Can the Texas Supreme Court require county and district clerks to connect their case management systems to the re:SearchTX records database?

Plain-English summary

re:SearchTX is a statewide database that lets people search for documents eFiled in participating courts across all 254 Texas counties. In May 2024, the Texas Supreme Court adopted rule changes (and incorporated a parallel Court of Criminal Appeals order) that, among other things, require district and county clerks to integrate their local case management systems with re:SearchTX. Tarrant County Auditor Kimberly Buchanan asked the AG two questions: does Government Code section 74.024 give the Supreme Court authority to order that integration, and does the order violate separation of powers by intruding on authority the Legislature gave clerks over court records (Local Government Code section 191.008(a) and Government Code section 51.304)?

The AG answered yes on authority and no on the separation-of-powers objection.

On authority, the AG explained that the Constitution makes the Supreme Court "responsible for the efficient administration of the judicial branch" and lets the Legislature delegate further rulemaking power. Through the Court Administration Act, the Legislature gave the Court power in section 74.024 to "adopt rules of administration setting policies and guidelines necessary or desirable for the operation and management of the court system and for the efficient administration of justice." The AG stressed how broad that is: the rules can be merely "desirable," not just "necessary." Because re:SearchTX creates a standardized, near-instant statewide repository of court records that benefits both the courts and the public, ordering clerks to integrate with it is at least desirable, if not necessary, for operating the court system. The Legislature itself had recognized the Court's authority to approve an electronic filing system by rule or order (Government Code sections 80.002(b) and 72.031). So the order is consistent with the Court's statutory authority.

On separation of powers, the AG walked through the three-branch structure and the principle that one branch cannot exercise another's powers, but also that the branches have "separateness but interdependence." The judicial branch has both express and inherent power over the administration of justice, including court records, which are "documents born within the judicial department." Making those records accessible through an electronic filing system flows directly from the judicial power. The AG added that here the Court's authority "is at its maximum," combining its own power with what the Legislature delegated.

The clerk statutes did not change that result. Local Government Code section 191.008(a) lets a commissioners court run a computerized records system, but a district clerk's records go in only if the clerk "agrees in writing." The Court's order does not stop a clerk from giving that written approval, and a county may still use its chosen electronic filing system, with integration happening "on the back end." Government Code section 51.304 governs a clerk's records-preservation plan, and the order neither addresses it nor blocks a clerk from keeping current preservation policies; the order expressly lets clerks keep their "current systems and processes." So the clerks' statutory authority remains intact, and the order works in harmony with those laws.

What this means for you

If you are a county auditor or county commissioner

Based on this opinion, the Supreme Court's order requiring re:SearchTX integration rests on valid statutory and judicial authority. The opinion notes a county may keep using its chosen case management system, with re:SearchTX integration occurring on the back end, so compliance does not require scrapping existing systems.

If you are a district or county clerk

The opinion concludes the integration order leaves your statutory records duties intact. Your custody and maintenance authority (Government Code section 51.303), your records-preservation plan authority (section 51.304), and the written-agreement requirement for putting your records in a county system (Local Government Code section 191.008(a)) are all unaffected. The order does not prohibit you from giving or withholding that written approval for a county system.

If you are a court administrator

The opinion reads section 74.024 broadly: the Court may adopt rules that are "desirable," not only strictly necessary, for the operation and management of the court system. A statewide, uniform record-access database falls comfortably within that authority and within the judicial branch's power over court records.

If you are an attorney or member of the public

The opinion supports the legality of the system that surfaces court orders and notices on re:SearchTX when a clerk dockets them. It treats broad, near-instant access to court records as serving the efficient administration of justice.

Common questions

Q: Can the Texas Supreme Court make clerks use re:SearchTX?
A: Yes. The AG concluded the Court has authority under Government Code section 74.024 to order county and district clerks to integrate their case management systems with re:SearchTX, the Court's approved electronic filing system.

Q: Doesn't that step on the clerks' authority over their own records?
A: No, according to the AG. The order leaves the clerks' statutory duties under sections 51.303, 51.304, and Local Government Code section 191.008(a) intact and lets them keep their current systems.

Q: Is this a separation-of-powers violation?
A: The AG concluded it is not. Court records fall within the judicial branch's substantive power, and making them accessible through an electronic filing system flows from that power without nullifying the Legislature's grants to clerks.

Q: Do counties have to replace their case management systems?
A: No. The AG noted the order lets clerks keep their "current systems and processes," with re:SearchTX integration occurring "on the back end."

Q: How broad is the Court's section 74.024 rulemaking power?
A: The AG read it broadly, since the Court may adopt rules that are "necessary" or merely "desirable" for the operation and management of the court system and the efficient administration of justice.

Background and statutory framework

The Constitution makes the Supreme Court "responsible for the efficient administration of the judicial branch" and directs it to promulgate administrative rules for the efficient and uniform administration of justice (Tex. Const. art. V, § 31(a)), while letting the Legislature delegate further rulemaking power (id. § 31(c)). The Court Administration Act (Tex. Gov't Code §§ 74.001–.257; In re Canales, 52 S.W.3d 698, 702–03 (Tex. 2001); Franklin v. State, 742 S.W.2d 66, 68 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, pet. ref'd)) includes section 74.024, under which the Court may adopt rules "necessary or desirable for the operation and management of the court system and for the efficient administration of justice" (Tex. Gov't Code § 74.024(a)), subject only to consistency with the Constitution and statutes (State v. Rhine, 255 S.W.3d 745, 751 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008), aff'd, 297 S.W.3d 301 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Pruett v. Harris Cnty. Bail Bond Bd., 249 S.W.3d 447, 452 (Tex. 2008)). The Legislature recognized the Court's authority to approve an electronic filing system by rule or order (Tex. Gov't Code §§ 80.002(b), 72.031).

On separation of powers, the Constitution divides government into three departments (Tex. Const. art. II, § 1; Fin. Comm'n of Tex. v. Norwood, 418 S.W.3d 566, 569 (Tex. 2013); Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993)), but with "separateness but interdependence" (Tex. Comm'n on Env't Quality v. Abbott, 311 S.W.3d 663, 671–72 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, pet. denied)). Courts presume coordinate branches act in good faith (In re Tex. House of Representatives, 702 S.W.3d 330, 343 (Tex. 2024); Webster v. Comm'n for Law. Discipline, 704 S.W.3d 478, 488 (Tex. 2024)). The judicial branch holds express and inherent power over the administration of justice, including court records, and the Legislature may define parameters of the judicial branch's operation but may not usurp its powers (Williams v. State, 707 S.W.2d 40, 45–46 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)). The clerk statutes (Tex. Gov't Code §§ 51.303, 51.304; Tex. Loc. Gov't Code §§ 191.008(a), 203.001) grant records authority that the AG concluded the order leaves intact, with the Court's authority "at its maximum" (cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).

Citations and references

Statutes:
- Tex. Gov't Code § 74.024 — Supreme Court rules of administration
- Tex. Loc. Gov't Code § 191.008 — county computerized records system; clerk's written agreement
- Tex. Gov't Code § 51.304 — district clerk records preservation plan

Key cases:
- In re Canales, 52 S.W.3d 698 (Tex. 2001) — purpose of the Court Administration Act
- Williams v. State, 707 S.W.2d 40 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) — Legislature may set parameters but not usurp judicial powers

Source

• Landing page: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/ken-paxton/kp-0490
• Original PDF: https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/2025/kp-0490.pdf

Original opinion text

KEN PAXTON
Attorney General of Texas

June 25, 2025

Ms. Kimberly M. Buchanan, CPA
Tarrant County Auditor
100 East Weatherford, Room 506
Fort Worth, Texas 76196-0103

Opinion No. KP-0490

Re: Authority of the Texas Supreme Court to require district and county clerks to integrate their case management systems with the proprietary re:SearchTX database (RQ-0556-KP)

Dear Ms. Buchanan:

You ask whether Government Code section 74.024 confers authority to the Texas Supreme Court to "order how district clerks and county clerks operate their respective offices," which includes "requiring all clerks to integrate their case management systems with re:SearchTX," a database allowing individuals to search "for any document eFiled in participating courts across all 254 Texas counties." In addition, you ask whether the Court's order "violate[s] the separation of powers doctrine by improperly infringing on the Legislature's conveyance" of authority to district clerks, via Local Government Code subsection 191.008(a) and Government Code section 51.304, granting the public access to court records. Request Letter at 1.

The Court's order implemented use of re:searchTX, a database for court records.

We start by examining the order at issue. In May 2024, the Court adopted changes to Texas Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 21, Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 9.2, and Rule 2.7 of the Statewide Rules Governing Electronic Filing in Criminal Cases. Attachments at 10−16.

The changes implement new Government Code subsection 80.002(b). See Misc. Docket No. 23-9071 (Tex. Sept. 8, 2023); see also Attachments at 4 (referencing Misc. Docket No. 23-9071 (Tex. Sept. 8, 2023)). In addition to a delivery method "required or authorized by law or supreme court rule," subsection 80.002(b) requires statutory county courts, district courts, and appellate courts to "deliver through the electronic filing system established under [Government Code] [s]ection 72.031 to all parties in each case in which the use of the electronic filing system is required or authorized all court orders the court enters for the case." TEX. GOV'T CODE § 80.002(b). In turn, section 72.031 states that "an electronic filing system" may be implemented "by supreme court rule or order[,] . . . for use in the courts of this state." Id. § 72.031(b)(1). "Electronic filing system" means "the filing system established by supreme court rule or order for the electronic filing of documents in courts of this state." Id. § 72.031(a)(2). Following this statutory change, the Court issued an order amending various rules to now require clerks send court documents electronically to the parties "through an electronic filing system approved by the Supreme Court." Attachments at 10−16. The order also "mandates district and county clerks . . . to integrate their local case management systems with re:SearchTX," the electronic filing system approved by the Court. Id. at 7.

The Court is responsible for the efficient administration of the judicial branch and, under section 74.024, may promulgate rules to effectuate that responsibility.

We begin by addressing your first question, which asks about the Court's authority under Government Code section 74.024 to make such a mandate. Request Letter at 1. The Court, like all Texas courts, has constitutional authority to exercise the judicial power of the State. TEX. CONST. art. V, §§ 1, 3. The Texas Constitution makes the Court "responsible for the efficient administration of the judicial branch" and directs it to "promulgate rules of administration not inconsistent with the laws of the state as may be necessary for the efficient and uniform administration of justice in the various courts." Id. § 31(a). Section 31 further provides that "[t]he [L]egislature may delegate to the Supreme Court . . . the power to promulgate such other rules as may be prescribed by law or this Constitution, subject to such limitations and procedures as may be provided by law." Id. § 31(c). In sum, the Constitution bestows independent rulemaking authority upon the Court while also empowering the Legislature to delegate other rulemaking power. Although the Court has constitutional rulemaking authority, we focus our discussion on the Court's statutory rulemaking authority raised in your first question. Request Letter at 1.

Employing its delegation authority, the Legislature enacted the Court Administration Act, a "comprehensive act for the administration of the Texas courts." Franklin v. State, 742 S.W.2d 66, 68 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, pet. ref'd); see also In re Canales, 52 S.W.3d 698, 702–03 (Tex. 2001) ("Th[e] Act's purpose was to provide a statewide framework for court administration and case management[] . . . ."). This legislation included what is now section 74.024 of the Government Code. Under that provision, the Court may "adopt rules of administration setting policies and guidelines necessary or desirable for the operation and management of the court system and for the efficient administration of justice." TEX. GOV'T CODE § 74.024(a). The Court may also "consider the adoption of rules relating to" various aspects of court administration including, inter alia, "a uniform dockets policy" or "transfer of related cases for consolidated or coordinated pretrial proceedings." Id. § 74.024(c)(7), (10); see generally id. § 74.024(c). Rules adopted under section 74.024 "remain in effect unless and until disapproved by the [L]egislature." Id. § 74.024(d).

Section 74.024 gives the Court wide latitude in its rulemaking endeavors concerning administration of the statewide court system and judicial proceedings. Subsection 74.024(a) reflects this broad authority as the Court may enact rules that are not only "necessary" but also those that are merely "desirable." Id. § 74.024(a). Such "desirable" rules need only be "worth having or wanting; pleasing, excellent, or fine . . . [a]dvisable; recommendable." THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 539 (2d ed. unabridged 1987); see also Tex. State Bd. of Exam'rs of Marriage & Fam. Therapists v. Tex. Med. Ass'n, 511 S.W.3d 28, 34 (Tex. 2017) (relying on dictionary definitions to determine the "common, ordinary meaning" where a statutory term is not defined). The purpose for these necessary or desirable rules is also broad, allowing for rulemaking to effectuate the "operation and management of the court system." TEX. GOV'T CODE § 74.024(a). And the Court's rulemaking authority even extends beyond general operation and management of the court system, permitting rules effectuating the "efficient administration of justice." TEX. GOV'T CODE § 74.024(a).

"[I]n 'exercising the powers and the broad authority granted by the Legislature, the only requirement is that [the Court's] rules and regulations must be consistent with the Constitution and Statutes of this State.'" State v. Rhine, 255 S.W.3d 745, 751 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008), aff'd, 297 S.W.3d 301 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (quoting Gerst v. Oak Cliff Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 432 S.W.2d 702, 706 (Tex. 1968)). To answer your first question, we must review if the Court's order is within the bounds of section 74.024. See Pruett v. Harris Cnty. Bail Bond Bd., 249 S.W.3d 447, 452 (Tex. 2008) ("An agency may adopt only such rules as are authorized by and consistent with its statutory authority." (citing R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Lone Star Gas Co., 844 S.W.2d 679, 685 (Tex. 1992))).

Subsection 74.024(a) grants the Court authority to promulgate rules that impact court records, including mandating integration of those records with an electronic filing system.

The Court's order creates a standardized repository and increases access to court records across the State through the adoption of the re:SearchTX case information database. See Attachments at 4−19. The resulting uniform record-access system benefits both officers of the court and the public. Id. at 18 (stating the purpose for adoption was "to establish a robust system that would allow parties and the public access to public records, including orders, notices, and other court-generated documents."). "The case alerts combined with the clerk's integration, mean[] that orders and notices . . . appear on re:SearchTX when docketed by the clerk and parties/attorneys . . . [are] notified[] . . . ." Id. Near instant access to court documents across the State through a uniform court-record database supports the efficient administration of justice and is at least desirable, if not necessary, for the operation and management of the court system. This conclusion is supported by the Legislature's express acknowledgment of the Court's authority to implement an electronic filing system that would be "approved by the Court," "by rule or court order," as was done here. See TEX. GOV'T CODE §§ 80.002(b), 72.031. And this makes sense in practice as the Court cannot efficiently administer justice or operate and manage Texas court systems without some degree of control over court records. Accordingly, the order mandating that clerks integrate their case management systems with re:SearchTX is consistent with the Court's statutory authority. We now turn to your second question concerning separation of powers.

The judicial branch possesses express and inherent authority to administer justice efficiently and uniformly in Texas courts, and the legislative branch may not enact laws interfering with that authority.

You also suggest that the Court's order violates the separation of powers doctrine by infringing on the Legislature's grant of power to district clerks. Request Letter at 1. You ask specifically about the district clerk's authority under Local Government Code subsection 191.008(a) and Government Code section 51.304. Id. We first address separation of powers.

"The separation of the powers of government into three distinct, rival branches—legislative, executive, and judicial—is the absolutely central guarantee of a just Government." Fin. Comm'n of Tex. v. Norwood, 418 S.W.3d 566, 569 (Tex. 2013) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). The Texas Constitution, in its Separation of Powers Clause, mandates "[t]he powers of the Government of the State of Texas shall be divided into three distinct departments" each of which "shall be confided to a separate body of magistracy, to wit: those which are Legislative to one, those which are Executive to another, and those which are Judicial to another." TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1. The Clause prohibits any "person, or collection of persons, being of one of these departments, [from] exercis[ing] any power properly attached to either of the others." Id. Authority bestowed upon one department of government cannot be exercised by another "unless expressly permitted by the [C]onstitution." Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993). When scrutinizing the actions of a coordinate branch of government, courts presume the relevant department acted in good faith and intended to comply with the Constitution. In re Tex. House of Representatives, 702 S.W.3d 330, 343 (Tex. 2024); see also Webster v. Comm'n for Law. Discipline, 704 S.W.3d 478, 488 (Tex. 2024) ("The doctrines of constitutional avoidance and of presuming good faith on the part of other governmental actors . . . manifest the judiciary's commitment to the separation of powers, respect for the other branches, and desire to prevent constitutional friction unless and until unavoidable."). Problems can arise, however, where one branch "exercis[es] its core authority in a way that negates the ability of a coordinate branch to do so." In re Tex. House of Representatives, 702 S.W.3d at 345; see, e.g., In re D.W., 249 S.W.3d 625, 641–42 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.) (discussing instances where one branch of government encroached upon the substantive powers of another).

But the Separation of Powers Clause is not "rigid and absolute," as "such a construction would be impossible to implement in all cases because not every governmental power fits logically and clearly into any particular department." Tex. Comm'n on Env't Quality v. Abbott, 311 S.W.3d 663, 671 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, pet. denied) (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted). Thus, Texas courts have "long held that some degree of interdependence and reciprocity is subsumed within the separation of powers principle." Id. at 672. Consequently, the separation of powers doctrine "enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity." Id.

The judicial power of the state is vested in the courts. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 1. "Judicial power" encompasses "the power to adjudicate upon, and protect the rights and interests of individual citizens and to that end to construe and apply the laws . . . . Under the judicial power determination is made of what the law is in relation to some existing thing already done or happened." Id. interp. commentary (West 2007). "The Supreme Court shall exercise the judicial power of the state," id. § 3(a), "is responsible for the efficient administration of the judicial branch," and "shall promulgate rules of administration . . . as may be necessary for the efficient and uniform administration of the justice in the various courts, id. § 31(a). "In addition to the express grants of judicial power to each court, there are other powers which courts may exercise though not expressly authorized or described by constitution or statute." Greiner v. Jameson, 865 S.W.2d 493, 498 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, writ denied). These are referred to as "inherent powers." Id. Inherent powers are derived from "the very fact that the state constitution has created and charged the court with certain duties and responsibilities." Id. at 499.

Flowing from the Court's constitutional judicial power are inherent powers "of the administrative kind"—that are "not secured by any legislative grant" and are "necessarily implied to enable the Court to discharge its constitutionally imposed duties." Webster, 704 S.W.3d at 489–90 (citation omitted); see also Greiner, 865 S.W.2d at 499 ("The inherent powers of a court are those that it may call upon to aid . . . in the administration of justice[] . . . ." (citing Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Tex. 1979))). The Court also possesses express powers that authorize the same. See TEX. GOV'T CODE §§ 74.001−.257; see also, e.g., §§ 22.004−.022. Like inherent powers, "[a] statutory grant of an express power carries with it, by implication, every incidental power that is necessary and proper to the execution of the power expressly granted." Austin Rd. Co. v. Evans, 499 S.W.2d 194, 203 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The judicial branch "may call upon [these powers] to aid in the exercise of its jurisdiction, in the administration of justice, and in the preservation of its independence and integrity." Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d at 398; see also Brewer v. Lennox Hearth Prods., LLC, 601 S.W.3d 704, 718 (Tex. 2020).

The power to make law, of course, is vested in the Legislature. TEX. CONST. art. III, § 1; see also id. interp. commentary (West 2007) ("[Article III, section 1] creates the Texas Legislature and vests therein the legislative power, i.e., the law-making power of the people."). This power encompasses "the power to make, alter, and repeal laws," unless limited "by [some] other provisions of the state Constitution." In re Tex. Dep't of Fam. & Protective Servs., 660 S.W.3d 161, 169–70 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2022, no pet.) (quoting Diaz v. State, 68 S.W.3d 680, 685 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000, pet. denied); see also TEX. CONST. art. III, § 1 interp. commentary (West 2007). Carrying out this core function, the Legislature detailed the duties of district and county clerks. Clerks as "records management officer[s]" are charged with "maintain[ing] and arrang[ing]" court records, "develop[ing] policies and procedures for the administration of an active and continuing records management program," and "administer[ing] the records management program and provid[ing] assistance . . . for the purposes of reducing the costs and improving the efficiency of recordkeeping." TEX. GOV'T CODE § 51.303(a) (regarding district clerks); TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE §§ 203.001, .002(1), .023(2) (regarding both district and county clerks); see also Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. JM-1224 (1990) at 9–10 (observing that the district clerk's office is among those "classified as county offices for the purposes of" the Local Government Records Act, which includes chapter 203). As the lawmaking body, the Legislature is within its authority to specify the role of clerks' offices as well as their authority where the Constitution provides no such limitations. See TEX. CONST. art. V, §§ 9, 20 (related constitutional provisions do not prohibit the Legislature from enacting laws detailing the offices' power); see also Owens v. State, 19 S.W.3d 480, 484 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2000, no pet.) ("Where, as here, a constitutional provision is not self-executing, it is incumbent on the Legislature to enact legislation to implement public policy.").

This legislative authority, however, has limits. It is well-established that the Legislature may enact laws to "define certain parameters within the operation of the judicial branch" but "may not interfere with the . . . powers of the judicial branch so as to usurp those . . . powers." Williams v. State, 707 S.W.2d 40, 45–46 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Although the Legislature enacted laws granting the district clerk statutory authority over certain records, "[t]he [L]egislature may not 'infringe upon the substantive power of the Judicial department . . . thus rendering the separation of powers doctrine meaningless.'" In re D.W., 249 S.W.3d at 640–41 (quoting Meshell v. State, 739 S.W.2d 246, 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)).

The Court's order is within the realm of its judicial power.

Making court records easily accessible to the public in an electronic filing system flows directly from the substantive powers of the judicial department to manage the operation of the court system and ensure efficient and uniform administration of justice. See supra pp. 5−6. And as discussed in response to your first question, the Court's order is also within its express statutory authority to enact rules that efficiently administer justice and impact the operation and management of the judicial branch. See supra pp. 2−4. Accordingly, the relevant authority of the Court "is at its maximum, for it includes all that [the Court] possesses in [its] own right plus all that [the Legislature] can delegate." Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (addressing acts taken by a president "pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress"). To carry out both its constitutional and statutory purposes, the Court must be able to enact rules that may impact, directly or indirectly, court records—documents born within the judicial department. The Court's order therefore falls within the heartland of judicial power and does not infringe on or conflict with the Legislature's lawmaking function.

The statutes you raise do not undermine this conclusion. Subsection 191.008(a) of the Local Government Code, for example, authorizes a commissioners court to establish and operate a computerized electronic information system. TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE § 191.008(a). This system "may provide . . . direct access to information that relates to all or some county and precinct records and records of the district courts and courts of appeals having jurisdiction in the county, that is public information, and that is stored or processed in the system." Id. A district clerk's records, however, may only be made available through the system if the clerk "agrees in writing to allow public access under this section to the records." Id.; see also Tex. Att'y Gen. Op. No. GA-0566 (2007) at 2 (observing that a commissioners court's authority to provide access to a district or county clerk's records is "[s]ubject to the clerk's written agreement and the other requirements of section 191.008").

But nowhere in the Court's order is a clerk prohibited from or hindered in giving written approval permitting the commissioners court to facilitate electronic access to the clerk's records. See TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE § 191.008(a); cf. Attachments at 4−16. In fact, a commissioners court may still use the electronic filing system it has chosen. See TEX. GOV'T CODE § 80.002(b) (providing that delivery through an electronic filing system may be "[i]n addition to any other delivery method required or authorized by law or supreme court rule"). The Court's order recognizes this by acknowledging continued use of current case management systems with the "integrat[ion] with re:SearchTX [occurring] on the back end" permitting "clerks' offices to docket and store documents using their current systems and processes while maintaining appropriate security." Attachments at 18. The clerk's authority is intact as the order does not impact subsection 191.008(a) or section 191.008 generally.

The same is true for section 51.304. The associated subchapter generally relates to district clerks, TEX. GOV'T CODE §§ 51.301–.322, and establishes the record-based responsibilities of that position—explaining that clerks have "custody of and shall carefully maintain and arrange the records relating to or lawfully deposited in the clerk's office," id. § 51.303(a); see also, e.g., id. § 51.303(b) (enumerating associated obligations). Section 51.304 likewise speaks to a district clerk's general authority concerning preservation of records and permits these clerks to "provide a plan for the storage of records." Id. § 51.304(a); see also id. § 51.304(b) (enumerating minimum standards). But nothing in the Court's order alters this landscape as the order neither addresses section 51.304 nor prohibits a clerk from maintaining its current record preservation policies. In fact, the order contemplates the opposite: explaining that clerks can keep their "current systems and processes." Attachments at 18. Thus, the clerk's authority under section 51.304 remains untouched—a clerk may still implement a record preservation plan for the records within the clerk's authority. See TEX. GOV'T CODE § 51.304; cf. Attachments at 4−16.

As courts have recognized, separation of powers contemplates separateness but also interdependence. Abbott, 311 S.W.3d at 672. Powers concerning the management and availability of court records contemplates the same. Here, the Court's order does not infringe on the Legislature's authority to institute laws of the People. Neither does the order hinder or nullify clerks' authority under subsection 191.008(a) or section 51.304. Instead, these duly enacted laws grant the clerks' authority over court records, and the Court's order, addressing accessibility of the same, work in harmony to ensure the People have equal and ready access to justice.

S U M M A R Y

The Texas Supreme Court has authority under Government Code section 74.024 to order county and district clerks to integrate their case management systems with re:SearchTX, the Court's approved electronic filing system. The Court's order is also within the scope of the judicial power to implement rules for efficient and uniform administration of the various courts; thus, it does not violate the separation of powers between the judicial and legislative branches.

Very truly yours,

KEN PAXTON
Attorney General of Texas

BRENT WEBSTER
First Assistant Attorney General

LESLEY FRENCH
Chief of Staff

D. FORREST BRUMBAUGH
Deputy Attorney General for Legal Counsel

JOSHUA C. FIVESON
Chair, Opinion Committee

AMY L. K. WILLS
Assistant Attorney General, Opinion Committee