In Texas, when do pretrial bond conditions like a no-contact order actually become enforceable, and do they still apply after a defendant is rearrested?

Plain-English summary

The Angelina County District Attorney asked the Attorney General two timing questions about pretrial bond conditions, the kind of "no contact" conditions courts use to keep a defendant away from an alleged victim.

First question: when do bond conditions kick in? When the defendant signs an order of conditions, or only after the defendant bonds out of jail? The AG's answer: conditions become enforceable when the defendant actually gives (posts) the bond the magistrate ordered. They do not take effect just because the defendant is eligible for bail or because some order was signed. Reading Chapter 17 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as a whole, conditions "of bond" and "on bond" attach at the moment the accused "has given the required bond" and is set at liberty under article 17.29(a). The Code does not even require the defendant to sign the conditions order, and there is no "order of conditions" by that name in Chapter 17.

That answer raised an obvious concern: if conditions only attach once the defendant is released, how do you protect a victim while the defendant is still in custody? The AG pointed to a different tool. A magistrate can issue an emergency protection order under article 17.292, which "is effective on issuance" and can prohibit the defendant from contacting the protected person, even from jail. The opinion cites a case affirming a conviction for violating an emergency protective order by contacting the victim while the defendant was still locked up.

Second question: are bond conditions still enforceable after the defendant is rearrested for violating them? No. Once the magistrate revokes the bond and the defendant is rearrested, the original bond conditions are no longer enforceable. Revocation discharges the sureties, and the court typically sets a new bond, which may or may not carry the same conditions. The same logic applies if the defendant is rearrested on a separate offense that leads to revocation.

What this means for you

If you are a prosecutor

Two operational points. First, do not treat a defendant as bound by bond conditions before the bond is actually posted. Under this opinion, the enforceable moment is when the defendant "gives the required bond," not when paperwork is signed. Second, if your goal is to keep a defendant away from a victim while the defendant is still in jail awaiting release, the bond conditions will not do that work, an emergency protection order under article 17.292 will, because it is effective on issuance and can bar contact even during custody.

After a revocation and rearrest, do not rely on the old conditions. The opinion is clear that they are no longer enforceable; you will be working from whatever new bond the court sets.

If you are a magistrate or judge

The opinion describes bond conditions as taking effect when the defendant posts the bond, and notes there is no statutory requirement that the defendant sign the conditions order (article 2A.1521 requires the magistrate to sign it). If victim safety during custody is the concern, article 17.292 gives you an order that is effective immediately on issuance. On revocation: once you revoke and the defendant is rearrested, the prior conditions lapse, and the path forward is setting a new bond under article 17.09, section 3.

If you are a criminal defense attorney

The timing rule cuts in your client's favor on enforceability: conditions of a posted bond are not enforceable before the bond is given. But be aware of the separate track, an emergency protection order under article 17.292 binds your client immediately on issuance, including while in custody, and violating it is independently punishable, as the Segundo case the opinion cites illustrates.

If you are a victim or victim advocate

The protection you may be relying on while the defendant is still in jail is the emergency protection order, not the bond conditions. The AG explained that bond conditions only become enforceable once the defendant posts bond and is released, while an emergency protection order is effective the moment the magistrate issues it and can prohibit the defendant from contacting you even from custody.

Common questions

Q: Do bond conditions apply as soon as the defendant signs them?
A: No. The opinion finds no "order of conditions" in Chapter 17 and no requirement that the defendant sign one. Conditions become enforceable when the defendant gives the bond the magistrate ordered.

Q: So a no-contact bond condition doesn't protect the victim while the defendant is still in jail?
A: The bond condition itself does not, because it is not enforceable until the bond is posted and the defendant is released. To protect a victim during custody, a magistrate can issue an emergency protection order under article 17.292, which is effective on issuance.

Q: Can a defendant be punished for contacting a victim from jail?
A: Yes, if an emergency protection order is in place. The opinion cites Segundo v. State, where a conviction was affirmed for violating an emergency protective order by contacting the protected victim while the defendant was in jail.

Q: If a defendant is rearrested for breaking a bond condition, do the old conditions still apply?
A: No. Once the bond is revoked and the defendant is rearrested, the original conditions are no longer enforceable. The court typically sets a new bond, which may or may not include the same conditions.

Q: What happens to the bail sureties when a bond is revoked?
A: Article 17.40(b) provides that once the defendant is placed in custody, revoking the bond discharges the sureties from any future liability on that bond.

Background and statutory framework

Chapter 17 of the Code of Criminal Procedure governs pretrial bonds, including the conditions a magistrate may place on release. Under article 17.028, a magistrate must make a bail decision without unnecessary delay and no later than 48 hours after arrest: grant a personal bond (with or without conditions), grant a surety or cash bond (with or without conditions), or deny bail as allowed by law. Conditions must be the least restrictive that achieve the statute's aims (article 17.028(b)), and a condition must be reasonable, secure the defendant's appearance, and relate to the safety of the victim or community (Ex parte Allen; article 17.15(a)). A condition barring contact with someone like the alleged victim is commonly called a "no contact order."

After the bail decision, the defendant gets a reasonable time to procure security (article 17.26). No security, and the magistrate commits the accused to jail until legally discharged (article 17.27). If the defendant is ready to give bail, the magistrate prepares a bond for the defendant and any surety to sign (article 17.28), and once "the accused has given the required bond," the defendant must "at once be set at liberty" (article 17.29(a)).

The AG read these provisions together using ordinary tools of construction (Boykin, Prichard, Schunior). Chapter 17 consistently speaks of conditions "of bond" and "on bond," language that ties the conditions to the bond itself. Because "bail" and "bond" are used interchangeably in Chapter 17 (Ex parte Gomez), and because release happens when the bond is given (article 17.29(a)), the conditions become effective at that point, not before. The opinion also invoked the presumption that the Legislature chooses its words with care (In re CenterPoint Energy; In re Commitment of Bluitt): article 17.292(j) expressly makes an emergency protection order "effective on issuance," but the bail-order provisions in article 17.028 contain no parallel language, so the AG would not read one in.

On revocation, article 17.44(c) lets a magistrate revoke the bond and order rearrest for violations of certain conditions, article 17.40(b) discharges sureties once the defendant is back in custody, and article 17.09, section 3 contemplates a new bond. Together these confirm that the original conditions do not survive revocation and rearrest.

Citations and references

Code of Criminal Procedure:
- Tex. Code Crim. Proc. ch. 17 — pretrial bonds, including the bail decision (art. 17.028), release on giving bond (art. 17.29), emergency protection orders (art. 17.292), and revocation (art. 17.44)

Key cases:
- Ex parte Allen, 657 S.W.3d 866 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2022, no pet.) — criteria for a valid pretrial bond condition
- Ex parte Gomez, 624 S.W.3d 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) — "bail" and "bond" used interchangeably in Chapter 17
- Segundo v. State, No. 09-23-00332-CR, 2024 WL 4284320 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Sept. 25, 2024, no pet.) — conviction for violating an emergency protective order from jail

Source

• Landing page: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/ken-paxton/kp-0513
• Original PDF: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/2026/kp-0513.pdf

Original opinion text

February 5, 2026

The Honorable Layne Thompson
Angelina County District Attorney
Post Office Box 908
Lufkin, Texas 75902-0908

Opinion No. KP-0513
Re: Enforceability of bond conditions (RQ-0571-KP)

Dear Mr. Thompson:

You write to ask two questions regarding the enforceability of bond conditions. You first ask if "bond conditions become enforceable when the defendant signs the order of conditions" or only "upon the defendant bonding out from custody." Request Letter at 1. Your second question concerns whether bond conditions are enforceable if a defendant is "rearrested." Id. You say "[t]hese issues mainly arise in the context of 'no contact' bond conditions" and efforts to "protect the victim while the defendant is in custody." Id.

Chapter 17 of the Code of Criminal Procedure governs pre-trial bonds.

Chapter 17 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure "governs the procedure for setting pre-trial bond for a criminal defendant, including conditions on that bond." Ex parte Tucker, 977 S.W.2d 713, 715 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998), pet. dism'd as moot, 3 S.W.3d 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (per curiam); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. arts. 17.01–.53. Article 17.028 requires a magistrate, "[w]ithout unnecessary delay but not later than 48 hours after a defendant is arrested," to order one of the following bail decisions: (1) grant personal bond with or without conditions; (2) grant a surety or cash bond with or without conditions; or (3) deny bail in accordance with law. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 17.028(a); see also id. art. 2A.151 (identifying officers who are "magistrates"). As referenced in that provision, a magistrate may impose conditions of bond on the defendant. Id. art. 17.028(b) (requiring the magistrate to "impose the least restrictive conditions" in setting the bail). A condition of pre-trial bail must be reasonable, secure the defendant's presence at trial, and be related to the safety of the alleged victim or the community. See Ex parte Allen, 657 S.W.3d 866, 870 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2022, no pet.); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 17.15(a) (detailing the rules for "any conditions of bail"). An order that contains a condition prohibiting a defendant from interacting with certain individuals, such as the alleged victim, is often referred to as a "no contact order." E.g., Ex parte Allen, 657 S.W.3d at 870.

Following the bail decision, a defendant is given a reasonable time "to procure security." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 17.26. If no security is given the "magistrate shall make an order committing the accused to jail to be kept safely until legally discharged." Id. art. 17.27. Conversely, if the defendant is ready to give bail, "the magistrate shall cause to be prepared a bond," which must be signed by the defendant and any surety. Id. art. 17.28. Once "the accused has given the required bond," the defendant must "at once be set at liberty." Id. art. 17.29(a). With that background, we turn to your first question regarding when bond conditions "become enforceable." Request Letter at 1.

Pre-trial bond conditions are effective when a defendant gives the bond ordered by the magistrate and may not be enforced prior to that time.

We begin our consideration with the relevant language in Chapter 17 and seek to effectuate the legislative intent and purpose in that statutory text. See Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Courts apply the plain meaning of a term when the statute is clear and unambiguous, id., consulting standard dictionaries to determine an undefined term's plain meaning, Prichard v. State, 533 S.W.3d 315, 319–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). "When interpretating a statute," they "look not only at the single, discrete provision at issue but at other provisions within the whole statutory scheme." State v. Schunior, 506 S.W.3d 29, 37 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016).

Chapter 17 consistently speaks to conditions "of bond," e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. arts. 17.40, .41(b), .45, and "on bond," e.g., id. arts. 17.44(a), .46(a), .465(b), .47, .49(b). The term "of" is "used as a function word to indicate the position in time of an action or occurrence," and the term "on" is "used as a function word to indicate . . . an instant, action, or occurrence when something begins or is done." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 860, 865 (11th ed. 2004). Bond means "the security given by the accused that he will appear and answer before the proper court the accusation brought against him, and includes a bail bond or a personal bond." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 17.01 (defining "bail"); Ex parte Gomez, 624 S.W.3d 573, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (en banc) ("Chapter 17 uses 'bail' and 'bond' interchangeably."). Based on a plain reading of the relevant provisions, a condition "of bond" or "on bond" is effective at the time a defendant gives the bond ordered by the magistrate and may not be enforced under Chapter 17 prior to that time. That a condition is effective once "the accused has given the required bond" and is to "be set at liberty," TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 17.29(a), ensures that the condition works to secure the defendant's presence at trial and keep the alleged victim or the community safe, Ex parte Allen, 657 S.W.3d at 870 (setting out the three criteria by which a condition of pre-trial bail is judged).

You propose that a bond condition may be enforceable "when the defendant signs the order of conditions." Request Letter at 1. We find no reference in Chapter 17 to an "order of conditions," and you provide no example of such an order. As previously discussed, an order by the magistrate granting bail may place conditions on the defendant. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 17.028(a)(1)–(2). And a magistrate is required to sign such an order. Id. art. 2A.1521. However, we find no requirement that a defendant sign the order. Regardless, bond conditions are not effective when the defendant is merely eligible for bail, but when the defendant gives the bond required by the magistrate's order. See supra p. 2. You appear to recognize this possibility by suggesting the alternative proposal that a bond condition is enforceable "upon the defendant bonding out from custody." Request Letter at 1. We find no reference to "bonding out" in Chapter 17, but to the extent this is meant to reference the point at which a defendant has "given the required bond," we agree the conditions are enforceable at that time. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 17.29(a).

Our conclusion is not meant to suggest that a magistrate has no ability under Chapter 17 to prohibit a defendant from interacting with an alleged victim prior to the defendant giving the required bond, which appears to be your underlying concern. See Request Letter at 1 (asking if "bond conditions that protect the victim while the defendant is in custody" may be enforced). Article 17.292(c) expressly authorizes a magistrate to "prohibit the arrested party" from directly communicating "with a member of the family or household or with the person protected under" an emergency protection order. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 17.292(c)(2)(A); see also id. art. 17.292(a) (providing a "magistrate may issue an order for emergency protection" when the defendant is arrested for certain offenses, including "an offense involving family violence"). An emergency protection order "is effective on issuance." Id. art. 17.292(j); see also Segundo v. State, No. 09-23-00332-CR, 2024 WL 4284320, at *2, 9–10 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Sept. 25, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (affirming a defendant's conviction of violating an emergency protective order by impermissibly contacting the victim protected by the order while the defendant was in jail). Had the Legislature intended the magistrate's article 17.028(a)(1)–(2) bail order to operate similarly, we presume it would have expressly provided the same. See In re CenterPoint Energy Hous. Elec., LLC, 629 S.W.3d 149, 158–59 (Tex. 2021) (explaining courts presume "the Legislature chose the statute's language with care, purposefully choosing each word, while purposefully omitting words not chosen" (quoting In re Commitment of Bluitt, 605 S.W.3d 199, 203 (Tex. 2020))).

Bond conditions are not enforceable after revocation and rearrest.

Your second question asks the following: "If a person violates their bond conditions after they have been rearrested, are the bond conditions still enforceable even though the defendant is no longer on bond?" Request Letter at 1. We understand you to mean the defendant is rearrested for violating the conditions of his bond. See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 17.08, § 6 (referring to the "rearrest[] of an accused who has violated the conditions of his bond"). For instance, a magistrate "may revoke the bond and order the defendant arrested" if the defendant fails to comply with bond conditions requiring home confinement and electronic monitoring or controlled substance testing. Id. art. 17.44(c); see also, e.g., Ex parte Vasquez, No. 01–17–00376–CR, 2017 WL 3184740, at 1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 27, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.). The bond conditions are no longer enforceable when the magistrate revokes the bond and the defendant is rearrested. Cf. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 17.40(b) ("Once the defendant is placed in custody, the revocation of the defendant's bond discharges the sureties on the bond, if any, from any future liability on the bond."). Rather, the court typically sets a new bond that may, or may not, include the same conditions. See id. art. 17.09, § 3; see also, e.g., Ex parte Marcantoni, No. 14-03-00079-CR, 2003 WL 1887883, at 3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 17, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.).

[Footnote: Likewise, the defendant's arrest for a wholly separate offense would typically result in the revocation of the defendant's bond, see, e.g., Ex parte Castellano, 321 S.W.3d 760, 763 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.), and in that case, the bond conditions would no longer be enforceable.]

S U M M A R Y

Based on a plain reading of the relevant provisions of Chapter 17 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, bond conditions are effective when a defendant gives the bond ordered by the magistrate and may not be enforced prior to that time.

Bond conditions are not enforceable after revocation of the bond and rearrest of the defendant.

Very truly yours,

KEN PAXTON
Attorney General of Texas

BRENT WEBSTER, First Assistant Attorney General
LESLEY FRENCH, Chief of Staff
D. FORREST BRUMBAUGH, Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel
JOSHUA C. FIVESON, Chair, Opinion Committee
CHRISTY DRAKE-ADAMS, Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee