750 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/503

Section 503(g) permits a trust to protect a child's best interests even without proof that the supporting parent is unwilling to make direct payments.

In re Parentage of Janssen · filed 1997-09-09(g)

A demonstrated unwilling­ness to make direct child support payments may justify the creation of such a trust ( In re Marriage of Rochford , 91 Ill. App. 3d 769, 782, 414 N.E.2d 1096, 1106-07 (1980)), but there may be other reasons that would support the creation of such a trust, and section 503(g) of the Marriage Act is not limited to circumstances wherein the supporting parent is unwilling to make direct child support payments.

Section 503(g) permits a court to create a trust for child support when a parent has shown an unwillingness to pay.

In Re Marriage of Chapman · filed 1998-06-19(g)

Similarly, the grounds necessary for the creation of a section 503(g) trust are present in the instant case, where Chapman has shown an unwillingness to pay child support.

A child support trust created under section 503(g) must follow the child support factors in section 505.

In Re Marriage of Wolfe · filed 1998-08-12(g)

However, when a court orders a section 503(g) trust established for the benefit of a child, it must proceed under the guidelines of the relevant statutory provision. ... Likewise, when a trial court orders the establishment of a trust for the purposes of child support, it must consider the factors set forth in section 505 of the Act.

Section 503(g) permits a court to establish a trust to protect children when an obligor spouse is unwilling or unable to pay child support.

In Re Marriage of Petersen · filed 2001-02-01(g)

A need for such protection arises when the obligor spouse is either unwilling or unable to make child support payments. ... In the present case Kevin has demonstrated such an unwillingness. Here, Kevin was held in wilful contempt of court twice in three months for failure to pay child support. ... The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in establishing a section 503(g) trust.

Section 503(g) permits a court to set aside marital or nonmarital assets in a separate fund to assure payment of child support when the noncustodial parent is unwilling or unable to pay.

In Re Marriage of Hari · filed 2004-02-03(g)

Thus, section 503(g) explicitly allows the trial court to set aside in a separate fund a portion of the noncustodial parent’s non-marital or marital assets to assure payment of his child support obligation if that parent is either unwilling or unable to make child support payments.

Section 503(g) permits a court to set aside property in a fund or trust for child support when necessary to protect the children’s best interests; it provides no comparable authority to secure spousal maintenance.

In Re Marriage of Ellinger · filed 2008-01-03(g)

Additionally, section 503(g) of the Act states that “[t]he court if necessary to protect and promote the best interests of the children may set aside a portion of the jointly or separately held estates of the parties in a separate fund or trust for the support *** of any *** child of the parties.” 750 ILCS 5/503(g) (West 2006). The Act does not contain a provision analogous to section 503(g) regarding a spouse’s maintenance obligation.

Section 503(g) permits a court to create a trust for children when needed to protect their interests, including when a parent is reluctant to keep paying support.

In re Marriage of Popa · filed 2013-10-17(g)

A need for such protection arises when the obligor spouse is either unwilling or unable to make child support payments. ... Although there was no finding by the trial court that Popa had failed to make his support payments, the record established that he was reluctant to continue paying support because he believed Garcia was misusing that money to remain in Uruguay with the children. The establishment of the trust for the benefit of the children assured Popa that the support payments would not be misused because neither he nor Garcia could make any withdrawals without court approval.

Section 503(g) permits a court to order replenishment of a trust for child-related expenses when a parent willfully refuses to pay those expenses.

In re Marriage of Pasquesi · filed 2015-06-10(g)

Thus, the circuit court was well within its discretion when it ordered him to replenish the section 503(g) trust after finding he had willfully refused to pay the non-medical expenses.

Section 503(g) permits a court to replenish a child support trust when a parent willfully refuses to pay covered child-related expenses.

In re Marriage of Pasquesi · filed 2015-07-14(g)

Thus, the circuit court was well within its discretion when it ordered him to replenish the section 503(g) trust after finding he had willfully refused to pay the non-medical expenses.

Section 503(g) permits a court to order replenishment of a child-support trust when a parent willfully refuses to pay covered child-related expenses.

In re Marriage of Pasquesi · filed 2015-08-07(g)

Thus, the circuit court was well within its discretion when it ordered him to replenish the section 503(g) trust after finding he had willfully refused to pay the nonmedical expenses.

Section 503(g) permits a trust for a child's support when the evidence shows it is needed to protect the child's interests.

Melamed v. Melamed · filed 2016-02-16(g)

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered the creation of a section 503(g) trust for the benefit of the parties' minor daughter. The evidence demonstrated a need to protect the interest of the parties' minor daughter.

Section 503(g) allows a court to set aside property in a trust to support children when a parent is unwilling to pay child support.

In re Marriage of Liszka · filed 2016-09-27(g)

Because of Michael’s unwillingness to pay child support, the trial court’s imposition of a section 503(g) trust was not an abuse of discretion.

Section 503(g) permits a court to set aside assets in a trust for children when a parent is unwilling to pay child support.

In re Marriage of Liszka · filed 2017-07-26(g)

Because of Michael’s unwillingness to pay child support, the trial court’s imposition of a section 503(g) trust was not an abuse of discretion.

Section 503(g) allows a child support trust without a finding that the noncustodial parent willfully disobeyed a court order.

In re Parentage of A.H., A.H., & A.H. · filed 2023-08-17(g)

Section 503(g) does not require, as a prerequisite to establishing a trust, a finding that the noncustodial parent has been in willful contempt of a court order.

A party’s petition for contribution does not waive attorney-client privilege.

Kaufman, Litwin and Feinstein v. Edgar · filed 1998-12-01(j)(3)

Section 503(j)(3) provides that a party’s petition for contribution will not be viewed as a waiver of attorney-client privilege. 750 ILCS 5/503(j)(3) (West 1996). Again plaintiff provides no support for its claim that this provision “invades the province of the court.” This provision protects the interests of both the attorney and the client by allowing the attorney to have a hearing for fees without concern that the other party will use the hearing as an opportunity to discover otherwise privileged information. We see no separation of powers issue here.

Section 503(j) requires a court ruling on a petition for contribution to attorney fees to consider the property division criteria in section 503(d).

In re Marriage of Julin · filed 2025-11-19(j)

Section 503(j) instructs the court, when ruling on a party’s petition for contribution to attorney fees, to consider the criteria for dividing property in subsection 503(d), including: each party’s contribution to the acquisition of marital or non-marital property; the dissipation by each party of the marital property; the value of the property assigned to each party; the duration of the marriage; the relevant economic circumstances of each party; any obligations and rights arising from a prior marriage; any prenuptial or postnuptial agreement; the age, health, occupation, amount and sources of income of each party; the custodial provisions for any children; whether the apportionment is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance; the reasonable opportunity of each party to acquire future capital assets and income; and the tax consequences of the property division.

Section 503(j)(2) bases contribution to attorney fees on the criteria for dividing marital property and, when maintenance has been awarded, the criteria for awarding maintenance.

In re Marriage of Sadovsky · filed 2020-05-27(j)(2)

A contribution award is based on the criteria for the division of marital property and, where maintenance has been awarded, the criteria for an award of maintenance. 750 ILCS 5/503(j)(2) (West 2016). ... The trial court’s finding that both parties had the ability to pay their own attorney fees was not an abuse of discretion.

Section 503(j)(2) bases contribution to a party’s attorney fees on the criteria for dividing marital property and, if maintenance is awarded, the criteria for maintenance.

In re Marriage of Zuber · filed 2020-11-25(j)(2)

Because we are remanding the cause to the circuit court to determine whether a maintenance award is appropriate, we also direct the circuit court to determine if payment of attorney fees remains inappropriate.

Section 503(j)(2) requires a contribution toward attorney fees to be based on the criteria for dividing marital property and, if maintenance has been awarded, the criteria for awarding maintenance.

In re Marriage of Ulanov · filed 2020-12-07(j)(2)

Section 503(j)(2) provides that when the circuit court decides a petition for contribution of attorney fees, “[a]ny award of contribution to one party from the other party shall be based on the criteria for division of marital property under this Section 503 and, if maintenance has been awarded, on the criteria for an award of maintenance under Section 504.” ... As Heroy and the cases discussed therein instruct, the circuit court should have considered both Irene’s and Mark’s financial resources and the statutory factors when determining whether to order Mark to contribute to Irene’s attorney fees.

Section 503(j) applies only after the court has resolved all issues between the parties other than attorney fees.

In re Marriage of Crecos · filed 2020-05-04(j)

Section 503(j) on its face applies only when the court has resolved "all *** issues between the parties" other than the award of attorney fees.

Section 503(j) applies to contribution to attorney fees only after the court has resolved all other issues between the parties.

In re Marriage of Crecos · filed 2021-04-28(j)

Section 503(j) on its face applies only when the court has resolved “all *** issues between the parties” other than the award of attorney fees.

Section 503(j)(2) bases attorney fee contribution on the criteria for dividing marital property and, if maintenance was awarded, the criteria for awarding maintenance.

In re Marriage of Conour · filed 2020-03-10(j)(2)

Finding no such showing, we assume the trial court considered both Lynette’s and Jeff’s financial resources and properly made its decision in accordance with subsection (j) of section 503 of the Dissolution Act.

Section 503(j) does not require a contribution hearing before a court rules on an attorney’s independent fee action under section 508(e).

Dussias Skallas Wittenberg, LLP v. Minogue · filed 2020-05-19(j)

Thus, the trial court was not required to hold a section 503(j) hearing before ruling on DSW’s fee petition.

Section 503(j) does not require a separate evidentiary hearing on a petition for contribution to attorney fees when the court has considered the relevant arguments and evidence.

In re Marriage of Kranzler · filed 2020-08-13(j)

The lack of a separate evidentiary hearing was not dispositive here, as the trial court abided by the requirements of section 503(j) and fully considered the issue with the relevant arguments and evidence sufficiently before it.

Section 503(j)(2) governs attorney fee contributions between spouses and directs courts to use the criteria for dividing marital property or awarding maintenance.

In re Marriage of Paris · filed 2021-03-12(j)(2)

Section 503(j)(2) also instructs the trial court to award attorney fees based on the criteria for the division of marital property or the award of maintenance. 750 ILCS 5/503(j)(2) (West 2016). That criteria, which includes factors like the duration of the marriage and the value of the property assigned to each spouse, is not applicable to someone who was not a spouse in the marital relationship.

Section 503(j) allows a court to decide a petition for contribution to attorney fees without a separate hearing when it already has adequate evidence to decide it.

In re Marriage of Patel · filed 2021-05-21(j)

The IMDMA states, in pertinent part, that “before judgment is entered, a party’s petition for contribution to fees and costs incurred in the proceeding shall be heard and decided.” 750 ILCS 5/503(j) (West 2018). ... This does not require an additional hearing, necessarily, but the court must hear “additional proofs, through testimony or otherwise.” Id. ... The court, therefore, was adequately situated to rule on the petition without an additional hearing. See id.

Section 503(j)(1) requires a petition for contribution to attorney fees and costs within 14 days after the close of proofs unless the court orders another filing period.

In re Marriage of Waldschmidt · filed 2020-02-20(j)(1)

A party’s petition for contribution to attorney fees and costs “shall be filed no later than 14 days after the closing of proofs *** or within such other period as the court orders.” (Emphasis added.) (750 ILCS 5/503(j)(1) (West 2018). Tamara filed her petition more than 14 days after the close of proofs. As Tamara correctly notes, the time for filing the petition is mandatory. Therefore, the petition was untimely.

Section 503(j) requires a contribution request to be heard and decided before entry of the dissolution judgment, but an objection to that timing may be forfeited.

In re Marriage of Kane · filed 2017-06-22(j)

It is worth noting that, pursuant to section 503(j), Canulli’s request for contribution should have been heard and decided prior to entry of the judgment for dissolution of marriage. Nevertheless, it appears that no party raised the issue in the trial court, and any objection is thus forfeited. The timing provisions of section 503(j), although mandatory, are not jurisdictional prerequisites, and they therefore may be forfeited.

Section 503(j)(2) makes the final allocation of interim attorney fees depend in part on the distribution of marital property.

In re Marriage of Arjmand · filed 2017-06-06(j)(2)

In this case, Muneeza cannot retain the benefit of Masud’s payment of interim attorney fees unless she files a motion for contribution at the close of the dissolution proceedings, and the trial court’s ultimate determination of that issue will depend in part on matters that are not yet resolved, such as the appropriate distribution of the marital estate.

Section 503(j)(2) requires a court deciding a petition for contribution to attorney fees to consider the property distribution and maintenance factors.

In re Marriage of Tworek · filed 2017-10-11(j)(2)

Pursuant to section 503(j)(2) of the Act, in deciding the petition for contribution, the trial court must consider the factors for property distribution set forth in section 503 (750 ILCS 5/503 (West 2014)) and for maintenance set forth in section 504 (750 ILCS 5/504 (West 2014)) of the Act.

Section 503(j)(2) requires an attorney fee contribution award to be based on the criteria for dividing marital property and, if maintenance was awarded, the criteria for awarding maintenance.

In re Marriage of Heroy · filed 2018-01-26(j)(2)

The trial court must (1) “consider[ ] the financial resources of the parties” and (2) make its decision on a petition for contribution “in accordance with subsection (j) of Section 503.” 750 ILCS 5/508(a) (West 2014). To say that the court should not consider the statutory factors is clearly contrary to the plain language of the statute.

Section 503(j)(2) requires a court deciding attorney fee contribution to consider the factors for property distribution and maintenance.

In re Marriage of Tworek · filed 2018-02-05(j)(2)

Pursuant to section 503(j)(2) of the Act, in deciding the petition for contribution, the trial court must consider the factors for property distribution set forth in section 503 (750 ILCS 5/503 (West 2014)) and for maintenance set forth in section 504 (750 ILCS 5/504 (West 2014)) of the Act.

Section 503(j)(2) bases attorney fee contribution awards on the marital property division criteria and, when maintenance has been awarded, the maintenance criteria.

In re Marriage of Heroy · filed 2017-03-23(j)(2)

As instructed by section 508, we turn to subsection 503(j) to determine whether an award of attorney fees was proper. ... The statutory factors are the tools used by the court to decide whether a party is unable to pay and whether the other party is able to do so.

Section 503(j)(5) permits an attorney fee contribution award payable to counsel when hardship has prevented the client from paying counsel.

In re Parentage of J.W. · filed 2017-04-28(j)(5)

The plain language of section 503(j)(5) clearly indicates that the legislature intended that, where counsel has received no payment from his client due to hardship, a court could order a contribution award “to the party’s counsel.”

Section 503(j)(5) permits an attorney fee contribution award payable to counsel when the client has paid no fees due to hardship.

In re Parentage of J.W. · filed 2017-06-30(j)(5)

The plain language of section 503(j)(5) clearly indicates that the legislature intended that, where counsel has received no payment from his client due to hardship, a court could order a contribution award “to the party’s counsel.”

Section 503(j) requires a contribution request to be heard and decided before the dissolution judgment, but an objection to that timing may be forfeited.

In re Marriage of Kane · filed 2016-12-29(j)

The timing provisions of section 503(j), although mandatory, are not jurisdictional prerequisites and they therefore may be forfeited.

Section 503(j) governs petitions for contribution to attorney fees and changes the procedure for hearing them without changing the criteria for an award.

In Re Marriage of McGuire · filed 1999-06-16(j)

In our view, the amendments to section 508(a) and the addition of section 503(j) do not constitute substantive changes. Rather, these amendments alter the procedures by which issues regarding attorney fees are presented and heard in dissolution cases. According to the 1997 amendments, final fee petitions are still governed by the provisions of section 508, but petitions for contribution are governed by the provisions of section 503(j).

Section 503(j)(2) requires an attorney fee contribution award to follow the marital property division criteria and, if maintenance was awarded, the maintenance criteria.

In Re Marriage of DeLarco · filed 2000-05-05(j)(2)

In making an award pursuant to a party’s petition for contribution to fees and costs, the trial court must base the award on the criteria for the division of marital property set forth in section 503 of the Act (750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 1996)) and, if maintenance has been awarded, the criteria for an award of maintenance set forth in section 504 of the Act (750 ILCS 57504(a) (West 1996)).

Section 503(j) requires the court to consider additional proof on a petition for contribution to attorney fees, but leaves a separate hearing to the court’s discretion.

In Re Marriage of Brackett · filed 1999-12-22(j)

We do not read section 503(j) as requiring an additional hearing, which would further burden already overburdened trial courts, but, rather, as requiring a trial court to hear, through testimony or otherwise, additional proofs when a petition for contribution is filed in accordance with section 503(j) in the context of preexisting proceedings. If the trial court wishes to hold a separate and distinct hearing on the petition, it has the discretion to do so.

Section 503(j) permits a court to consider other competent and relevant evidence when deciding fee contribution, but does not require it.

In Re Marriage of Hasabnis · filed 2001-05-09(j)

We see nothing in section 503(j) that stops the trial judge from considering other competent and relevant evidence. Nor do we see anything that requires it.

Section 503(j) does not require a separate evidentiary hearing to decide a petition for contribution toward attorney fees and costs.

In Re Marriage of Suriano and LaFeber · filed 2001-08-30(j)

The plain and ordinary meaning of section 503(j) does not require a separate evidentiary hearing.

Section 503(j) requires a petition for contribution to attorney fees to be heard and decided before final judgment, but its timing requirement may be waived.

In Re Marriage of Lindsey-Robinson · filed 2002-05-13(j)

Following Belleville Toyota, we must find that the timing provision of section 503(j) of the Act, although mandatory (see People v. O’Brien, 197 Ill. 2d 88, 93 (2001) (holding that the legislature’s use of “shall” demonstrates its intent to create a mandatory, rather than directive, provision)), is not a jurisdictional prerequisite and thus may be waived.

Section 503(j)'s procedural requirements for petitions for contribution toward attorney fees do not apply in post-dissolution proceedings.

MacAluso v. MacAluso · filed 2002-05-15(j)

We find that the procedural requirements of section 503(j) have no effect in post-dissolution proceedings.

Section 503(j) directs courts deciding attorney fee contributions in dissolution cases to consider the allocation of assets and liabilities, maintenance, and each party’s earning ability.

In Re Marriage of Keip · filed 2002-07-18(j)

Section 503(j), which sets forth the procedures to be followed in presenting and hearing issues of attorney fees in dissolution cases, codifies the standard criteria courts had traditionally applied in determining whether to award attorney fees and in what proportion. 750 ILCS 5/503(j) (West 2000). Specifically, a court should consider the allocation of assets and liabilities between the parties, any maintenance awarded, and the relative earning abilities of each of the parties.

Section 503(j) requires the court to hear and decide a petition for contribution to attorney fees before judgment, but it does not require a separate hearing when the evidence needed to decide the petition is already before the court.

In Re Marriage of Selinger · filed 2004-07-28(j)

Section 503(j) of the Dissolution Act establishes the method for formally petitioning the court for contribution of attorney fees. ... The lack of a hearing here is not dispositive. The assets and liabilities of the two parties were before the court already, as was the amount of Pamela's attorney fees. We fail to see what other evidence had to be presented for the court to rule on Pamela's request.

Section 503(j)(1)'s filing deadline does not apply to petitions for contribution to attorney fees in postdecree proceedings.

In re Marriage of Blum · filed 2007-10-17(j)(1)

In sum, we reconsider the holding of Konchar and hold that the time limits of section 503(j)(l) of the Act do not apply to petitions for contribution to attorney fees in postdecree proceedings.

Section 503(j)(1)'s filing deadlines for attorney fee contribution petitions do not apply to postdecree proceedings.

In re Marriage of Blum · filed 2007-11-20(j)(1)

In sum, we reconsider the holding of Konchar and hold that the time limits of section 503(j)(1) of the Act do not apply to petitions for contribution to attorney fees in postdecree proceedings.

Section 503(j)(2) permits a reasonable attorney fee contribution award based on the property division and maintenance criteria without a precise finding that every fee incurred was reasonable.

In Re Marriage of Nesbitt · filed 2007-11-14(j)(2)

Accordingly, although the trial court was unable to “tell with precision whether all of the work performed by [Schiller, DuCanto & Fleck] was reasonable” based on the “ ‘bundled’ ” billing records, it was not required to make such a finding prior to ordering contribution.

Section 503(j)(2) directs courts deciding attorney fee contributions to consider the criteria for dividing marital property, including whether a party unnecessarily increased litigation costs.

In Re Marriage of Haken · filed 2009-09-08(j)(2)

We believe the language in section 503 allows a court to consider an “unnecessary increase in the cost of litigation” when determining a fee award under section 508(a).

Section 503(j)(2) bases an attorney fee contribution on the marital property division factors and, when maintenance was awarded, the maintenance factors rather than a simple comparison of incomes.

In re Marriage of Sobieski · filed 2013-01-29(j)(2)

Section 503(j) directs consideration of the factors listed under section 503(d) and, if maintenance was awarded, the factors under section 504(a). ... Accordingly, we reject Jon’s argument that we are to apply a simple formula to compare relative financial situations.

Section 503(j)’s filing deadline for attorney fee contribution petitions does not apply to postdecree petitions.

Blum v. Koster · filed 2009-10-08(j)

Finally, we hold that section 503(j) does not apply to postdecree petitions for contribution of attorney fees and the trial court therefore erroneously dismissed Judy’s petition for contribution of attorney fees as untimely.

Section 503(j)(2) provides for attorney fee contribution between the two spouses in a dissolution action.

Pal v. Gudgel · filed 2010-01-27(j)(2)

Thus, the language of section 503(j)(2) also makes clear only two parties, the spouses, are involved when making an award of attorney fees.

Section 503(j)(2) limits attorney-fee contribution awards to the two spouses in a dissolution action.

In re the Marriage of Pal · filed 2010-01-27(j)(2)

Thus, the language of section 503(j)(2) also makes clear only two parties, the spouses, are involved when making an award of attorney fees.

Section 503(j)(2) bases an award of contribution to fees and costs on the criteria for dividing marital property and, if maintenance has been awarded, on the maintenance criteria.

In re Marriage of Bolte · filed 2012-09-12(j)(2)

Section 503(j)(2) provides that any award of contribution for fees and costs to one party from the other party shall be based on the criteria for division of marital property under this section 503 and, if maintenance has been awarded, on the criteria for an award of maintenance under section 504 (750 ILCS 5/503(j)(2) (West 2010)).

Section 503(j)(2) bases a contribution to attorney fees on the property division criteria and, when maintenance has been awarded, the maintenance criteria.

In re Marriage of Price · filed 2013-03-22(j)(2)

The trial court considered all of the financial issues affecting both parties as it should have under sections 503 and 504 of the Dissolution Act, including the distribution of their assets, their liabilities, and Jill’s award of maintenance in ordering Melvin to pay a portion of Jill’s attorney fees.

Section 503(j) requires a contribution petition to be decided before judgment, but that timing requirement is not jurisdictional, so a pending petition may still be heard after judgment.

In re Marriage of Cozzi-Digiovanni · filed 2014-06-27(j)

Following Belleville and Lindsay-Robinson, the timing requirement in section 503(j) is not jurisdictional. Accordingly, Canulli's reinstated petition should have been heard, even though the court had already entered the judgment.

Section 503(j) requires a contribution petition to be decided before final judgment, but missing that deadline does not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction.

In re Marriage of Cozzi-DiGiovanni · filed 2014-08-28(j)

The timing provisions in section 503(j) are not jurisdictional prerequisites.

Section 503(j)(2) requires courts deciding attorney-fee contribution to consider the criteria for dividing marital property and, if maintenance has been awarded, the criteria for awarding maintenance.

In re Marriage of Shen · filed 2015-06-30(j)(2)

Thus, the same criteria regarding the division of marital property thus must be considered in determining a request for contribution to attorney fees.

Section 503(j)(2) requires courts deciding contribution to attorney fees to consider the criteria for dividing marital property and, if maintenance has been awarded, the criteria for awarding maintenance.

In re Marriage of Shen · filed 2015-08-19(j)(2)

Thus, the same criteria regarding the division of marital property thus must be considered in determining a request for contribution to attorney fees.

Section 503(j)(2) requires attorney fee contributions to be assessed using the criteria for dividing marital property or awarding maintenance.

In re Marriage of Paris · filed 2019-12-19(j)(2)

Section 503(j)(2) also instructs the trial court to award attorney fees based on the criteria for the division of marital property or the award of maintenance.

Section 503(j) applies to contribution to attorney fees only after the court has resolved all other issues between the parties.

In re Marriage of Crecos · filed 2020-06-22(j)

Section 503(j) on its face applies only when the court has resolved “all *** issues between the parties” other than the award of attorney fees.

Section 503(j)(2) bases attorney fee contribution awards on the property division criteria in subsection (d) and, when maintenance has been awarded, the maintenance criteria in section 504.

In re Marriage of Power · filed 2021-06-25(j)(2)

Under section 503(j), an award of contribution for one party’s attorney fees must be based on the criteria for division of marital property under section 503(d) of the Act and, if maintenance has been awarded, the criteria for an award of maintenance under section 504 of the Act.

Section 503(j) does not waive a contribution petition filed before trial merely because the court enters a dissolution judgment before hearing it.

In re Marriage of Montana · filed 2022-01-28(j)

In this case, Vito filed a petition for contribution to attorney fees before the matter even proceeded to trial. For this reason, we reject Natalia’s argument that resolution of the fee petitions is waived under section 503(j) because the circuit court did not conduct a hearing on the petitions before entering the order of dissolution.

Section 503(j)(2) bases an attorney fee contribution award on the criteria for dividing marital property and, when maintenance has been awarded, the criteria for maintenance.

In re Marriage of Conopeotis · filed 2022-07-28(j)(2)

A contribution award is based on the criteria for the division of marital property and, where maintenance has been awarded, the criteria for an award of maintenance. 750 ILCS 5/503(d), 503(j)(2), 504(a), 508(a) (West 2018).

Section 503(j) requires a fee contribution petition to be heard and decided, but does not require a separate hearing.

In re Marriage of Almodovar · filed 2023-11-13(j)

Thus, although Janet was not entitled to a separate hearing on her petition, she was entitled to have her petition heard and decided.

Section 503(j) applies to attorney fee contributions in parentage proceedings, where the court must consider the reasonableness of the requested fees.

In re Parentage of Z.B.M. · filed 2025-04-09(j)

This court has found section 503(j) to be applicable in parentage proceedings. ... It follows that, in this context, the trial court must consider the reasonableness of the attorney fees requested.

Section 503(j)(2) bases an award of contribution to attorney fees on the criteria for dividing marital property and, if maintenance has been awarded, the criteria for awarding maintenance.

In re Former Marriage of Skalla · filed 2024-03-01(j)(2)

Subsection 503(j) of the Act states that “[a]ny award of contribution to one party from the other party shall be based on the criteria for division of marital property under this Section 503 and, if maintenance has been awarded, on the criteria for an award of maintenance under Section 504.” 750 ILCS 5/503(j)(2) (West 2022). ... Here, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered John to contribute $50,000 towards Elizabeth’s attorney fees. The court based its decision on many of the statutory factors above, including Elizabeth’s age, her financial situation after the loss of her job with Lake Lodge Associates, and her financial prospects, as well as John’s continued ability to ... earn over $200,000 a year.

Section 503(j)(2) requires an attorney fee contribution award to account for the criteria for dividing marital property and, if maintenance has been awarded, the criteria for awarding maintenance.

In re Marriage of Chapa · filed 2024-06-20(j)(2)

Section 503(j) requires that any award of contribution “shall be based on the criteria for division of marital property under this Section 503 and, if maintenance has been awarded, on the criteria for an award of maintenance under Section 504.” 750 ILCS 5/503(j)(2) (West 2020). ... Further, we find that the court’s failure to identify the relevant statutory factors in granting its attorney fee award resulted in the application of the improper legal standard, and its failure to rationalize its fee award amounted to an abuse of its discretion.

When a dissolution judgment awards no maintenance, section 503(j)(2) bases contribution to attorney fees on the section 503(d) marital property factors.

In re Marriage of Bremer · filed 2024-10-18(j)(2)

Here, Kathy focuses on the factors in section 504, however, because the court did not award maintenance in the dissolution judgment, section 503(j) indicates that the factors to be considered are those in section 503(d), although we acknowledge some of the factors are the same or similar.

Section 503(j) permits a court to order one spouse to contribute to the other’s reasonable attorney fees when the requesting spouse establishes an inability to pay and the other spouse’s ability to pay.

In re Marriage of Lugo · filed 2025-04-07(j)

However, various sections of the Act permit a trial court to order one party to contribute to the other party’s reasonable attorney fees in light of the parties’ respective financial positions. See 750 ILCS 5/503(j) (West 2018), 5/508 (West 2016). To obtain attorney fees under the Act, the party seeking them must establish his or her inability to pay the fees and the other spouse’s ability to do so. ... Carey’s failure to meet her burden on her fee contribution request was due to her own actions stemming from her failure to engage in the discovery process. After reviewing the record, we again do not find that the court abused its discretion in denying Carey’s petition for contribution.

Section 503(j) permits a court to order contribution toward a spouse’s reasonable attorney fees when the requesting spouse cannot pay and the other spouse can.

In re Marriage of Lugo · filed 2025-05-12(j)

However, various sections of the Act permit a trial court to order ... one party to contribute to the other party’s reasonable attorney fees in light of the parties’ respective financial positions. See 750 ILCS 5/503(j), 508 (West 2018). To obtain attorney fees under the Act, the party seeking them must establish his or her inability to pay the fees and the other spouse’s ability to do so.

Section 503(j) requires a petition for contribution before a court may award attorney’s fees; a request in closing argument does not satisfy that requirement.

In re Marriage of Paul · filed 2025-07-16(j)(1)

Reading Section 508 and Section 503(j) in conjunction, it is clear that a procedural requirement for an award of contribution to attorney’s fees is the filing of a petition for contribution.

Section 503(j)(1) does not require a separate petition for contribution to attorney fees when the party’s pleadings already request payment of those fees.

In re Marriage of Kestner-Pennell · filed 2024-06-05(j)(1)

While certainly the better practice would have been for petitioner to have filed a petition for contribution to make her request clear, we conclude that she was not required to do so ... when her pleadings contained such a request.

Section 503(j)(1) requires a petition for contribution to fees and costs incurred for a final hearing to be filed within 14 days after the closing of proofs, regardless of when final judgment is entered.

Walker v. Tillman · filed 2025-09-26(j)(1)

Melody’s argument that there was no final order because the various post-judgment motions tolled the time in which she was required to petition for fees has no basis in Section 503(j)(1), which requires the petition to be filed within 14 days of “the closing of proofs,” and not a final judgment.

Section 503(d)’s property division factors govern the ability-to-pay analysis for attorney fees through section 503(j); fault for increasing litigation is not one of those factors.

In re Marriage of Hipes · filed 2025-08-05(d)

However, unlike sanctions under section 508(b), fault for increasing litigation is not among the statutory factors that govern the ability-to-pay-analysis that applies to sections 508(a) and 506(b) (see 750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2022)) and is therefore irrelevant to our consideration of the parties’ ability to pay section 508(a) and 506(b) fees.

Section 503 does not provide an adequate remedy at law to protect an interest in marital property that includes unique real estate.

In Re Marriage of Schmitt · filed 2001-04-25

Moreover, there is no adequate remedy at law. Respondent insists that section 503 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/503 (West Supp. 1999)) is adequate to protect petitioner’s interest in the disposition of property. Respondent reasons that, because petitioner only seeks to protect a monetary interest that can be calculated with certainty, an injunction was inappropriate. Respondent, however, does not consider that the marital estate consists of more than monies. It also contains various trusts and other properties. Because of the unique nature of real estate, respondent’s argument is without merit.

Section 503 cannot authorize division of future Social Security benefits as marital property because federal law preempts that use of its property division rules.

In Re Marriage of Hulstrom · filed 2003-07-29

In Mitchell, the Marriage Act authorized the trial court to enter the child support order; but in this case, the property division section of the Marriage Act is preempted by the Social Security Act, which bars the transfer of social security benefits. Because the trial court in this case lacked jurisdiction to divide the parties’ social security benefits, the traditional rule governing void and voidable judgments, as restated in Mitchell, indicates that the portion of the judgment allocating the marital property is void.

Section 503(d) permits division only of marital property, so hypothetical Social Security benefits cannot be used to reduce the value of a marital pension.

In re Marriage of Mueller · filed 2015-06-18(d)

And if Social Security benefits are not marital property, then surely hypothetical Social Security benefits, like those calculated by Mack, are not marital property and cannot be used to pare down the value of marital property. ... To hold otherwise would be to ignore section 503(d), which instructs trial courts to divide only marital property.

Section 503(d) excludes from equitable division the portion of a pension earned in lieu of Social Security benefits; any excess remains subject to division.

In re Marriage of Roberts · filed 2015-05-29(d)

The portion of petitioner’s pension exceeding the value of the Social Security benefits she would have received, if any, remains subject to equitable distribution.

Section 503(d), read with section 504, permits a court to require life insurance as security for a maintenance obligation.

In Re Marriage of Walker · filed 2008-11-26(d)

In light of this liberal construction, sections 503 and 504 are sufficiently broad to allow the trial court to award a form of security for a maintenance obligation, not necessarily limited to life insurance.

Section 5/503(e)'s marital property concept applies when dissolution proceedings begin and does not determine spouses' interests in a joint tax refund in bankruptcy.

Gerald O. McInerney · filed 2019-11-15(e)

That law, however, applies only when spouses are seeking a dissolution of marriage. ... Adopting the idea of marital property from domestic relations law to determine the Debtor’s interest in the joint tax refunds here does not further the goals of bankruptcy.

Section 5/503(e) gives each spouse a contingent interest in marital property owned by one spouse when a divorce petition is filed.

Reid v. Wolf (In re Wolf) · filed 2018-11-19(e)

If, at the time of the divorce petition, one spouse owns property that is also marital property, then his/her independent ownership ceases, and each spouse acquires a contingent interest in the property.

Section 503(e) gives each spouse a contingent interest in marital property when a dissolution petition is filed.

Reinbold v. Thorpe (In re Thorpe) · filed 2017-03-16(e)

Upon the filing of the divorce petition, each spouse acquired a contingent interest in all of the marital property, including each other’s half of the house.

Section 503(e) does not transfer one spouse’s interest in jointly owned marital property to the other spouse when a divorce petition is filed.

Reinbold ex rel. Estate of Thorpe v. Thorpe (In re Thorpe) · filed 2016-02-11(e)

As explained below, no transfer occurred when the divorce petition was filed since BELVA was already a joint owner of the property.

Section 5/503(e) makes an interest in marital property vest when dissolution proceedings begin and continue only while they are pending.

In re Ruhl · filed 2012-07-02(e)

Illinois does recognize a form of “marital property” acquired by spouses during a marriage, but this type of ownership only “vests at the time [marriage] dissolution proceedings are commenced and continues only during the pendency of the action.” 750 ILCS 5/503(e) (2008).

Section 5/503(e) gives each spouse a common ownership interest in marital property during dissolution proceedings, but that interest does not restrict the title holder’s transfer of the property absent a specific injunction.

Sa'd v. Comm'r · filed 2012-12-18(e)

We acknowledge that under Illinois law, during most of 2001 the stock of Action Mortgage was “marital property” in which “[e]ach spouse has a species of common ownership * * * which vests at the time dissolution proceedings are commenced and continues only during the pendency of the action.” 750 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/503(e). But the statute further provides that this “common ownership” interest in marital property “shall not encumber that property so as to restrict its transfer, assignment or conveyance by the title holder” unless the title holder is specifically enjoined from doing so.

Section 5/503(e) gives spouses common ownership of marital property only while dissolution proceedings are pending; it does not establish either spouse’s ownership after the divorce.

Steele v. Heard · filed 2013-02-04(e)

By its terms, that section does not render Steele’s rights in the Pension Settlement vested after the conclusion of the divorce proceedings, nor does it cause that Pension Settlement to become her sole and exclusive property. It says only that there was common ownership in the pension benefits when the divorce proceedings were underway, without indicating what (if any) interest Steele had in those benefits after entry of the divorce decree and conclusion of the divorce proceedings.

Section 503(e) gives each spouse a common ownership interest in marital property that vests when dissolution proceedings begin and continues while they are pending.

In re West · filed 2014-03-26(e)

The parties further agree that the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act provides that “[e]ach spouse has a species of common ownership in the marital property which vests at the time dissolution proceedings are commenced and continues only during the pendency of the action.” 750 ILCS 5/503(e). Due to that law, and thereafter due to the Judgment for Dissolution of Marriage, in accordance with that Judgment, the Debtor has an interest in the Retirement Plan. Upon the entry of the Judgment for Dissolution, which incorporated the MSA, that interest became quantified and the Debtor’s sole and separate property.

Section 5/503 gives a spouse no vested interest in marital property before the property rights established by a dissolution judgment become final.

United States v. Tresch · filed 2015-12-22(e)

But Tresch concedes that the money was marital property when he posted the bond and when he moved for exoneration, 750 ILCS 5/503(b)(1), meaning that Ms. Tresch had no vested interest in the money, id. 5/503(e).

Section 5/503(e) gives each spouse a species of common ownership in marital property from the filing of a divorce petition until the property is distributed.

Lunn v. Lunn · filed 2022-06-21(e)

Applying Sanderfoot and § 5/503(e) to the case at bar, a species of common ownership in the parties’ marital property was created pursuant to § 5/503(e) when the divorce petition was filed on September 12, 2016.

Section 503(b-5)(1) does not authorize a court to require life insurance to secure a property obligation.

In re Marriage of Porikos-Gorgees · filed 2021-11-08(b-5)(1)

Section 503(b-5)(1) does not authorize the court to ... require life insurance to secure a property obligation.

Section 503(b-5)(2) does not revoke a former spouse’s life insurance beneficiary designation when the dissolution judgment predates the provision’s effective date.

Shaw v. U.S. Financial Life Insurance · filed 2022-11-16(b-5)(2)

We therefore conclude that the most reasonable reading of the statute is that the operative act which triggers its application is the entry of the dissolution ... judgment. In the instant case, where the date of the dissolution judgment preceded the effective date of the statute, the statute does not apply.

Section 5/503(b-5)'s beneficiary redesignation rule does not apply to life insurance policies when ERISA or another federal law preempts it.

King v. King · filed 2023-05-10(b-5)(4)

Thus, whether the provision applies depends on whether ERISA preempts the redesignation provision—an item that has not been briefed.

Section 503(b-5) does not revoke a former spouse’s life insurance beneficiary designation when the dissolution judgment predates the amendment’s effective date.

Murphy v. Transamerica Life Insurance Company · filed 2023-07-18(b-5)

In other words, even after their divorce, Beverly remained the primary beneficiary of Tyrone’s life insurance because the date of their dissolution judgment predated the Act’s amendments. Id. ... Here, the Court finds no convincing reason to believe the Illinois Supreme Court would decide the issue differently. ... Therefore, because Shaw is fatal to Plaintiff’s arguments, Plaintiff’s claim is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Section 5/503(b-5) makes a former spouse’s life insurance beneficiary designation ineffective after divorce unless a statutory exception applies, and directs payment to the named alternative beneficiary.

State Farm Life Insurance Company v. Smith · filed 2024-04-04(b-5)(2)-(3)

Accordingly, any designation of Catherine as a beneficiary of the Personal Policy is ineffective under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. Because the designation is ineffective, the proceeds are payable to Daniel, the named alternative beneficiary of the Personal Policy.

Section 5/503(b-5) does not apply retroactively to a divorce that preceded its effective date because it affects substantive beneficiary rights.

American General Life Insurance Company v. Whitney Martin, Special Administrator of the Estate of Jean Robert Saintilus · filed 2024-12-03(b-5)

Here, the Illinois revocation-by-divorce stat- ute does not apply retroactively to Oracin’s divorce, leaving her as the named benefi- ciary of the life insurance policy.