for their services.

Paul v. Bathurst · filed 2023-11-01(1)

If she was an independent contractor, her claims are governed by the six-year contract statute of limitations in SDCL 15-2-13(1).

Section 15-2-13(1) gives a declaratory judgment action premised on an insurance contract six years from accrual to commence.

Milbank Insurance Company v. Rushmore Photo & Gifts, Inc. · filed 2018-09-04(1)

The statute of limitations for a declaratory judgment action premised on a contract is governed by SDCL § 15-2-13.

Section 15-2-13 provides a six-year limitations period for fraud and breach-of-contract claims; when intertwined tort, fraud, and contract claims leave doubt about the governing period, the six-year period applies to the entire action.

Richards v. Lenz · filed 1995-10-18

The causes of action alleging negligence are subject to a three-year statute of limitations, SDCL 15-2-14, and the causes of action alleging fraud and breach of contract are subject to a six-year statute of limitations. SDCL 15-2-13. ... In this instance doubt remains as to which statute of limitations applies because the Richards' claims are grounded in tort, fraud and contract. Any such doubt should be resolved in favor of the longer limitation period. ... We therefore hold that the six-year statute of limitations governing breach of contract claims applies to this entire action and the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Lenz.

When fraud and contract claims are interwoven with tort claims and the governing limitation period is uncertain, § 15-2-13’s six-year period applies.

Rehm v. Lenz · filed 1996-05-08

Similarly, Rehms' claims are grounded in tort, fraud, and contract, leaving doubt as to which limitations period applies. Since such doubt exists, it must be resolved in favor of the longer six-year period governing claims of fraud and breach of contract.

Actions on a contract or for relief on the ground of fraud must be brought within six years after accrual; a claim based on an alleged insurance misrepresentation is untimely when the plaintiffs knew the nature of their coverage more than six years before suit.

Schuster v. Woodmen Accident & Life Co. · filed 1985-01-16(1), (6)

SDCL 15-2-13(1) provides that an action upon a contract must be commenced within six years after the cause of action shall have accrued. Likewise, SDCL 15-2-13(6) provides that an action for relief on the ground of fraud must be brought within six years after the cause of action shall have accrued. ... Whatever their knowledge on the date they applied for the policies, plaintiffs subsequently acquired clear knowledge of the exact nature of their policies more than six years prior to the date they commenced their action.

The six-year limitations period begins when a claimant knows of facts that would prompt a reasonably prudent person to investigate a problem and its cause, even if the claimant has not identified the responsible party.

S.D. Petroleum Release Compensation Fund v. Bp · filed 2020-08-12

There is no dispute that prior to July 2, 2004, the Fund was on notice that the USTs at 18 of the indirect sites had leaked and that it may have a claim against a responsible party for reimbursement of the cleanup costs. These facts were sufficient to start the six-year statute of limitations. The circuit court properly concluded that the Fund’s indirect claims against BP at these 18 sites were time- barred by the six-year statute of limitations in SDCL 15-2-13.

Section 15-2-13(1) allows six years from accrual to bring civil actions of this nature, and a factual dispute over accrual precludes summary judgment on limitations grounds.

Salem School District 43-3 v. Puetz Construction, Inc. · filed 1984-08-08(1)

SDCL 15-2-13(1) would apply and allows commencement of civil actions of this nature within six years after the cause of action shall have accrued. When this cause of action accrued is a genuine question of material fact.

For a conversion claim involving an instrument with a forged endorsement, the six-year limitations period begins when the defendant wrongfully exercises dominion over the property, regardless of when the plaintiff discovers the forgery.

Wang v. Farmers State Bank of Winner · filed 1989-11-01(4)

Because of the necessity to have finality involving matters dealing with negotiable instruments in the commercial world and the fact it is presumed that a property owner knows what and where his property is, we hold that in a conversion of property case involving an instrument with a forged endorsement, the statute of limitations commences to run from the date a defendant wrongfully exercises dominion over the property, regardless of the plaintiff’s ignorance.

Section 15-2-13’s limitations period for a constructive trust claim begins when the alleged constructive trustee wrongfully acquires the property.

Meyer v. Kneip · filed 1990-06-06

In cases of constructive trust, “the statute of limitations ‘begins to run from the time the act was done by which the party became charged as constructive trustee.’ ”

Under § 15-2-13, a construction defect claim accrues when the claimant has actual or constructive notice of that defect; a separate defect has its own accrual date if notice of an earlier problem did not provide notice of it.

East Side Lutheran Church of Sioux Falls v. Next, Inc. · filed 2014-08-06

If East Side was put on actual or constructive notice of the alleged deficiency because of the actual notice of the water infiltration, then a claim based on that alleged deficiency is not a separate cause of action but accrued at the time of the water infiltration and is therefore barred by the statute of limitations. If East Side was not put on actual or constructive notice of the alleged deficiency because of the actual notice of the water infiltration, then a claim based on that alleged deficiency is a separate cause of action with a separate accrual date.

Section 15-2-13 gives a claimant six years from a contract for deed to bring an undue influence claim when the buyer acquires equitable title and the claimant knows the contract terms.

Matter of Matheny Family Trust · filed 2015-01-28

Thus, under SDCL 15-2-13, Karen had six years from the date of the contract for deed to assert her claim of undue influence against Wayne and Donna.

Section 15-2-13’s six-year limitations period for a bank-setoff claim accrues when the setoff occurs, absent tolling.

Strassburg v. Citizens State Bank · filed 1998-07-08

Absent some tolling provision, Strassburg’s claim accrued under SDCL 15-2-13 when the setoff occurred because, had he known, he could have commenced an action at .that time..

Section 15-2-13(2) applies a six-year limit to a claim against a school district for unpaid retirement contributions; retirement does not postpone accrual when the employee already knows the pertinent facts.

Jiricek v. WOONSOCKET SCHOOL DIST. NO. 55-4 · filed 1992-07-22(2)

Thus, SDCL 15-2-13(2) [2] sets forth the applicable statute of limitations, which is six years after the cause of action accrued. ... Accordingly, Jiricek's cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations set forth in SDCL 15-2-13(2).

For a claim against a buyer’s agent for failing to advise about the seller’s disclosure duty, the six-year limitations period begins at closing when the agent’s obligation to advise continues through that date.

Saiz v. Horn · filed 2003-08-06(1)

Because even a late disclosure can alert buyers to problems that may cause the purchase agreement to be modified or terminated, Horn’s obligation to advise his clients continued until the closing date. Thus, August 25, 1995, the date of closing, is the date on which the limitations period began to run. The complaint was served on August 6, 2001. The claim is not barred by the six-year statute of limitations.

Section 15-2-13(1) gives a plaintiff six years from accrual to sue on a contract, obligation, or liability; a claim accrues when the plaintiff has actual or constructive notice of the injury, even without knowing its precise cause.

Gades v. Meyer Modernizing Co. · filed 2015-06-03(1)

As indicated in the previous paragraph, the Gadeses were permitted to file their cause of action within six years of its accrual. SDCL 15-2-13(1). ... The Gadeses were aware of facts sufficient for their cause of action to accrue by at least spring 2002.

Section 15-2-13(2) does not bar a Veterans’ Home maintenance claim merely because charges arose more than six years before the member’s death; the limitations period begins when the claim becomes actionable.

S. D. State Veterans' Home v. Nat'l Bank · filed 1975-11-26(2)

We are of opinion, therefore, that the trial court erred in the conclusion of law that charges made by the home more than six years before the death of the member are barred by the statute. SDCL 15-2-13(2).

The six-year limitation for fraud claims does not bar an action brought after the plaintiff discovers the fraud, because the cause of action accrues on discovery.

Delany v. Delany · filed 1987-03-18(6)

Ben claims that Karon’s action was barred from the outset by the six year statute of limitations for fraud, SDCL 15-2-13(6). ... Based on the foregoing, we hold that Karon’s claim was not time barred since the cause of action did not accrue until she discovered the fraud when the deeds were recorded in November of 1984.

Section 15-2-13(6) imposes a six-year limit on fraud claims, but under § 15-2-3 the claim accrues when the aggrieved party discovers or has notice of the facts constituting the fraud.

Tri-State Refining & Investment Co. v. Apaloosa Co. · filed 1988-11-09(6)

Opdahl argues that the fraud claim is barred by the six-year statute of limitations under SDCL 15-2-13(6). ... However, SDCL 15-2-3 provides: ... There is nothing, however, to indicate that Tri-State had notice of the facts constituting fraud. ... The trial court so found, and held that Tri-State first learned of the fraud in 1982, as a result of the report by the private investigator. This finding is not clearly erroneous and the fraud claim is not barred by the six-year statute of limitations under SDCL 15-2-3.

Section 15-2-13(6) gives fraud and deceit claims six years after accrual to be brought.

Anderson v. Production Credit Ass'n · filed 1992-04-01(6)

The statute of limitations for fraud and deceit is six years after the cause of action accrues. SDCL 15-2-13(6).

Section 15-2-13(6) supplies the six-year limitation period for an actual fraud claim against a real estate agent when the allegations support fraud and doubt exists about whether the fraud or malpractice limitation period applies.

Masloskie v. Century 21 American Real Estate, Inc. · filed 2012-08-01(6)

In such cases, the doubt regarding the applicable statute of limitations is resolved in favor of the longer period. We conclude that SDCL 15-2-13(6) governs Masloskies’ cause of action for fraud.

Section 15-2-13’s six-year fraud limitations period does not apply to fraud allegations arising from performance of an existing contract when they do not state an independent tort claim.

Deutz & Crow Co. v. South Dakota State Cement Plant Commission · filed 1991-02-13

Therefore, these allegations do not state separate tort claims for the purposes of applying the six-year Statute of Limitations. Thus, the four year statute applies.

Section 15-2-13(6) gives fraud and deceit claims a six-year limitations period.

Anderson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. · filed 2017-07-17(6)

The six-year statute of limitations in SDCL § 15-2-13(6) applies to Mr. English and Mr. Dallman’s fraud and deceit claims.

Section 15-2-13(1) gives contract actions a six-year limitations period, which is tolled when fraudulent concealment prevents discovery of the claim.

Fox v. Burden · filed 1999-12-15(1)

The statute of limitations for an action upon a contract is six years. See SDCL 15-2-13(1) (providing an action upon a contract can be commenced only within six years after the cause of action shall have accrued). ... Based upon our above holdings, the trial court did not err in finding that the statute of limitations is tolled based upon Kathleen’s silence which amounted to concealment of the contract provision dealing with the life insurance policy proceeds.

Section 15-2-13’s six-year limitations period is tolled by fraudulent concealment until the cause of action is discovered or might have been discovered.

Conway v. Conway · filed 1992-06-17

However, this statute of limitations will be tolled until the cause of action is discovered or might have been discovered, if there is fraudulent concealment of the cause of action.

Section 15-2-13’s six-year limitations period is not tolled for fraudulent concealment when the claimant had actual notice of the claim.

Healy v. Osborne · filed 2019-09-25

To the contrary, by his own admissions, Bret has established that he had actual knowledge. Thus, the circuit court did not err by rejecting Bret’s argument that the statute of limitations in SDCL 15-2-13 should be tolled.

Section 15-2-13(2) gives the State six years to bring an action for sales tax liability created by statute, measured from discovery of the taxpayer’s fraud when fraud tolls the limitations period.

In Re State Sales Tax Liability of Simpson · filed 1993-05-19(2)

According to SDCL 15-2-13(2), "[a]n action upon a liability created by statute" must be commenced within six years after the cause of action accrues. ... Therefore, because the State commenced this action within six years from the time it discovered Simpson's fraud, the assessment is not barred.

Section 15-2-13(6) provides a six-year limitations period that may be equitably tolled when a defendant induces the plaintiff to let the period expire.

South Dakota Wheat Growers Association v. Chief Industries, Inc. · filed 2018-08-28(6)

While the parties disagree as to whether SDWG had notice of the insufficiency of Chief’s and Gateway’s repairs such that the statute of limitations for those claims would have accrued, and while the remaining claims against Chief and Heyer would otherwise by barred by the six-year statute of limitations, this court determines that these claims may nonetheless be equitably tolled. SDCL § 15-2-13(6); see also Masloskie v. Century 21 American Real Estate, Inc., 818 N.W.2d 798, 803 (S.D. 2012) (holding that, where a claim “is based in fraud as much as in negligence .. . the doubt regarding the applicable statute of limitations is resolved in favor of the longer period”).

Section 15-2-13(3) gives six years to bring nuisance and trespass claims for property damage; a continuing tort tolls that period, but continuing damage from a single act does not.

Brandt v. County of Pennington · filed 2013-02-27(3)

Brandt asserts property damage via nuisance and trespass, which have a statute of limitations of six years. ... A continuing tort tolls the statute of limitations and the 180-day notice period does not begin until the wrong is terminated. ... Brandt’s claims of nuisance and trespass are barred because there was no continuing tort.

Section 15-2-13(2) does not bar a timely filed claim against a deceased veteran’s estate for maintenance at the State Veterans’ Home.

S. D. State Veterans' Home v. Hamilton · filed 1975-12-12(2)

The claim made by the 'state against the estate of Willis F. Hamilton having been timely filed is not barred by SDCL 15-2-13(2).

Section 15-2-13(2) provides a six-year limitations period for a § 1983 action enforcing a liability created by statute.

Berry v. Arthur · filed 1979-08-06(2)

Accordingly the limitation period of six years in 15-2-13(2) is adopted under these circumstances as the most analogous state statute.

Section 15-2-13(2) gives the Department six years to collect unpaid sales taxes, beginning when the taxes become delinquent absent a finding of fraud.

Karras v. State, Department of Revenue · filed 1989-05-31(2)

In the absence of a finding of fraud, we believe that the Department’s cause of action for the payment of the sales taxes in question did not accrue until they became delinquent. ... Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s decision with one exception, namely, its holding that the Department’s collecting the sales taxes due for the first quarter of 1980 is not barred by the six-year statute of limitations contained in SDCL 15-2-13(2).

Section 15-2-13 gives claims under the residential real estate disclosure statutes a six-year limitations period.

Schwartz v. Morgan · filed 2009-12-22

A claim under SDCL ch. 43-4 must be brought within the applicable limitations period: six years. See SDCL 15-2-13.

Section 15-2-13(2) gives claims for indemnity and contribution a six-year limitations period.

Avera St. Luke's Hospital v. Karamali · filed 2012-01-24(2)

Since both remedies are creatures of statute, both fall into the catch-all six-year statute of limitations. SDCL 15-2-13(2).

Section 15-2-13(1) gives an action on a father’s implied common-law duty to support his minor child six years from accrual.

State Ex Rel. Stearns v. Blume · filed 1983-05-11(1)

Being a civil action upon an obligation or liability implied and imposed by law, it must be commenced within six years after the cause of action shall have accrued. SDCL 15-2-13(l).

Section 15-2-13 imposes a six-year limit on parental-support or contract claims that do not enforce support provisions of a divorce decree.

Hershey v. Hershey · filed 1991-03-13

Actions which do not seek to enforce support provisions of a divorce decree, but which are based on the common law duty of parental support or on a breach of a contract claim, come under SDCL 15-2-13, and recovery is limited to six years.

Section 15-2-13 limits actions to recover pregnancy and confinement expenses to six years; a father may be held liable for only the six years preceding a paternity action absent proper notice or tolling.

Tovsland v. Reub · filed 2004-08-18

Applying the Rules of Civil Procedure, a mother could be pursued for costs of pregnancy and confinement up to six years under SDCL 15-2-13 which provides in part: ... A better reading of the statutory scheme is that a father may be pursued for paternity and support obligations until the child reaches majority, but may only be held liable for six years preceding the paternity action absent proper notice or tolling of the statute of limitation.

Section 15-2-13(1) does not impose its six-year contract limitation on enforcement of a divorce stipulation incorporated into a divorce decree; the limitation for judgments applies.

Wehrkamp v. Wehrkamp · filed 2009-09-16(1)

Therefore, it is not the six-year statute of limitations applicable to contracts, but the twenty-year limitations period applicable to judgments that pertains to this action.

Section 15-2-13(4) does not govern an action to enforce a sister-state divorce decree ordering transfer of a life insurance policy; the ten-year limit for actions on foreign judgments in § 15-2-8 applies.

Hahne v. Hahne · filed 1989-07-12(4)

Anthony argues that Gloria's claim is barred under either SDCL 15-2-8, [1] the ten-year statute of limitations which applies to actions upon judgments of sister states or SDCL 15-2-13(4). The latter statute provides for a six-year limitation on "[a]n action for taking, detaining, or injuring any goods or chattels, including actions for specific recovery of personal property." Of these two statutes, it is clear that SDCL 15-2-8, governing foreign judgments, applies.

The six-year limitations period for trespass and conversion does not apply to a claim for compensation for property taken or damaged for public use, even if the facts also support a tort claim; the twenty-year period applies.

Boland v. City of Rapid City · filed 1982-02-03(3), (4)

The twenty-year statute of limitations applies to Jef-fersons’ claim against the County regardless of the underlying tort claim.

Section 15-2-13(3)'s six-year limitations period does not bar a claim for property damaged for public use; the twenty-year adverse-possession period applies.

City of Sioux Falls v. Miller · filed 1992-11-04(3)

As stated previously, the trial court applied the statute of limitations set out in SDCL 15-2-13(3) and held the six-year statute of limitations had run. We conclude the trial court applied the wrong statute of limitation. ... We most recently addressed this issue in Boland v. City of Rapid City, 315 N.W.2d 496, 501 (S.D. 1982), where, relying on Art. VI, § 13, we held the twenty-year statute of limitations applying to adverse possession is applicable where property rights are damaged in the name of the public, regardless of the underlying tort claim.

Section 15-2-13 provides a six-year limitations period for constructive or implied trust claims; a complaint does not establish that the period has run when the alleged breach may have occurred within six years of suit.

Smith v. Smith · filed 2022-09-07

Taking the facts from the well-pleaded allegations of the Complaint, this Court cannot conclude as a matter of law ona motion to dismiss that the six-year limitations period on a breach of implied trust claim has run.

A conversion claim accrues when the owner knows or has reason to know that the status of the property has changed.

Nelson v. Tinkcom · filed 2025-07-23(4)

The cause of action for conversion ... could not accrue until the Nelson Estate knew or had reason to know the status of that property had changed.

Section 15-2-13 gives six years to bring a legal malpractice claim arising before the 1977 attorney-malpractice limitations statute, and that limit is constitutional as applied under the state open-courts provision.

Green v. Siegel, Barnett & Schutz · filed 1996-12-31

SDCL 15-2-13, providing a six-year statute of limitations period, is applicable to the 1976 trust benefiting the Green children. ... We conclude that under the facts of this case, these statutes are constitutional as applied to Green and Sam-mis.

Section 15-2-13(1) starts the six-year limitations period for legal malpractice claims governed by it when the malpractice occurs, subject to an exception for fraudulent concealment.

Hoffman v. Johnson · filed 1985-09-06(1)

Although both SDCL 15-2-14.1 and 15-2-14.2 apply only to causes of action arising after the effective dates of those statutes, we conclude that we should apply the now clearly expressed legislative intent to those legal malpractice claims that are still governed by SDCL 15-2-13(1) by holding that the date of the occurrence of the legal malpractice triggers the running of the statute of limitations, subject only to the fraudulent concealment exception.

Section 15-2-13(1) supplies a six-year limitations period for an insured’s bad faith claim arising from denial of workers’ compensation benefits.

Harms v. Cigna Insurance Companies · filed 2006-03-13(1)

Based on all of the foregoing, the court predicts that the South Dakota Supreme Court would apply the six-year limitations period in § 15-2-13(1) to Harms’s bad faith claim, rather than the three-year limitations period contained in § 15-2-14(3).

Section 15-2-13(1) requires a professional negligence claim arising from construction work to be filed within six years after it accrues, even when the construction statute of repose also applies.

Hoven v. Banner Associates, Inc. · filed 2023-07-12(1)

Applying SDCL 15-2A-6, our statement in Gades, and the line of reasoning from McMacken, the Hovens had to commence suit within six years after the alleged negligence claim accrued as required by SDCL 15-2-13(1).

A negligence claim first pleaded more than six years after it arose is barred even under § 15-2-13’s six-year limitation period.

Gilbert v. United National Bank · filed 1989-02-08

CLM’s causes of action against UNB, including any claim of negligence, arose in 1979, and would be subject to the six-year limitation period under SDCL 15-2-13, or the shorter three-year limitation period under SDCL 15-2-14. UNB’s motion for summary judgment or dismissal asserted that “any purported claims ... would be time barred by the statute of limitations.” This motion was sufficient to challenge any claim of negligence. Therefore, CLM’s negligence claim is barred for failing to plead it within the above limitation periods.

Section 15-2-13(1)’s six-year limit for contract actions does not apply to an action to reform a deed.

Burke v. Bubbers · filed 1984-01-04(1)

Bubbers refer to this as an action upon a contract, maintaining that the transaction is grounded upon the option to purchase real property. Despite Bubbers’ claim, this is not a contract action; it is an action to reform a deed. As such, one cannot look to the statute of limitations for contract actions.

The six-year limit in § 15-2-13 does not govern medical malpractice claims, even when based on contract, because § 15-2-14.1 prescribes a specific two-year limit.

Rindahl v. Reisch · filed 2024-09-30

However, SDCL § 15-2-13 states that it applies “[e]xcept where, in special cases, a different limitation is prescribed by statute.” SDCL § 15-2-14.1 prescribes a two-yeat time limitation to bring a claim whether based on contract or tort for alleged medical “malprabtice, error, mistake, or failure to cure.”

Section 15-2-13’s six-year limit for common law actions does not govern claims for motor fuel tax refunds, which are subject to the specific refund deadline.

Pourier v. South Dakota Department of Revenue · filed 2004-01-07

Muddy Creek cites other possible statutes, such as SDCL 15-2-13 (six years for common law actions) and SDCL 10-59-19 (three years for overpaid taxes), but those do not specifically deal with the time limit for obtaining refunds on motor fuel taxes. [1] In cases where more than one statute arguably touches upon the same subject matter, we presume that the statute with the more specific language "relating to a particular subject will prevail over the general terms of another statute."

The six-year limit for contract actions does not apply to a quiet title action based on an agreement that already conveyed the property interest.

Estate of Henderson v. Estate of Henderson · filed 2012-11-20(1)

Because this is not a breach of contract action nor an attempt by Walter to assert his ownership interest through adverse possession, the limitation periods set forth in SDCL 15-2-13(1) and SDCL 15-3-2 are not applicable.

Section 15-2-13(1)’s six-year period does not apply when the claim is not an action upon a contract, obligation, or liability.

Rindahl v. Reisch · filed 2024-03-25(1)

Rindahl has not brought an “action upon a contract, obligation, or liability” against Dr. Mullin. Thus, his argument that the applicable statute of limitations is SDCL § 15-2-13(1) fails.

Section 15-2-13(6) provides a six-year period for fraud and deceit, but a medical malpractice claim does not gain that period merely by being pleaded as fraud or deceit.

Bruske v. Hille · filed 1997-08-20(6)

With fraud and deceit, the six-year statute of limitations applies and would not begin to run “until the aggrieved party discovers, or has actual or constructive notice of, the facts constituting the fraud.” ... Medical malpractice characterized as fraud and deceit will not sanction a shift to a more beneficial statute of limitations.

Section 15-2-13(5)’s six-year catch-all period does not apply to strict-liability actions for personal injury, which are subject to the three-year limit in § 15-2-14(3).

Carr v. Core Industries · filed 1986-08-20(5)

Appellant argues that the six-year “catch-all” statute of limitations, SDCL 15-2-13(5), is applicable to his action for strict liability rather than the three-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injuries, SDCL 15-2-14(3). ... We hold that the three-year statute, SDCL 15-2-14(3), bars appellant’s action to recover for his personal injuries based on strict liability.

The six-year period for contract actions does not apply to a debt arising from the sale of goods, which is subject to a four-year limitation period.

Sherman v. Sherman · filed 2000-08-23(1)

The undisputed evidence in the record shows that the debt originated from the sale of feed, thus it was subject to the 4-year statute of limitations for the sale of goods.

The six-year contractual limitations period does not apply to additional medical expenses caused by medical malpractice.

Peterson, Ex Rel. Peterson v. Burns · filed 2001-10-24(1)

Although not a personal injury per se, additional medical expense is just as clearly within the ambit of the two-year medical malpractice statute of limitations and not the six-year contractual statute of limitations.

Section 15-2-13 does not apply when a special statute prescribes a different limitation period, including for contests of trust amendments.

In Re Elizabeth A. Briggs Revocable Living Trust · filed 2017-06-28

But by its own terms, SDCL 15-2-13 is a general statute of limitations that does not apply “where, in special cases, a different limitation is ... prescribed by statute,” and this trust contest is a special case specifically governed by SDCL 55-4-57(a). Therefore, SDCL 15-2-13 does not apply.

A defendant asserting the six-year limitations period for a contract claim must show that the claim accrued more than six years before it was filed.

Huron Center, Inc. v. Henry Carlson Co. · filed 2002-08-14(1)

Therefore, the burden is on Defendants to show that Huron Center’s cause of action accrued more than six years before the April 1997 filing date.

A defendant asserting the six-year limit for a contract action bears the burden of showing that the claim accrued more than six years before filing.

Huron Center v. Carlson and Durrant Group v. Zurbrigen Industries · filed 2002-08-14(1)

Therefore, the burden is on Defendants to show that Huron Center’s cause of action accrued more than six years before the April 1997 filing date.

Section 15-2-13(1) does not bar use of inflation adjustments from outside the six-year limitations period to calculate damages recoverable within that period.

Clarkson & Co. v. Continental Resources, Inc. · filed 2011-11-09(1)

We agree with the trial court that the statute of limitations does not prevent Clarkson from recovering for inflation adjustments under the escalation clause during the barred period.