Can a Texas occupational licensing agency accept an applicant's sworn statement that they have no Social Security number, instead of an actual SSN?

Plain-English summary

The Attorney General issued this opinion on his own initiative to correct what he viewed as a longstanding misreading of Texas law. Some Texas agencies were issuing occupational licenses to applicants who did not provide a Social Security number, instead accepting sworn affidavits "claiming" the applicant has no SSN.

The AG concluded that this is not allowed. Family Code section 231.302(c)(1) says "each licensing authority shall request and each applicant for a license shall provide the applicant's social security number." The word "shall" imposes a duty. So occupational licensing authorities must request the SSN, and applicants must provide it, and agencies cannot solicit or accept attestations that an applicant does not have one.

The opinion overrules a 2001 AG opinion, JC-0409, that had reached the opposite conclusion. JC-0409 relied on a nonbinding federal guidance memorandum (PIQ-99-05) interpreting 42 U.S.C. section 666(a)(13). The AG made two points against that reasoning. First, an agency cannot use a nonbinding federal bureaucrat's preference to override the words the Texas Legislature enacted. Second, the timing does not work: the federal provision JC-0409 leaned on was added to the Social Security Act in 1996, a year after Texas enacted section 231.302(c)(1) in 1995, so the 1995 statute could not have turned on a 1996 federal provision.

The AG limited the opinion to occupational licensing, expressly noting it does not address other license categories such as driver's licenses, which have their own statutory exception in Transportation Code section 521.142(g).

What this means for you

If you run an occupational licensing agency

Under this opinion, you must request each applicant's Social Security number, and you cannot accept a "no SSN" affidavit in place of an actual number for an occupational license. The AG specifically flagged affidavit forms that let applicants claim they have no SSN as inconsistent with section 231.302(c)(1). The opinion points to coordinate rules already in place for architects, landscape architects, interior designers, engineers, and land surveyors (22 Tex. Admin. Code §§ 1.23(e), 3.23(e), 5.33(f), 133.21(d)(1)(B), 134.21(d)(1)(B)) as examples of the SSN requirement being implemented.

If you are applying for a Texas occupational license

Expect the agency to require your Social Security number on the application. Based on this opinion, an agency should not let you substitute a sworn statement that you have no SSN for an occupational license.

If you advise a state licensing agency

The opinion overrules JC-0409, so guidance built on that older opinion (and on the federal PIQ-99-05 memo) no longer reflects the AG's position. Note the scope limit: the AG addressed occupational licensing only and said the opinion "should not be read more broadly," distinguishing categories like driver's licenses that carry their own statutory SSN exception.

Common questions

Q: Can a Texas occupational license applicant skip the SSN by signing an affidavit?
A: No, according to this opinion. Section 231.302(c)(1) requires the applicant to provide an SSN and the agency to request it, and the AG concluded agencies cannot accept attestations that the applicant has no SSN.

Q: Didn't a prior AG opinion say applicants weren't required to have an SSN?
A: Yes, Opinion JC-0409 (2001) said that, relying on nonbinding federal guidance. This opinion overrules JC-0409 and its progeny.

Q: Why did the AG reject the older opinion's reasoning?
A: Two reasons. An agency cannot use a nonbinding federal guidance memo to override the Legislature's enacted words, and the federal provision the older opinion relied on (42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(13)) was added in 1996, a year after Texas enacted section 231.302(c)(1) in 1995.

Q: Does this apply to driver's licenses or other licenses?
A: No. The AG limited the opinion to occupational licensing and said it should not be read more broadly, noting that driver's licenses have a separate statutory exception in Transportation Code section 521.142(g).

Background and statutory framework

Texas enacted Family Code section 231.302(c)(1) in 1995 to assist child-support enforcement administered under federal law (42 U.S.C. §§ 601-617 and 651-669 as they read in 1995). The provision directs that "each licensing authority shall request and each applicant for a license shall provide the applicant's social security number." Under Government Code section 311.016(2), "shall" imposes a duty.

The 2001 opinion JC-0409 had read Texas law to mean an individual is not required to have an SSN, relying on a federal guidance memorandum (the "Ross Memo," PIQ-99-05) interpreting 42 U.S.C. section 666(a)(13). The AG rejected that approach. Citing the principle that an agency cannot "exercise what is effectively a new power, or a power contradictory to the statute" for administrative convenience (Public Utility Commission v. City Public Service Board of San Antonio), and invoking the U.S. Supreme Court's rejection of reflexive deference to agency interpretations in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, the AG held that the meaning of Texas law does not turn on a single federal bureaucrat's nonbinding reading. The AG also relied on plain-meaning canons (LTTS Charter School v. C2 Construction; In re Office of Attorney General) to take the Legislature "at its word."

The AG noted the timing problem directly: the federal subsection JC-0409 leaned on, 42 U.S.C. section 666(a)(13), was added by the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, a year after Texas enacted section 231.302(c)(1). The opinion situates the requirement in the broader 1995 child-support framework, where an SSN aided locating absent parents and processing data (e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 653(b), 652(a)(10)(E), 654(16), 666(a)(3)(C) (1995)). The AG limited the holding to occupational licensing, distinguishing driver's licenses, which have a statutory exception in Transportation Code section 521.142(g).

Citations and references

Statutes:
- Tex. Fam. Code § 231.302 — Social Security number required for license applications
- 42 U.S.C. § 666 — state procedures for child-support enforcement, including recording SSNs on license applications

Key cases:
- Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024) — rejecting reflexive deference to agency interpretations (U.S. Supreme Court)
- Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex. v. City Pub. Serv. Bd. of San Antonio, 53 S.W.3d 310 (Tex. 2001) — agencies cannot assume powers contradictory to statute
- Webster v. Comm'n for Law. Discipline, 704 S.W.3d 478 (Tex. 2024) — Attorney General's role as chief law officer

Overruled:
- Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. JC-0409 (2001) — overruled, along with its progeny

Source

• Landing page: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/ken-paxton/kp-0516
• Original PDF: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/2026/kp-0516.pdf

Original opinion text

February 10, 2026

Opinion No. KP-0516
Re: Social Security Numbers Required for Occupational Licenses

The Governor has made clear that "all appropriate state agencies [are] to assist federal actors" in combatting the presence of "illegal aliens found in Texas." Tex. Exec. Order No. GA-54, 50 Tex. Reg. 810 (Feb. 14, 2025); see also OFF. OF THE TEX. GOVERNOR, Governor Abbott Directs Texas DPS To Strictly Enforce English Proficiency Requirements For Commercial Drivers (Sept. 4, 2025). Likewise, for three decades, our Legislature has commanded that "each licensing authority shall request and each applicant for a license shall provide the applicant's social security number." Act of May 27, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 751, § 84, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 3888, 3916 (codified at TEX. FAM. CODE § 231.302(c)(1)). Various agencies are nonetheless issuing occupational licenses to individuals who do not provide a social security number in their application. Upon review, it appears the Legislature's unambiguous mandate was obscured by vaulting the nonbinding preference of a federal bureaucrat over the words democratically memorialized in Texas law. See generally Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. JC-0409 (2001) at 1–2. As the "chief law officer of the State" with solemn duties "involving at all times the exercise of broad judgment and discretion," Webster v. Comm'n for Law. Discipline, 704 S.W.3d 478, 495 (Tex. 2024) (citations omitted), the Attorney General is dutybound to clarify the current state of law.

It is axiomatic that an agency cannot "exercise what is effectively a new power, or a power contradictory to the statute, on the theory that such a power is expedient for administrative purposes." Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex. v. City Pub. Serv. Bd. of San Antonio, 53 S.W.3d 310, 316 (Tex. 2001). Still, agencies were loosed of their statutory reins during the Cornyn administration: Attorney General Opinion JC-0409 reflexively relied on PIQ-99-05—a nonbinding guidance memorandum interpreting a provision of federal law that mandates state-level "[p]rocedures requiring . . . the social security number of[] . . . any applicant for [certain licenses] . . . be recorded on the application," 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(13) (including "occupational license[s]")—to conclude that "[a]n individual is not required to have a social security number" under Texas law. Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. JC-0409 (2001) at 1–2 (citing Memorandum from David Gray Ross, Comm'r, Off. of Child Support Enf't, to State IV-D Dirs. & Reg'l Program Managers (July 14, 1999) ("Ross Memo")).

[Footnote 1: Apparently, agencies accept sworn affidavits "claiming" the applicant has no social security number. See, e.g., TEX. DEP'T OF LICENSING & REGUL., OCCUPATIONAL LICENSE APPLICATION CLAIMING TO HAVE NO SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER (2022).]

The time has come to correct the error spawned by JC-0409. Even beyond the now-rejected fealty to agencies' statutory interpretation, Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 411 (2024) (overruling Chevron's "judicial invention"), the opinion incorrectly suggests the meaning of Texas law somehow turns on a single bureaucrat's nonbinding interpretation of a federal statutory provision that did not exist when subsection 231.302(c)(1) was codified by our Legislature in 1995. The PIQ at the heart of JC-0409 purports to interpret title 42 of the United States Code, subsection 666(a)(13). See generally Ross Memo. Yet that subsection was added to the Social Security Act on August 22, 1996—the year after subsection 231.302(c)(1) was enacted. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–193, § 317, 110 Stat. 2105, 2220–21 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(13)). This is no small oversight given that our Legislature enacted subsection 231.302(c)(1) "[t]o assist in the administration of laws relating to child support enforcement under . . . [title] 42 [of the United States Code] [s]ections 601–617 and 651–669" as they read in 1995. Act of May 27, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 751, § 84, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 3888, 3916 (codified at TEX. FAM. CODE § 231.302(c)(1)). As such, JC-0409 ignores basic interpretive principles as well as the linear progression of time itself. We therefore overrule this mistaken opinion and its progeny.

[Footnote 2: Neither is it difficult to see why requiring a social security number would prove helpful to this version of the Social Security Act. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 653(b) (1995) (authorizing the social security number "of any absent parent" be provided to certain entities); see also, e.g., id. §§ 652(a)(10)(E) (1995) (reporting state-specific data on "locate requests submitted without the absent parent's social security account number"), 654(16) (1995) (authorizing state-administered "data processing and information retrieval" containing social security numbers), 666(a)(3)(C) (1995) (requiring states furnish "notice of the absent parent's social security . . . number" for tax refund offsets).]

Our blackletter obligation "in construing a statute is to honor the Legislature's expressed intent, and ordinarily the truest manifestation of legislative intent is legislative language—the words the Legislature chose." LTTS Charter Sch., Inc. v. C2 Constr., Inc., 342 S.W.3d 73, 75 (Tex. 2011) (footnote omitted). That is to say "[w]e take the Legislature at its word." In re Off. of Att'y Gen., 422 S.W.3d 623, 629 (Tex. 2013). Doing so here returns us to the unmistakable call of the Family Code: Occupational licensing authorities "shall request and each applicant for a license shall provide the applicant's social security number." TEX. FAM. CODE § 231.302(c)(1) (emphases added). The term "'[s]hall' imposes a duty," TEX. GOV'T CODE § 311.016(2), which compels "each licensing authority [to] request" and "each applicant for a license [to] provide the applicant's social security number," TEX. FAM. CODE § 231.302(c)(1); accord, e.g., 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 1.23(e), 3.23(e), 5.33(f), 133.21(d)(1)(B), 134.21(d)(1)(B) (implementing coordinate rules for architects, landscape architects, interior designers, engineers, and land surveyors). This leaves no room for attestations that serve only to memorialize statutory non-compliance by occupational license applicants and soliciting agencies alike.

[Footnote 3: This opinion is limited to occupational licensing—as other categories may prove distinct, cf., e.g., TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 521.142(g) (codifying exception for driver's licenses)—and should not be read more broadly.]

S U M M A R Y

Family Code subsection 231.302(c)(1) unambiguously requires that occupational licensing authorities request and each applicant provide their social security number. As such, agencies cannot solicit or accept attestations that an applicant does not have a social security number.

Prior reliance on the nonbinding federal guidance in PIQ-99-05 is misplaced, and Attorney General Opinion JC-0409 as well as its progeny are overruled.

Very truly yours,

KEN PAXTON
Attorney General of Texas

BRENT WEBSTER
First Assistant Attorney General

LESLEY FRENCH
Chief of Staff

D. FORREST BRUMBAUGH
Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel

JOSHUA C. FIVESON
Chair, Opinion Committee