735 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 5/13-202

Section 13-202’s two-year limitations period applies to claims under the Chicago Residential Landlord and Tenant Ordinance.

Faison v. RTFX, Inc. · filed 2014-02-07

The applicable statute of limitations on claims such as plaintiff's, brought under subsection 5-12-080 of the RLTO, is two years. Namur, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 1013. See 735 ILCS 5/13-202 (West 2008). This two-year time frame does not, however, encompass plaintiff's claims occurring after March 28, 2009. Because plaintiff brought suit on March 28, 2011, her claim regarding the failure to provide a receipt for the additional $10 she contributed toward her security deposit on May 1, 2009, or the failure to pay interest on March 31, 2009, would not be barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations.

Section 13-202 gives a plaintiff two years from the date of injury to bring a personal injury action.

Torrijos v. International Paper Co. · filed 2021-06-22

The issue here is whether the trial court properly granted Cano’s section 2-619(a)(5) motion to dismiss the action against Cano as barred by the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. See 735 ILCS 5/13-202 (West 2016). Plaintiff was injured on February 8, 2016. The two-year limitations period, therefore, expired on February 8, 2018.

Section 13-202 gives plaintiffs two years to bring Illinois assault and battery claims.

Mohammed v. Jenner & Block · filed 2022-03-02

Under Illinois law, a plaintiff must bring a claim for assault and battery within two years of the injury.

Section 5/13-202 gives a battery claim a two-year limitations period.

Goldstein v. Kinney Shoe Corp. · filed 1996-07-03

Finally, the plaintiffs argue that I should dismiss Mr. Duda’s counterclaim alleging battery on the basis that it is barred by the two year statute of limitations under 735 ILCS 5/13-202. Mr. Duda alleges that Ms. Goldstein committed battery against him between March, 1992 and June, 1992. The earliest date on which Mr. Duda’s claim could have been barred is March, 1994.

Section 5/13-202 generally gives two years to bring a personal injury claim, but a one-year limit applies to claims against a government entity like Metra.

Hudson v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation · filed 2019-09-09

Although Illinois generally applies a two-year statute of limitations to personal injury claims, see 735 ILCS 5/13- 202, a personal injury suit against a government entity like Metra must be brought within one year, see Copes v. Ne. Ill. Reg’1 Commuter R.R. Corp., 45 N.E.3d 1123, 1129-30 (IIL. App. 2015) (citing 70 ILCS 3615/5.03 and 70 ILCS 3615/2.20(a)(x)).

Section 5/13-202 gives negligence-based failure-to-warn claims a two-year limitations period.

Couture v. Haworth Inc · filed 2020-01-07

Failure to warn also has a two-year statute of limitations. See Deluca v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5938, at *32-33 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 4, 2003) (Illinois’ statute of limitations for personal injury, 735 ILCS 5/13-202, applied to negligence-based failure to warn claims).

A personal injury action must be filed within two years after it accrues; presenting the complaint after the clerk’s official closing time on the deadline is too late.

Roach v. Coastal Gas Station · filed 2005-12-14

The plaintiff failed to file her complaint within two years after the cause of action accrued (735 ILCS 5/13 — 202 (West 2002)) because she failed to present it to the clerk prior to 4 p.m. on November 3, 2003.

A personal injury complaint presented to the clerk after the office closes is untimely if filed the next day, after the two-year limitations period expires.

Roach v. Coastal Gas Station · filed 2006-01-26

The plaintiff failed to file her complaint within two years after the cause of action accrued (735 ILCS 5/13-202 (West 2002)) because she failed to present it to the clerk prior to 4 p.m. on November 3, 2003.

Section 13-202 bars a personal injury complaint filed more than two years after the claim accrues when an earlier complaint filed intentionally under a fictitious name is a nullity and the later complaint cannot relate back.

Santiago v. E.W. Bliss Co. · filed 2010-12-21

Absent misnomer, plaintiffs original and first amended complaints were null and void because they were not filed in the name of a natural person. As a result, the first legally valid complaint that plaintiff filed was his second amended complaint. Because plaintiff’s second amended complaint was filed more than two years after his cause of action accrued, it is time-barred by the statute of limitations. The doctrine of relation back is not available to plaintiff because there are no other legally valid pleadings to which his second amended complaint could relate back.

A complaint filed within two years of the injury satisfies the personal injury limitations period.

Dunning v. Dynegy Midwest Generation, Inc. · filed 2015-04-28

Plaintiff's first amended complaint was timely, as it was filed within two years of his accident.

Naming unidentified “John Doe” defendants does not stop the two-year limitations period from running.

Santiago v. Anderson · filed 2012-08-06

We are skeptical of the latter conclusion, see Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 865–66 (7th Cir. 2012); Smith v. Knox County Jail, 666 F.3d 1037, 1040 (7th Cir. 2012), but we need not discuss this claim further because Santiago named as defendants only a pair of never‐identified “John Doe” physicians, which did nothing to forestall the running of the two‐year statute of limitations long before the judge screened his complaint in September 2006, see 735 ILCS 5/13–202; Gomez, 680 F.3d at 864 n.1; Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 698–99 (7th Cir. 2008).

The two-year limitations period is satisfied when a timely negligence complaint is amended to add a product liability claim arising from the same accident and the new claim relates back.

Dunning v. Dynegy Midwest Generation, Inc. · filed 2015-07-10

Plaintiff’s first amended complaint was timely, as it was filed within two years of his accident. Accordingly, the first requirement of the relation-back doctrine has been met. The second requirement of the relation-back doctrine is also satisfied here, as plaintiff’s product liability count arises from the same accident as the negligence count. Hence, plaintiff’s product liability count against AVI properly relates back to the timely filing of plaintiff’s negligence count against AVI, and the statute of limitations has not been violated.

Section 13-202 requires a personal injury action arising from a sudden traumatic injury to be filed within two years of the injury.

Giles v. Parks · filed 2018-02-05

To begin, plaintiff essentially concedes that without the aid of a separate justifying statute, the cause of action he asserts in his complaint is barred by the two-year statute of limitations (735 ILCS 5/13-202 (West 2012)). ... Because the statute of limitations began to run on the date of Giles’s injury, December 22, 2012, and the claim was not filed until December 23, 2014, plaintiff’s claim is time barred.

Section 13-202 requires a personal injury action to be filed within two years of accrual; an injury from a sudden traumatic event accrues on the day it occurs.

Giles v. Parks · filed 2018-04-27

To begin, plaintiff essentially concedes that without the aid of a separate justifying statute, the cause of action he asserts in his complaint is barred by the two-year statute of limitations (735 ILCS 5/13-202 (West 2012)). ... Actions for damages for an injury to the person shall be commenced within two years of when the cause of action accrues. ... Because the statute of limitations began to run on the date of Giles’s injury, December 22, 2012, and the claim was not filed until December 23, 2014, plaintiff’s claim is time barred.

The two-year period for personal injury claims does not justify dismissal when the complaint leaves open facts that could defeat a limitations defense.

Lempa v. Sandoz Inc. · filed 2019-03-29

The Complaint certainly raises questions about the timeliness of the claims, given the two-year statute of limitations for personal injury claims under Illinois law. See 735 ILCS 5/13-202. But it also does not rule out a set of facts that could defeat a statute of limitations defense.

Section 5/13-202 sets a two-year limit for personal injury actions; an amended claim that relates back to the original complaint can satisfy that limit.

Swanson v. Piramal Glass-USA Inc. · filed 2021-02-10

Under Illinois law, a plaintiff has a two-year statute of limitations within which to bring a cause of action for personal injuries. 735 ILCS 5/13-202. ... The Court finds that Plaintiff Martinez’s claim for willfully and wantonly hiring, training, retention, supervision, and entrustment against Defendant Piramal was filed within the statute of limitations as it relates back to the Original Complaint.

Section 5/13-202’s two-year limitations period does not support dismissal at the pleading stage when the complaint leaves open facts that could make the suit timely.

Perkins v. Johnson & Johnson · filed 2021-12-27

While the indefinite date given in the Complaint raises more questions than it answers, a more complete factual record is necessary before the Court can determine whether Plaintiff’s suit is untimely. At this stage, Plaintiff’s allegations do not “create an ironclad defense,” and so Defendants’ “limitations argument must await factual development.”

A Section 5/13-202 limitations defense that would bar only some alleged conduct affects recovery rather than whether the complaint states a claim.

City of Chicago v. Door Dash, Inc · filed 2022-03-09

According to defendants, only a month’s worth of claims remain, because earlier claims are barred by the two-year statute of limitations in 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/13- 202. Even if defendants are correct, this argument goes to recovery, not to whether plaintiff has stated a claim.

Section 5/13-202 gives plaintiffs two years to file a personal injury action, but a complaint need not plead facts defeating a limitations defense; dismissal requires allegations that establish the defense.

Michaels v. Genetic Design, Inc. · filed 2023-12-21

While Illinois law specifies that an action for personal injuries must be filed within two years5, plaintiffs argued in their response that the discovery rule delayed accrual of the action for purposes of the statute of limitations until the plaintiffs “knew or reasonably should have known” of their injuries (Doc. 57, p. 4). ... Nevertheless, dismissal is not appropriate at this juncture. ... in this case, plaintiffs did not “affirmatively plead themselves out of court” for the Court to consider an affirmative defense in a motion to dismiss.

Section 5/13-202 requires personal injury and premises liability actions to begin within two years after the cause of action accrues.

Macias v. Haralson · filed 2025-12-31

Actions for personal injury and premises liability must commence within two years after the cause of action accrued. 735 ILCS 5/13-202 (West 2020). ... As such, to comply with the statute of limitations, plaintiff had to file his action by September 4, 2022. As he did not file his complaint until September 9, 2022, his action was untimely and, thus, the trial court properly entered summary judgment in defendant’s favor on counts I and III of the plaintiff’s complaint which was premised on the September 4, 2020, spider bite.

For Illinois § 1983 claims, Section 13-202’s two-year filing deadline extends under Federal Rule 6(a) when its last day falls on a weekend or legal holiday.

Sroga v. Williams · filed 2018-07-23

To determine the last day by which Sroga may file this suit, we apply Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a). ... Rule 6(a) provides that, when the last day to file a pleading falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the filing period continues to run until the end of the next day that is not one of those three excluded days.

Section 5/13-202 supplies the two-year limitations period for a Fourth Amendment claim.

Marshall v. Buckley · filed 2009-08-13

The applicable statute of limitations for a Fourth Amendment claim is two years. 735 ILCS 5/13— 202; ... Here, Plaintiff was arrested on May 30, 2005, and brought this action in November 2008. (R. 1, Compl.) The claim is thus untimely.

Section 5/13-202 sets a two-year limitations period for false arrest claims arising in Illinois.

Tillman v. Burge · filed 2011-11-02

The applicable statute of limitations for false arrest claims arising in Illinois is two years.

Section 5/13-202 requires an Illinois false imprisonment claim to be brought within two years.

Scott v. Bender · filed 2013-05-21

The statute of limitations for false imprisonment claims in Illinois is two years. ... Because Scott brought his false imprisonment claim after the statute of limitations had run, the Court cannot consider his claim.

Section 5/13-202 supplies a two-year limitations period for Illinois § 1983 false-arrest claims.

Beck v. City of Chicago · filed 2020-12-15

As noted, a claim pursuant to § 1983 must be filed within two years of the claim’s accrual. Jenkins v. Vill. of Maywood, 506 F.3d 622, 623 (7th Cir. 2007); 735 ILCS 5/13–202. ... This lawsuit, filed in September 2020, was at least a few months too late—likely longer.

Section 5/13-202 supplies a two-year limitations period for § 1983 false arrest claims brought in Illinois.

Harvey v. City of Chicago · filed 2021-09-27

In Illinois, the statute of limitations for a § 1983 false arrest claim is two years. Brooks v. Davey, 572 F. Supp. 2d 917, 918 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (citing 735 ILCS 5/13-202). ... The statute of limitations for Harvey’s false arrest claim based on the May 2013 arrest thus expired in May 2015.

Section 13-202’s two-year limitations period applies to spoliation claims derived from personal-injury actions.

Skridla v. General Motors Co. · filed 2015-12-30

Pursuant to Wofford, the two-year limitations periods of the underlying actions—sections 13-202 and 2—also apply to plaintiff’s derivative spoliation actions.

Section 13-202’s two-year limitations period applies to spoliation claims derived from personal injury actions.

Skridla v. General Motors Co. · filed 2016-02-19

Pursuant to Wofford, the two-year limitations periods of the underlying actions–sections 13-202 and 2–also apply to plaintiff’s derivative spoliation actions.

Section 13-202 gives a plaintiff two years to bring a personal injury claim and applies with the common-law discovery rule to childhood sexual abuse claims that accrued before section 13-202.2 was enacted.

Doe v. Hastert · filed 2019-06-21

Accordingly, in analyzing the timeliness of plaintiff’s claims, we will apply the general statute of limitations applicable to personal-injury claims and the common-law discovery rule. ... An action for personal injury must be filed “within 2 years next after the cause of action accrued.” 735 ILCS 5/13-202 (West 2016).

Section 5/13-202’s two-year limitations period applies to a sexual battery claim when the Tort Immunity Act does not apply.

Fonseca-Bradford v. DuPage County Election Commission · filed 2020-08-03

The Court concludes that the TIA does not apply to Bradford’s claim of sexual battery and that this claim is timely under the two-year statute of limitations.

Section 13-202’s two-year limitations period applies to personal-injury claims arising from childhood sexual abuse before January 1, 1991, subject to the extension for minors in section 13-211.

Doe v. Lake Forest High School District 115 · filed 2022-10-17

We determine that plaintiff’s complaint is barred by the two-year statute of limitations contained in sections 13-202 and 13-211 of the Code.

Before January 1, 1991, the two-year limitations period in Section 13-202 governed personal injury claims arising from childhood sexual abuse.

Wolfgram v. Miller · filed 2023-09-30

Before January 1, 1991, claims for personal injury resulting from childhood sexual abuse were governed by the two-year limitations period.

Section 13-202’s two-year period for statutory penalty actions does not apply to BIPA claims because BIPA is remedial.

Meegan v. NFI Industries Inc · filed 2020-06-04

BIPA’s provision for actual damages and the regulatory intent of its enactment show that it is a remedial statute not within the scope of the two-year statute of limitation imposed by section 13-202.

The two-year personal injury limitations period does not apply to BIPA informed-consent claims alleging informational injury rather than physical or mental injury.

Quarles v. Pret A Manger (USA) Limited · filed 2021-04-26

Next Pret argues that Quarles’s alleged BIPA injuries are analogous to mental anguish injuries and therefore subject to Illinois’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. 735 ILCS § 5/13-202; see Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 207 Ill.2d 263, 278 (2003) (personal injuries include emotional distress). But this characterization is too simplistic. ... Because Quarles alleges an informational injury and not a physical or mental one, the two-year statute of limitations does not apply.

Section 5/13-202’s two-year period does not apply to BIPA claims alleging neither physical nor emotional injury.

Vaughan v. Biomat USA, Inc. · filed 2022-09-19

The two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries does not apply to Plaintiffs’ claims under BIPA Sections 15(a) or (b).

Section 13-202’s two-year limit for personal injury suits does not apply to BIPA claims alleging injury to statutory privacy rights.

Brandenberg v. Meridian Senior Living, LLC · filed 2021-09-30

As a result, Section 13-202’s two-year statute of limitations for personal injury suits does not apply to injuries resulting from violating the statutory rights bestowed by BIPA.

Section 5/13-202’s two-year limitations period does not apply to GIPA Section 25(c)(1) claims because a statutory privacy injury is not an injury to the person and GIPA is not a penal statute.

Taylor v. Union Pacific Railroad Company · filed 2024-07-16

The two-year limitations period under Section 5/13-202 is also not a good fit. Relevant here, Section 5/13-202 applies to “[a]ctions for damages for an injury to the person” or “for a statutory penalty.” Union Pacific does not explain how a violation of statutory privacy rights amounts to “an injury to the person” as used in Section 5/13-202. ... Section 5/13-202’s limitations period does not apply to GIPA Section 25(c)(1).

Section 5/13-202’s two-year limitations period does not apply to GIPA claims; the five-year period in section 5/13-205 applies instead.

Ginski v. Ethos Seafood Group, LLC · filed 2024-09-23

Thus, consistent with the Illinois Supreme Court’s analysis of BIPA, this Court declines to adopt 735 ILCS 5/13-202’s more stringent two-year statute of limitations and instead holds that 735 ILCS 5/13- 205’s five-year limitation period applies.