Alaska Stat. § 25.24.160

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) applies only to married couples, not unmarried cohabitants.

Boulds v. Nielsen · filed 2014-04-25(a)(4)

We made clear in Bishop that AS 25.24.160(a)(4) applies only to married couples, and does not apply to cohabiting couples.

Property acquired after permanent separation but before divorce is subject to division if it was acquired with property that would otherwise have been divided.

Hunt v. Hunt · filed 1985-04-19(6)

The legislature empowered courts to divide property of the parties acquired during coverture. AS 25.24.160(6). ... Property acquired after the permanent separation but prior to final divorce should be included in the property settlement if it was acquired with property which would otherwise have been subject to division. If the later-acquired property was purchased with property which would not have been divided, then the new property should remain with the purchasing spouse.

Section 25.24.160(4) excludes property acquired with income earned after a final separation leading to divorce, so long as no earlier marital asset was used to acquire it.

Schanck v. Schanck · filed 1986-06-26(4)

As a general rule, we hold that property accumulated with income earned after a final separation that is intended to, and does in fact, lead to a divorce is excluded from the category of marital property, as long as it is obtained without the invasion of any pre-separation marital asset.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) makes property acquired during marriage available for division, except inherited property and property bought with separate assets and kept separate.

Lewis v. Lewis · filed 1990-01-19(a)(4)

As discussed above on pages 13 and 14, this court has construed AS 25.24.160(a)(4) to mean that all property acquired during the marriage is available for distribution, excepting only inherited property and property acquired with separate property which is kept as separate property.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) excludes unmarketable professional goodwill from the marital property available for division.

Richmond v. Richmond · filed 1989-09-15(a)(4)

Property divisions are reviewed to determine "whether the trial court abused the broad discretion given it under AS 25.24.160(a)(4)." Moffitt v. Moffitt, 749 P.2d 343, 346 (Alaska 1988). ... We conclude that Robert has no marketable professional goodwill in his law practice, and that the trial court erred by including his professional goodwill in the marital estate.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) permits a divorce court to value real estate with negative equity at zero when its debt is nonrecourse and the spouse receiving it can default without personal liability.

MacK v. MacK · filed 1991-08-30(a)(4)

The trial court has broad discretion in property division cases. AS 25.24.160(a)(4); Moffitt v. Moffitt, 749 P.2d 343, 346 (Alaska 1988). ... As a result, the trial court had reason to ignore the negative equity on the realty in its equal division calculations. ... Accordingly, we conclude that, on the unique facts of this case, the trial court did not clearly err by assigning a value of zero to the Mack's business realty for the purposes of a marital property division.

Section 25.24.160(6) permits division of property acquired during marriage even when one spouse held it separately.

Gabaig v. Gabaig · filed 1986-04-11(6)

Much of the property consisted of trust assets formerly held separately by Husband, but AS 25.24.160(6) expressly allows division of property held separately.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) treats an unallocated tort recovery as marital property unless a spouse proves by a preponderance of the evidence the portion compensating for separate losses.

Bandow v. Bandow · filed 1990-06-29(a)(4)

However, to the extent that the parties do not provide sufficient evidence to make a reasonable allocation to a separate estate, the award should be classified as marital property. ... Therefore, on remand, Gale will have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence what amount or proportion of the annuity represents compensation for loss of his separate property; i.e., compensation for his post-divorce economic losses, and compensation for non-economic losses, whether incurred before or after divorce.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) allows business good will to be valued in a divorce property division only if it exists and is marketable.

Moffitt v. Moffitt · filed 1988-01-15(a)(4)

Preliminarily, the trial court must decide whether good will exists. If the trial court finds good will exists, it then must determine whether the good will could actually be sold to a prospective buyer. If the trial court determines either that no good will exists or that the good will is unmarketable, then no value for good will should be considered in dividing the marital assets.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) makes property acquired during marriage available for division and permits division of premarital property when the equities require it.

Zimin v. Zimin · filed 1992-07-31(a)(4)

AS 25.24.160(a)(4) places all property acquired during the marriage, whether joint or separate, before the court for purposes of division. This statute also authorizes invasion of premarital holdings "when the balancing of the equities between the parties requires it."

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) requires the court to consider the statutory property division factors, including the parties’ earning capacities, health, and the income producing capacity of their property.

Money v. Money · filed 1993-05-21(a)(4)

On remand, the superior court should consider the factors identified in AS 25.24.-160(a)(4)(A) through (I) with particular emphasis to the earning capacities of the parties, the health of the parties, and the income producing capacity of the properties.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) sets out factors for dividing marital property; diminution in earning capacity is not itself a statutory factor.

Ulsher v. Ulsher · filed 1994-02-11(a)(4)

"Diminution in earning capacity" is not a statutory factor, however. Based on the statutory factors, the trial court's allocation of marital property was not clearly unjust and should not be disturbed.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) requires trial courts to consider nine factors when dividing marital and non-marital property.

Davila v. Davila · filed 1995-12-29(a)(4)

Alaska Statute 25.24.160(a)(4) lists nine factors which the trial court must consider in dividing marital and non-marital property.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) permits a court to divide property acquired during a putative marriage even if the marriage is found to be void.

Rodriguez v. Rodriguez · filed 1995-12-29(a)(4)

By including the phrase “or action declaring a marriage void,” the legislature must have intended to allow the division of property acquired during a putative marriage which is found to be void because it was “contracted by a person during the life of a former husband or wife which marriage has not been annulled or dissolved.” AS 25.24.020. Thus, we conclude that the superior court properly exercised jurisdiction to divide the parties’ property and that any error in failing to grant Rolando’s motion for leave to amend his pleadings to raise lack of subject matter jurisdiction was harmless error.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) permits a court to divide marital property and, when equity requires, separate property; an equal division is presumptively just but must account for the relevant factors.

Brown v. Brown · filed 1996-03-29(a)(4)

By statute, the court is empowered to divide all of the property acquired during the marriage and to invade separate property of either spouse if a balancing of the equities so requires. AS 25.24.160(a)(4). ... A 50/50 property split is presumptively just and is the starting point for application of the factors the court must consider. ... We are not persuaded that the court’s award was an abuse of discretion.

Section 25.24.160(a) gives the superior court broad discretion to divide property equitably; its distribution is reversed only if clearly unjust.

McCoy v. McCoy · filed 1996-11-15(a)

The superior court has broad latitude in fashioning an equitable distribution within the perimeters of AS 25.24.160(a). The superior court’s distribution will not be disturbed unless it is so clearly unjust as to constitute an abuse of discretion.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) permits division of premarital property when a balancing of the equities requires it.

Harrelson v. Harrelson · filed 1997-02-14(a)(4)

Only the marital property is subject to division unless the court finds that invasion of separate property is required by a "balancing of the equities." AS 25.24.160(a)(4).

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) gives trial courts broad discretion to divide marital property equitably in divorce proceedings.

Johns v. Johns · filed 1997-09-26(a)(4)

Trial courts have broad discretion in dividing property as part of divorce proceedings. See AS 25.24.160(a)(4); Doyle v. Doyle, 815 P.2d 366, 368 (Alaska 1991).

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) permits division of premarital property when the court specifically finds that the equities between the spouses require it.

Nicholson v. Wolfe · filed 1999-03-26(a)(4)

In the absence of such a finding, the trial court would be justified in dividing the Northstar assets only if it "specifically found that a 'balancing of the equities between the parties’ required invasion of the pre-marital holding.”

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) requires a property division to account for necessary repair and sale costs when those costs would defeat the court’s intended allocation.

Tollefsen v. Tollefsen · filed 1999-06-11(a)(4)

Alaska Statute 25.24.160(a)(4)(A)-(I) governs the division of marital property in a divorce proceeding and sets forth the factors the superior court must consider in allocating property. ... While the trial court had considerable discretion over how to carry out its findings in the property distribution, its failure to make any provision for the costs of repair and sale prevented the property division from meeting the court's stated goal of an unequal property split in Mary's favor.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) requires courts to consider the applicable statutory factors when equitably dividing marital property.

Edelman v. Edelman · filed 2000-06-16(a)(4)

Therefore, we must remand this issue to the superior court, and on remand the superior court must allocate the marital assets equitably in accordance with any applicable factors enumerated in AS 25.24.160(a)(4).

Section 25.24.160 requires a court dividing property to consider specified factors and fairly allocate the economic effect of divorce.

Green v. Green · filed 2001-08-31(a)(4)

Alaska Statute 25.24.160 requires the trial court to "fairly allocate the economic effect of divorce." ... The trial court here considered the factors set forth in AS 25.24.160 when dividing the property.

Section 25.24.160(a) applies to divorce actions and actions declaring a marriage void, not to property disputes between unmarried cohabitants.

Bishop v. Clark · filed 2002-09-13(a)

Moreover, AS 25.24.160(a) applies by its terms only to "action[s] for divorce or action[s] declaring a marriage void...." As we noted above in Part III.B.1, the property the couple accumulated must be divided in accordance with their intentions.

Section 25.24.160(a) commits property division in a divorce action to the trial court’s discretion.

Miller v. Miller · filed 2005-01-28(a)

The division of property in a divorce action is a matter committed to the discretion of the trial court.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) permits punitive damages to be divided between marital and separate property in the same proportions as the underlying compensatory damages.

Lundquist v. Lundquist · filed 1996-08-16(a)(4)

The rule we adopt today is that punitive damages can be partially marital and partially separate, or even entirely one or the other, depending on the facts. An award of punitive damages should be apportioned in the same manner as the underlying compensatory damages award.

In dividing property under subsection (a)(4), the portion of a personal injury settlement compensating for lost earnings during marriage is a marital asset, while compensation for personal pain and suffering is separate property.

Lacher v. Lacher · filed 1999-12-10(a)(4)

Tarie testified that only $5,000 of the settlement was to compensate for lost earnings while the remaining $45,000 was for her personal pain and suffering. Bob presented no controverting evidence. Accordingly, only $5,000 qualifies as a marital asset available for distribution.

Separate property becomes marital property when the spouses intend to treat it as marital, and placing it in joint ownership creates rebuttable evidence of that intent.

Leis v. Hustad · filed 2001-05-18(a)(4)

The evidence establishes as a matter of law that the parties intended to transmute Bob's Holly Lane property into a joint asset.

In dividing marital property, the court should usually identify assets as of separation and value them as of trial.

Ogden v. Ogden · filed 2001-12-14(a)(4)

But we have consistently held that a divorcee court engaged in dividing property should usually identify marital assets as of the time of separation but establish their value at the time of trial.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) requires courts to consider the property division factors, but findings need only explain the factual basis for the division, not address every factor.

Young v. Lowery · filed 2009-12-24(a)(4)

When dividing marital property, the trial court must consider the factors enumerated in AS 25.24.160(a)(4). ... These factors are "not exhaustive, and the trial court need not make findings pertaining to each factor, but its findings must be sufficient to indicate the factual basis for the conclusion reached."

Section 25.24.160(a) authorizes a court to divide property but does not permit piecemeal distribution after the parties’ property rights have been incorporated into a final judgment.

Williams v. Williams · filed 2011-05-27(a)

Under AS 25.24.160(a) a court has authority to divide property, but the statute does not authorize a court to distribute assets on a "piecemeal basis" when the parties' property rights have been incorporated into a final judgment.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) does not require findings on every property division factor if the findings show the factual basis for the division.

Helen S.K. v. Samuel M.K. · filed 2012-11-16(a)(4)

And while the court did not specifically consider the length of the parties' marriage, "the trial court need not make findings pertaining to each factor," so long as its findings are "sufficient to indicate the factual basis for the conclusion reached."

Section 25.24.160(a) does not authorize a court to divide property again after the parties’ property rights have been incorporated into a final judgment.

McCarter v. McCarter · filed 2013-07-05(a)

However, AS 25.24.160(a) does not authorize a court to dispose of assets on a piecemeal basis where, as here, the parties’ property rights have been purportedly adjudicated and incorporated into a final judgment.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) requires the trial court to consider the Merrill factors when dividing marital property.

Stanhope v. Stanhope · filed 2013-08-09(a)(4)

In dividing property the trial court must consider the Merrill factors, codified at AS 25.24.160(a)(4). ... However, we conclude that the superior court made sufficient findings to indicate the factual basis for its decision to divide the property 50/50, and that division — a presumptively equitable one — was therefore not an abuse of discretion.

A court may accept a fair and equitable divorce property settlement entered into freely with counsel without making explicit findings on the statutory property division factors.

Glover v. Ranney · filed 2013-12-13(a)(4)

Because the superior court found that the settlement agreement entered into freely and with counsel was fair and equitable, the decision to accept the settlement agreement without explicit findings on statutory factors was not an abuse of discretion.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) requires consideration of the property division factors but does not require findings on each factor.

Limeres v. Limeres · filed 2014-03-14(a)(4)

The court was not required to “make findings pertaining to each factor.”

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) requires a property division to be based on the listed factors, including the parties’ earning capacities and financial circumstances.

Bagley v. Bagley · filed 2014-04-30(a)(4)

As noted above, these findings are consistent with the positions taken by both parties at trial, and they are supported by the record. We conclude that the superior court did not abuse its discretion when analyzing the factors required for distribution of marital property.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) requires a court dividing assets from a business to determine whether the underlying business interest is marital or separate property.

Dragseth v. Dragseth · filed 2009-07-10(a)(4)

This analysis was misplaced. Instead of focusing narrowly on the notes, the parties and the trial court should have been looking at Taku Marine itself and whether Joseph's interest in the business was marital or separate.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) does not permit division of property first acquired after divorce, even when past marital labor contributes to its later value.

Young v. Kelly · filed 2014-08-22(a)(4)

We have never held that property acquired after divorce may become marital if, in retrospect, it can be seen to have more value than it would have had absent the marriage, and AS 25.24.160(a)(4) does not allow it.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) permits division of marital property; property acquired after the spouses cease functioning as a single economic unit is excluded.

Jackson v. Sey · filed 2016-06-15(a)(4)

Overall, we have declined to set one particular event as marking the date of separation for all divorce cases; instead, such an analysis is fact-specific, and the date of separation — that is to say, the date that the marriage was terminated as a joint enterprise — varies from case to case. ... We also conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jackson half the value of Sey’s car and her $8,300 deposit and denying Jackson’s Rule 60(b) motion on the merits.

For divorce property division, a post-retirement TRICARE benefit earned during marriage is marital property, while eligibility for IHS healthcare acquired before marriage is separate property.

Horning v. Horning · filed 2017-02-17(a)(4)

We therefore vacate the superior court’s order and remand this case with instructions to classify Donovan’s post-retirement TRICARE benefit as marital property, to classify Shanda’s eligibility for IHS healthcare as separate property, and to equitably divide the marital property based on these findings.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) permits a court to divide separate property if the equities require it.

Kessler v. Kessler · filed 2018-02-16(a)(4)

Finally, the superior court can invade Kenneth’s separate property, including the condominium, if the equities so require.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) permits division of separate property when the equities require it, but the court must make a finding to support that division.

Brennan v. Brennan · filed 2018-08-10(a)(4)

The superior court does have the authority to invade a party’s separate property “when the balancing of the equities between the parties requires it,”63 but in the absence of a finding to that effect, we cannot uphold an order dividing proceeds from the sale of separate property.

Section 25.24.160 permits a court to enforce a divorce property division by ordering the sale of the marital home when necessary.

Vogltanz Jr. v. Stinson · filed 2021-07-07

And this authority includes the power of enforcement; the court may force a sale of the home when necessary to effectuate the terms of the property division.

Section 25.24.160(e) requires a just and equitable division of community property held in a trust after consideration of the relevant factors, unless the trust provides for another disposition.

Philips v. Barbara S. Bremner Philips, Barbara S. Bremner-Philips v. John L. Philips · filed 2020-12-18(e)

Alaska Statute 25.24.160(e) controls the division of property in a community property trust upon divorce. It provides that in distributing “community property under a community property agreement or trust under AS 34.77, unless the parties have provided in the agreement or trust for another disposition of the community property, the court shall make such disposition . . . as shall appear just and equitable after ... considering all relevant factors,” listing four factors. ... The court clearly considered the factors relevant to the division of property in a community property trust.

Section 25.24.160(6) allows separate property acquired during marriage to be divided as justice requires, including consideration of one spouse’s support of the other’s children.

Burgess v. Burgess · filed 1985-12-06(6)

In Alaska, however, separate property acquired during marriage is subject to division “in the manner as may be just,” AS 25.24.160(6). We are unable to say that the division in this case was made unjust by the court’s consideration of Larry’s contributions to the support of Carole’s children.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) gives trial courts broad discretion to divide property equitably; an allocation is set aside only if clearly unjust.

Johnson v. Johnson · filed 1992-07-17(a)(4)

Property divisions are reviewed to determine “whether the trial court abused the broad discretion given it under AS 25.24.160(a)(4).” Moffitt v. Moffitt, 749 P.2d 343, 346 (Alaska 1988). ... When the trial court’s property division is viewed as a whole, we cannot say that the award of the homestead to Sylvia is “clearly unjust” in light of the award to Donald of all the animal trophies and the entire Bear Lake Lodge operation.

Section 25.24.160(4) permits a court to divide premarital property when balancing the equities between the spouses requires it.

Burcell v. Burcell · filed 1986-01-31(4)

The statute also authorizes invasion of pre-mar-ital holdings of either spouse “when the balancing of the equities between the parties requires it....”

Section 25.24.160(4) permits division of separate premarital property only if the court specifically finds that balancing the parties’ equities requires it.

Carlson v. Carlson · filed 1986-07-18(4)

As such, the property should not have been deemed a marital asset available for division unless the court specifically found that a “balancing of the equities between the parties” required invasion of the pre-marital holding.

Section 25.24.160(4) allows a court to divide appreciation of premarital property only when necessary for a just and equitable property division.

Brooks v. Brooks · filed 1987-03-06(4)

AS 25.24.160(4) authorizes a court to invade a spouse’s premarital holdings “when the balancing of the equities between the parties requires it.” We have interpreted this statute to allow the post-marital appreciation of a premarital asset to be treated as marital property only when necessary for a just and equitable property division.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) gives the trial court discretion to treat a premarital asset as separate property even when the parties have treated it as joint property.

Miles v. Miles · filed 1991-08-02(a)(4)

In previous cases, we have held that where a property distribution comes within the parameters of AS 25.24.160(a)(4), [3] the distribution "will not be disturbed unless it is clearly unjust." Wanberg, 664 P.2d at 570 (citations omitted). ... Thus, the trial court retains discretion to decide whether a premarital asset remains separate property even where the asset has been treated as joint property.

An inheritance received by one spouse during marriage is separate property and is subject to division only when a balancing of the equities requires it.

Julsen v. Julsen · filed 1987-08-14(a)(4)

Therefore, we hold that for the purposes of equitable division, an inheritance received by one spouse ... during marriage is not property acquired during coverture within the meaning of AS 25.24.160(a)(4), but constitutes a non-marital asset of the inheriting spouse.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) permits invasion of separate property when marital property cannot be divided equitably and the balance of equities requires it.

Chotiner v. Chotiner · filed 1992-04-03(a)(4)

If an equitable distribution is not possible, the court turns to the parties' separate property. At that point, the court is addressing the question of whether the balance of the equities between the parties requires that separate property be invaded.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) permits invasion of separate property when marital property alone cannot be divided equitably; the court must identify and value the separate property before adjusting the division.

Murray v. Murray · filed 1993-07-23(a)(4)

If at the third step the court finds that an equitable division is not possible using the marital property alone, then the court must determine whether invasion of separate property is necessary to balance the equities. AS 25.-24.160(a)(4). If invasion is necessary, then the court must determine what separate property the parties own, value it, and adjust the initial division as needed.

Premarital property may be treated as marital property if the spouses’ actions during marriage show an intent to hold it jointly.

Rhodes v. Rhodes · filed 1994-02-04(a)(4)

An asset that is originally premarital may be treated as marital for purposes of distribution if the parties, by their actions during the marriage, demonstrated an intent to treat the asset as a joint holding.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) permits division of property acquired during marriage; premarital property can also become marital if its owner intends that result and acts to show that intent.

Gardner v. Harris · filed 1996-09-20(a)(4)

Under AS 25.24.160, only property acquired during the marriage, whether jointly or separately held, may be distributed by the trial court at divorce. AS 25.24.160(a)(4). However, it is a well-settled principle that property acquired before marriage "can become marital property where that is the intent of the owner and there is an act or acts which demonstrate that intent." Chotiner, 829 P.2d at 832; see also Rhodes v. Rhodes, 867 P.2d 802, 804 (Alaska 1994); Wanberg, 664 P.2d at 571.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) permits a court to divide separate property when balancing the equities between the spouses requires it.

Sampson v. Sampson · filed 2000-12-15(a)(4)

But invasion of separate property considers whether "the balancing of the equities between the parties requires" invasion.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) ordinarily excludes premarital property from equitable division, but spouses can make it marital property by intending to treat it jointly.

Martin v. Martin · filed 2002-07-19(a)(4)

Because Don purchased Roy's Health Foods prior to marriage, Roy's would ordinarily be considered his separate property, not subject to equitable division.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) permits a court to divide premarital property as marital property when the spouses’ conduct shows they intended to treat it as jointly held.

Keturi v. Keturi · filed 2004-01-30(a)(4)

The division of property in divorce is governed by AS 25.24.160(a)(4), which vests in the superior court the authority to provide: ... The parties evinced an intent to treat the triplex as marital property. Accordingly, the superior court did not err in concluding that the triplex was transmuted from separate to marital property during the course of the marriage. It therefore properly divided the value of the triplex between the parties.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) requires a court to consider whether an unequal division of marital property will balance the equities before invading separate property.

Odom v. Odom · filed 2006-08-11(a)(4)

We agree that it was error to invade the separate estate without first determining whether an unequal division of the marital estate would properly balance the equities between Bill and Carey.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) permits property acquired during premarital cohabitation to be treated as marital property if the couple later marries.

Chase v. Chase · filed 2005-04-01(a)(4)

Property acquired by a couple prior to marriage may be considered marital property when the property was acquired during premarital cohabitation. “[S]o long as the parties do marry, the trial court is free to consider the parties’ entire relationship, including any period(s) of premarital cohabitation, in making its property division under AS 25.24.160(a)(4), so long as the court observes the distinction which AS 25.24.160(a)(4) draws between assets acquired prior to and during coverture.”

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) permits a court dividing property to consider premarital cohabitation when the parties later marry, while recognizing that property acquired before marriage was initially separate.

Abood v. Abood · filed 2005-09-02(a)(4)

Thus, as long as the trial court recognized that the home was originally Patrick's separate property and that the period of premarital cohabitation is relevant only to Patrick's intent to treat the property as marital, it could have properly considered this period of time in determining Patrick's intent to donate the home to the marriage.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) generally limits marital property division to property acquired during marriage; including courtship debt requires specific findings that equity calls for it.

Barnett v. Barnett · filed 2010-08-27(a)(4)

Under AS 25.24.160, courts are generally called upon to divide property "acquired only during marriage." ... We conclude it was error to include courtship expenses in the marital estate absent specific findings explaining why the balancing of the equities required such inclusion.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) permits a court to include property acquired during premarital cohabitation in the marital estate when the parties later marry and were an economic unit during that period.

McLaren v. McLaren · filed 2012-01-20(a)(4)

In light of the evidence that the parties were an economic unit during their pre-marital cohabitation, the superior court had discretion to include in the marital estate property that was acquired during this period of premarital cohabitation.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) permits a court to treat property acquired during premarital cohabitation as marital property without a transmutation analysis.

Hughes v. Hughes · filed 2013-05-01(a)(4)

The trial court’s analysis of the transmutation factors for Tract C was unnecessary and does not affect the validity of the decision that the two properties were marital when acquired.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) generally excludes separate property from division upon divorce unless the equities require its division.

Cates v. Cates · filed 2024-08-21(a)(4)

The superior court valued the account at $62,374 — and allocated it to John. That meant that the court counted only the $62,374 as marital property, and John received the balance of the account as his separate property. The superior court properly accounted for John’s separate property in the disputed accounts.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) permits a court to invade a spouse’s separate property when balancing the equities under the Merrill factors requires it.

Kilkenny v. Kilkenny · filed 2025-09-19(a)(4)

Alaska Statute 25.24.160(a)(4) explains that a superior court may decide to invade one spouse’s property “when the balancing of the equities between the parties requires it” in accordance with the Merrill factors.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) permits a court to consider a premarital obligation in dividing property when balancing the equities between the parties requires it.

Gambini v. Hamilton · filed 2019-03-29(a)(4)

Therefore it would have been authorized by AS 25.24.160(a)(4), and not a clear abuse of discretion, even if the classification of the HELOC as a marital obligation had been erroneous.

Property inherited in one spouse’s name may be marital property when the donor intended to give it to both spouses.

Katrina Spare, f/k/a Katrina Moreland v. Moreland · filed 2021-10-06(a)(4)

There is no basis to conclude that Spare’s bare legal title to the property mandates as a matter of law that the property is Spare’s separate property.

A just division of pension benefits may require giving the employee spouse the option to keep working and pay the other spouse the benefits that would otherwise have been received.

Morlan v. Morlan · filed 1986-06-20(4)

In recognition of this, other courts have given the employee spouse the option of not retiring and periodically paying the non-employee spouse sums equal to the pension benefits which otherwise would have been received. ... In our view, it was clearly unjust to deprive Charles of such an option in this case.

Section 25.24.160(4) permits a divorce court to order an employee spouse to pay the other spouse a share of retirement benefits earned during the marriage.

Rice v. Rice · filed 1988-07-01(4)

Thus, even prior to the amendment of AS 39.35.500, it was clearly within the trial court’s power to order the employee spouse to pay the non-employee spouse a percentage of the retirement benefits. See AS 25.24.160(4); ... Consequently AS 39.35.500 as amended merely codifies the means by which to distribute an asset.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) treats nonvested pension rights as marital property, but defers their division until they vest.

Laing v. Laing · filed 1987-08-21(a)(4)

We are persuaded that the contingencies that may prevent the employee spouse from ever collecting his or her nonvested pension should not bar the non-employee spouse from recovering a share if the pension is in fact paid out. ... In this regard, we adopt the rule representing the current trend and recognize nonvested pension rights as a marital asset. ... First, because the nonvested pension may, by definition, be forfeited in its entirety, it should not be considered when the trial court makes the initial property division at the time of the divorce. If and when the employee spouse’s pension rights vest and if the parties are unable to reach an agreement on their own, the non-employee spouse may at any time thereafter seek an order dividing the pension.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) requires courts dividing marital property to consider the parties’ earning capacity and financial condition, including the financial effect of replacing military retirement pay with disability benefits.

Clauson v. Clauson · filed 1992-05-08(a)(4)

Alaska Statute 25.24.160(a)(4) (1991) requires a trial court to “fairly allocate the economic effect of divorce” based, inter alia, on the earning capacity and financial condition of the parties involved. Since the waiver of retirement pay and collection of disability benefits clearly affects James and Dorothy’s relative financial positions, Dorothy is entitled to a redistribution of the marital estate under these new circumstances.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) requires a just division of marital property without regard to fault; a spouse’s marital share of a pension must be valued before it is divided.

Nelson-Lizardi v. Lizardi · filed 2002-06-14(a)(4)

Alaska law requires that property be divided "in a just manner and without regard to which of the parties is in fault. ..." ... Jackie is entitled to a determination on the merits and, before that determination can be made, discovery is necessary to determine the value of the pension and whether Jackie's portion is offset by the settlement of the loans secured by the house.

Retirement health insurance benefits reacquired with marital funds are marital property at least in part, even if originally earned before marriage.

Hansen v. Hansen · filed 2005-09-02(a)(4)

By using marital funds during the marriage, Mada reacquired the post-retirement health insurance benefits she earned before the marriage; the benefit is, therefore, at least in part a marital asset.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) permits a court to make a pension interest non-devisable when doing so serves an equitable property division.

Ethelbah v. Walker · filed 2010-03-26(a)(4)

Although an award of pension benefits is normally devisable, we conclude the trial court did not err in making Mary Sue's interest in Lawrence's pension benefits non-devisable, because courts retain broad discretion to reallocate property rights in pursuit of an equitable property division.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4)(D) requires courts dividing marital property to consider its value at the time of division, generally using the later trial date when a trial spans multiple days.

Stevens v. Stevens · filed 2011-10-14(a)(4)(D)

Alaska Statute 25.24.160(a)(4)(D) instructs the court to consider, in addition to other factors, "the value of the property at the time of division" when dividing property.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4)(I) requires the court to consider property value at the time of division; post-separation mortgage payments ordinarily do not justify valuing marital home equity at separation instead of trial.

Beals v. Beals · filed 2013-06-28(a)(4)(I)

Alaska Statute 25.24.160(a)(4)(I) directs the superior court to consider, among other factors,“the value of the property at the time of division.”

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) allows TRICARE benefits to be treated as marital property and permits an unequal division when the relevant factors support it.

Burts v. Burts · filed 2011-12-02(a)(4)

Further, California follows community property laws to determine divorce distributions, but Alaska uses a statutory scheme of equitable division codified in AS 25.24.160(a)(4). ... We conclude that TRICARE is not too speculative to be characterized as marital property simply because it is subject to congressional appropriation. ... The factors the superior court cited readily support an unequal distribution of the marital estate.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4)(D) allows courts to consider current and reasonably anticipated Social Security benefits when assessing the parties’ financial condition and dividing marital property.

Dunmore v. Dunmore · filed 2018-05-11(a)(4)(D)

The statutory admonition that courts consider the parties’ “financial condition”33 when deciding issues such as spousal maintenance and the division of marital property allows consideration of even nondivisible assets.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) allows a court to award a spouse a share of military retirement benefits starting at separation and order repayment of relevant funds received by the other spouse.

Numann v. Diane Gallant f/k/a Diane Numann · filed 2024-09-06(a)(4)

The discretion we grant courts to equitably divide the pension means a court can determine a non-military spouse is entitled to a portion of the benefit starting at separation and order the military spouse to pay back relevant funds to the non-military spouse.

Section 25.24.160(6) permits a court dividing marital property to count property one spouse conveyed to others toward that spouse's share.

Brooks v. Brooks · filed 1984-01-27(6)

Clearly, the trial court is permitted to take Robert's conduct during the marriage into consideration by including the value of properties he conveyed in his half of the property division.

Section 25.24.160(6) allows the court to divide marital property in any manner that is just; it does not require an equal division of each asset.

Schober v. Schober · filed 1984-12-07(6)

Thus, we decline to direct the superior court to award one-half of this asset to Mrs. Schober, as she requests. The court is authorized to distribute the parties' property in any "manner as may be just,” AS 25.24.160(6), and we trust that the court will make its final decision with that principle in mind.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) requires courts to distinguish marital from separate property and make explicit findings when equity requires division of separate property.

Murray v. Murray · filed 1990-03-02(a)(4)

We thus remand the matter to the superior court to distinguish separate from marital assets; to assess whether the equities require invasion of separate assets under AS 25.24.160(a)(4); and if so, then to enter explicit findings to that effect.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) gives trial courts broad discretion to identify, value, and equitably divide marital property.

McDaniel v. McDaniel · filed 1992-04-03(a)(4)

We must determine whether the trial court’s property division was within the broad discretion granted to it by AS 25.24.160(a)(4). ... In a marriage of long duration, where the parties have commingled their assets, the trial court determines property division using a three step process: (1) determining the property available for distribution; (2) valuing that property; and (3) equitably allocating that property.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) requires courts dividing marital property and debt to consider the relevant factors and make findings explaining the division.

Gallant v. Gallant · filed 1994-09-30(a)(4)

A court should consider a number of statutory and ease law factors in dividing the marital property. AS 25.24.160(a)(4); ... We remand for specific findings on the value of significant items of marital property and an explanation of the basis for the distribution of the marital property and debts.

Section 25.24.160 bars using fault in ending a marriage to justify an unequal property division, but permits consideration of a spouse’s dissipation of marital assets.

Hartland v. Hartland · filed 1989-07-07(a)(4)

We agree with Jay’s reading of AS 25.24.160. Under the concept of no-fault divorce, a court cannot rely on one party’s fault in ending the marriage to justifying awarding a greater portion of the marital property to the other spouse. However, reading the court’s above statements in context, we conclude that the trial court did not reduce Jay’s share because his actions were “disruptive” of the marriage. Rather, the court reduced his share for the entirely appropriate reason that he dissipated substantial amounts of marital assets for his own benefit during the parties’ separation.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) bars consideration of fault in causing the marriage to end, but permits consideration of a spouse’s conduct affecting marital property and debts after separation.

Oberhansly v. Oberhansly · filed 1990-09-14(a)(4)

In fact, it is Warren who misconstrues the legislature’s reference to fault in AS 25.24.160(a)(4). We recently reiterated that the statute’s prohibition of any consideration of fault in the division of property refers only to the fault as to the breakdown of the marriage.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) permits greater financial need to justify a more favorable property division; greater earning capacity does not.

Gilboe v. Gilboe · filed 1990-03-30(a)(4)

It is greater need that may justify a more favorable property division, not less need.

A spouse’s lower earning capacity can justify an unequal property division, but it does not require one.

Carstens v. Carstens · filed 1994-02-11(a)(4)

While it is true that her earning capacity will probably not reach that of Richard, that is not necessarily dispositive. A lower earning capacity can justify an unequal property division in favor of the disadvantaged spouse, Merrill v. Merrill, 368 P.2d 546, 547-48 n. 4 (Alaska 1962), but it does not, as a matter of law, mandate one.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4)(F) requires a divorce court to consider whether a parent with primary physical custody should be allowed to live in the family home for a reasonable period, even if the home is awarded to the other spouse.

Hanlon v. Hanlon · filed 1994-03-25(a)(4)(F)

However, the court made no mention of the second portion of the statutory provision, which required it to consider the desirability of awarding Patricia, as Michelle’s custodian, “the right to live in [the family home] for a reasonable period of time.”

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) requires courts to consider its listed factors when dividing marital property and permits consideration of other relevant factors.

Cox v. Cox · filed 1994-09-09(a)(4)

In making an equitable allocation of the marital property between the parties, the trial court must consider the Merrill factors, 368 P.2d at 548 n. 4, as codified in AS 25.24.160(a)(4): ... The Merrill factors are not exclusive in determining an equitable division; the trial court may consider other relevant factors.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4)(D) requires a court dividing marital property to consider a spouse’s health insurance costs when they are relevant.

Foster v. Foster · filed 1994-10-21(a)(4)(D)

The only statutory factor identified by James that was not explicitly addressed by the trial court was the cost of health insurance for James. On remand, the court should take this into account.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) gives courts broad authority to divide marital property justly, but does not require them to review every agreed property settlement for fairness.

Murphy v. Murphy · filed 1991-06-07(a)(4)

We relied upon AS 09.55.210(6), now AS 25.24.160(a)(4), which gives the court power to divide the parties’ property “in a just manner” and held, ... Although this section grants broad authority to a trial court to fashion property settlements absent an agreement, we do not read the section as imposing an affirmative duty on a trial court to examine every property settlement reached by the parties to determine if it is just.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4)(H) requires a court dividing marital property to consider the time and manner of acquisition when that factor is relevant.

Bellanich v. Bellanich · filed 1997-04-18(a)(4)(H)

Alaska Statute 25.24.160(a)(4)(H) specifies that "the time and manner of acquisition of the property in question" is a factor to be considered in dividing marital property. ... This rule applies here. On remand the court should consider the time and manner of acquisition of the property which was given to Michael by his parents.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) bars consideration of misconduct that caused the marriage to fail but permits consideration of economic misconduct that unreasonably depleted marital assets.

Jones v. Jones · filed 1997-07-25(a)(4)

This tension is best resolved by construing “fault” in AS 25.24.160(a)(4) to refer to moral or legal misconduct which has led to the failure of the marriage, but not to economic misconduct which has unreasonably depleted marital assets.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) requires courts considering an unequal division of marital property to consider the Merrill factors codified and expanded in the statute.

Brown v. Brown · filed 1997-10-31(a)(4)

In determining whether an imbalanced award of the marital assets is appropriate, the trial court should consider the Merrill factors as codified and expanded in AS 25.24.160(a)(4).

Section 25.24.160(4) permits equitable division of a vehicle bought with one spouse’s separate funds when the spouses intended it to be a family vehicle.

Dunn v. Dunn · filed 1998-01-16(4)

The court, however, divided the van using equitable distribution principles. See AS 25.24.160(4); Merrill v. Merrill, 368 P.2d 546, 547 (Alaska 1962). ... Although Larry bought the van with his separate savings, evidence that the parties intended the van to be a family vehicle warranted the finding that the van was marital property. The superior court did not err in awarding Angela half the value of the van.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) allows an unequal division of marital property and debts when the court considers the statutory factors and finds the division just.

Tybus v. Holland · filed 1999-10-15(a)(4)

Here, the trial court discussed each applicable statutory factor and stated that it based its decision to distribute the marital assets unequally primarily on the parties’ unequal earning power, stations in life, and conduct during the marriage.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) requires a property division that fairly allocates the economic effects of divorce after consideration of the statutory factors.

Sloane v. Sloane · filed 2001-03-02(a)(4)

A property division must fairly allocate the economic effects of divorce by considering the Merrill ... factors, as codified at AS 25,24.160(a)(4).

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) directs courts dividing marital property to consider the parties' health, earning capacities, health insurance costs, and unreasonable depletion of marital assets.

Kinnard v. Kinnard · filed 2002-03-15(a)(4)

Under AS 25.24.160(a)(4), when dividing the marital property the trial court is directed to consider the parties' health, their earning capacities, their financial conditions including the availability and cost of health insurance, as well as any unreasonable depletion of the marital assets.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) authorizes a court in a divorce action to divide marital property, including retirement benefits acquired during the marriage.

Inman v. Inman · filed 2003-04-11(a)(4)

The court clearly has the authority to so order the equitable division of the marital property under AS 25.24.160(a)(4), which provides that in an action for divorce, the court may provide for the division of the parties' property, including retirement benefits acquired during the marriage.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) permits an unequal property division based on a party’s financial circumstances, even when that party has greater full-time earning capacity.

Veselsky v. Veselsky · filed 2005-06-03(a)(4)

Alaska Statute 25.24.160(a)(4) lists factors to be considered by the trial court in fashioning a property division. These factors include, among others, the earning capacity of the parties, the “financial condition” of the parties, and the “circumstances and necessities” of each party. ... We conclude that it was not clearly unjust for the trial court to award Patricia approximately $3,352 more than a fifty percent share of the marital property based on Patricia’s circumstances as an unemployed graduate student despite her full-time earning capacity.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) requires courts dividing marital property to consider the spouses’ health, financial conditions, and needs.

Fortson v. Fortson · filed 2006-02-17(a)(4)

However, the statutory factors for distribution include the consideration of “the age and health of the parties,” “the financial condition of the parties, including the availability and cost of health insurance,” and “the circumstances and necessities of each party.” ... In light of these facts, a 60/40 property division in favor of Jayne was well within the trial court’s discretion.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) requires a court that divides marital property unequally based on children’s needs to explain why child support alone cannot meet those needs.

Rodvik v. Rodvik · filed 2006-12-08(a)(4)

If the superior court deems it necessary to distribute property in either party’s favor based on the needs of the children, it must explain why the needs of the children cannot be met with child support alone.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) permits a court to credit a spouse for post-separation payments that preserve marital property and requires findings on a disputed request for credit.

Berry v. Berry · filed 1999-04-16(a)(4)

An equal division is "the starting point for application of the [AS 25.24.160] factors the court must consider." [11] However, "[a]n unequal division may be upheld `when it is justified by relevant factors identified in the findings of the court.'" [12] Courts may give credit to one spouse for post-separation payments made to preserve marital assets, but are not required to do so.

Section 25.24.160(4)(E) requires courts dividing marital property to consider the parties’ conduct, including unreasonable depletion of marital assets; unexplained spending during marriage alone does not establish depletion.

Elliott v. James · filed 1999-05-28(4)(E)

Alaska Statute 25.24.160(4)(E) instructs trial courts to consider the conduct of the parties, including whether there has been unreasonable depletion of marital assets, in dividing marital property.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4)'s factors did not justify assigning all marital student loan debt to an economically disadvantaged spouse.

McDougall v. Lumpkin · filed 2000-11-03(a)(4)

The statutory factors outlined in AS 25.24.160(a)(4) do not justify such an inequitable division of this debt.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4)(F) does not apply when the parents’ custodial time is too close to an even split for either to be the primary custodian.

Silvan v. Alcina · filed 2005-01-14(a)(4)(F)

Because there is not such a significant difference in their custodial times that Silvan should be considered to be the primary custodian, AS 25.24.160(a)(4)(F) does not apply.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) permits a court to consider a virtually certain inheritance from an immediate family member when dividing property, but only as one factor without undue weight.

Krize v. Krize · filed 2006-08-25(a)(4)

An absolute prohibition on considering prospective inheritance is unwarranted, but we think any such consideration (1) must be limited to immediate family members, (2) must be limited to inheritances that are not just possible but virtually certain, and (8) must treat the prospect as simply one factor and not give it inordinate weight.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) requires courts to consider the Merrill factors and make findings to justify an unequal division of marital property.

Walker v. Walker · filed 2007-01-26(a)(4)

When dividing marital property, the trial court must consider the Merrill factors codified in AS 25.24.160.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) permits a property division that may help a spouse pursue career training without requiring the findings needed for rehabilitative alimony.

Cartee v. Cartee · filed 2010-09-24(a)(4)

Because alimony awards and property divisions are guided by different principles and aimed at serving different purposes, we hold that property awards made to potentially facilitate career training are distinct from rehabilitative alimony awards, and should be analyzed by the trial court under the property division statute, and not the rehabilitative alimony standard.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) excludes divorce attorney's fees incurred after the spouses' effective separation from the marital estate.

Berry v. Berry · filed 2012-06-01(a)(4)

In response to Michael's concern that the superior court treated April's attorney's fees as part of "the marital debt," we also take this opportunity to clarify that attorney's fees incurred in a divorce proceeding do not constitute part of the marital estate in Alaska. AS 25.24.160(a)(4), which governs the division of marital property, limits the division to property "acquired only during marriage" unless "the balancing of the equities" requires invasion of separate property.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) permits a court to consider how a spouse’s conduct caused financial hardship, but prohibits dividing property based on blame for the marriage’s failure.

Jerry B. v. Sally B. · filed 2016-06-10(a)(4)

The statute does not require the court to ignore the reasons behind Jerry’s “circumstances and necessities.” Nor does it prevent the court from considering how Jerry’s own conduct caused his financial situation simply because that conduct also may have factored into the failure of the marriage. Rather, the statute requires the court to divide property “without regard to” marital fault; in other words, a court may not tip the equities against a party because it believes that party’s moral or legal misconduct was to blame for the marital breakdown.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4)(C) requires consideration of a party's earning capacity, but not potential capacity after significant additional education.

Hooper v. Hooper · filed 2008-07-25(a)(4)(C)

It does not require the court to consider the party's potential future earning capacity following significant additional education.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) requires a fair allocation of the economic effects of divorce, including consideration of the income-producing capacity of the property divided.

Partridge v. Partridge · filed 2010-05-21(a)(4)

Alaska Statute 25.24.160(a)(4) requires trial courts to "fairly allocate the economic effect of divorce" and codifies several factors for courts to consider to achieve this goal. ... The record convinces us that the trial court did consider the income-producing versus income-consuming nature of the assets it awarded.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) gives the court discretion in dividing property after considering a spouse’s health and the availability and cost of health insurance.

Sparks v. Sparks · filed 2010-06-25(a)(4)

The superior court also found that the size of the estate was such that Richard would be able to obtain health insurance with his portion of the estate. Even if he were unable to obtain state coverage, we would not find this to rise to the level of injustice that would warrant a finding of abuse of discretion.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4)(D) requires a court dividing marital property to consider health insurance costs as part of each party's financial condition and make findings when those costs matter.

Day v. Williams · filed 2012-09-07(a)(4)(D)

Alaska Statute 25.24.160(a)(d4)(D) specifies that cost of health insurance is an element of the parties' financial condition, and the superior court therefore should have made such findings under the circumstances of this case.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4)(D) requires courts to consider health insurance costs when dividing marital property, but does not require explicit findings about those costs in every case.

McCormick v. McCormick · filed 2015-09-16(a)(4)(D)

However, Day does not stand for the proposition that the superior court must make explicit findings about health insurance costs in every divorce case.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4)(E) allows consideration of economic misconduct, but the court remanded a property division that may have counted vexatious litigation conduct again after an enhanced attorney’s fee award.

Heustess v. Kelley-Heustess · filed 2011-08-26(a)(4)(E)

Alaska Statute 25.24.160(a)(4)(E) states that in dividing marital property a superior court may consider "the conduct of the parties, including whether there has been unreasonable depletion of marital assets." We have stated that "a court may take into account economic misconduct under subpart (E), but it may not consider a party's moral or legal marital failings which do not amount to economic misconduct." ... On remand, the superior court should reconsider its distribution of the marital estate without considering Allen's vexatious litigation conduct as a factor.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) permits a just division of property acquired during marriage. Debt incurred during marriage is presumptively marital unless the party claiming otherwise shows that the parties intended it to be separate.

Richter v. Richter · filed 2014-08-01(a)(4)

In a judgment for divorce, the court may provide “for the division between the parties of their property, . . . whether joint or separate, acquired only during marriage, ... in a just manner.” ... Debt incurred during marriage is presumptively marital; the party claiming otherwise must show that the parties intended it to be separate.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) does not require installment payments when dividing the marital estate.

Rasmussen v. Rasmussen · filed 2015-03-18(a)(4)

But the statute does not require installment payments as part of the division of the marital estate.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4)(I) generally supports an unequal property division based on income-producing capacity only when the property gives the receiving spouse a substantial economic advantage.

Engstrom v. Engstrom · filed 2015-05-15(a)(4)(I)

We conclude that the “income-producing capacity”of property under AS 25.24.160(a)(4)(I) generally supports an unequal distribution only when the property will provide a substantial economic advantage to the party who receives it — not when, as here, the property only levels the parties’ burdens.

Section 25.24.160 requires courts to consider the spouses’ financial conditions, including receipt of military disability retirement benefits, when dividing marital property and deciding alimony.

Guerrero v. Guerrero · filed 2015-09-18(a)(2)(D), (a)(4)(D)

But we note that Juan’s and Pamela’s financial conditions, including Juan’s receipt of his military disability ... retirement benefits, must be considered when equitably dividing the marital estate and when deciding whether to require alimony.

Section 25.24.160(a)(2)(E) allows a court to consider waste of marital assets when dividing property, but gambling alone does not establish waste.

Wagner v. Wagner · filed 2017-01-13(a)(2)(E)

Equal division of marital assets and liabilities is presumptively correct,19 but the superior court may vary this formula in order to reach an equitable distribution; a party’s waste of marital assets may be one reason to vary.20 ... The superior court did not abuse its discretion when, on the basis of those findings, it allocated the marital student loan debt equally.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4)(E) permits a court dividing marital property to consider a domestic violence protective order and to deny the restrained spouse credit for the other spouse’s use of the home.

Shear v. Shear · filed 2014-12-03(a)(4)(E)

Therefore, it was not an abuse of discretion for the superior court to decline to award Karl a credit for Elizabeth’s use of the marital residence because her possession was protected by a domestic violence restraining order.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) governs equitable division of marital property, and an equal division is presumptively valid.

Yassick v. Yassick · filed 2017-03-08(a)(4)

Rather than substantively challenging the superior court’s equitable distribution analysis under AS 25.24.160(a)(4), Clarice asserts that it was error to divide the marital estate evenly and to refuse to award her attorney’s fees. ... Furthermore, we conclude that because Clarice does not substantively challenge the superior court’s equitable distribution analysis, and because “[a]n equal division of the marital property is presumptively valid,” the superior court did not abuse its discretion in dividing the marital estate evenly.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) requires courts to divide marital property using its equitable factors; a hypothetical coverture fraction is not one of them.

Gordon v. Gordon · filed 2018-08-10(a)(4)

These variables are not among the equitable division factors listed in AS 25.24.160(a)(4) and they have no inherent relation to those factors. The coverture fraction is thus not suited to the task of dividing marital property; it should only be used for characterizing property as marital or separate.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) requires a fair division of marital property based on the statutory factors; a post-division equalization payment cannot justify an equal division when those factors weigh heavily in one spouse’s favor.

Fletcher v. Fletcher · filed 2018-11-30(a)(4)

we conclude that a post-division equalization payment cannot justify an equal division of this marital estate. Based on the findings the superior court made, the property division was clearly unjust.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) requires an unequal division of marital property to be equitable under its listed factors.

Thompson v. Thompson · filed 2019-11-29(a)(4)

While marital property may be unequally divided, such a division must be equitable based on the factors in AS 25.24.160(a)(4).

Section 25.24.160(a)(4)(D) calls for consideration of the parties’ financial condition, including the availability and cost of health insurance, when dividing marital property.

Grove Jr. v. Cheryl M. Grove, n/k/a Cheryl M. Antenucci · filed 2020-04-22(a)(4)(D)

Because Melvin did not offer any evidence of changed financial conditions nor evidence regarding the availability or ... cost of health insurance, there was no reason for the court to reconsider its equitable distribution of the estate.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) permits an unequal division of marital property when the parties’ earning capacities and financial circumstances support it.

Miller v. Loreta Miller · filed 2022-05-11(a)(4)

Taken together, Brian’s much higher earning capacity, receipt of lifetime health insurance benefits, and military disability pay demonstrate that the superior court did not abuse its discretion by dividing the marital estate 63/37.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) gives superior courts broad discretion to divide marital property equitably, including the allocation of marital debt.

Orville Wesley Jenkins Layton v. Mary Tabitha O'Dea, f/k/a Mary Tabitha O-Dea-Layton · filed 2022-08-12(a)(4)

“A [superior] court has broad discretion to provide for the equitable division of property between the parties in a divorce.”

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) requires courts to consider statutory factors when dividing marital property equitably and permits an unequal division supported by those factors.

Mohammed S. v. Abeir E. · filed 2023-08-09(a)(4)

The court thus considered the relevant law in deciding that a distribution favoring Abeir was equitable. We conclude that this property division was well within the superior court’s broad discretion.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) requires courts to consider the Merrill factors when dividing marital property, but does not require findings on every factor.

Haynes v. Haynes · filed 2023-08-16(a)(4)

These factors “are not exhaustive, and the court is not required to enter findings on each factor; the court’s findings regarding the division of property need only be sufficient to indicate the basis of the court’s conclusion.”

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) permits an unequal division of marital property when the spouses’ circumstances support a fair and equitable distribution.

Jolin v. Jolin · filed 2024-10-16(a)(4)

Overall, in light of Kathijo’s disadvantaged position, the court determined that a 60/40 split in her favor was equitable and fair. Given the support in the record for the court’s underlying findings, and the court’s reasoned analysis of the relevant factors, we affirm.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) requires the superior court to consider the relevant factors when dividing marital property.

Johnston v. Tiffany G. Adkins f/k/a Tiffany G. Johnston, Tiffany G. Adkins, f/k/a Tiffany G. Johnston v. Ryan A. · filed 2025-10-08(a)(4)

With this as a starting point, the superior court must then consider the factors outlined in Merrill v. Merrill and codified at AS 25.24.160(a)(4) to determine its division.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4)(E) requires a divorce court to consider whether either spouse unreasonably depleted marital assets when dividing property.

Jibade v. Ogunniyi · filed 2025-12-31(a)(4)(E)

And it also must consider the parties’ conduct, including “whether there has been unreasonable depletion of marital assets.”

Section 25.24.160(a)(4)(G) directs courts dividing marital property to consider each spouse's circumstances and needs, including whether assisted living meets one spouse's needs.

Downs v. Downs · filed 2019-05-03(a)(4)(G)

Further, AS 25.24.160(a)(4)(G) specifically instructs trial courts to consider "the circumstances and necessities of each party" when dividing a marital estate. ... Because AS 25.24.160(a)(4)(G) specifically directs the superior court to consider these findings and these findings were not clearly erroneous, the superior court did not abuse its discretion.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4)(G) permits a court to consider a spouse’s death and the surviving spouse’s greater financial needs when dividing marital property.

Laura Aubert, Personal Representative of the Estate of David L. Aubert v. Debra J. Wilson, f/k/a Debra J. Aubert · filed 2021-03-26(a)(4)(G)

David’s death could be properly considered as an element of “the circumstances and necessities of each party.”62 Because David is deceased, Debra’s relative financial needs are far greater. This disparity is a reasonable basis to order an unequal division of the marital estate.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) permits a court dividing marital property to consider who can maintain the family home and how a sale would affect the children, even when the other spouse contributed to acquiring it.

Johnson v. Johnson · filed 2020-07-22(a)(4)

But the superior court’s decision was well supported by other factors, including who could maintain the home and what course of action would be in the children’s best interest.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4)(E) requires courts dividing marital property to consider unreasonable depletion of marital assets; leaving a marital business unattended does not necessarily establish marital waste.

Jordan v. Jordan · filed 2021-02-12(a)(4)(E)

Although all three unreasonable depletion elements need not be present, based on the two missing elements the court was entitled to determine there was insufficient evidence of unreasonable depletion.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4)(F) allows a court dividing marital property to consider awarding the family home to the parent with primary physical custody of the children.

Francesca S., f/k/a Francesca K. v. Shawn K. · filed 2021-09-08(a)(4)(F)

Alaska Statute 25.24.160(a)(4)(F) specifically authorizes the superior court when dividing a marital estate to consider “the desirability of awarding the family home . . . to the party who has primary physical custody of the children.”

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) permits courts to consider dissipation of marital assets; the remedy is to value the lost asset at separation and credit that value to the responsible spouse.

Rohde v. Rohde · filed 2022-04-15(a)(4)

But if the superior court does find “unreasonable depletion” — i.e., dissipation — the proper remedy is to recapture the lost asset by valuing it at separation and crediting that value to the responsible party.

In dividing marital property, a court must consider a spouse’s absence from the job market and responsibilities for children during the marriage.

Mary Teresa Arthur n/k/a Mary Teresa Wills v. Arthur · filed 2022-09-07(a)(4)(C)

The superior court seems to have ignored Teresa’s marital contribution of caring for the children and concluded that, because Dominic provided the marital income after 2009, Teresa’s contribution of separate property essentially ... equalized the parties’ financial contributions to the marital estate. This would be incorrect.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4) sets out factors for dividing marital property; findings on those factors supported an unequal division.

Lydia May f/k/a Lydia Petersen v. Petersen · filed 2025-03-14(a)(4)

It supported this division by making findings on each of the factors set out in AS 25.24.160(a)(4).

Section 25.24.160(a)(4)(E) permits a court to consider economic misconduct in dividing marital property; concealing plans to separate does not qualify without economic harm to the marital estate.

Hudson v. Hudson · filed 2023-07-07(a)(4)(E)

In all, the analysis of this factor was flawed because the appropriate legal factors were not considered. We therefore reverse the court’s finding that Veronica committed economic misconduct and that the relative conduct of the parties favored Dan. Given the record in this matter, this factor is neutral, favoring neither party.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4)(E) permits a divorce court to consider vexatious litigation when dividing marital property, so long as the conduct is not also counted in an enhanced attorney’s fees award.

B.M. v. R.C. · filed 2024-01-24(a)(4)(E)

Vexatious litigation conduct is therefore properly considered under AS 25.24.160(a)(4)(E), so long as the court does not double-count this conduct in ordering enhanced attorney’s fees.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4)(E) allows courts to consider how spouses handle marital property and debts after separation when dividing property.

Butts v. Lemaster · filed 2024-03-06(a)(4)(E)

And while Butts argues that this factor focuses on conduct during marriage, we apply it as well to the handling of marital property and debts after separation.

Section 25.24.160(a)(4)(C) does not require a court dividing marital property to consider that an adult child lives with one parent.

Hagel v. Brook Hagel · filed 2025-05-07(a)(4)(C)

The superior court properly did not consider the fact that Jennifer’s and Brook’s adult daughter chose to live with Jennifer when it divided the marital estate.

When weighing the parties’ financial condition under subsection (a)(4), a court need not assign precise values to separate property; it need only determine their relative financial condition.

Donna Lohrke, f/k/a Donna Sorrels v. Sorrels · filed 2026-01-14(a)(4)

Because items of separate property are not subject to division, precise determinations of value are not essential. The court need only determine the parties’ relative financial condition.