Alaska Stat. § 25.24.160

Section 25.24.160(3) requires an alimony award to consider need, ability to earn a living as affected by age or physical condition, and other appropriate factors.

Burrell v. Burrell · filed 1984-03-09(3)

The legislative history of AS 09.55.210(3) reveals the intention to require that "an award of alimony to either party be based on a consideration of need, ability to earn a living (as affected by age or physical condition) and other appropriate factors."

Section 25.24.160(3) permits alimony when it is just and necessary, but not in addition to a favorable property award that already compensates the supporting spouse.

Rhodes v. Rhodes · filed 1988-06-03(3)

We have indicated that “when there is no substantial property to divide the supporting spouse may be entitled to alimony if it is both ‘just and necessary.’ ” AS 25.24.160(3); ... The marital assets here were substantial enough to make a compensatory favorable award to the supporting spouse. An award of alimony in addition to the favorable award of property is clearly neither just nor necessary.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) permits a court dividing property after a short marriage with no significant commingling of assets to place the spouses as close as possible to their premarital financial positions.

Rose v. Rose · filed 1988-06-10(a)(4)

We conclude that, in marriages of short duration, where there has been no significant commingling of assets between the parties, the trial court may, without abusing its discretion, treat the property division as an action in the nature of rescission, aimed at placing the parties in, as closely as possible, the financial position they would have occupied had no marriage taken place.

Section 25.24.160(3) permits permanent alimony when it is just and necessary, but alimony is neither when divisible property can meet the spouse's reasonable needs.

Hilliker v. Hilliker · filed 1988-06-03(3)

Permanent alimony may be awarded when it is "just and necessary." AS 25.24.160(3). We have repeatedly held that such an award should not be made where the court can provide for the reasonable needs of the spouse seeking alimony from the property available for division in a divorce proceeding. Where property can provide support, alimony is neither just nor necessary.

Former subsection (3) permits temporary rehabilitative support when just and necessary; the preference for meeting needs through property division does not apply to rehabilitative support of limited duration.

Bays v. Bays · filed 1991-03-15(3)

Former AS 25.24.160(3) authorizes trial courts to grant maintenance payments to a spouse which are “just and necessary” without regard to fault. ... We take this occasion to advise that our rule which “established a preference for meeting the parties’ needs with the division of property, rather than alimony, where the marital assets are adequate to do so,” does not apply to rehabilitative alimony or support of limited duration.

Section 25.24.160(a)(2) requires the court to assess the recipient spouse’s specific financial needs before making a sizable alimony award.

Jones v. Jones · filed 1992-06-26(a)(2)

Alaska Statute 25.24.160(a) provides that spousal support may be awarded to the extent it is "just and necessary." ... In the absence of specific findings concerning Virginia's financial needs, we are unable to evaluate whether $2,500 per month in alimony is just and necessary. We therefore vacate the alimony award and remand the issue of spousal support for findings concerning Virginia's financial needs. In unusual cases like this one, where due to Virginia's disabilities and lack of work experience the alimony award is sizable, it is imperative that the trial court inquire into the specific needs of the recipient spouse before making the award.

Section 25.24.160(a)(2) permits both reorientation and rehabilitative alimony when the record supports the separate requirements for each.

Davila v. Davila · filed 1994-07-01(a)(2)

Although reorientation and rehabilitative alimony serve separate goals, require different findings, and are consequently distinct forms of temporary support, they are not mutually exclusive; in some instances, when supported by the record, both may be appropriate.

Reorientation alimony lasting more than one year requires exceptional circumstances.

Davila v. Davila · filed 1995-12-29(a)(2)

Neither the trial court’s original findings nor its additional findings on remand set forth exceptional circumstances supporting more than one year of reorientation alimony. We therefore conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding reorientation alimony of more than one year’s duration.

Section 25.24.160(a)(2) permits alimony awards of varying durations when the circumstances make them just and necessary.

Gallant v. Gallant · filed 1997-09-12(a)(2)

While we have frequently reversed lengthy alimony awards, ... we have indicated that, under the right circumstances, AS 25.24.160 would authorize alimony awards with a variety of durations.

Section 25.24.160(a)(2) permits temporary post-divorce mortgage payments as spousal support when they are just and necessary to fairly allocate the economic effect of divorce.

Dodson v. Dodson · filed 1998-03-27(a)(2)

Because Jim was required to make these post-decree house payments out of his share of the property division, the payments can best be characterized as an award of spousal support to Robin. In fact, the superior court implicitly treated them as such, finding them to be “both just and necessary,” as required by AS 25.24.160(a)(2).

Section 25.24.160(a)(2) permits graduated spousal maintenance based on financial need and ability to pay without requiring enrollment in vocational training.

Broadribb v. Broadribb · filed 1998-05-08(a)(2)

A trial court may award spousal maintenance as “just and necessary” to “fairly allocate the economic effect of divorce.” ... We conclude that the graduated payments are justified as spousal support.

Section 25.24.160(a)(2) permits alimony of indefinite duration when it is just and necessary.

Hammer v. Hammer · filed 1999-11-12(a)(2)

Thus, in keeping with AS 25.24.160(a)(2), our case law allows alimony of indefinite duration when it is "just and necessary."

Section 25.24.160(a)(2) requires a needs analysis to support an award of rehabilitative alimony.

Conner v. Conner · filed 2003-04-18(a)(2)

The needs analysis typically required as an accompaniment of an award of rehabilitative alimony is not reflected in the court's findings.

Section 25.24.160(a)(2) permits spousal support when marital property cannot meet a disadvantaged spouse’s needs, and the court must make adequate findings to justify the award.

Urban v. Urban · filed 2013-12-13(a)(2)

We have required the superior court to make adequate findings showing that the property division is insufficient to meet the parties’ needs in order to justify an award of spousal support.

Section 25.24.160(a)(2) permits spousal support based on factors including the parties’ incomes and an anticipated reduction in earning capacity.

Novak v. Novak · filed 2015-08-26(a)(2)

Laura is correct that the superior court considered a number of the statutory factors, such as Jeremy’s and Laura’s respective annual gross incomes of $137,775 and $54,628, and the fact that Laura was anticipating a temporary reduction in her earning capacity due to her upcoming shoulder surgery. Under these circumstances, the superior court did not abuse its discretion by awarding Laura spousal support.

Section 25.24.160(a)(2) requires an award of spousal support when an unfair property division leaves support as the only way to fairly allocate the economic effect of divorce.

Bulger-Post v. Post · filed 2015-04-08(a)(2)

In view of this obvious inequity, this case presents a rare situation where spousal support is the only way to fairly allocate the economic effect of the divorce. It therefore was error to deny Kazue’s request for spousal support.

Section 25.24.160(a)(2) permits spousal maintenance when property division is insufficient to meet the parties’ needs.

Ruppe v. Ruppe · filed 2015-09-25(a)(2)

To award spousal support, the superior court must “make adequate findings showing that the property division is insufficient to meet the parties’ needs.”45 Thus, finding that the split of marital property was sufficient to equip Terri Lin to continue her education was not an abuse of discretion.

Section 25.24.160(a)(2) permits temporary reorientation support to meet a spouse’s financial needs while marital property is sold.

Donavin G. Bender v. Bender · filed 2024-05-01(a)(2)

The spousal support was transitional and intended to address Holly’s financial needs while Donavin sold non-liquid property (the house). This award fits squarely within the purpose of reorientation support.

Before awarding spousal support, a court must determine whether a disproportionate share of marital property can meet the spouse’s financial needs; the spouse’s preference for support is insufficient.

Hockema v. Hockema · filed 2017-08-25(a)(2)

Deferring to Janet’s preference to receive spousal support rather than a disproportionate share of the marital property was an abuse of discretion. The court did not enter findings regarding whether her needs could be met through unequal property division or through a larger cash equalization payment.

Section 25.24.160(a)(2) permits limited spousal support when the property division cannot adequately support the spouse with lower earning capacity and the award is just and necessary.

Rutherford v. Rutherford · filed 2025-11-19(a)(2)

But when the division of marital assets is inadequate to support the spouse with smaller earning ... capacity, the superior court may award spousal support for a limited period “to the extent it is ‘just and necessary.’ ”

Section 25.24.160(a)(1) allows a court setting child support to consider why a parent voluntarily reduced income rather than automatically reducing the support obligation.

Pattee v. Pattee · filed 1987-10-30(a)(1)

We see no reason why this principle should not extend to initial child support award determinations.

Section 25.24.160(a)(1) allows a divorce court to order continuing support for a disabled adult child.

Streb v. Streb · filed 1989-05-19(a)(1)

The relevant Alaska divorce statute, AS 25.24.160(a)(1), does not limit child support to minor children. ... We therefore hold that the divorce court has the authority to award continuing support payments for a handicapped adult child.

Section 25.24.160(a)(1) allows just and proper child support awards, and Civil Rule 90.3 provides guidelines for applying that standard.

Coghill v. Coghill · filed 1992-07-10(a)(1)

Alaska Statute 25.24.160 allows courts to set child support awards “as may be just and proper for the parties to contribute toward the nurture and education of their children.” AS 25.24.160(a)(1). Civil Rule 90.3 interprets this statute and establishes guidelines to enable courts to determine what is a “just and proper” contribution.

Section 25.24.160(a)(1) allows courts to set just and proper child support awards, and Civil Rule 90.3 provides guidelines for determining that amount.

Lawson v. Lawson · filed 2005-03-11(a)(1)

Alaska Statute 25.24.160 allows courts to set child support awards “as may be just and proper for the parties to contribute toward the nurture and education of their children.” Civil Rule 90.3 interprets this statute and establishes guidelines to enable courts to determine what is a “just and proper” contribution.

Section 25.24.160(a)(1) expressly authorizes support for children of the divorcing parties, but its language does not prevent a court from enforcing an agreement to support a nonbiological child.

Ray v. Ray · filed 2005-07-01(a)(1)

Although it is true that the language of this statute only explicitly authorizes entry of support orders for children of the two divorcing parties, we have previously enforced support orders that fall outside the statute’s plain language.

Section 25.24.160(2) does not itself authorize a court to order post-majority educational support in a divorce decree.

Dowling v. Dowling · filed 1984-03-30(2)

The Hinchey court did not consider other relevant statutes in determining the legislative intent behind AS 09.55.210 [AS 25.24.160]. ... In light of these provisions, we are not convinced that the legislature intended to provide for post-majority educational support in either an original decree, or in a modification of the original decree. To the extent Hinchey is inconsistent with this conclusion, it is overruled.

Section 25.24.160 does not authorize a court to require a parent to pay for a child's post-majority college education.

Hpa v. Sca · filed 1985-08-09

AS 25.24.160 provides that in a divorce action, a court may require the parties to make payments "toward the nurture and education of their children." This section does not confer on a court the power to require a party to make payments towards post-majority education, typically college education.

Section 25.24.160(a)(1) permits a court to order support for an adult child unable to support himself or herself because of a physical or mental disability, even when support is requested after the child reaches majority.

Daum v. Daum · filed 2022-10-14(a)(1)

We further recognized that courts’ statutory authority to issue child support orders is not limited to claims involving minor children. ... Because none of Mark’s arguments persuade us that Streb is not controlling here, we affirm the superior court’s exercise of authority to issue a post-majority child support order for Nathan.

Section 25.24.160 does not authorize a no-contact order in a divorce judgment, but it does not limit the superior court’s independent equitable power to issue one.

Siggelkow v. State · filed 1987-01-09

AS 25.24.160 grants the court power to make certain provisions in a judgment in an action for divorce, but a no-contact order is not among the provisions authorized. ... While these statutes do not themselves authorize the court to issue a no-contact order, neither do they, as Walter suggests, limit the inherent equitable powers of the court.

Section 25.24.160(a)(5) permits a court to change a spouse’s name in a divorce action, but a child is not a party whose name may be changed under that provision.

Lone Wolf v. Lone Wolf · filed 1987-09-04(a)(5)

Second, a child is not a party to a divorce action within the meaning of AS 25.24.-160(5). It is clear from the context of that statute that it was meant to encompass only the parents/spouses and not the children.

Section 25.24.160(a) permits property division and alimony after a marriage is declared void only if the requirements of the putative marriage statute are met.

Batey v. Batey · filed 1997-03-07(a)

Thus, where a marriage is void, the superior court may divide property and award alimony under AS 25.24.160(a) only if the requirements of the putative marriage statute, AS 25.05.051, see infra, are satisfied.

Section 25.24.160 addresses remedies in divorce actions but does not limit the superior court’s jurisdiction over a tort claim joined with a divorce action.

Adam M v. Christina B · filed 2013-06-05

Neither AS 25.24.160 nor AS 22.10.025 expressly limits the superior court’s subject matter jurisdiction — the statutes simply address the superior court’s power to affect rights and provide remedies when adjudicating divorce actions.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) permits a former spouse to seek division of property left unresolved by a divorce decree through a later motion.

Schaub v. Schaub · filed 2013-08-02(a)(4)

Accordingly, under AS 25.24.160(a), Theresa could properly file a motion in the superior court seeking a division of the parties’ property.