11 Del. Code Ann. § 4214

Section 4214 permits habitual criminal sentencing when substantial evidence establishes the required prior felony convictions.

Saunders v. State · filed 1979-03-30

The Trial Judge’s findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record. We find no error of law nor abuse of discretion in the habitual criminal proceedings.

Section 4214(b) makes a defendant with three qualifying prior felony convictions eligible for a life sentence as an habitual offender.

Trawick v. State · filed 2004-04-07(b)

This felony drug conviction, in addition to two other prior felony convictions, rendered Trawick eligible to be sentenced to life imprisonment as an habitual offender pursuant to Del.Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4214(b).

Section 4214(a) requires the State to establish a defendant's habitual offender status.

Reeder v. State · filed 2010-02-05(a)

Finally, the record reflects that Reeder's habitual offender status was established by the State in accordance with the statutory requirements.

Section 4214(a) can apply to a qualifying repeat drug offender even when another statute provides enhanced penalties for repeat drug offenses.

Jackson v. State · filed 2009-09-08(a)

While Jackson is unquestionably a repeat drug offender, there is no legal support for his claim that, for that reason, the General Assembly did not intend for the habitual offender statute to apply to him.

The State may establish the predicate felony convictions needed for habitual offender sentencing under § 4214(a) with sufficient documentary evidence.

Alley v. State · filed 2015-07-24(a)

It is clear from the record that the State provided sufficient documentary evidence in this case to establish that Alley had the requisite number of predicate felony convictions to be declared a habitual offender. Accordingly, we find no error in the Superior Court’s imposition of Alley’s habitual offender sentence under 11 Del. C. § 4214(a).

Section 4214(a) counts felony convictions from other states as predicates for habitual offender sentencing.

Thomas v. State · filed 2015-12-17(a)

Thus, Thomas’s felony convictions in New Jersey qualified as predicate offenses under Section 4214(a).

Section 4214(b) permits a felony conviction for an offense committed as a juvenile to count toward habitual criminal sentencing when the defendant was convicted as an adult.

Vickers v. State · filed 2015-06-11(b)

As the State points out, we have travelled this road before, and have found that a juvenile’s prior felony convictions for offenses occurring while a juvenile are admissible as proof of habitual offender status.

Section 4214(a) requires the State to establish that the defendant had a chance for rehabilitation after sentencing on each prior conviction.

Lewis v. State · filed 2015-07-30(a)

Moreover, when moving to declare a defendant to be a habitual offender under Section 4214(a), the State must establish that a defendant had some chance of rehabilitation following the sentencing on each prior conviction.

Section 4214 treats a conviction as a predicate felony if the crime was a felony at the time of conviction, even if it is later reclassified as a misdemeanor.

Wehde v. State of Delaware · filed 2015-09-09(a)

The later reclassification of some of the crimes underlying Wehde’s predicate felony convictions as misdemeanors does not make those convictions non-predicate convictions under Section 4214.

Section 4214(a) permits a prior felony conviction more than ten years old to support habitual offender sentencing.

Herring v. State · filed 2015-11-18(a)

There is no prohibition against the State supporting a habitual offender motion with convictions that are more than ten years old, and there was no error in seeking Herring‟s sentencing as a habitual offender based, in part, on his 1996 RSP conviction.

Section 4214(a) does not require predicate felonies to be designated as violent felonies.

Coleman v. State · filed 2016-02-05(a)

Section 4214(a) does not require that predicate felonies be designated as “violent” felonies under 11 Del. C. § 4201(c).

Section 4214(a) includes attempted felonies as qualifying predicate felonies.

Colon v. State · filed 2016-02-08(a)

An attempted felony is by definition included in the broad term “felony” as used in subsection (a).

Section 4214(a) allows a felony conviction to serve as a predicate for habitual offender status regardless of whether it is designated violent or non-violent.

Newman v. State · filed 2016-02-09(a)

This 9th day of February 2016, having considered the opening brief, motion to affirm, and record on appeal, we find it evident that the judgment of the Superior Court denying the appellant’s motion for correction of sentence should be affirmed for the reason assigned in its August 14, 2015 order, holding that the designation of the appellant’s predicate felonies as violent or non-violent was irrelevant to determining his current status as a habitual offender under 11 Del. C. § 4214(a).

Section 4214(a) does not require predicate felony convictions to be designated as violent felonies.

Lewis v. State · filed 2016-04-26(a)

Section 4214(a) does not require that predicate felonies be designated as “violent” felonies under 11 Del. C. § 4201(c).

A prior conviction remains a predicate under § 4214(a) when a later judgment changes its sentence without vacating the conviction.

Nash v. State of Delaware · filed 2017-06-26(a)

we conclude that the Superior Court did not err in determining Nash’s sentence was legal. ... The April 2001 judgment reflects a new sentence for Nash’s convictions, not that Nash’s convictions were vacated.

Under the prior version of § 4214, subsection (a) required three prior felony convictions, and subsection (b) required two prior convictions for felonies named in that subsection.

Curry v. State · filed 2017-10-17

But Section 4214(a) of the old statute required three prior felony convictions and old § 4214(b) required two prior convictions of felonies specifically named in that section. Notably, neither of the prior felonies listed in the State’s petition were listed as predicate felonies in old § 4214(b). In short, the State’s petition did not meet either of the aforementioned requirements and, had the correct statute been applied, should have been denied.

Section 4214(b) permits a felony to remain a predicate conviction for habitual offender sentencing despite later changes to its classification.

Miles v. State · filed 2018-09-07(b)

Under similar circumstances, this Court has held that “[t]he later reclassification of some of the crimes underlying [a defendant’s] predicate felony convictions as misdemeanors does not make those convictions non- predicate convictions under Section 4214.”3 Thus, we conclude that Miles was properly sentenced as a habitual offender in 2009.

Section 4214(a) permits habitual offender sentencing for a subsequent felony even if that felony is non-violent.

Duffy v. State · filed 2019-02-05(a)

Duffy’s claim that he could not be sentenced as a habitual offender for a non-violent felony is incorrect. 11 Del. C. § 4214(a) (providing that “any person who has been 3 times convicted of any felony under the laws of this State, and/or any other state, United States or any territory of the United States, and who shall thereafter be convicted of a subsequent felony is declared to be an habitual criminal” and may be sentenced to up to life imprisonment).

Section 4214 counts prior Delaware felony convictions toward habitual offender status even if those offenses are later eliminated or recategorized.

Ayala v. State · filed 2019-02-11(a)

And despite the General Assembly’s reform of our drug laws in 2011 such that three of Ayala’s predicate felony convictions are no longer felonies and no longer defined as distinct offenses, Ayala is nevertheless subject to sentencing as a habitual offender under 11 Del. C. § 4214 because he had been three times convicted of a felony and was thereafter—in this case—convicted of a subsequent felony.

Under the applicable version of Section 4214(a), a felony conviction from another state counts toward the three prior felonies required for habitual offender sentencing.

Roten v. State · filed 2019-04-03(a)

Under the applicable version of Section 4214(a), Felonious Larceny conviction constituted a predicate offense if it was a conviction of “a felony . . . under the laws of . . . any other state.”9 The record reveals that, in addition to the predicate offenses that Roten does not challenge, Roten was convicted of larceny of goods with a value of $1,200, a Class H felony under North Carolina law.10 Roten therefore undeniably had been convicted of three prior felonies,11 and the Superior Court correctly declared Roten to be a habitual offender.

Section 4214 does not require a prior conviction to be for the same type of offense as the new conviction.

Marsh v. State · filed 2019-05-03(a), (d)

Section 4214 does not provide that a predicate offense for sentencing as an habitual offender must be the same type of offense as the new conviction for which the defendant is being sentenced.

Section 4214(a) counts simultaneous convictions as one prior violent felony conviction; a separate earlier conviction can supply another predicate for habitual offender sentencing.

State v. Woods · filed 2020-01-29(a)

As to Woods’ first argument, Trial and Appellate Counsel’s representation did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness because the State’s habitual offender petition satisfied the requirements of Section 4214(a) and (d) and counsel therefore had no basis to oppose it. ... But the State did not rely on the two 2005 convictions as distinct convictions. Rather, the State relied on the 1990 conviction as Woods’ first violent felony conviction and the 2005 convictions as Woods’ second violent felony conviction. Accordingly, Woods’ first ineffective assistance claim fails because his counsel had no basis to oppose the petition as statutorily inadequate.

Under the applicable version of § 4214(a), three prior felony convictions subjected a defendant to habitual-offender sentencing.

Thomas v. State · filed 2021-12-07(a)

As we previously concluded, under the applicable version of Section 4214(a), Thomas was subject to habitual-offender sentencing if he had three prior felony convictions.

Section 4214(b) requires the State to show three convictions with enough time between them to permit rehabilitation.

State v. Salaberrios · filed 2020-11-02(b)

This falls well within the statutory requirement that the State demonstrate three convictions with at least some time between events to show a sufficient period to permit rehabilitation. As such, Defendant’s argument that the motion was facially deficient is without merit.

Section 4214(d) permits habitual offender sentencing when two qualifying violent felony convictions precede a third violent felony; a comparable conviction from another jurisdiction may qualify even if that jurisdiction does not call it violent.

State v. Goodman · filed 2021-04-29(d)

Having been convicted of two violent felonies prior to his plea to the Manslaughter charge in 2018, his designation as a Habitual Offender was legal under 11 Del. C. § 4214 (d).

Section 4214(a) permits habitual-offender sentencing based on three prior felony convictions even if a predicate offense was later eliminated or reclassified.

Garnett v. State · filed 2022-05-23(a)

Garnett does not dispute that he had been convicted of felonies on three separate occasions before the offense at issue in this case. Thus, he was subject to sentencing under the version of Section 4214(a) that was in effect at the time of his crime that is the subject of this appeal.

Section 4214(c) permits successive felony convictions to count toward habitual criminal status when each later offense occurred after sentencing for the preceding felony; even a moment between sentencing and the next offense provides the required chance for rehabilitation.

State v. Peters · filed 2022-09-30(c)

So, as it appears this Court is the most recent contributor to this murkiness, it is only fitting that this Court should state the rule plainly: “Some chance for rehabilitation after each sentencing” means only that there must be crime-conviction-sentence, crime-conviction-sentence sequencing, with no overlap, for each given felony that is included in the habitual criminal status calculation. And there need be no more than the passing of a moment between the fall of the gavel recessing a prior’s sentencing hearing and the person’s commission of his next felony to insure there is no overlap.

Section 4214(a) requires successive predicate convictions with some time between sentencing for an earlier conviction and the offense leading to the next, allowing a chance for rehabilitation.

Hubbard v. State · filed 2022-11-14(a)

We have held that “some chance of rehabilitation” means only that “some period of time must have elapsed between sentencing on an earlier conviction and the commission of the offense resulting in the later felony conviction.”

Section 4214(a) permits a robbery conviction to serve as a predicate felony even when it was also the underlying felony for a later escape-after-conviction conviction.

Winn v. State · filed 2023-02-20(a)

Winn also argued below that his 1985 prior robbery conviction (the underlying felony for his 1988 conviction for escape after conviction) could not also be used as a predicate felony for habitual-offender purposes. Winn’s position is not supported by our case law and is without merit.

Section 4214(d) requires a defendant with two prior Title 11 violent felony convictions who is convicted of another Title 11 violent felony to receive a minimum sentence equal to the statutory maximum for the new offense.

State v. Lindsey · filed 2023-03-16(d)

Accordingly, the Court properly considered each of Mr. Lindsey’s pre-1996 felony convictions as prior violent felony convictions that formed the predicate of Mr. Lindsey’s present enhanced § 1448 conviction and that, in turn, triggered his habitual criminal status under 11 Del. C. § 4214(d).

Section 4214(a) permits a predicate conviction to enhance a sentence before the defendant completes the sentence for that conviction, provided the convictions are successive and the defendant had some opportunity for rehabilitation after each sentencing.

Morris v. State · filed 2023-05-25(a)

Second, the habitual-offender statute does not require that the defendant complete his sentence for a predicate conviction before the conviction may be used to enhance his sentence—it requires only that the predicate convictions be successive and that the defendant have some opportunity for rehabilitation after each sentencing.

Section 4214(a)’s predicate-offense requirement can be established by a defendant’s admission through counsel that the requisite offenses occurred in the requisite chronological order.

Marvel v. State · filed 2023-03-03(a)

After counsel and Marvel conferred further, Marvel admitted, through his counsel, that “there are the requisite offenses in the requisite chronological order.”10 Marvel was given the opportunity to speak before he was sentenced and did not contradict his attorney’s statements on his behalf.11 Marvel is bound by his lawyer’s representations, and the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion by denying his motion for correction of sentence.

Section 4214(b) sets no time limit on prior felonies and does not require the three predicate felonies to be violent.

State v. Waples · filed 2025-02-17(b)

There is no time-limits set for offenses to count under 11 Del. C. § 4214(b). Furthermore, it does not matter whether the three predicate felonies were violent or non-violent in determining a habitual offender under 11 Del. C. § 4214(b).

Section 4214(a) permits habitual offender sentencing for a fourth felony after three separate qualifying felony convictions, even if some predicate convictions also qualify under subsection (b).

State v. Fuller · filed 2024-12-10(a)

It follows that when a Defendant is convicted of three separate, qualifying predicate felonies of any kind, he may be sentenced as a habitual offender under §4214(a) for the fourth felony. It makes no difference in the interpretation or operation of §4214(a) that some of the predicate convictions also qualified as §4214(b) violent felony predicate convictions.

Section 4214(c) permits prior felony convictions to count toward habitual offender sentencing even if those offenses are no longer felonies when the defendant is sentenced.

State v. Moore · filed 2025-01-22(c)

Pursuant to the Delaware Supreme Court’s holdings in Ayala and Johnson, the fact that Moore’s 2003 and 2009 predicate offenses 27 are no longer felonies does not negate his habitual offender eligibility or status. Accordingly, Moore was properly sentenced to 15 years of unsuspended Level V time for his PFBPP offense pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4214(c).

Section 4214(c) permits a conviction to serve as a predicate offense even if the sentence for that conviction was suspended.

Davis v. State · filed 2025-04-22(c)

Even assuming that Davis received a suspended sentence for his escape conviction,8 his claim is without merit—whether a sentence is suspended or not has no bearing on whether the underlying conviction may be used as a predicate offense.

Section 4214(a) permits a conviction for which an inmate is serving a sentence to count as a predicate offense when the inmate later commits assault in a detention facility.

Roten v. State · filed 2025-05-20(a)

Thus, the offense for which an inmate is serving a sentence when he commits assault in a detention facility constitutes a predicate offense for habitual-offender sentencing for assault in a detention facility.

Section 4214(a) does not require a defendant to complete a prior sentence before committing another qualifying felony.

State v. Newman · filed 2025-11-18(a)

There is no requirement that a sentence for one crime must be completed before a defendant commits another qualifying felony.

Section 4214(a) does not prohibit a minimum mandatory sentence for a non-violent felony.

Henry v. State · filed 2008-03-07(a)

The habitual offender statute, which provides for a life sentence, does not prohibit the Superior Court from imposing a minimum mandatory sentence on a non-violent felony.

Section 4214(a) requires an enhanced sentence for a qualifying violent felony and permits the court to enhance fewer counts than the State requests.

Turner v. State · filed 2008-09-10(a)

According to 11 Del. C. 4214(a), if a conviction that forms the basis for the State's petition to declare the defendant an habitual offender is for a violent felony, the court must impose a sentence greater than the statutory maximum, up to life imprisonment (the "penalty-enhancing provision"). [28] ... The sentence was also in compliance with our holding in Kirby v. State because the trial judge did not apply habitual offender status to any greater number of counts than those advanced by the State.

Section 4214(a) permits habitual offender status after three prior felony convictions and a subsequent felony, even when the subsequent felony is not violent.

Rollins v. State · filed 2015-08-25(a)

The fact that Strangulation was not a violent felony under Section 4201(c) meant that the Superior Court was not required to impose a minimum mandatory Level V sentence of five years for the second count of Strangulation under Section 4214(a), not that Rollins was ineligible for habitual offender status. ... Under Section 4214(a), a person who has been convicted three times of a felony and is convicted of a subsequent felony can be declared a habitual offender.

Section 4214(a) permits habitual offender sentencing for a fourth felony after three prior felony convictions, including a federal conviction.

Stevenson v. State · filed 2016-01-19(a)

Stevenson was eligible for habitual offender sentencing because of his three prior felony convictions. Even if he had accepted the State’s plea offer, the State would have been free to seek habitual offender sentencing.

Section 4214(a) does not limit the aggregate sentence for multiple violent felonies to forty-five years.

Reed v. State · filed 2015-02-12(a)

Neither Crosby nor Evans support Reed’s argument that his total sentence for multiple violent felonies was limited to forty-five years or less under Section 4214(a).

Section 4214(a) permits a habitual offender convicted of third-degree burglary to be sentenced to up to life in prison, even though the offense is a nonviolent felony.

Anderson v. State · filed 2015-03-24(a)

Under the habitual offender statute, 11 Del. C. § 4214(a), the Superior Court, in its discretion, was authorized to sentence Anderson to a term of up to life in prison.

Section 4214(a) permits a court to impose a sentence of up to life imprisonment.

State of Delaware v. Williams. · filed 2015-03-26(a)

Moreover, the Court could possibly impose a sentence of up to life imprisonment on any sentence under 11 Del. C. § 4214(a).

Section 4214(a) permits a habitual offender sentence of up to life imprisonment.

Carpenter v. State · filed 2015-05-28(a)

But, Carpenter pled guilty as a habitual offender under Section 4214(a). Under that statute, the Superior Court had discretion to impose a sentence “up to life imprisonment.”5 The Superior Court’s ten year sentence was well within the range of statutorily authorized sentences.

Section 4214 does not bar probation for a separate offense that was not sentenced under its habitual offender provisions.

Davis v. State · filed 2016-01-28

First, Davis was not sentenced as an habitual offender for Arson in the Third Degree, which is the sentence that included probation.

A § 4214(a) habitual offender motion must be filed before sentencing with reasonable time for the court and defense to consider it.

State of Delaware v. Henderson · filed 2016-04-26(a)

The State knew on January 26, 2016 that it needed to file a motion under 11 Del. C. § 4214(a) prior to sentencing. Instead of providing a reasonable time to the Court and Mr. Henderson’s counsel for considering the Habitual Offender Motion or asking for a continuance of the sentencing, the State chose to file the Habitual Offender Motion later in the day on April 7, 2016.

Section 4214(a) authorizes sentencing a defendant as a habitual offender when the evidence supports that status.

Clanton v. State · filed 2017-01-12(a)

Clanton’s habitual offender status is supported by the evidence, and his sentence is authorized under the habitual offender statute.

Section 4214(a) authorizes a sentence of up to life imprisonment for a qualifying habitual offender, even when the underlying crime has a lower statutory maximum.

Rivera v. State · filed 2016-08-29(a)

As to Rivera’s claim that his twenty year sentence for Strangulation exceeds the five year statutory maximum for that crime,3 Rivera ignores that he was sentenced for Strangulation under the habitual offender statute, 11 Del. C. § 4214(a), which authorized a sentence of up to life imprisonment.

A habitual offender sentence under § 4214(a) for a crime committed after June 29, 1990 remains subject to the Truth in Sentencing Act.

Winn v. State · filed 2018-05-29(a)

Winn’s sentencing as an habitual offender under § 4214 for Burglary in the First Degree does not make that sentence a pre-TIS Act sentence.

Section 4214(a) permits habitual offender sentencing when the defendant’s prior convictions satisfy its requirements.

Satchell v. State · filed 2018-12-20(a)

Satchell’s prior convictions clearly satisfy the statutory requirements for habitual offender status under § 4214(a).

Section 4214(a) permits habitual offender status after three prior felony convictions followed by a subsequent felony conviction.

State v. Wright-Clayton · filed 2019-06-04(a)

Wright-Clayton’s challenge to his habitual offender status is without merit. Section 4214(a) in part provides that “any person who has been 3 times convicted of any felony under the laws of this State . . . and who shall thereafter be convicted of a subsequent felony is declared to be a habitual offender.” ... From this, there was a clear basis for the Court to declare Wright-Clayton a habitual offender.

Section 4214(e) bars suspension of minimum sentences imposed under subsections (b), (c), or (d), but does not bar suspension of a sentence under subsection (a).

Dorsey v. State · filed 2018-12-14(e)

Section 4214(e) provides that a minimum sentence required to be imposed under subsections (b), (c), or (d) cannot be suspended, but Dorsey was not sentenced under those subsections. He was sentenced, as the State petitioned for, under Section 4214(a).

Section 4214(a) permits a habitual offender convicted of a nonviolent felony to receive a sentence from that felony’s minimum up to life imprisonment.

Duffy v. State · filed 2019-07-31(a)

Because Duffy’s conviction is for a nonviolent felony, his sentence is governed by subsection (a). Under § 4214(a), the Superior Court was authorized by statute to impose anywhere from the minimum sentence for violation of privacy—no Level V time—up to life imprisonment.

Section 4214 can require habitual offender designation and a mandatory sentence based on prior convictions; SENTAC guidelines cannot override that requirement.

State v. Johnson · filed 2019-10-24(d)

Neither override the plain language of 11 Del. C. § 4214, which, in Johnson’s case, because of his prior convictions, required the Court to declare him a habitual offender and to impose a sentence of 25 years on the PFDCF charge.

Section 4214(b) allows a qualifying conviction for possession of a firearm by a person prohibited to trigger habitual offender sentencing when it is the defendant’s first violent Title 11 felony.

Basher v. State · filed 2020-02-20(b)

His plea to this “enhanced” PFBPP—a violent Title 11 felony under 11 Del. C. § 4201(c)—constituted his first violent Title 11 felony conviction and triggered his eligibility to be sentenced as an habitual offender under 11 Del. C. § 4214(b).

Section 4214(a) requires a habitual offender’s sentence to be at least the minimum for the felony prompting the designation and permits a sentence up to life imprisonment.

Penn v. State · filed 2020-01-16(a)

Under 11 Del. C. § 4214(a), the Superior Court must impose the minimum sentence for the felony prompting the designation of Penn as a habitual offender6 and may impose a sentence up to life imprisonment.

Under the version of § 4214(b) in effect in 2013, the court had to impose a life sentence once the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had two enumerated predicate felony convictions and a triggering felony conviction.

Brown v. State · filed 2020-02-07(b)

Once the State met its burden and established beyond a reasonable doubt that Brown had been convicted of two enumerated predicate felonies under § 4214(b), the court was bound to sentence him to life under that subsection.

Section 4214(a) authorized a sentence of up to life imprisonment for a declared habitual offender.

Bradley v. State · filed 2020-07-09(a)

The Superior Court sentenced Bradley under the habitual offender statute, which authorized a sentence of up to life imprisonment.

Section 4214(c) applies when a person previously convicted twice of a felony and once of a violent felony is convicted of another violent felony.

Downs v. State · filed 2023-02-14(c)

There is no unfair prejudice to the defendant here because he was given a full opportunity to be heard and he is, in fact, an habitual offender under ... Section 4214(c).

Under the April 2016 version of Section 4214(a), each qualifying conviction carried a minimum sentence equal to its statutory maximum penalty and a possible life sentence.

Griffin v. State · filed 2022-08-30(a)

Under the previous version of Section 4214(a), Griffin was subject to a minimum sentence of the statutory maximum penalty and up to a life sentence for each conviction for which the State sought habitual offender ... sentencing.

Section 4214(a) permits a sentence of up to life imprisonment for an eligible habitual offender convicted of carrying a concealed deadly weapon.

Brown v. State · filed 2023-10-27(a)

Here, in contrast, Brown was eligible for habitual-offender sentencing and therefore could have received a sentence up to life under Section 4214(a) for the CCDW offense.

Under the 2012 version of Section 4214(a), a habitual offender convicted of a Title 11 violent felony is subject to a minimum sentence equal to the felony’s statutory maximum.

Clark v. State · filed 2023-01-23(a)

Thus, Clark’s prior conviction(s) for possession with intent to deliver made him subject to sentencing under Section 1448(e) and, therefore, also subject to the minimum-mandatory sentence under Section 4214(a).

Section 4214 permits an enhanced penalty for each felony identified in the State’s habitual-offender petition when the defendant qualifies for habitual-offender sentencing.

Vickers v. State · filed 2023-04-10(b)

Contrary to Vickers’ reasoning, we find it evident that the legislature intended for a defendant who is found eligible for sentencing under Section 4214 to be subject to the imposition of an enhanced penalty for each felony that forms the basis of the State’s habitual-offender petition.

Section 4214(e) prevents a court from suspending or reducing a mandatory minimum sentence imposed under subsection (c).

State v. Gardner · filed 2023-07-12(e)

Again, the eight years of imprisonment for Mr. Gardener’s § 4214-enhanced CCDW conviction represents the shortest term of incarceration that must be imposed18 and cannot be suspended or reduced.

Section 4214(c) requires a habitual offender to receive the maximum sentence for the offense as a minimum sentence.

State v. Clark · filed 2024-06-17(c)

Any one of those three enhancements results in PFBPP becoming a class C felony with a maximum sentence of 15 years, and, therefore, the minimum sentence a habitual offender must receive under § 4214(c).

Section 4214(c) makes the statutory maximum for the triggering felony the minimum sentence for a qualifying habitual offender.

State v. Anderson · filed 2024-10-16(c)

As a Habitual Offender, Anderson “shall receive a minimum sentence of the statutory maximum penalty.”13 ... In accordance with 11 Del.C. § 4214(c), the Court imposed 15 years at Level V.

Section 4214(d) requires a person convicted of a third or subsequent violent felony after two violent felony convictions to receive at least the statutory maximum penalty for the new felony.

State v. Fistzgiles · filed 2025-07-30(d)

Therefore, the eight-year imprisonment sentence imposed by this Court is the statutory minimum sentence authorized under 11 Del. C. § 4214(d).

Section 4214(a) permits habitual-offender sentencing when a defendant admits the qualifying prior felony convictions in a plea agreement.

Morris v. State · filed 2025-09-03(a)

As part of his plea agreement, Morris admitted the facts that made him subject to habitual-offender sentencing under Section 4214(a).

Section 4214(b) sets a sentencing range of 12 years and 6 months to life for PFDCF when the defendant has three prior felony convictions.

Braxton v. State · filed 2025-10-01(b)

Because PFDCF was a class B violent felony, Braxton was subject to a sentencing range of 12 years and 6 months up to life if he had three prior felony convictions.

Under the applicable version of Section 4214(a), a person with three prior felony convictions who commits a fourth violent felony faces a minimum sentence equal to that felony’s ordinary statutory maximum and a possible sentence of up to life imprisonment.

Fulton v. State · filed 2025-07-01(a)

Thus, Fulton was subject to a sentencing range of eight years to life under Section 4214(a) if he had three prior felony convictions.

Section 4214(a) permits a sentence of up to life imprisonment when a defendant has three qualifying prior felony convictions.

Johnson v. State · filed 2025-12-05(a)

Under Section 4214(a), Johnson was subject to a sentence of up to life in prison for drug dealing and for second-degree conspiracy if he had three prior felony convictions.

A life sentence under Section 4214(a) is treated as a fixed 45-year term subject to reduction and conditional release for good time credit.

Crosby v. State · filed 2003-05-30(a)

Accordingly, we hold that Crosby’s life sentence pursuant to section 4214(a) is considered to be a fixed term of 45 years ... that is subject to reduction ... and conditional release ... for good time credit.

Section 4214(a) is not unconstitutionally vague because felony convictions give defendants notice and leave no room for arbitrary judicial enforcement.

State of Delaware v. Chambers. · filed 2015-12-16(a)

Therefore, Delaware’s habitual offender statute is not unconstitutionally vague, because there is no judicial discretion that would encourage arbitrary and erratic outcomes, and a defendant has notice before he is determined to be a habitual offender that he has a felony conviction.

Section 4214(a) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to a defendant who offers no evidence that differences in habitual offender sentences rest on an arbitrary classification.

Anderson v. State · filed 2015-12-18(a)

Anderson cites no relevant authority to support his contention that Section 4214 is unconstitutionally vague because it encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by giving a sentencing court the discretion to impose a sentence of up to life imprisonment.

Section 4214 does not contain the language held unconstitutionally vague in Johnson v. United States, so Johnson does not apply to Delaware’s habitual offender statute.

Jones v. State · filed 2016-05-16

Because the language at issue in Johnson does not appear in Delaware’s habitual offender statute, 11 Del. C. § 4214, this Court has held that the holding of Johnson does not apply under Delaware law.

Section 4214’s habitual offender enhancement may be applied to separate offenses committed at the same time without violating double jeopardy.

State v. Manuel · filed 2025-01-13

The fact that the punishment for each crime is enhanced by the same factor – Manuel’s habitual offender status – does nothing to change the separate character of the offenses. Double jeopardy is not implicated simply because Manuel, an habitual offender, committed more than one crime.

Section 4214(f) allows a habitual offender who meets its sentence and time-served requirements to seek a sentence modification.

State v. Smith · filed 2017-06-21(f)

Smith meets the type-of-sentence and time-served eligibility requirements set forth in ll Del. C. § 4214(f).

Section 4214(f) does not make a person sentenced under § 4214(a) eligible for sentence modification when the judge used discretion to impose a term above the mandatory minimum.

Clark v. State · filed 2018-04-24(f)

The Superior Court exercised discretion in sentencing Clark to fifteen years of Level V incarceration for Robbery in the Second Degree, instead of the five-year minimum mandatory under § 4214. The Superior Court did not err in holding Clark was not eligible for relief under 11 Del. C. § 4214(f).

Section 4214(f) does not make an offender eligible for sentence modification when a judge imposed life imprisonment in discretion rather than as the required minimum sentence.

Durham v. State · filed 2018-05-02(f)

Because the sentencing judge exercised discretion under § 4214(a) to sentence Durham to life imprisonment instead of twenty years at Level V incarceration, Durham did not receive “a minimum sentence of not less than the statutory maximum penalty for a violent felony.”

Section 4214(f) does not permit sentence review when the sentencing judge exercised discretion to impose more than the applicable mandatory minimum.

State v. Williams · filed 2018-06-08(f)

As in Clark and Durham, because the sentencing judge exercised discretion under the then-extant version of Section 4214(a) to exceed the minimum sentence, Williams did not receive “a minimum sentence of not less than the statutory maximum penalty for the violent felony.”

Section 4214(f) allows a habitual offender who meets its sentence-type and time-served requirements to seek sentence modification.

State v. Harris · filed 2018-06-11(f)

Harris meets the type-of-sentence eligibility requirement set forth in 11 Del. C. § 4214(f).9 Harris also meets the time-served eligibility requirements set forth in 11 Del. C. § 4214(f).

Section 4214(f) provides no relief to a defendant who was not sentenced as an habitual offender under § 4214.

Walls v. State · filed 2018-06-05(f)

The Superior Court did not err in finding that the appellant, who was not sentenced as an habitual offender under 11 Del. C. § 4214, was not eligible for relief under § 4214(f).

Section 4214(f) requires an inmate to meet both the sentence-type and time-served requirements to seek sentence modification.

State v. Lewis · filed 2018-08-28(f)

lt appears that Lewis does meet the type-of-sentence eligibility requirement set forth in 11 Del. C. § 4214(f).'0 But the Court finds that Lewis does not meet the time-served eligibility requirement set forth in 11 Del. C. § 4214(f).

For a sentence under former § 4214(a), § 4214(f) requires the inmate to have received the minimum term the judge was required to impose; a longer discretionary term does not qualify.

State v. Alley · filed 2018-10-16(f)

And the Court has since received and reviewed the parties’ supplemental filingsll to determine Alley’s eligibility to seek § 4214(f) relief. The Court has carefully considered the parties’ positions as to whether Alley can be granted a certificate of eligibility. He cannot.

Section 4214(f) does not make a person eligible for sentence modification when the sentencing judge chose life imprisonment instead of imposing the statutory minimum sentence.

Coble v. State · filed 2018-12-13(f)

Because the sentencing judge exercised discretion under § 4214(f) to sentence Coble to life imprisonment instead of eight years at Level V incarceration, Coble did not receive a “minimum sentence of not less than the statutory maximum penalty for a violent felony.”

Section 4214(f) does not make an inmate eligible for sentence modification when the sentencing judge imposed a discretionary term above the former habitual offender minimum.

State v. Hester · filed 2018-12-20(f)

Because the sentencing judge exercised her discretion under Section 4214(a) to sentence Hester to twelve years of unsuspended Level V time instead of the minimum mandatory eight years at Level V incarceration, Hester did not receive “a minimum sentence of not less than the statutory maximum penalty for a violent felony.”

Section 4214(f) requires an inmate to have received the mandatory minimum sentence under former § 4214(a); a longer sentence imposed in the judge’s discretion does not qualify.

State v. Winckler · filed 2019-03-20(f)

Because the sentencing judge exercised her discretion under § 4214(a) to sentence Winckler to ten years of imprisonment instead of five years at Level V incarceration, Winckler did not receive “a minimum sentence of not less than the statutory maximum penalty for a violent felony.”

Section 4214(f) requires an applicant to meet sentence-type and time-served requirements to seek modification of a habitual offender sentence.

State v. Wright · filed 2019-06-11(f)

Wright meets the type-of-sentence and time-served eligibility requirements set forth in 11 Del. C. § 4214(f).

Section 4214(f) directs the court to review a habitual offender’s criminal history, conduct while incarcerated, and likelihood of reoffending when considering a sentence modification petition.

State v. Wehde · filed 2019-09-13(f)

Pursuant to § 4214(f), the Court reviews the petition and the habitual offender’s “prior criminal history, including arrests and convictions,” their conduct while incarcerated, and “available evidence as to the likelihood that the applicant will reoffend if released including a formal, recent risk assessment.”

Denials of sentence modification under § 4214(f) are reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Wehde v. State · filed 2020-04-07(f)

We therefore review the Superior Court’s denial of a motion for sentence modification under § 4214(f) for abuse of discretion.

Section 4214(f) gives the court discretion to deny an eligible sentence modification petition after reviewing the required factors if it would have imposed the same sentence anyway.

Tucker v. State · filed 2020-04-14(f)

The statute is silent as to what weight, if any, the Court should apply to these reviewed elements. It therefore sounds for all the world like the amendments to section 4214(f) are intended to return sentencing discretion to the Court in those cases meeting the eligibility requirements. In cases where, after considering the same elements the Court would be considering in any non-mandatory sentencing scheme, the sentence is one the Court would have imposed anyway, then relief is not warranted.

Section 4214(f) requires a person sentenced as a habitual offender before July 19, 2016 to serve the applicable mandatory term before petitioning for sentence modification.

Walker v. State · filed 2020-05-04(f)

Walker cannot apply for sentence modification under § 4214(f) until after he “has served a sentence of incarceration equal to any applicable mandatory sentence otherwise required by this section or the statutes describing said offense or offenses, whichever is greater.”6 This is a requirement, not a suggestion as Walker claims, for § 4214(f) eligibility.

Section 4214(f) allows previously sentenced habitual offenders who meet its sentence-type and time-served requirements to seek sentence modification.

State v. McDougal · filed 2020-07-31(f)

After reviewing the record and counsel’s submissions, the Court concludes McDougal meets the type-of-sentence and time-served eligibility ... requirements set forth in 11 Del. C. § 4214(f).

Section 4214(f) requires a petitioner to be serving a qualifying habitual sentence and to have served the minimum term calculated from the petitioner’s full conviction history.

State v. Harris · filed 2022-02-14(f)

Although it is true that Mr. Harris originally was sentenced as a habitual offender, he no longer is serving a habitual sentence because his sentence was commuted by the Governor. Mr. Harris therefore does not qualify under the type- of-sentence requirement in Section 4214(f).

Section 4214(f) does not permit sentence review when the sentencing judge exercised discretion to impose a habitual offender sentence above the applicable mandatory minimum.

State v. Foster · filed 2018-09-26(f)

As in Clark and Durham, because the ... sentencing judge exercised discretion under the then-extant version of Section 4214(a) to exceed the minimum sentence, Foster did not receive “a minimum sentence of not less than the statutory maximum penalty for the violent felony.”

Section 4214(f) requires an inmate seeking sentence review to serve the greater of the applicable mandatory sentence under the current habitual criminal provisions or the sentence required by the offense statute.

State v. Douglas · filed 2018-10-16(f)

So Douglas must serve a minimum of 25 years for the triggering first degree robbery conviction (IS03-09-0150) before he can be deemed eligible for § 4214(f) consideration.

Section 4214(f) requires an inmate to serve the applicable mandatory sentence before seeking sentence review.

State v. Dwyer · filed 2019-02-01(f)

Because Dwyer has not met the time-served requirement set forth in ll Del. C. § 4214(f), he cannot seek sentence review under that statute.

Section 4214(f) permits habitual offenders who meet its terms to petition for review of their sentences.

State v. Walls · filed 2019-09-12(f)

Respectively, 11 Del. C. § 4204A and 11 Del. C. § 4214(f) permit Juveniles and habitual offenders who otherwise qualify for relief under the specific terms of those statutory provisions to petition the Court for a review of sentence.

Section 4214(f)’s type-of-sentence requirement excludes a life sentence imposed solely at the sentencing judge’s discretion.

State v. Whiteman · filed 2020-04-28(f)

Whiteman does not meet this requirement because his life sentence was imposed solely within his sentencing judge’s discretion.

Section 4214(f) requires a habitual offender to serve the applicable mandatory sentence before seeking sentence modification.

State v. Yelardy · filed 2020-05-01(f)

Yelardy has not served that period of time and therefore he does not meet Section 4214(f)’s requirement that he serve “a sentence of incarceration equal to any applicable mandatory sentence otherwise required by this section.”

Section 4214(f) permits sentencing relief only after a person has served the greater of the applicable mandatory term under the current Habitual Criminal Act or the mandatory term for the offenses.

State v. Reed · filed 2022-03-09(f)

As such, you are not eligible for relief under new 11 Del. C. § 4214(f) because you do not meet the statute’s time-served eligibility requirement.

Section 4214(f) requires a person seeking sentencing relief to serve the applicable mandatory term before becoming eligible.

State v. Wright · filed 2022-03-09(f)

So you are not eligible for relief under 11 Del. C. § 4214(f) because you do not meet the statute’s time-served eligibility requirement.

Section 4214(f) requires an inmate sentenced under the pre-2016 Habitual Criminal Act to meet both a sentence-type requirement and a time-served requirement to qualify for sentencing relief.

State v. Rowan · filed 2022-03-28(f)

To be eligible for sentencing relief under § 4214(f), an inmate serving a sentence (or sentences) imposed under the pre-2016 Habitual Criminal Act must meet both a type-of-sentence and the time-served requirement.

Section 4214(f) does not make a person eligible to petition for sentence modification when the sentencing judge imposed a discretionary term rather than the qualifying minimum sentence.

Henry v. State · filed 2022-10-18(f)

The fifteen-year sentence is therefore not “a minimum sentence of not less than the statutory maximum penalty.”

Section 4214(f) leaves the decision whether to grant a sentence modification to the court’s discretion.

State v. Heath · filed 2022-10-31(f)

But at this final stage in a § 4214(f) proceeding—just as with any other type of sentence reduction or modification application—the decision whether to grant any relief is left wholly to the discretion of the Court.

Section 4214(e) bars a court from suspending the mandatory portion of a habitual offender sentence.

State v. Ransome · filed 2022-11-22(e)

The Court has no authority to change or modify the mandatory portion of Defendant’s sentence under either Rule 35(b) or § 4214.

Section 4214(f) permits the Superior Court to modify an eligible habitual offender’s sentence but does not require it to do so.

Miles v. State · filed 2023-07-14(f)

Under Section 4214(f), the Superior Court is not required to grant an eligible petitioner’s motion for sentence modification.

Section 4214(f) requires a petitioner to be serving an habitual offender sentence and to have served the applicable mandatory minimum before seeking sentence modification.

Harris v. State · filed 2023-09-26(f)

In other words, petitioners must satisfy two requirements to be eligible for sentence modification. ... He is no longer an habitual offender serving an habitual-offender sentence.

Section 4214(f) permits sentence review only for inmates who received a minimum sentence the prior Habitual Criminal Act required the judge to impose.

State v. Henry · filed 2022-09-09(f)

It is, at bottom, a truly unique vehicle for those in a very small universe—i.e., only those inmates that received the minimum sentence a judge was constrained to impose under the prior version of the Habitual Criminal Act—to have their habitual sentences reviewed and the Court decide if a form of wholly discretionary relief is appropriate.

For multiple habitual-offender sentences in one case, § 4214(f)’s time-served requirement must be met for each count.

Yelardy v. State · filed 2022-10-14(f)

That argument is without merit. For a person who is serving habitual-offender sentences for multiple felony convictions in a single case to satisfy the time-served requirement, “each individual count must be eligible for § 4214(f) relief.”

Section 4214(f) requires an inmate serving multiple habitual criminal sentences in one case to meet the time-served requirement for each count to qualify for relief.

State v. Brown · filed 2022-10-26(f)

As such, Mr. Brown is not eligible for relief for his drug and weapons convictions under 11 Del. C. § 4214(f) because he does not meet the statute’s time-served eligibility requirement.

Section 4214(f) requires an inmate to serve the greater of the applicable mandatory sentence under current habitual criminal law or the offense statute before becoming eligible to seek sentencing relief.

State v. Chambers · filed 2023-12-13(f)

One might become time-served eligible for § 4214(f) relief only “after [he] has served a sentence of incarceration equal to any applicable mandatory sentence otherwise required by th[e current provisions of the Habitual Criminal Act] or the statutes describing said offense or offenses, whichever is greater.”

Section 4214(f)’s type-of-sentence requirement excludes life terms imposed at the sentencing judge’s discretion under the former habitual criminal law.

State v. Saunders · filed 2022-11-30(f)

Mr. Saunders’ sentencing judge exercised that discretion under that version of § 4214(a) and sentenced him to life imprisonment on each remaining count. Consequently, Mr. Saunders does not meet § 4214(f)’s type-of-sentence eligibility requirement on any of those remaining counts.

Section 4214(f) permits a second sentence modification application only when extraordinary circumstances justify the new filing, were beyond the petitioner’s control, and prevented relief on the first application.

State v. Miles · filed 2025-02-18(f)

Anything claimed to be an “extraordinary circumstance” under those provisions should be limited to that which: specifically justifies the filing of a second § 4214(f) application; is entirely beyond a petitioner’s control; and, prevented the petitioner from obtaining the § 4214(f) remedy on the first occasion.

Section 4214(f) time-served eligibility must be determined under the statute; hypothetical resentencing outcomes, comparisons with other inmates, and rehabilitation do not count.

State v. Vickers · filed 2025-05-28(f)

The Court must determine a § 4214(f) applicant’s time-served eligibility consistent with the statute and cannot consider the what-ifs Mr. Vickers offers,13 his suggested comparison to those he deems like-situated inmates, or his claim of rehabilitation.

A motion seeking habitual offender sentencing under subsection (b) can support designation under subsection (a) when it supplies enough certified convictions for either designation.

State v. Brown · filed 2018-04-06(a), (b)

Brown asserts the sentencing pursuant to subsection (a) violated his due process rights because the State’s motion only sought sentencing under subsection (b). Brown says this subjected him to a longer sentence. There can be no sentence longer than Life. The State’s motion provided the Court with enough certified convictions for designation under either or both subsections This claim is without ... merit.

Section 4214(a) permits an eight-year mandatory sentence for a qualifying habitual offender convicted of possession of a firearm by a person prohibited.

Coleman v. State · filed 2018-05-15(a)

The Superior Court sentenced Coleman on his PFPP conviction to an eight year, minimum mandatory term of incarceration under Section 4214(a), not Section 4215.

Section 4214(b)’s habitual offender enhancement may be imposed without a jury finding when the defendant admits the facts needed for the enhancement and waives a jury determination through a guilty plea.

State v. Braxton · filed 2025-04-14(b)

Just as Braxton waived his right to have a jury determine his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt when he entered his guilty plea, so too did he waive his right to have a jury determine the enhancements for two of the PFDCF charges and his status as a habitual offender for the third. He admitted to all of the facts a jury would need to find unanimously beyond a reasonable doubt for the enhancements to apply.

A defendant who admits habitual offender status in a guilty plea waives a jury determination of that status under § 4214(a).

State v. Newman · filed 2025-04-25(a)

Newman admitted his status a ... habitual offender in the plea agreement. Just as Newman waived his right to have a jury determine his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt when he entered his guilty plea, so too did he waive his right to have a jury determine his status as a habitual offender.

Section 4214 does not require a grand jury to determine habitual offender eligibility before an enhanced sentence is imposed.

State v. Grzybowski · filed 2025-05-14

There is no requirement that a grand jury be presented with the question of whether a defendant is subject to enhanced sentencing.

Section 4214(a), as amended, was effective by April 13, 2017 and could support a habitual offender sentence imposed in 2018.

Duffy v. State Of Delaware · filed 2021-02-03(a)

The habitual offender statute pursuant to which he was sentenced – and to which the State cites – was effective on April 13, 2017. See 11 Del. C. § 4214 (a) (eff. Apr. 13, 2017).

When a sentence uses an inapplicable provision of § 4214, the defendant must be resentenced under the appropriate habitual offender provision.

Cannon v. State · filed 2021-03-05

We agree that the proper course of action is to remand this matter to the Superior Court. Upon remand, the Superior Court shall declare Cannon an habitual offender under the appropriate provision of § 4214 and resentence him for his resisting arrest conviction.

Under the version of § 4214(a) in effect when the offense occurred, three prior felony convictions can support habitual offender sentencing; use of a later version does not make the sentence illegal when the motion identifies those convictions and the sentencing range is the same.

Wright v. State · filed 2022-02-17(a)

Under these circumstances, Wright’s habitual offender sentence is not illegal. The habitual offender motion provided a sufficient basis to declare Wright an habitual offender under the correct version of Section 4214.

A habitual offender sentence under the amended Section 4214 is not illegal on that basis when the earlier version would produce the same sentence.

State v. Jackson · filed 2023-03-17

In addition, the Court finds that the sentence is not an illegal sentence as the sentence would be the same under pre-July 18, 2018 version of Section 4214 or the post-July 18, 2016 version of Section 4214.

Section 4214(a) supports a habitual offender sentence when the prior convictions and petition establish eligibility under the version in effect when the defendant committed the offense, even if the sentencing court applied a later version with the same sentencing range.

Johnson v. State · filed 2023-03-28(a)

The State’s habitual offender motion provided a sufficient basis to declare Johnson a habitual offender under the correct version of Section 4214. Johnson faced the same sentencing range ... under the incorrect version of Section 4214 that he faced under the correct version of Section 4214, and he was sentenced to the same minimum sentence.

Section 4214 applies in the version in force when the offense was committed.

State v. Manuel · filed 2024-02-29

Manuel is correct that the habitual offender statute applicable, if at all, to him for the crimes for which he was sentenced is the one in force prior to the 2016 amendment. Accordingly, his Motion is GRANTED and the Court will resentence him.

The 2016 revisions to § 4214 did not entitle a defendant whose offense predated them to a lower habitual criminal minimum absent express retroactive authorization.

State v. Dillard · filed 2024-10-29(b)

The parties and Court agreed to the application of the new provisions to the only conviction for which the State sought habitual criminal sentencing: the second-degree assault count. ... Mr. Dillard is simply mistaken that benefit was one due to him by law. ... The sentencing provisions in effect at the time that a criminal act is committed are those applied when imposing a sentence for that act. ... Delaware courts need apply intervening ameliorative changes to sentencing statutes only when the General Assembly expressly provides for their retroactive application.

The 2016 amendment to Section 4214(b) does not apply to earlier offenses unless the General Assembly expressly makes it retroactive.

State v. Dillard · filed 2024-11-08(b)

The sentencing provisions in effect at the time that a criminal act is committed are those applied when imposing a sentence for that act. Delaware courts need apply intervening ameliorative changes of sentencing statutes only when the General Assembly expressly provides for their retroactive application.