Alaska Stat. § 25.24.150

Section 25.24.150(h) sets no time limit on past acts of domestic violence; a court must consider whether a found act triggers the custody presumption.

Yelena R. v. George R. · filed 2014-05-23(h)

There is no express time limit on the relevance of past acts of domestic violence under AS 25.24.150(h), and because the court found that Yelena committed an act of domestic violence, it was clear error not to consider whether that finding required application of the domestic violence presumption.

Section 25.24.150(c)(7) requires courts to consider any evidence of domestic violence in a custody determination, regardless of when it occurred.

Dobson v. Dobson · filed 2014-08-06(c)(7)

Any domestic violence, not just “recent” domestic violence, is relevant and must be considered in a custody determination.

Section 25.24.150(g)'s rebuttable presumption against awarding custody to a parent with a history of domestic violence applies in custody modification proceedings.

Williams v. Barbee · filed 2010-12-08(g)

It follows that the presumption is properly a part of the "best interests" analysis in modification proceedings just as it is in initial custody determinations.

Previously unaddressed domestic violence may be considered in a custody modification, and serious prior incidents can warrant an evidentiary hearing.

McAlpine v. PACARRO · filed 2011-10-21(g)

Nor does the finality principle bar Kalindi from basing her 2009 motion on the 1999 and 2004 domestic violence incidents, any new claims of domestic violence occurring between 2005 and 2007, or claims of domestic violence occurring after the December 2007 hearing, because none of these undisputed or alleged incidents have been addressed by the superior court in its custody determinations. We also conclude that the 1999 and 2004 domestic violence incidents alone are sufficiently serious to provide a prima facie case for modification, and therefore a hearing is required.

Subsection (h) requires the court to make each finding needed to overcome the presumption against awarding custody to a parent with a history of domestic violence.

Weinberger v. Weinmeister · filed 2012-01-20(h)

We also agree that the legislature used "and" when it identified the findings that must be made under .150(h) to overcome the presumption against awarding custody to a person with a "history of perpetrating domestic violence."

A parent may rebut the domestic violence custody presumption by means other than completing an intervention program for batterers.

Stephanie F. v. George C. · filed 2012-01-20(h)

The present case squarely presents the issue, and we now hold that the rebuttable presumption in AS 25.24.150(g) may be overcome by means other than the completion of an intervention program for batterers.

A parent seeking to rebut the domestic violence custody presumption must prove completion of a batterers’ intervention program, no substance abuse, and that custodial participation serves the child’s best interests.

Charles J. v. Shellie J. · filed 2013-05-08(h)

In order to rebut the presumption the perpetrating parent must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) he has completed a batterers’ intervention program; (2) he does not engage in substance abuse; and (3) the best interests of the child require that he participate as a custodial parent.

Section 25.24.150(h)'s domestic violence history inquiry does not apply to a household member who is neither a parent nor seeking custody.

Derrick S. v. Dawn S. · filed 2012-07-25(h)

Alaska Statute 25.24.150(h) does not apply to Andrew as he is neither a parent nor someone seeking custody in this proceeding.

Domestic violence in the proposed custodial household must be weighed in the child’s best interests analysis even if the child was not present.

Harris v. Governale · filed 2013-11-01(c)(7)

But domestic violence in the proposed custodial household must be weighed in the best interests analysis regardless of whether the child was present.

When both parents have a history of domestic violence, the court may consider the relative severity of their assaults in deciding which parent is less likely to continue the violence and should receive sole custody.

Dennis Q. v. Monika M. · filed 2014-05-07(i)(1)

We conclude that the superior court did not abuse its discretion by awarding sole legal and physical custody to Monika upon determining that she was the parent least likely to perpetrate domestic violence. ... We conclude that the superior court did not err by relying on the disparity in the severity of domestic violence rather than on who started the violence in this case.

Subsection (k) does not apply to a condition the court did not rely on to deny custody.

Kristina B. v. Edward B. · filed 2014-07-03(k)

Since the superior court did not base its custody award on Kristina’s PTSD, AS 25.24.150(k) is irrelevant to that issue.

Section 25.24.150(g)’s domestic violence presumption was not triggered by a prior finding of neglect where the record lacked credible evidence that the parent committed domestic violence against the children.

Wade R. v. Melinda R. · filed 2014-10-08(g)

Wade’s argument is unpersuasive. ... Second, Wade points to no credible evidence in the record establishing that Melinda committed acts of domestic violence against any of the children. ... On this record, we see no error.

The custody presumption for a history of domestic violence does not apply when the parent has only one proven incident that did not cause serious physical injury.

McAlpine v. Pacarro · filed 2014-10-08(g), (h)

The court therefore determined that Pacarro did not have a “history” of domestic violence and that the statutory presumption barring parents with a history of domestic violence from having custody of children did not apply.7 ... But having reviewed the record in light of the superior court’s credibility findings, we conclude that the court’s findings of fact are not clearly erroneous and that its legal analysis is correct.

A history of perpetrating domestic violence can be established by more than one incident even if the abuse was not continuous, and the court must make specific findings on that question.

Faye H. v. James B. · filed 2015-04-17(h)

Here the superior court appears to have specifically avoided determining whether James “engaged in more than one incident of domestic violence” under AS 25.24.150(h). Instead the superior court focused on whether James’s abuse of Faye was “continuous,” an issue not relevant to the statutory definition of a “history of perpetrating domestic violence.”

Section 25.24.150(g) requires courts deciding custody to consider alleged domestic violence and to seek information needed to evaluate allegations raised by pro se parties.

Sarah D. v. John D. · filed 2015-06-12(g)

Under AS 25.24.150(g) superior courts must “consider alleged incidents of domestic violence,” and when dealing with pro se litigants, “the trial court should solicit from the parties the information it needs to determine whether [certain incidents are] act[s] of domestic violence.”

Section 25.24.150(g)’s custody presumption may be based on domestic violence allegations from before a custody settlement.

Kenneth S. v. Beulah E. · filed 2015-08-26(g)

The trial court properly considered pre-settlement-agreement domestic violence accusations when determining whether to apply AS 25.24.150(g)’s rebuttable presumption that a parent with a history of domestic violence may not be awarded custody.

Subsection (h) allows a parent to rebut the domestic violence custody presumption based on other circumstances affecting the child's best interests, even when the other parent is available.

Caroline J. v. Theodore J. · filed 2015-08-28(h)

Subsection [3][b] allows the presumption to be rebutted regardless of the availability of the other parent, so long as it is in the best interest of the children that the perpetrating parent exercise some degree of custody.

Subsection (g) creates a rebuttable presumption against awarding custody to a parent with a history of domestic violence; the presumption does not apply without a finding of domestic violence.

Kristi N. v. Christopher R. · filed 2016-03-09(g)

If the superior court finds that a parent has a “history of perpetrating domestic violence,” then AS 25.24.150(g) creates a “rebuttable presumption” that the perpetrating parent may not be awarded physical or legal custody. ... Thus, we reject Kristi’s argument that the superior court erred by failing to apply the statutory presumption in AS 25.24.150(g) against Christopher in making its custody determination.

Section 25.24.150(g) presumptively bars an award of custody to a parent with a history of domestic violence unless the parent overcomes the presumption.

Kierston R. v. Eugene R. · filed 2016-12-21(g)

Because the superior court’s finding that Kierston had a history of domestic violence is consistent with the governing statutes and not clearly erroneous, the statutory presumption of AS 25.24.150(g) precluded an award of custody to her unless she overcame the presumption.

Section 25.24.150(g) creates a rebuttable presumption against awarding custody to a parent with a history of domestic violence.

Frederico A. v. Francisca A. · filed 2016-12-28(g)

We therefore hold that the superior court’s determination that the domestic violence presumption of AS 25.24.150(g) applied to Frederico was not clearly erroneous, and we hold the same for the superior court’s decision not to apply the presumption against Francisca.

A court need not consider the domestic violence custody presumption without evidence that would trigger it.

Kayla L. v. Kelvin D. · filed 2017-03-08(g)

Because the court was not presented with evidence that would have triggered its obligation to consider the domestic violence presumption, the court did not err in not considering it.

A court must find that a parent with a history of domestic violence has rebutted the statutory presumption before awarding that parent joint physical custody.

Jessie R. v. Timothy F. · filed 2017-04-05(h)

Because Timothy has a history of domestic violence, the superior court was required to find that Timothy had rebutted the domestic violence presumption before granting him joint physical custody.

A court may find domestic violence for the custody presumption even if the parent was never charged with a domestic violence crime.

Khan v. Coulter · filed 2018-03-28(g)-(h)

Moreover AS 25.24.150(g)-(h) does not require that a perpetrator of domestic violence be charged with a crime of domestic violence before the trial court may find that domestic violence occurred.

A history of domestic violence under § 25.24.150(h) requires serious physical injury in one incident or more than one incident, and the court must make findings sufficient for appellate review.

Solomon v. Solomon · filed 2018-06-08(h)

“A parent has a history of perpetrating domestic violence” if the superior court finds that the parent “caused serious physical injury” during a single incident of domestic violence or “engaged in more than one incident of domestic violence.” ... Thus, the absence of adequate findings to permit us to review the domestic violence determination is not harmless error and requires us to vacate the superior court’s determination and remand for additional findings regarding domestic violence.

Section 25.24.150(g) creates a rebuttable presumption against awarding custody to a parent with a history of domestic violence.

Louis W. v. Maria G. · filed 2018-09-26(g)

Under AS 25.24.150(g), “[t]here is a rebuttable presumption that a parent who has a history of perpetrating domestic violence against the other parent, a child, or a domestic living partner may not be awarded sole legal custody, sole physical custody, joint legal custody, or joint physical custody of a child.” ... We therefore reject Louis’s challenge to the court’s application of the domestic violence presumption.

A domestic living partner includes someone with whom a parent spends significant time in a shared domestic environment, even if they maintain separate homes.

Timothy W. v. Julia M. · filed 2017-08-25(g)

We conclude that in adopting the term “domestic living partner” to address the broad problem of children witnessing domestic abuse, the legislature intended to capture violence that took place within the context of relationships where partners spend a significant amount of their time in a shared domestic environment.

Section 25.24.150(g) requires courts to consider evidence of domestic violence when deciding child custody.

Burns-Marshall v. Krogman · filed 2018-11-09(g)

The superior court is required to consider evidence of domestic violence in a child custody determination.

A history of domestic violence requires recurring violence; a 30-minute episode of excessive corporal punishment is one incident even if the violence stops and resumes.

John E. v. Andrea E. · filed 2019-07-19(h)

The references to a "pattern" of domestic violence; to "repetitive, perpetual" domestic violence; to "perpetuating" domestic violence; and to "do[ing] it again and again ... to maintain control" indicate that the legislature viewed the phrase "more than one incident of domestic violence" as referring to habitual or recurring violence. An episode of excessive corporal punishment lasting 30 minutes does not evince a "pattern" of domestic violence. Thus, although it was arguably broken into two periods of violence, we conclude that the 30-minute episode was a single incident for the purposes of the domestic violence presumption.

A parent with a history of domestic violence may be limited to supervised visitation until the parent overcomes the statutory presumption against custody.

Loren R. v. Sharnel V., Loren R. v. Sharnel V. · filed 2020-07-22(g)

By restricting him to supervised visitation until he takes the steps necessary to overcome the statutory presumption against custody, the court merely followed the law based upon its findings about Loren’s conduct.

A finding that a parent committed more than one act of domestic violence against a child, the other parent, or an intimate partner triggers a presumption against awarding that parent custody.

Clarence S. v. Samantha S. · filed 2020-09-23(g)-(h)

Alaska Statute 25.24.150(g)-(h) clearly states that a finding that a parent committed more than one act of domestic violence against the children, the other parent, or an intimate partner triggers a presumption against awarding that parent custody.

When domestic violence is alleged, the custody court must make detailed findings about the incidents before deciding whether the presumption against awarding custody applies.

Jennifer L. v. Geoffrey G. · filed 2021-05-19(g)

We conclude that the superior court’s failure to make detailed findings about the alleged incidents of domestic violence was error.

Section 25.24.150(g) applies a rebuttable custody presumption when a parent’s domestic violence history includes one incident that caused serious physical injury.

Heather R. v. Justin L. · filed 2021-09-08(g)

Because there was one incident of domestic violence, the superior court must determine on remand whether Justin caused serious physical injury during that incident. If so, the rebuttable presumption applies and requires the court to restrict Justin’s contact with the child until he has satisfied the statutory requirements to rebut its application.

A court must consider the abuse underlying a rebutted domestic violence presumption when weighing the custody best interests factors.

Angelica C v. Jonathan C, Angelica C v. Jonathan C · filed 2020-03-20(c)

The court’s conclusion that Jonathan rebutted the domestic violence presumption did not permit it to thereafter ignore the underlying facts of the conduct making him a domestic violence perpetrator when it made its best interests analysis.

An older, isolated incident of domestic violence may receive little weight in the child’s best interests analysis.

David D. v. Marissa D. · filed 2021-11-17(c)(7)

The court’s domestic violence findings are supported by the record and not clearly erroneous; and given the age of the ... single incident it found to be proven, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion by giving the domestic violence factor little weight in its best interests analysis.

The court must consider any evidence of domestic violence or child abuse when deciding custody and visitation, even if it does not establish a history of domestic violence.

Robert A. v. Tatiana D. · filed 2020-10-23(c)(7)

But this does not significantly advance Robert’s argument, as the court is required to take into account “any evidence of domestic violence [or] child abuse” — not just whether there is a history of domestic violence — when making decisions about custody and visitation.

When the domestic violence presumption applies, a court may require a parent to complete an available batterers’ intervention program before visitation.

Benjamen J. v. Heather J. · filed 2021-04-21(j)

The court thus did not abuse its discretion by requiring Benjamen to complete a batterers’ intervention program before visitation.

Section 25.24.150(c)(7) allows a parent’s history of domestic violence to remain relevant to the child’s best interests even after the parent overcomes the domestic violence presumption.

Ott v. Runa · filed 2020-05-08(c)(7)

A parent may overcome the domestic violence presumption, but a history of domestic violence still may be a relevant factor in determining which custody configuration is in the child’s best interests.

Section 25.24.150(g)’s domestic violence presumption requires courts to consider allegations that were never adjudicated, including allegations predating a stipulated custody agreement.

Edna K. v. Jeb S. · filed 2020-07-17(g)

We reverse the court’s decision to apply collateral estoppel, vacate its findings on no change of circumstances, and remand for an evidentiary hearing on the domestic violence allegations regarding alleged incidents before and after the parties’ stipulated custody agreement.

The domestic violence presumption does not apply when the court finds that no acts of domestic violence occurred.

Leilani P. v. Keith P. · filed 2023-06-21(g)

Accordingly it had no basis to apply the statutory domestic violence presumption against custody.

Section 25.24.150(j) limits a parent with a history of domestic violence to supervised visitation conditioned on participation in and completion of available batterer intervention and parenting education programs.

Adam F. v. Caitlin B. · filed 2024-07-12(j)

In addition the statute provides that a court “shall allow only supervised visitation by that parent with the child, conditioned on that parent’s participating in and successfully completing an intervention program for batterers, and a parenting education program, where reasonably available.”

The court must consider evidence of domestic violence in a custody decision, but further action under section 25.24.150 requires a finding that a party committed domestic violence.

O'Brien v. Francis X. Delaplain, Kassandra Spencer, Kenneth M. O'Brien, Willis A. Ehlers, and the Central Council of Tlingit and Haida Indian Tribes of Alaska · filed 2024-09-27(j)

The best interest factors enumerated in AS 25.24.150(c) require that the court consider “any evidence of domestic violence . . . in the proposed custodial household.” But the statute does not require the superior court to take further action unless it finds that a party had committed domestic violence.

Section 25.24.150(g) requires courts to consider alleged incidents of domestic violence and make findings specific enough to show how they reached their conclusions.

Jasmine R. v. Cornell R. · filed 2025-03-19(g)

Alaska Statute 25.24.150(g) requires a superior court to consider alleged incidents of domestic violence and make findings about them specific enough to “allow us to glean from the record what considerations were involved” in reaching its conclusions.

Section 25.24.150 requires detailed findings on alleged domestic violence so a court can determine whether the rebuttable presumption against custody applies.

John M. v. Michelle M. · filed 2025-04-16(g)

The superior court “must make detailed findings on alleged incidents of domestic violence” under AS 25.24.150.

Section 25.24.150(c)(7) requires explicit consideration of domestic violence when the evidence makes it relevant to a custody decision.

Farkas v. Caitlin Burr · filed 2026-02-25(c)(7)

Explicit consideration of AS 25.24.150(c)(7) was required because it was “relevant in light of the evidence presented.”

A parent who has committed more than one act of domestic violence against a child is subject to a presumption against custody and may be limited to supervised visitation.

Mohammed S. v. Abeir E. · filed 2023-08-09(g), (h), and (j)

The record fully supports the superior court’s factual findings about Mohammed’s abusive treatment of his children and those findings fully support the superior court’s application of AS 25.24.150(g), (h), and (j).

A parent with a history of domestic violence faces a rebuttable presumption against custody; shared custody may be awarded when the presumption is overcome and equal time serves the child’s best interests.

Sheri-Louise A. v. Barry A. · filed 2024-08-14(g)

These earlier findings support the superior court’s final custody order. In the final custody order the court found that “Barry has overcome the [DV] presumption and the best interests of the child are met by having equal time with both parents, all other factors being equal.” Although these particular findings are scant, we see no clear error in light of the court’s previous factual findings, its previous credibility determinations, and the additional testimony that was presented after the court’s interim custody order but before the final order.

Section 25.24.150(g)’s domestic violence custody presumption does not apply when the court cannot find that either parent perpetrated domestic violence.

Rashae J. v. James J. · filed 2024-10-04(g)

Because the court’s factual findings are not clearly erroneous, it did not err by declining to apply the domestic violence presumption in its award of custody.

Section 25.24.150(c)(7) requires consideration of any evidence of domestic violence in the proposed custodial household when determining the child's best interests.

Bruce H. v. Jennifer L. · filed 2017-10-06(c)(7), (g)

Neither the best interests statute nor our precedent requires evidence of either separate judicial proceedings or multiple instances of domestic violence to make domestic violence findings in a custody dispute. And the court improperly relied on AS 25.24.150(g) to define domestic violence. That statute contains no such definition, instead describing the presumption against awarding custody to a parent with “a history of perpetrating domestic violence.”

Section 25.24.150(h) allows the custody presumption against a parent with a history of domestic violence to be overcome without completion of a batterers’ intervention program when the statutory purpose is satisfied.

Joy B. v. Everett B. · filed 2019-11-01(h)

Alaska Statute 25.24.150(g) imposes “a rebuttable presumption that a parent who has a history of perpetrating domestic violence against the other parent, a child, or a domestic living partner may not be awarded sole legal custody, sole physical custody, joint legal custody, or joint physical custody of a child.” ... We conclude that the trial court did not err when it considered the seriousness of Everett’s incidents of domestic violence — and specifically their situational nature — in the context of deciding whether he had overcome the presumption against awarding him custody of the parties’ child.

A parent has a history of perpetrating domestic violence after more than one incident of domestic violence, triggering a presumption against legal or physical custody.

Terrace L. Solomon v. Wendy Solomon, n/k/a Wendy Racer · filed 2020-09-23(h)

We have reviewed the record and the superior court’s factual findings — which Terrace does not contest in his briefing — and we see no error in its determination of a history of perpetrating domestic violence.

Section 25.24.150(c)(5) requires courts to consider the child’s stable environment and the desirability of continuity, including each parent’s ability to maintain a stable relationship with the child after separation.

McQuade v. McQuade · filed 1995-08-18(c)(5)

Alaska Statute 25.24.150(c)(5) requires the superior court to consider “the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity” in determining the best interests of the child. Thus, the superior court must consider each parent’s respective ability to maintain stable and satisfactory relations between themselves and the child following separation.

When stability and continuity favor the current custodian but the other parent relationship factor favors a change, § 25.24.150(c) requires the court to explore less intrusive ways to obtain compliance before changing custody, unless those measures would be futile.

Vachon v. Pugliese · filed 1996-11-08(c)

Further, when there is a conflict between the stability and continuity factor (a factor that clearly favored Linda), and the factor regarding the custodial parent’s desire and ability to allow an open and loving frequent relationship (a factor that potentially favored Robert), a change in custody should not be ordered until the court has explored less intrusive means of obtaining compliance unless it finds such means would be futile.

Subsection (c)(5)'s continuity factor does not give the child's primary caregiver an automatic custody preference.

Ijd v. Drd · filed 1998-07-31(c)(5)

Irma's argument that Joseph should remain with her simply because of her status as primary caregiver lacks merit.

Section 25.24.150(c) requires courts considering a proposed move to decide whether remaining with the custodial parent serves the children’s best interests, without requiring proof that the move itself does.

Hayes v. Hayes · filed 1996-09-06(c)

Moreover, we do not read the House and McQuade criteria as requiring the custodial parent to show, under any standard of proof, that the move proposed is in the children's best interests. Rather, the showing must be that it is in the children’s best interests to remain in the custody of the present custodial parent, given the proposed move.

Section 25.24.150(c) calls for consideration of all its best interests factors when a parent's move prompts a custody hearing.

Pearson v. Pearson · filed 2000-07-07(c)

When the trial court conducts a custody hearing as a result of a parent's move, it should consider all the criteria in AS 25.24.150(c).

The stability and continuity factor does not require special weight when the other custody factors are equal.

Elliott v. Settje · filed 2001-07-27(c)(5)

Alaska Statute 25.24.150(c) lists the factors that the court must consider in determining the best interests of a child. ... Our decision in Evans allowed the trial court substantial discretion to analyze the stability and continuity factor and other non-statutory factors related to stability, but it did not require giving the stability and continuity factor special weight when the other factors are equal.

Section 25.24.150(c)(5) requires courts to assess continuity and stability both retrospectively and prospectively when deciding custody.

Meier v. Cloud · filed 2001-11-16(c)(5)

The statute's plain language requires the court to view continuity and stability both prospectively and retrospectively: the court must examine both the time that a child "has lived" in a stable environment and "the desirability of maintaining [that] continuity."

Section 25.24.150(c)(5) requires courts to consider continuity of care, but that factor may be outweighed by a parent's inability to support the child's relationship with the other parent.

Hamilton v. Hamilton · filed 2002-03-08(c)(5)

Alaska Statute 25.24.150(c)(5) requires the court to look to the desirability of maintaining continuity. ... Judge Thompson found Phyllis's inability to allow John frequent access to the children, and the stress that this was causing the boys, to be more important than the desirability of maintaining continuity of care by Phyllis.

Section 25.24.150(c) requires courts deciding custody when a parent relocates to assess the child's best interests under its factors, including the reasons for the move.

Moeller-Prokosch v. Prokosch · filed 2001-07-27(c)

Under the standards we have set forth in House v. House ... and McQuade v. McQuade, a court making a custody determination in cases where one parent chooses to move away from Alaska must do so by determining what custody arrangement is in the best interests of the child under the criteria stated in AS 25.24.150(c), including determining whether there are legitimate reasons for the move.

In assessing a child's stable environment, the court may consider the custodial home, school, friends, family, cultural community, relationships with both parents, and stability of place.

Barrett v. Alguire · filed 2001-11-16(c)(5)

The trial court's consideration of the stability of the children's environment in a custody modification case can encompass a multitude of factors, including, but not limited to, the relationship with the custodial parent, the home provided by the custodial parent, the children's school, the community of friends and family, the cultural community, and the children's relationship with the non-custodial parent. It also includes stability of place.

When a parent plans to relocate, the custody court must consider how separation from either parent would affect the child's stability.

Moeller-Prokosch v. Prokosch · filed 2004-10-01(c)(5)

As part of considering Jeremiah's best interests in terms of relational stability, the superior court should have fully considered the effect of his separation from the noncustodial parent, assuming his mother moves to Florida.

Section 25.24.150(c)(5) permits a court to consider the possible trauma of changing a child's primary caregivers when deciding custody.

In Re Adoption of LEKM · filed 2003-05-30(c)(5)

There was evidence in the record to support a conclusion that the transfer of custody could be risky, and such trauma is properly considered during a custody determination under AS 25.24.150(c)(5).

When a parent plans to relocate, the court must assess custody under the statutory best interests factors, determine whether the move has legitimate reasons, and assume the move will occur.

Veselsky v. Veselsky · filed 2005-06-03(c)

We have held that “a court making a custody determination in cases where one parent chooses to move away from Alaska must do so by determining what custody arrangement is in the best interests of the child[ren] under the criteria stated in AS 25.24.150(c), including determining whether there are legitimate reasons for the move.”

Section 25.24.150(c)(5) requires courts to consider a child's stable living arrangements and the desirability of maintaining continuity when deciding custody.

Odom v. Odom · filed 2006-08-11(c)(5)

The superior court may properly conclude that awarding custody to the primary caregiver will establish greater emotional stability for the purposes of AS 25.24.150(c)(5), which requires the court to consider the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory, environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity.

In weighing stability and continuity under subsection (c)(5), a court may consider sibling relationships and give emotional continuity greater weight than geographic continuity.

Melendrez v. Melendrez · filed 2006-09-15(c)(5)

It appropriately balanced multiple factors in considering the best interests of the children, and it determined that the need for continuity of sibling relationships outweighed other considerations.

The custody continuity factor requires consideration of both geographic continuity and relational stability.

Blanton v. Yourkowski · filed 2008-04-11(c)(5)

Alaska Statute 25.24.150(c)(5) requires the court in a child custody case to consider "the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity." The continuity factor has two components: maintaining geographic continuity and maximizing relational stability.

When evaluating a child's best interests after a legitimate proposed move, a court may consider a parent's secondary motive to limit the other parent's involvement.

Eniero v. Brekke · filed 2008-09-12(c)

Thus, even motives that are not the "primary motivation" for a move can be taken into account in the best interests analysis.

The stability factor considers both geographic continuity and the child's relationships with family and community.

Rego v. Rego · filed 2011-08-12(c)(5)

Michael correctly points out that we have recognized two components of stability: geographic and relational. However, Michael is incorrect in suggesting that the superior court disregarded relational stability. The court considered the "extended network of family and friends in Fairbanks" an important factor in Dante's stability; a review of the court's opinion suggests that the court was more focused on Dante's relationships in the Fairbanks community than the geographic location itself. We perceive no abuse of discretion in this regard.

The stability factor requires courts to consider both the child's past living environment and whether maintaining that arrangement remains desirable.

Rebecca L. v. Martin C. · filed 2013-03-13(c)(5)

It “requires the court to view continuity and stability both prospectively and retrospectively: the court must examine both the time that a child ‘has lived’ in a stable environment and ‘the desirability of maintaining [that] continuity.’ ”

A court may consider a parent’s prior marriages when assessing stability and continuity only if evidence shows they could adversely affect the child’s best interests.

John N. v. Desiree N. · filed 2013-05-08(c)(5)

Finally, AS 25.24.150(c)(5) requires the court to consider “the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity.” ... The superior court on remand should not rely on John’s prior marriages absent evidence that they could adversely affect the best interests of the child.

Subsection (c)(5) requires courts to consider both geographic continuity and a parent’s ability to provide emotional stability; geographic continuity need not carry greater weight.

Tinsley v. Nakayama · filed 2014-08-27(c)(5)

The superior court clearly considered the desirability of geographical stability but placed greater weight on Molly’s ability to better meet the children’s emotional needs.

Section 25.24.150(c)(5) permits a court to consider the child’s geographic, emotional, and relational environment when assessing stability.

Houston v. Wolpert · filed 2014-09-05(c)(5)

The court, in its stability analysis, may consider circumstances affecting the child’s geographic, emotional, and relational environment.

In a relocation custody dispute, the stability factor requires the court to consider how separation from the moving parent would affect the child’s continuity and stability.

Mengisteab v. Oates · filed 2018-08-03(c)(5)

We agree with Mengisteab that the court erred in failing to adequately consider the effect living in Alaska without his mother and siblings would have on continuity and stability in Saul’s life.

The stability and continuity factor considers more than a child’s geographic stability.

Beals v. Beals · filed 2015-03-25(c)

But factor five measures more than just geographical continuity.

The stability factor considers the child’s relationships as well as geographic continuity; geographic stability alone does not decide custody.

Snider v. Snider · filed 2015-09-25(c)(5)

Thad’s argument amounts to a “continuity test centered entirely on the child’s geographical stability,” which we have specifically disclaimed.

Section 25.24.150(c)(5) requires consideration of continuity, but a court may give greater weight to a parent’s interference with the child’s relationship with the other parent.

Scott v. Gaines · filed 2017-06-14(c)(5)

Thus the court did not abuse its discretion by “placing undue weight on the factor of allowing a relationship and not enough weight on the desirability of maintaining continuity.”

When a parent plans to relocate, the court considers a secondary motive to make visitation more difficult under the best interests factor concerning that parent’s willingness to foster the child’s relationship with the other parent.

Johnson v. Wilson · filed 2019-02-20(c)(6)

For example, if a parent has a secondary motive of making visitation more difficult, the court should consider this as part of the inquiry into the parent’s “willingness to foster communication between the child and the other parent.”

When a parent plans to move, the stability and continuity factor requires the court to consider the child’s circumstances both if the child moves and if the child remains, including the effect of separation from a primary caregiver.

Saffir v. Wheeler · filed 2019-02-22(c)(5)

But it did not address the impact of removing the child from her established routine or from Saffir, the parent who established it. ... We therefore hold that there was a failure to engage in proper symmetrical analysis, which constituted error.

A court may consider a parent's primary caregiver status when assessing the child's stability and the desirability of continuity.

Brett M. v. Amanda M. · filed 2019-08-02(c)(5)

Accordingly it was not legal error for the superior court to consider Amanda's primary caregiver status as an element in its fifth best interests factor determination.

The stability and continuity factor considers both geographic continuity and each parent’s ability to maintain a stable relationship with the child.

Belk v. Belk · filed 2020-03-18(c)(5)

A court’s consideration of AS 25.24.150(c)(5), the stability and continuity factor, encompasses not only geographical continuity but also relational stability, or ... “each parent’s respective ability to maintain stable and satisfactory relations between themselves and the child.”

The stability and continuity factor does not require a court to preserve an unstable and unsatisfactory custody arrangement solely for the sake of continuity.

Sarah B. v. Edward H. · filed 2021-02-24(c)(5)

It is true that the custody modification greatly reduced the amount of time the children have with Sarah, but factor five does not require the court to maintain what it has found to be an unstable and unsatisfactory environment solely for the sake of continuity.

The stability and continuity factor includes the child’s relationships with siblings and other family members when a parent plans to relocate.

Theisen v. Thompson · filed 2023-02-15(c)(5)

The court also considered the child’s attachment to her “two half-siblings . . . and close grandparent ties with the paternal grandparents” in Alaska, concluding that Stephanie was “best able to meet the important social needs for [the child] to maintain the ties with her siblings.” These findings are relevant to the “relational stability” we ... have determined to be an important part of the “stability and continuity” factor.

When assessing a child’s stability after a parent’s relocation, the court must consider both geographic and relational stability.

McCann v. McCann · filed 2023-02-22(c)(5)

When analyzing a child’s stability under factor five, the court must consider both geographic stability and relational stability.

When a parent moves from Alaska, the stability factor requires the court to consider both geographic continuity and the child’s relational stability.

Boone v. Boone · filed 2023-08-02(c)(5)

When one parent is moving from Alaska, this factor requires the court to consider both the desirability of maintaining geographical continuity, but also maximizing relational stability.

The stability and continuity factor does not give presumptive preference to maintaining an interim custody arrangement.

Lymburner v. Ashley Lee Axhelm f/k/a Ashley Lee Lymburner · filed 2023-10-25(c)(5)

Likewise, trial courts may not accord presumptive preference to maintaining the interim custody order.

Section 25.24.150(c)(5) requires courts to consider the child’s stable environment and the value of continuity, including established school and therapeutic support.

J. M. v. S. C. · filed 2024-07-19(c)(5)

Alaska Statute 25.24.150(c)(5) requires courts to consider “the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity.” ... Again, the court did not clearly err in its relevant factual findings or abuse its discretion by weighing this factor in favor of S.C.

Section 25.24.150(c)(5) permits a custody court to give greater weight to a child’s relationships with both parents than to geographic stability when assessing stability and continuity.

Maria Thereza Pinho de Almedia Guimaraes v. Schlehofer · filed 2024-10-30(c)(5)

Under the facts and circumstances of this case, it was permissible for the court to elevate relational stability above geographic stability, even when the court’s decision would require Katherine to attend school in a new district.

The continuity and stability factor requires courts to consider a child’s relationships as well as geographic stability.

Brenna M. Outwater, f/k/a Brenna M. Ahmasuk v. Ahmasuk · filed 2025-08-01(c)(5)

Instead, courts must examine this factor more holistically, considering not only the places and geography involved, but the social and emotional impacts associated with changes in the children’s relationships.

When a parent proposes a legitimate relocation, § 25.24.150(c) requires the court to weigh the child’s best interests by comparing the child’s life with each parent after assuming the move has occurred.

Schachle v. Schachle · filed 2026-06-17(c)

Second, the court must weigh the factors listed in AS 25.24.150(c) to decide what custody arrangement is in the children’s best interests. ... In this second step, the court must assume the move has occurred and compare the children’s lives with each parent in their respective locations.

In a relocation custody decision, a court may give greater weight to a parent's willingness to foster the child's relationship with the other parent when distance will separate them.

Silvan v. Alcina · filed 2005-01-14(c)(6)

The court assumed that a move would occur and found that Silvan had a legitimate reason to move: “a desire to get away from the State of Alaska”; and it thoroughly examined the factors for determining the best interests of the children as laid out in AS 25.24.150(c). ... It is essential to have a custodial parent willing to foster an open relationship with the other parent when a great distance separates the children from the non-custodial parent, and it is reasonable for the superior court to place enhanced importance on this factor when making its decision.

Section 25.24.150 does not empower a court to enjoin contact with a former spouse.

Siggelkow v. State · filed 1987-01-09

We think it would be unreasonable to hold that AS 25.24.-150 empowers the court to enjoin contact with a former spouse.

Section 25.24.150(a) and (c) allow a court to decide a custody issue on its own motion when a party has raised it and both sides have an opportunity to present full testimony.

Tmc v. Sac · filed 1993-09-03(a), (c)

"[D]uring the pendency of the action, or at the final hearing or at any time thereafter during the minority of a child of the marriage," the trial court can "make, modify, or vacate an order for the custody of or visitation with the minor child that may seem necessary or proper," in accordance with the best interests of the child. AS 25.24.150(a), (c); see also AS 25.20.060(a), (c) (allowing award of joint custody if in best interests of child). In such cases, the trial court may decide issues *319 on its own motion, as long as a party has raised them and both sides have the opportunity to present full testimony.

Section 25.24.150(c) requires findings addressing how unsupervised visitation would affect the child's needs and other listed interests before a court orders supervised visitation.

Jfe v. Jas · filed 1996-12-13(c)

Therefore, an order requiring that visitation be supervised must be supported by findings that specify how unsupervised visitation will adversely affect the child's physical, emotional, mental, *414 religious, and social well-being and the other interests set out at AS 25.24.150.

Section 25.24.150(a) does not apply to a custody dispute between unmarried adults when neither parent has died.

Buness v. Gillen · filed 1989-10-27(a)

Standing is an issue here because Seanne and Tim were never married, thereby making AS 25.24.150(a) (“[i]n an action for divorce or for legal separation or for placement of a child when one or both parents have died”) inapplicable.

Section 25.24.150 permits supervised visitation when the court’s findings explain how unsupervised visits would harm the child.

Rodvik v. Rodvik · filed 2006-12-08(c)

The trial court’s order that the visits be supervised is therefore adequately supported in the record and the harm to the children from unsupervised visitation is clearly articulated in its findings.

Section 25.24.150 requires the court to decide whether a parent must complete a batterers’ intervention program as a condition of visitation; the court cannot delegate that decision to the other parent.

Misyura v. Misyura · filed 2010-11-19

Alaska Statute 25.24.150, entitled "Judgments for custody" provides that if a court *1042 has jurisdiction and is the appropriate forum, it may "make, modify, or vacate an order for the custody of or visitation with [a] minor child that may seem necessary or proper." ... In this case, the court delegated to Lyudmila the authority to decide whether to impose the condition that Sergey complete an intervention program for batterers. That decision is one that must be made by the court.

Section 25.24.150(a) permits a court with jurisdiction to modify a custody order when necessary or proper, including to make it conform to Alaska law.

Heber v. Heber · filed 2014-08-01(a)

But Alaska Statute 25.24.150(a) provides that a court with jurisdiction may “make, modify, or vacate” a custody order if such action seems “necessary or proper.” ... The superior court was well within its discretion when it modified the August 23 order to make it conform to Alaska law.

Section 25.24.150 permits modified joint legal custody that gives one parent final authority when the parents cannot agree; calling that arrangement “primary” legal custody does not by itself make the order an abuse of discretion.

Smith v. Smith · filed 2024-02-07

“Primary” legal custody is not a term supported by Alaska statute. See AS 25.24.150. ... But we find that here, the unclear phrasing alone does not amount to an abuse of discretion because the superior court clearly articulated that its legal custody ruling was “modified joint legal custody requiring that the parties communicate with each other regarding major decisions” and Evelyn holding final decision-making authority.

Section 25.24.150(a) does not authorize post-adoption visitation for biological relatives.

Matter of WEG · filed 1985-12-06(a)

However, we cannot conclude that the "grandparents' visitation" statute applicable to divorce-related custody cases was intended to indirectly liberalize the strictly worded adoption statute to allow post-adoption visitation rights for biological relatives.

Section 25.24.150(a) does not authorize post-adoption visitation rights for an adopted child’s biological relatives.

In re W.E.G. · filed 1985-12-06(a)

However, we cannot conclude that the “grandparents’ visitation” statute applicable to divorce-related custody cases was intended to indirectly liberalize the strictly worded adoption statute to allow post-adoption visitation rights for biological relatives.

Section 25.24.150(a) permits grandparent visitation when it is in the children's best interests without requiring the trial court to explain precisely why.

Brown v. Brown · filed 1996-03-29(a)

The trial court could have reasonably determined that visitation by the paternal grandparents would be in the best interests of the children; we see no reason to require a precise explanation.

Section 25.24.150(a) permits a court to award shared custody to a parent and a non-parent when doing so serves the child’s best interests.

Carter v. Novotny · filed 1989-10-09(a)

By ordering shared custody between a non-parent and a parent, the superior court attempted to effectuate the purposes of AS 25.20.060 — 25.20.130 and AS 25.24.150. The court would not abuse its discretion by awarding shared custody between a parent and non-parent, so long as the best interests of the child are served.

Section 25.24.150's best interests standard does not govern a custody dispute between a biological parent and a stepparent, however close the stepparent's relationship with the child.

Jw v. Rj · filed 1998-01-16

The court instead appears to have applied the best interest standard set out in AS 25.24.150. ... The relationship between the stepparent and the child, no matter how close, does not justify application of the best interests standard; the court may take the relationship into account, however, in deciding whether awarding custody to the biological parent would be detrimental to the child.

Section 25.24.150(c)(6) considers each parent's willingness to encourage the child's relationship with the other parent in custody disputes between two parents.

Osterkamp v. Stiles · filed 2010-06-25(c)(6)

We consider "the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage a close and continuing relationship between the other parent and the child" in a custody dispute between two parents. AS 25.24.150(c)(6) But this is not a dispute between two parents. Consistent with our opinion in Evans, the parental preference may only be overcome if it is determined, by clear and convincing evidence, that it would be in the best interests of the child to award third party visitation.

The 2004 amendments to § 25.24.150 do not apply when the evidence closed before their effective date.

Van Sickle v. McGraw · filed 2006-04-28

We conclude that the amended version of AS 25.24.150 does not apply to this ease because the evidence closed before the effective date of the statute.

Section 25.24.150 permits courts to enter custody and visitation orders in divorce proceedings without violating a parent's constitutional right to care and custody of a child.

Kurka v. Amy L Kurka, Walter J Kurka v. Amy L Kurka · filed 2012-11-28

Walter attempts to challenge the validity of that order by arguing that AS 25.24.150, the statute permitting the superior court to enter custody and visitation orders, is unconstitutional because it infringes on his constitutional right to the care and custody of his son. This argument is without merit. It is well-established that courts have the authority to make custody determinations in divorce proceedings.

Section 25.24.150(c) requires courts to consider enumerated best interest factors when determining custody, but it does not mandate specific factors or restrict travel for international visitation.

Moore v. Moore · filed 2015-05-29(c)

Alaska law does not explicitly prohibit child custody visitation in non-Hague Convention signatory nations or otherwise restrict international travel as part of custody visitation, and there are no specific statutorily mandated factors for a trial court to consider with regard to foreign visitation.