815 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 505/1

Section 505/1 includes corporate officers, directors, and stockholders in its definition of persons who may be sued under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act.

DeLeon v. Beneficial Construction Co. · filed 1998-01-16

ICFA clearly provides that “any person” may be sued under its provisions, including “any agent, employee, salesman, partner, officer, director, member, [or], stockholder” of a corporation that is also being sued.

Section 1(c) defines “person” to include corporate salesmen and employees, allowing an employee who participates in a deceptive practice to be sued individually under the Act.

Garcia v. Overload Bond & Investment Co. · filed 1996-07-05(c)

Section 1(c) of the Act includes corporations and the salesmen and employees who work for these corporations within the definition of the term "person.” 815 ILCS 505/1(c) (West 1992). Given this definition, we must determine whether the plaintiffs have properly pleaded a cause of action against Bass under section 2. ... Therefore, the trial judge erred in dismissing him as a party defendant.

Section 1 defines “person” to include both natural persons and businesses, so the same standing test applies to each under the Act.

Bank One Milwaukee v. Sanchez · filed 2003-01-17

Thus, the Act draws no distinction between natural persons and businesses, granting both the status of "person." By virtue of this status, both are further granted the right to bring an action under the Act in section 10a.

Section 505/1(c) excludes a board of education, as a body politic, from the definition of a “person.”

Cooney v. Chicago Public Schools · filed 2010-12-30(c)

The Board, as a body politic, is not a “person” within the meaning of the Consurmer Fraud Act and therefore cannot be held liable for a violation of the statute.

Section 505/1(c)'s definition of “person” excludes school districts, so they lack standing to sue under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act.

In re Riddell Concussion Reduction Litigation · filed 2015-01-15(c)

The ICFA defines “person” to include any natural person or his legal representative, partnership, corporation (domestic and foreign), company, trust, business entity or association, and any agent, employee, salesman, partner, officer, director, member, stockholder, associate, trustee or cestui que trust thereof. ... Accordingly, claims by the Cohokia School District under the ICFA must be dismissed with prejudice because the school district lacks standing and amendment would be futile.

Section 505/1 defines “person” to include business entities, associations, and trusts, allowing such entities to sue under the Act when the statutory requirements are met.

Russo v. Walgreen Co. · filed 2018-03-09

But Walgreens ignores the fact that “person” is defined to include business entities, associations, and trusts. 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 505/1.

Section 505/1(c) excludes municipalities from the definition of “person,” so they cannot sue or be sued under the ICFA.

Brown v. City of Chicago · filed 2020-01-30(c)

Finally, the City contends that a municipality is not a person under the ICFA and is, therefore, not subject to suit. 815 ILCS 505/1(c). The Court agrees. ... As aresult, the City is not able to sue or be sued under the ICFA.

Section 505/1(c) defines persons to include partnerships, corporations, companies, and business entities and associations.

In Re American continental/lincoln S & L SEC. Lit. · filed 1993-11-29(c)

Persons are defined to include partnerships, corporations, companies, and business entities and associations.

Section 505/1(e) does not treat a business as a consumer when it buys cars to rent to customers and eventually resell.

KC Rental, LLC v. WMK Automotive, Inc. · filed 2024-09-18(e)

The fact that KC Rental initially leased, rather than sold, its cars to customers is immaterial—either way, the cars were purchased for the customers’ use and also for eventual resale, which means that KC Rental was not a “consumer” under the ICFA for the Kia Forte GT it attempted to purchase from McGrath Kia.

A seller of grain is not a consumer under Section 505/1(e) merely because having a buyer benefits his business.

Webster v. Bunge-SCF Grain, LLC · filed 2024-01-30(e)

Instead, Plaintiff is receiving money for his grain. His business certainly benefits from having a buyer, but that benefit alone does not mean that he is receiving a service. Although Plaintiff attempts to contort the facts to turn himself into the consumer, that is simply not the case.

Section 505/1(e) defines a consumer as a person who purchases merchandise for use rather than resale; an individual must allege their own purchase to claim consumer status.

Ali v. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. · filed 2021-09-13(e)

A consumer is defined as “any person who purchases or contracts for the purchase of merchandise not for resale in the ordinary course of his trade or business but for his use or that of a member of his household.” 815 ILCS 505/1(e). ... On this record, Plaintiff has not stated a claim for relief under the ICFA as a “consumer” of the Subject Vehicle.

A person who purchases an intangible and contracts for its servicing is a consumer under the Act.

Wafra Leasing Corp. 1999-A-1 v. Prime Capital Corp. · filed 2002-05-28(e)

The Act applies to securities transactions, see Lyne v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 772 F.Supp. 1064, 1068 (N.D. Ill.1991), and Wafra alleges that it purchased the Owner’s Certificate (an “intangible”) and contracted for the servicing of the financial contract (“services”), Compl. ¶¶ 39, 41, so it contracted for the sale of “merchandise” under § 1(b) of the Acts and is therefore a “consumer.” § 1(e).

Franchise rights may qualify as intangible merchandise, allowing their purchasers to qualify as consumers under Section 505/1.

Bixby's Food Systems, Inc. v. McKay · filed 1997-11-21(b), (e)

Counter defendants fail to explain why franchise rights would not come under this expansive definition, perhaps falling into the category of intangibles. ... This would bring the McKays within the definition of “consumers.”

Section 505/1 defines consumer to include business entities that purchase services without reselling them in the ordinary course of business.

Law Offices of William J. Stogsdill v. Cragin Federal Bank for Savings · filed 1995-01-10(b), (c), (e), and (f)

The Act defines "consumer” as any person who purchases merchandise not for resale in the ordinary course of his business. (815 ILCS 505/1(e) (West 1992).) "[M]erchandise” includes services. (815 ILCS 505/1(b) (West 1992).) "[P]erson” includes a partnership, corporation, or business entity. (815 ILCS 505/1(c) (West 1992).) Thus, plaintiff fits the broad statutory definition of a consumer. The fact that both parties to the transaction are business entities does not render the Act inapplicable.

A buyer of Illinois real estate is not a “consumer” under the section’s definitions of consumer and merchandise.

Scarsdale Builders, Inc. v. Ryland Group, Inc. · filed 1996-01-16(e), (b)

Those provisions certainly make it plain that the buyer of real estate in Illinois is not a “consumer” in statutory terms.

Section 505/1(e) requires a person to purchase or contract to purchase merchandise to qualify as a consumer of that merchandise.

Serpico v. Menard, Inc. · filed 1996-05-17(e)

It is undisputed that plaintiff did not purchase or contract to purchase defendant’s nut at the time he left defendant’s store, and that this case resulted from that conduct.

A corporation purchasing banking services for its own use can be a consumer under section 505/1(e).

Skyline International Development v. Citibank, F.S.B. · filed 1998-12-15(e)

We find that Skyline was a consumer under the definition provided by the Act. Plaintiff, though a corporation, was a consumer of defendant’s banking services when it requested the wire transfer.

Section 505/1(e) defines a consumer as a person who purchases merchandise for use rather than resale; a seller of scrap is not the consumer in that transaction.

3Com Corp. v. Electronic Recovery Specialists, Inc. · filed 2000-06-09(e)

The ICFA defines a consumer as “any person who purchases or contracts for the purchase of merchandise not for resale in the ordinary course of his trade or business but for his use or that of a member of his household.” 815 ILCS 505/l(e). ... Plaintiff cannot be considered thé consumer in this relationship.

Section 505/1(e)’s definition of consumer covers purchasers of banking services.

Randazzo v. Harris Bank Palatine, N.A. · filed 2000-07-07(e)

As to the standing issue, the statute defines a “consumer” as “any person who purchases or contracts for the purchase of merchandise not for resale in the ordinary course of his trade or business but for use or that of a member of his household.” 815 ILCS § 505/l(e). ... And, in fact, it is clear that the Consumer Fraud Act protects purchasers of banking services. ... Additionally, Randazzo’s stock sale occurred during the course of his business relationship (his purchase of banking services) with Harris Bank. Therefore, we conclude that Randazzo has standing under the Consumer Fraud Act.

Section 505/1(e) defines a consumer as someone who purchases merchandise for use rather than for resale in the ordinary course of business.

Prime Leasing, Inc. v. Kendig · filed 2002-06-28(e)

Prime, as the lessor, sold its services to Ben Franklin; it was not a consumer and, as such, cannot be granted relief under the Act. Wechsler is a stock brokerage firm and market maker and subsequently purchased Ben Franklin stocks in the ordinary course of its business. Since Wechsler bought Ben Franklin stocks or bonds in the ordinary course of business, it was not a consumer as defined by the Act.

Section 505/1(e) excludes people who purchase merchandise for resale from its definition of consumer.

DeJohn v. The. TV Corp. Intern. · filed 2003-01-16(e)

Under the statute, the term “consumer” means “any person who purchases or contracts for the purchase of merchandise not for resale in the ordinary course of his trade or business but for his use or that of a member of his household.” 815 ILCS § 505/l(e). ... DeJohn is thus not a consumer and lacks standing to pursue a claim based on the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Practices Act.

A business that resells a purchased service in the ordinary course of business is not a consumer under the Act’s definition.

First Magnus Financial Corp. v. Dobrowski · filed 2005-06-02(e)

Plaintiffs allegations reveal that it resold Alliance Trust’s service in the ordinary course of its business, and thus it was not a consumer under the ICFA definition.

Purchasing another corporation’s assets does not, by itself, make a business a consumer under the Act.

American Roller Co. v. Foster-Adams Leasing, LLP · filed 2007-02-06(e)

The mere purchasing of assets from another corporation, though, does not establish plaintiff as a consumer, and no court has ever broadened the reach of the ICFA to cover a corporate acquisition.

Section 505/1 allows a corporation that buys insurance for its own use to qualify as a consumer under the Act.

Labella Winnetka, Inc. v. General Casualty Insurance · filed 2009-08-19(e), (c)

The Act by its terms allows a corporation to qualify as a “consumer” who can bring suit, so long as it “purchases or contracts for the purchase of merchandise * * * for his use or that of a member of his household.” 815 ILCS 505/l(e), 1(c). Because the sale of insurance qualifies as merchandise, insureds are considered consumers within the Act.

A purchaser who buys merchandise for resale is not a consumer under the Act.

MacNeil Automotive Products, Ltd. v. Cannon Automotive Ltd. · filed 2010-05-25(e)

MacNeil sought to resell the floor mats to carmakers and thus is not a consumer.

Section 505/1(e) defines a consumer as someone who buys merchandise for personal or household use rather than for resale in the ordinary course of business.

Jamison v. SUMMER INFANT (USA), INC. · filed 2011-04-18(e)

She clearly has standing to sue as a consumer under the ICFA, which defines “consumer” as “any person who purchases or contracts for the purchase of merchandise not for resale in the ordinary course of his trade or business but for his use or that of a member of his household.” 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/1(e).

A corporation purchasing another business’s product for resale is not a consumer under the Act.

Freedom Mortgage Corp. v. Burnham Mortgage, Inc. · filed 2010-06-14(e)

Under the ICFA, “consumer” is defined as “any person who purchases or contracts for the purchase of merchandise not for resale in the ordinary course of his trade or business but for his use or that of a member of his household.” 815 ILCS 505/l(e). ... In the instant case, Freedom was not a consumer of Ticor’s “product” — the loans and title commitments, which Freedom purchased for resale.

A business is not a consumer under Section 1(e) when it buys a component for incorporation into the finished product it sells to customers.

Tile Unlimited, Inc. v. Blanke Corp. · filed 2011-04-20(e)

The ICFA defines “consumer” as “any person who purchases ... merchandise not for resale in the ordinary course of his trade or business but for his use or that of a member of his household.” 815 ILCS 505/l(e). ... Accordingly, Tile Unlimited is not a “consumer” under the ICFA, at least with respect to its purchase of Uni-Mat Pro.

A person who buys a purported money-making program can be a consumer under the Act, even if the person seeks financial gain.

Morrison v. YTB International, Inc. · filed 2011-07-27(e)

Plaintiffs are consumers in the sense that they purchased a product from YTB. That YTB’s product is a (supposedly) money-making program does not make plaintiffs “businesses” in their dealings with YTB, even if they would be classified as businesses in their dealings with people who want to get from Los Angeles to Lahore.

An employee asserting a claim arising from employment is not a consumer under section 505/1(e).

Hess v. Kanoski & Associat · filed 2012-02-02(e)

Hess has no claim under the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act, Count II, because Hess was an employee, not a “consumer.”

Section 505/1(e) defines a consumer as someone who purchases or contracts to purchase merchandise for their own or household use, rather than for resale; requesting utility markings without a purchase does not satisfy that definition.

Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Munizzo · filed 2013-03-26(e)

Today, and at all times relevant to this matter, the Consumer Fraud Act defines a consumer as “any person who purchases or contracts for the purchase of merchandise not for resale in the ordinary course of his trade or business but for his use or that of a member of his household.” 815 ILCS 505/1(e) (West 2010). ... We agree with the trial court that the transaction described in Munizzo’s consumer fraud count is not one involving a person who purchases or contracts for the purchase of merchandise. Therefore, we find that the trial court did not err in finding Munizzo failed to meet the definition of a consumer within the Consumer Fraud Act.

A person who exchanges marketing services for in-game lives can qualify as a consumer under the ICFA.

Liston v. King.com, Ltd. · filed 2017-05-23(e)

The Court need not evaluate whether Liston has satisfied the consumer nexus test because he has adequately alleged that he is a “consumer” under ICFA. ... Liston has thus alleged that he agreed to exchange his marketing services for valuable Donated Lives, and meets the definition of “consumer” for ICFA purposes.

Section 505/1(e) defines a consumer as a person who purchases merchandise for personal or household use rather than for resale in the ordinary course of business.

Kmak v. Sorin Group Deutschland GMBH · filed 2017-12-12(e)

The ICFA defines a consumer as “any person who purchases or contracts for the purchase of merchandise11 not for resale in the ... ordinary course of his trade or business but for his use or that of a member of his household.” 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/1(e). Even reviewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, she has not alleged that she bought the 3T System for her or her household’s use.

Section 505/1(e) treats prospective home buyers as consumers when the challenged business practices affect them; home sellers are not consumers on that theory.

Patel v. Zillow, Inc. · filed 2018-05-07(e)

Because Plaintiffs’ theory of liability relates to Zillow’s business practices affecting potential home buyers – the “consumers” for purposes of this ICFA claim are the home buyers, not Plaintiffs.

Section 505/1(e) defines a consumer as someone who buys merchandise for personal or household use rather than resale.

CHS Acquisition Corp v. Watson Coatings, Inc. · filed 2018-08-20(e)

A consumer is defined in the ICFA as “any person who ... purchases or contracts for the purchase of merchandise not for resale in the ordinary course of his trade or business but for his use or that of a member of his household.” 815 ILCS 505/1(e). ... Because Watson did not purchase the resin for its own use, it does not meet the statutory definition of a “consumer.”

Section 1(e) defines a consumer to include a person who obtains merchandise for personal or household use without requiring privity with the provider.

Griffin v. Safeguard Properties Management LLC · filed 2019-07-19(e)

Safeguard alleges that plaintiffs do not meet the ICFA's definition of "consumers" and thus cannot maintain a claim under that statute. It relies on the ICFA's definition of a consumer as a "person who purchases or contracts for the purchase of merchandise nor for resale in the ordinary course of his trade or business but for his use or that for a member of his household." 815 ILCS 505/1(e). ... They did not purchase these services from Safeguard, but the statute, including the definition of "consumer," does not "require that privity exist between the purchaser and the provider" of the services. ... Thus they meet the statutory definition of a consumer.

Section 505/1(e) defines a consumer as someone who purchases merchandise for personal or household use.

Thakkar v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC · filed 2019-05-17(e)

The ICFA defines a “consumer” as “any person who purchases or contracts for the purchase of merchandise not for resale in the ordinary course of his trade or business but for his use or that of a member of his household.” 815 ILCS § 505/1(e). The first element of the “consumer nexus” test is satisfied because Thakkar was in a position akin to that of a consumer.

A franchisee’s purchase of leases, licenses, and services needed to run its business does not make it a consumer under § 505/1(e).

Hashmi v. 7-Eleven Inc · filed 2020-02-06(e)

Just as in Lululemon, here, the leases, licenses, and services that Plaintiffs purchased from 7-Eleven were “necessary prerequisite[s]” for their business. ... So understood, those purchases do not make Plaintiffs consumers within the meaning of the Act.

Section 505/1(e) defines a consumer as a person who purchases merchandise for personal or household use rather than resale.

Breeze v. Bayco Products, Inc. · filed 2020-04-09(e)

A consumer under the ICFA “means any person who purchases or contracts for the purchase of merchandise not for resale in the ordinary course of his trade or business but for his use or that of a member of his household. 815 ILCS 505/1(e). The decedent did not purchase the Bayco light and thus does not fit squarely into the definition of a consumer.

Section 505/1(e) defines a consumer as a person who purchases or contracts to purchase merchandise for personal or household use.

Cummings v. TVI, Inc. · filed 2020-03-05(e)

In this case, it is clear that neither the plaintiff nor his decedent were consumers under 815 ILCS § 505/1(e) of the ICFA. They did not purchase or contract for the purchase of any merchandise relevant to the decedent’s tripping and falling.

Section 505/1(e) defines a consumer as a person who purchases or contracts to purchase merchandise for nonresale use, so an individual cannot qualify merely because an affiliated business bought the item.

Ali v. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. · filed 2020-09-03(e)

Based on the statutory text, the Fraud Act grants a cause of action to any “person” who “purchases or contracts for the purchase of merchandise… .” 815 ILCS 505/1(e) (emphasis added). ... In short, Ali simply does not allege any facts to suggest that he personally purchased the vehicle. Because Ali is not a “consumer” as defined by the Fraud Act, he is the wrong party to bring a claim against McGrath.

Section 505/1's consumer definition does not require a purchaser to have a direct contract with the defendant.

Griffin v. Safeguard Properties Management LLC · filed 2020-10-16

Though the defendants note that Griffin did not directly contract with them, she needn't have. ICFA's definition of consumer does not "require that privity exist between the purchaser and the provider of the merchandise."

Section 1(c) defines “consumer,” and section 1(e) includes corporations and their employees, officers, directors, and shareholders within “person.”

Alma Lasers, Inc. v. Yigazu Isthetics, Inc. · filed 2021-02-26(c), (e)

For purposes of the Act, a “consumer” is “any person who purchases or contracts for the purchase of merchandise not for resale in the ordinary course of his trade or business but for his use or that of a member of his household,” and a “person” includes a corporation and its employees, officers, directors, and shareholders. 815 ILCS 505/1(c), (e) (West 2018).

Section 505/1(e) excludes a purchaser of rental investment property from the definition of “consumer” when the property is not intended for the purchaser’s or a household member’s use.

Jilani v. Berger · filed 2022-08-16(e)

Accordingly, regardless of whether it was the plaintiff or his company that purchased the property because the property was not intended for the plaintiff’s use or that of a household member, neither was a “consumer” under the plain language of the Act.

Section 505/1(e) defines a consumer as someone who purchases merchandise for use rather than resale; a service provider is not a consumer merely by providing services.

ALTISOURCE S.A.R.L v. SZUMANSKI · filed 2022-03-29(e)

The IFCA defines a “consumer” as “any person who purchases or contracts for the purchase of merchandise not for resale in the ordinary course of his trade or business but for his use or that of a member of his household.” 815 ILCS 505/1(e). ... First, Plaintiffs are not consumers. Rather, the Plaintiffs were the service provider in this case.

Tenants are consumers under the ICFA, so tenants bringing ICFA claims need not establish a separate consumer nexus.

Williams Jr v. Heartland Realty Investors, Inc. · filed 2022-08-01(e)

In doing so, courts have concluded tenants are consumers for purposes of the ICFA. ... Meanwhile, defendants’ consumer nexus argument does not fit the facts of this case because plaintiffs are the actual consumers.

Section 505/1(e) defines a consumer as a person who buys or contracts to buy merchandise for personal or household use rather than for resale in the ordinary course of business.

Butler v. Hogshead-Makar · filed 2023-07-20(e)

As an initial matter, Plaintiffs are not consumers under the ICFA. See 815 ILCS 505/1(e) (a consumer is “any person who purchases or contracts for the purchase of merchandise not for resale in the ordinary course of his trade or business but for his use or that of a member in his household.”). Plaintiffs have not alleged they purchased or contracted for the purchase of anything from Defendants.

A person harmed in their capacity as a supplier of labor is not a consumer under the Act.

Rivers v. Southway Carriers, Inc. · filed 2023-08-20(e)

But the distinction does not matter for purposes of the ICFA: a person harmed in his capacity as a supplier of labor, which is what is alleged here, is not a "consumer" under the statute.

Section 505/1(e) requires a consumer to purchase or contract for services for personal use rather than a business purpose.

Piquion v. Amerifreight Systems LLC · filed 2023-11-22(e)

This argument ignores the definition’s critical limitation: a consumer must purchase or contract for services for personal use—not for a business purpose.

Section 505/1(e) defines a consumer as someone who buys or contracts to buy merchandise for personal or household use; independent contractors exchanging services in a business relationship do not qualify.

Lee v. AAA Freight Inc. · filed 2023-05-02(e)

The court agrees with defendants that plaintiffs are not consumers as defined by the ICFA, and have not alleged a plausible consumer nexus. Plaintiffs do not allege that they purchased defendants’ services for their personal use; rather, plaintiff allege that they contracted with defendants to exchange services.

A franchisee that acquires rights to operate its business is not a consumer under section 505/1(e) when it uses those rights to sell its products rather than for personal use.

Hickory Hills Foodmart, Inc. v. Equilon Enterprises, LLC · filed 2023-06-29(e)

The law defines “consumer” as “any person who purchases or contracts for the purchase of merchandise not for resale in the ordinary course of his trade or business but for his use or that of a member of his household.” 815 ILCS 505/1(e). The Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff does not have standing under the ICFA because it cannot be considered a “consumer.” ... Assuming, arguendo, that franchise rights may be considered “merchandise,” these rights undoubtedly permitted Plaintiff to sell its fuel and carry out its business and thus were not for “personal use.”

A business that buys materials for resale as part of its product is not a consumer under the ICFA definition.

Our Pet Project, LLC v. International Paper Company · filed 2023-06-30(e)

The facts alleged, taken as true and in the light most favorable to OPP, establish that it is a business purchasing product for resale. The Court affirms its previous finding that, as a matter of law, OPP is not a “consumer” under ICFA.

Section 505/1(e) defines a consumer by a purchase or contract to purchase merchandise for the buyer’s or a household member’s use; a plaintiff outside that definition must plead a consumer nexus.

Advanced Hair Restoration LLC v. Restoration Holdings · filed 2026-03-30(e)

... the Court agrees that Advanced is not a “consumer” under the Fraud Act, so the consumer-nexus requirement applies to its claim. See 815 ILCS 505/1(e) (defining “consumer” as one “who purchases or contracts for the purchase of merchandise … for his use or that of a member of his household”).

A business that buys components to make products it sells is not a consumer under the Act’s definition.

Williams Electronics Games, Inc. v. Garrity · filed 2004-04-29(e)

In the non-literal reading adopted by that case, the business purchaser is not a consumer, because his only use of the purchased product is as an input into the making of a product that he sells, in contrast to the individual who consumes a six-pack of beer for pleasure or nutrition rather than incorporating the beer into a product (his beer belly is not for sale).

Section 505/1(e) defines a consumer as someone who purchases or contracts to purchase merchandise for personal or household use rather than resale; a claimant outside that definition must satisfy the consumer nexus test.

Mighty v. Safeguard Properties Management, LLC · filed 2018-10-30(e)

A consumer is defined in the ICFA as “any person who purchases or contracts for the purchase of merchandise not for resale in the ordinary course of his trade or business but for his use or that of a member of his household.” 815 ILCS 505/1(e). This court previously determined that the Estate is not a proper plaintiff as it pertains to count III and that Mighty, in her individual capacity, is not within the traditional understanding of ICFA consumers, so her claim must be analyzed under the “consumer nexus test.” (Dkt. 36 at 6.)

A business can qualify as a consumer under Section 505/1(e), but selling its portfolio to another company is not a consumer purchase.

Hyer Standards LLC v. Super G Capital LLC · filed 2020-06-01(e)

The ICFA defines a consumer as “any person who purchases or contracts for the purchase of merchandise not for resale in the ordinary course of his trade or business but for his use or that of a member of his household.” Id; 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/1(e). ... While Hyer is correct that a business can prevail under the ICFA, the alleged deceptive practice did not occur in the context of a purchase from Multipoint.

Section 1(c) allows businesses to bring actions under the Consumer Fraud Act even though they are not consumers.

Web Communications Group, Inc. v. GATEWAY 2000, INC. · filed 1995-03-29(c)

This fact notwithstanding, it is well established that plaintiffs need not actually be “consumers;” business have standing to bring actions under the Act.

Section 505/1(f)’s definition of trade or commerce permits the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act to apply to transactions involving Illinois corporations and consumers outside Illinois.

Perry v. Household Retail Services, Inc. · filed 1996-08-05(f)

The court’s analysis of Count III does not end here because the court must determine whether the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act applies to transactions where consumers reside outside Illinois. ... The Illinois Consumer Fraud Act has been applied to several other cases involving Illinois corporations, but not Illinois consumers. ... For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that HRSI’s motion for summary judgment relating to Count III is due to be denied.

Section 505/1(f) defines trade or commerce to include the sale of an extended service plan and the provision of covered repair services.

Williams v. Ford Motor Co. · filed 1997-11-20(f)

The CFA defines the terms “trade” and “commerce” to mean the “advertising, offering for sale, sale, or distribution of any services and any property____” 815 ILCS 505/l(f). ... Clearly, Highland’s sale of the ESP in connection with the sale of a used automobHe and its subsequent provision of covered repair services constitutes the type of “trade or commerce” contemplated by the CFA.

Section 1(f)’s definition of trade or commerce excludes an individual’s casual sale of their own single-family home, even when the sale uses a listing and a real estate agent.

Carrera v. Smith · filed 1999-07-16(f)

This issue requires us to determine whether the Smiths, private individuals who sold their own residence through a listing and with representation of a real estate agent, engaged in the conduct of a “trade or commerce” as defined by the Act. ... Under Zimmerman, the Smiths were not engaged in a “trade or commerce” under section 2 of the Act.

The definition of trade or commerce does not bar nonresident consumers from bringing ICFA claims for purchases in Illinois.

Tylka v. Gerber Products Co. · filed 1998-10-28(f)

Rather, the statute merely defines trade or commerce as including trade or commerce that “directly or indirectly affect[ ] the people of this State.” 815 ILCS 505/l(f). ... Accordingly, the court directs that with respect to standing under the ICFA, any Illinois consumers, or any non-resident consumers, who purchased the allegedly misrepresented items in Illinois within the relevant time period have standing to sue and are members of the class.

Section 1(f) defines trade or commerce by its effect on the people of Illinois; purchases and alleged injuries outside Illinois by consumers with no Illinois contact fall outside that definition.

Oliveira v. Amoco Oil Co. · filed 2000-02-09(f)

The language of the Act itself refers to trade or commerce under the Act as “directly or indirectly affecting the people of this State.” 815 ILCS 505/l(f) (West 1996). In the case of an out-of-state consumer, the trade or commerce referred to by the Act occurred outside Illinois where the putative class members lived, purchased gasoline, and were allegedly harmed. They had no contact with Illinois.

Section 1(f)’s phrase “wherever situated” describes property and things of value; it does not extend the Act to out-of-state consumer transactions.

Avery v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance · filed 2005-08-18(f)

The words "wherever situated" do not expand the scope of the Act to apply to consumer transactions that take place out-of-state.

Section 505/1(f)'s definition of trade or commerce excludes conduct within the actual practice of dentistry, including treatment decisions.

Tkacz v. Weiner · filed 2006-11-01(f)

The Act defines "trade and commerce" as "the advertising, offering for sale, sale, or distribution of any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value wherever situated, and shall include any trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of this State." 815 ILCS 505/1 (f) (West 2004). ... Consequently, we reject plaintiff's claim that the practice of dentistry is a "trade or commerce" so as to fall under the ambit of the Act.

Section 1(f)'s definition of trade or commerce does not bring an out-of-state transaction within the Consumer Fraud Act merely because a deceptive policy was devised in Illinois.

Phillips v. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. · filed 2007-03-26(f)

Under Avery, plaintiffs’ claim that the deceptive policies were devised in and promulgated from Illinois is not sufficient to establish a nexus with Illinois.

Section 505/1(f) limits the Act to conduct affecting people in Illinois; a nonresident’s claim must arise from circumstances occurring primarily and substantially in Illinois.

Orion Refining Corporation v. UOP, a General Partnership, UOP, LLC EM Sector Holdings, Inc., and Catalysts, Absorbents a · filed 2007-10-04(f)

In addition, the Act is directed against conduct "affecting the people of [Illinois]," 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 505/1(f) (West 1998); it has no "extraterritorial effect." ... We hold that Orion cannot recover under the Act because the alleged circumstances that relate to its claims did not occur "primarily and substantially in Illinois," as that phrase has been construed by the Illinois courts.

The Act’s definition of trade or commerce excludes medical, dental, and legal services.

Doe v. PLANNED PARENTHOOD/CHICAGO AREA · filed 2011-08-19

"Illinois courts have previously interpreted the term `trade or commerce' as defined by the Act to exclude medical, dental and legal services." Tkacz v. Weiner, 368 Ill.App.3d 610, 613, 306 Ill.Dec. 717, 858 N.E.2d 514 (2006). Count III of the plaintiff's complaint is outside the bounds of the Act.

Section 505/1(f) defines trade and commerce to include the sale of property, including a painting.

Freeman v. Fairchild · filed 2014-07-30(f)

The Illinois Act defines the terms “trade” and “commerce” as “the advertising, offering for sale, sale, or distribution of any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value . . . and shall include any trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of this [s]tate.” 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/1(f) (2007). Given the evidence Fairchild submitted in support of his claims for negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation, plus evidence that Love’s alleged deception occurred in the course of his sale of the painting to Fairchild, it is clear that Fairchild also made a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment on the claim under the Illinois Act.

Section 505/1(f) defines trade and commerce to include the sale of property, including a painting.

Freeman v. Fairchild · filed 2014-09-10(f)

The Illinois Act defines the terms “trade” and “commerce” as “the advertising, offering for sale, sale, or distribution of any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value . . . and shall include any trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of this [s]tate.” 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/1(f) (2007). Given ... the evidence Fairchild submitted in support of his claims for negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation, plus evidence that Love’s alleged deception occurred in the course of his sale of the painting to Fairchild, it is clear that Fairchild also made a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment on the claim under the Illinois Act.

Section 505/1(f) defines “trade” and “commerce” as including the advertising, offering for sale, sale, or distribution of services, property, and other things of value.

G & G Closed Circuit Events, LLC v. Castillo · filed 2018-06-20(f)

ICFA defines "trade" and "commerce" as "the advertising, offering for sale, sale, or distribution of any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value wherever situated." 815 ILCS 505/1(f). This definition heads off any ICFA claim based on the events described in the Third Amended Counterclaim. For G & G and Riley's actions to fall within the purview of ICFA, G & G and Riley would have had to engage in deceptive acts or unfair practices "in the conduct of" the "advertising, offering for sale, sale, or distribution" of G & G's property, 815 ILCS 505/1(f). The Castillos allege that G & G, Riley, and their agents engaged in all manner of shady practices in their attempts to extract settlements from unlicensed exhibitors of G & G properties. But G & G's efforts to enforce its rights through litigation and threats of litigation is not "the advertising, offering for sale, sale or distribution" of any property or service, which is what ICFA regulates.

Section 505/1 defines trade and commerce to include offering for sale, sale, or distribution of services and property.

Linkepic Inc. v. Vyasil, LLC · filed 2019-03-27

Illinois law defines "trade" and "commerce" to include the offering for sale, sale, or distribution of any services and any property. 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 505/1 (West 2007). This clearly covers Vyasil's sale of software development services to London.

The section defines trade and commerce to include offering for sale, sale, or distribution of services and property.

Veoxo, Inc. v. Vyasil, LLC · filed 2019-03-27

Illinois law defines “trade” and “commerce” to include the offering for sale, sale, or distribution of any services and any property. 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 505/1 (West 2007). This clearly covers Vyasil’s sale of software development services to London.

The definition of trade or commerce includes offering, selling, or distributing services or property and commerce affecting Illinois residents.

Mosier v. Village of Holiday Hills · filed 2019-05-03(f)

The term “trade or commerce” means the “advertising, offering for sale, sale, or distribution of any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value wherever situated, and shall include any trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of this State.” ... Because we determine—without opining on any of the other elements—that the Village was not engaged in trade or commerce, count II of the second amended complaint fails.

Section 505/1(f) defines trade and commerce to include distributing services that directly or indirectly affect Illinois residents.

Khan v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC · filed 2021-03-30(f)

I disagree. Ocwen recorded the loan release and false correction within the regular distribution of its services as a mortgage servicer, and therefore, in the course of trade or commerce. Specifically, the 2016 recorded documents were part of Ocwen’s services on behalf its client, mortgage-holder MERS. ... A reasonable chain of inferences follows: Ocwen’s services on behalf of clients like MERS included recording releases and related documents; the act of recording documents was part of its distribution of this service; it directly or indirectly affected the people of Illinois, namely Khan and other title holders, and it therefore amounted to the conduct of trade or commerce under ICFA.

Section 505/1(f) defines trade and commerce to include the sale or distribution of services and property and commerce affecting Illinois.

Madonis v. Sterling Bay Cos., LLC · filed 2020-12-02(f)

The Consumer Fraud Act defines “trade” and “commerce” as “the advertising, offering for sale, sale, or distribution of any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value wherever situated, and shall include any trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of this State.” 815 ILCS 505/1(f) (West 2014). As one-time purchasers of the properties or entities related to the purchasers, defendants have not provided any services under the Act such as selling or distributing any services or property, and plaintiffs do not allege as much. Thus, the trial court correctly determined that defendants themselves were not engaged in any trade or commerce under the Act.

Section 1 defines protected parties, merchandise, consumers, and trade or commerce, and its trade and commerce definition covers Illinois real estate transactions.

Solwest, LLC v. Fifth Third Bank · filed 2021-05-10(b), (c), (e), (f)

Section 1(b) outlines protected goods and transactions. Merchandise includes “any objects, wares, goods, commodities, intangibles, real estate situated outside the State of Illinois, or services.” (Emphasis added.) Id. § 1(b). As real estate situated in Illinois, the building is not merchandise under the Act. ... Solwest, nonetheless, argues that under section 1(f), the transaction falls within protected trade and commerce. We agree. The terms “trade” and “commerce” mean “the advertising, offering for sale, sale, or distribution of any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value wherever situated” and includes trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of Illinois. Id. § 1(f). The text of section 1(f) includes real property, no matter the location. Fifth Third engaged in trade and commerce when it listed the real property for sale and sold it to Solwest. Unlike the section 1(b) definition of merchandise, section 1(f) leaves out a geographic limit.

Trade and commerce include advertising and offering services for sale.

Biesterfeld v. Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. · filed 2022-03-31(f)

The terms trade and commerce do cover adver- tising or, even more broadly, the offering of services for sale.

Section 505/1(f) defines trade or commerce broadly enough to cover a vehicle maker’s distribution of an owner’s manual in the course of selling vehicles.

Fleury v. General Motors LLC · filed 2023-06-02(f)

GM’s alleged conduct plausibly falls within the ICFA’s sweeping definition of “trade or commerce.” ... GM distributed the owner’s manual to consumers of Flex Fuel vehicles—an act it committed in the course of selling the vehicles.

Section 505/1(f)'s definition of trade and commerce covers the business aspects of dentistry, including billing.

Mathis v. Yildiz · filed 2023-11-22(f)

We are persuaded that, even if the Consumer Fraud Act does not apply to the actual practice of dentistry, it does apply to the business aspects of the dental industry. As explained above, the plain language of the Consumer Fraud Act includes the dental industry and expresses no intent to exclude dentists or their businesses. ... Charging and collecting out-of-pocket payments from patients is part of a dental clinic’s business, not the practice of dentistry.

Section 1(f)’s trade or commerce definition excludes the actual provision of veterinary care, but Consumer Fraud Act claims may arise from business aspects such as misleading billing.

Miller v. Klingsporn · filed 2025-03-25(f)

Despite the relatively broad language of the statutory prohibition (see 815 ILCS 505/1(f), 2 (West 2018)), in the context of professional services, Illinois state reviewing courts have held that the provision of medical, dental, and legal services do not constitute “trade or commerce” under the Consumer Fraud Act and that a plaintiff, therefore, cannot bring a private Consumer Fraud Act claim arising out of the actual provision of those services. ... In those cases, the reviewing courts have held that a plaintiff may not bring a private Consumer Fraud Act claim that is premised upon the actual provision of the professional services listed above (the actual practice of medicine, dentistry, or law), such as substandard treatment, but that a plaintiff may bring a Consumer Fraud Act claim that is premised upon the business aspects of those professional services, such as misleading billing. ... In the present case, the parties do not dispute that the above rules apply to the provision of veterinary services. We agree and so hold.

Section 505/1(f) defines trade or commerce; changing a property's identification number and recording that change do not fall within its listed categories.

Winfrey v. CitiMortgage, Inc. · filed 2018-10-03(f)

Berrios’ changing of the PIN and Yarbrough’s recording of documents reflecting that change do not fall under any of the categories listed in ICFA as conduct involving trade or commerce. Therefore, Plaintiffs cannot bring an ICFA claim based on this conduct.

A dispute over competing property rights does not involve trade or commerce under Section 505/1(f) merely because a property owners’ association seeks assessments.

Wahlert v. Nesbit · filed 2019-02-07(f)

Plaintiff’s claim against LLPOA does not, however involve trade or commerce as it is defined under the Act. Despite plaintiff’s attempt to argue otherwise, the claims in this case do not involve a “real estate transaction” in any manner.

Section 505/1(f) defines trade or commerce; a municipality issuing a building permit under its regulatory powers is not engaged in trade or commerce.

Mosier v. Village of Holiday Hills · filed 2019-07-22(f)

The term “trade or commerce” means the “advertising, offering for sale, sale, or distribution of any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value wherever situated, and shall include any trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of this State.” 815 ILCS 505/1(f) (West 2016). Because we determine—without opining on any of the other elements—that the Village was not engaged in trade or commerce, count II of the second amended complaint fails.

Section 505/1(f) defines trade and commerce to include advertising, offering for sale, selling, or distributing services or property; a defendant’s status as a business alone does not satisfy that requirement.

Kim v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. · filed 2021-06-30(f)

Illinois courts have long held that the application of the Consumer Fraud Act is limited to deception “in the course of trade or commerce.” As defined by the statute, “[t]he terms ‘trade’ and ‘commerce’ mean the advertising, offering for sale, sale, or distribution of any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value wherever situated.” 815 ILCS 505/1(f) (West 2010). The mere fact that a defendant is a business that engages in commerce is insufficient to satisfy this element.