KY OAG 26-02 2026-02-04

Does a Kentucky farmland owner have to live on the land to hunt or fish there without a license?

Short answer: No. The Attorney General concluded that a bona fide owner of Kentucky farmland who is a resident of the Commonwealth does not have to live on the farmland to qualify for the hunting and fishing license exemption in KRS 150.170(4). State residency is what the statute requires, not residency on the particular parcel. Two older opinions that suggested otherwise were overruled to that extent.
Disclaimer: This is an official Kentucky Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority in Kentucky courts but are not binding precedent like a court ruling. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Consult a licensed Kentucky attorney for advice on your specific situation.
About this page: The plain-English summary, reader guidance, and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official AG opinion. The original opinion (linked at the bottom of this page, or PDF in the sidebar) is the authoritative source for any reliance.
View original AG opinion (PDF)

Plain-English summary

Senator Gary Boswell asked the Attorney General a narrow question about Kentucky's hunting and fishing license rules: when a person owns farmland, do they have to actually live on that land to take fish or hunt there without a license, or is owning it enough? The opinion concludes that a resident owner does not have to live on the parcel. Kentucky residency is what the exemption requires.

KRS 150.170(1) generally requires a license to hunt or fish. KRS 150.170(4) carves out an exception for "[t]he resident owner of farmlands or his or her spouse or dependent children," who may hunt or fish during open season "on farmlands of which they are bona fide owners," and extends the same privilege to tenants and their dependent children "residing upon these farmlands." The opinion reads the text closely. The defined term "resident" (KRS 150.010(38)) ties the word to a person's connection to Kentucky, not to a particular tract of land. By contrast, the General Assembly defined "tenant" (KRS 150.010(47)) to require actually working on and residing on the land. The opinion treats that difference as deliberate: the legislature limited tenants to those "residing upon" the farm but did not impose a parcel-residency requirement on owners.

The Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources told the office it has historically read the exemption to cover bona fide owners regardless of whether they physically live on the farmland, and it has not enforced a live-on-the-land rule. The opinion finds that reading consistent with the plain text. It then re-examines two older opinions, OAG 63-14 (1963) and OAG 79-127 (1979), which had suggested owners must reside on the parcel. Both leaned on Holland v. Flora and Draffen v. Black, but those cases involved pay-lake patrons claiming to be lessees, not owners, so they did not actually decide the owner question. To the extent OAG 63-14 and OAG 79-127 are inconsistent with the new conclusion as applied to owners, the opinion overrules them.

What this means for you

Kentucky farmland owners: Based on this opinion, if you are a Kentucky resident and a bona fide owner of farmland, you (and your spouse and dependent children) may hunt and fish on that farmland during open season without buying a sport license, even if you live somewhere else in Kentucky. Trapping is not covered by the exemption, and the privilege runs to the farmland you own.

Hunters and anglers generally: The exemption is specific to resident owners of farmland (and tenants residing on it). It is not a general license waiver. The opinion also notes the AG encouraged owners to buy licenses voluntarily because license sales fund the Department's conservation work, but that is a suggestion, not a requirement.

Conservation officers and the Department: The opinion endorses the Department's historical, lenient reading of KRS 150.170(4) and concludes a parcel-residency requirement is not in the statute. Older guidance from OAG 63-14 and OAG 79-127 pointing the other way is overruled to the extent it applied a live-on-the-land rule to owners.

Common questions

Q: Do I need to live on my Kentucky farmland to hunt there without a license?
A: No. The opinion concludes a resident owner does not have to live on the parcel; being a Kentucky resident and bona fide owner is enough to qualify for the KRS 150.170(4) exemption.

Q: Who else is covered besides the owner?
A: The statute extends the privilege to the owner's spouse and dependent children, and to tenants and their dependent children residing on the farmland. Tenants, unlike owners, must actually reside on the land.

Q: Does the exemption cover trapping?
A: No. KRS 150.170(4) covers taking fish and hunting during open season "except trapping."

Q: Why did the AG overrule the older opinions?
A: OAG 63-14 and OAG 79-127 had suggested owners must reside on the parcel, but they relied on Holland v. Flora and Draffen v. Black, which involved pay-lake patrons claiming to be lessees, not owners. Because those cases did not decide the owner question, the opinion concluded the older opinions were wrong on that point and overruled them as applied to owners.

Q: Should I still buy a license?
A: That is up to you. The opinion stresses it is "not intended to discourage" owners from voluntarily buying licenses, because license purchases fund the Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources' conservation programs.

Background and statutory framework

KRS 150.170(1) sets the general rule that no person may do an act authorized by a license without holding the proper resident or nonresident license, subject to the chapter's exceptions, and KRS 150.175 establishes the licenses themselves. KRS 150.170(4) is the farmland exception: a "resident owner of farmlands" and the owner's spouse or dependent children may take fish or hunt during open season (except trapping) on farmlands of which they are bona fide owners, and tenants and their dependent children "residing upon these farmlands" share the privilege.

The opinion turns on definitions. "Resident" in KRS 150.010(38) means a person who has established permanent domicile and legal residence and resided in the state for 30 days before applying for a license; "nonresident" in KRS 150.010(28) is defined by the absence of that in-state connection. Neither ties residency to a specific parcel. "Tenant" in KRS 150.010(47), by contrast, is defined as a person "actually engaged in work upon a farm or lands and residing in a dwelling on the farms or lands." The opinion treats the legislature's choice to require residence for tenants, but not for owners, as meaningful.

For interpretive method the opinion cites Garrard Cnty. v. Middleton ("the text of the statute is supreme"), Farley v. P&P Constr., Inc. (quoting W. Ky Coal Co. v. Nall & Bailey) and Univ. of Louisville v. Rothstein (the legislature "meant exactly what it said"), and Schroader v. Atkins (a defined term controls). It distinguishes Holland v. Flora and Draffen v. Black as pay-lake cases about purported lessees, not owners, and concludes the Department's historical reading is consistent with the plain text. KRS 150.015 states the chapter's conservation purpose and supports the closing point about voluntary license purchases.

Source

Original opinion text

February 04, 2026

OAG 26-02

Subject: Does a Kentucky owner of farmland need to live on the farmland to qualify for the exemption to the state's licensure requirements provided by KRS 150.170(4), or does ownership of the farmland alone qualify an individual?

Requested by: Senator Gary Boswell, Kentucky Senate, District 8

Written by: J. Christopher Bowlin, Assistant Attorney General

Syllabus: A bona fide owner of farmland in Kentucky, who is a resident of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, is not required to live on the farmland to qualify for the licensure exemption provided by KRS 150.170(4).

Opinion of the Attorney General

The general requirements for purchasing a hunting and fishing license in Kentucky are outlined in KRS 150.170(1). The statute states:

Except as provided in the following subsections of this section, and subject to administrative regulations promulgated under this chapter, no person, resident, or nonresident shall do any act authorized by any kind of license or permit or assist in any way any person in doing any act provided for in this chapter with respect to wildlife unless he or she holds the kind of license or permit, resident or nonresident, that authorizes the act. It shall be the specific purpose of this chapter to prohibit the taking or pursuing of any wildlife, protected or unprotected, or the fishing in any stream or body of water whether public or private, without first procuring the license provided for in KRS 150.175, except to the extent as may be otherwise provided in this section.

However, KRS 150.170(4) exempts a "resident owner of farmlands" from the requirement to obtain a hunting or fishing license. It states:

The resident owner of farmlands or his or her spouse or dependent children shall, without procuring any sport hunting or sport fishing licenses, have the right to take fish or hunt during the open season, except trapping, on farmlands of which they are bona fide owners. Tenants or their dependent children residing upon these farmlands shall have the same privilege.

When interpreting statutes, Kentucky courts apply well-established principles of construction. "In matters of statutory interpretation, the first rule is that the text of the statute is supreme." Garrard Cnty. v. Middleton, 520 S.W.3d 746, 750 (Ky. 2017). Statutes must be interpreted as written, and when the language is plain and unambiguous, the intent of the General Assembly must be deduced from the text. Farley v. P&P Constr., Inc., 677 S.W.3d 415, 419 (Ky. 2023) (quoting W. Ky Coal Co. v. Nall & Bailey, 14 S.W.2d 400, 401–02 (Ky. 1929)). When the General Assembly defines a word or gives it a particular meaning, it must be accepted when construing the statute. See Schroader v. Atkins, 657 S.W.2d 945, 947 (Ky. 1983). It is presumed that the General Assembly "meant exactly what it said, and said exactly what it meant." Farley, 677 S.W.3d at 423 (quoting Univ. of Louisville v. Rothstein, 532 S.W.3d 644, 648 (Ky. 2017)).

Applying these principles, the Office must first look to the language of the licensure exemption in the statute. It exempts a "resident owner of farmlands or his or her spouse or dependent children" on "farmlands of which they are bona fide owners." The General Assembly defined the term "resident" in KRS 150.010(38). It states:

"Resident" means any person who has established permanent domicile and legal residence and has resided in this state for thirty (30) days immediately prior to his or her application for a license. All other persons shall be classed as nonresidents, except students enrolled for at least six (6) months in an educational institution as full-time students and military personnel of the United States who are under permanent assignment, shall be classified as residents while so enrolled or assigned in this state[.]

This definition refers to an individual's connection to Kentucky as expressed plainly by the language "in this state." Furthermore, the General Assembly defined the term "nonresident" in KRS 150.010(28) to mean "a person who has not established a permanent domicile in this state and has not resided in this state for thirty (30) days immediately prior to his or her application for a license." This definition also plainly refers to an individual's connection to the state. Neither definition contains language linking the term "resident" to a particular parcel of farmland owned by an individual.

By contrast, the term "tenant," to which KRS 150.170(4) also applies, is defined differently. The General Assembly chose expressly to link the term to individuals working upon and residing on a particular parcel of land. KRS 150.010(47) provides:

"Tenant" means any resident sharecropper, lessee, or any other person actually engaged in work upon a farm or lands and residing in a dwelling on the farms or lands including noncontiguous lands, but shall not include any other employee or tenant unless actually residing on the property and engaged or employed as above mentioned[.]

This distinction is harmonious with the disparate treatment of "resident owners" and "tenants" in the licensure exemption provided by KRS 150.170(4). The statute does not expressly require a resident owner of farmland to reside on the land, but it expressly limits the exception for tenants to those "residing upon" the farmland.

In response to a request from this Office for input as to Senator Boswell's question, the Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources ("KDFWR") stated:

Historically, and considering the Department's understanding of KRS 150.170 . . ., KDFWR has applied a lenient interpretation of the same; construing the phrase 'resident [owner] of farmlands' to include bona fide owners of farmland, without regard to whether such owners physically resided upon the farmland. [1]

KDFWR further stated, "the Department has not applied an internal policy for enforcement accounting for whether a landowner physically resides on the property."

KDFWR's stated interpretation differs from how two prior decades-old Opinions of the Attorney General suggest that the exemption should be construed. As a result, the Office will consider this issue anew and decide whether the older Opinions remain valid in response to Senator Boswell's question.

In 1963 the Office answered the question of whether a Conservation Officer properly arrested a man for hunting upon a piece of his father-in-law's farm without a license. The Office opined that "… only the owner, his wife and children who actually reside on the farm may hunt thereon without a license." OAG 63-14. The Office further opined that the arrest of the son-in-law was proper because he did not own the farm and he resided in another county.

Then in 1979 the Office answered the question of what constitutes a "resident owner" of farmlands under the licensure exception statute. The Office opined that owners of farmland were required to reside on the parcel of land upon which they were hunting or fishing to be exempt from purchasing a hunting and fishing license. OAG 79-127.

Both OAG 63-14 and OAG 79-127 relied, in part, upon the reasoning contained in Holland v. Flora, 284 S.W.2d 824 (Ky. 1955). However, the facts underlying Holland were materially different from those posed by Senator Boswell's question. Holland involved pay lake owners who attempted to characterize patrons as lessees to avoid the statutory fishing license requirement. In rejecting one of the arguments of the pay lake owners, the Court held that the characterization was an "obvious attempt to evade the requirements of the statute." Id. at 825. The Court further observed that "the patrons of the appellees' business, even if they are true lessees, are not sufficiently connected with the land of the appellees to come within the purview of the exclusionary provision of the statute." Id. Holland only construed the license exemption statute as applied to pay lake patrons claiming to be lessees; it did not involve application of the statute with respect to the owners.

OAG 63-14 additionally relied upon Draffen v. Black, 196 S.W.2d 362 (Ky. 1946), which is likewise distinguishable. In Draffen, the owner of a private pond allowed the public to fish from his pond for a fee. Id. at 362. The owner objected to Conservation Officers employed by the Fish and Game Commission entering his property to determine whether the persons fishing in the pond had obtained fishing licenses and were following the applicable size and number restrictions. Id. at 362–63. The parties "conceded that the [licensure] Statute has no application to the owner of the land, his resident children, or lessees of the land on which the pond is located." Id. at 363. In holding that the Conservation Officers could enforce the state's licensure statute and fishing regulations on private property and that they could enter on private property for that purpose, the Court observed that "our [licensure] Statute seems to exempt the owner himself, his resident children, and his lessees from the provisions of the Act." Id. at 364. Draffen thus construed the statute only in the context of paid patrons using the pond; it did not decide whether an owner must reside upon a particular parcel to qualify for the farmland-owner exemption.

Neither Holland nor Draffen, upon which these prior Opinions relied, interpreted the licensure exemption statute with respect to owners. Therefore, they shed no light on the application of the exemption statute with respect to Senator Boswell's question.

While the interpretation of statutes is ultimately a question of law for Kentucky courts, the manner in which KDFWR has historically construed the exemption is not contrary to the plain language of the licensure exemption statute. The statutory definition of "resident" in KRS 150.010(38), the statutory definition of "nonresident" in KRS 150.010(28), and the text of KRS 150.170(4) do not compel a conclusion that a farmland owner's eligibility for the exemption depends upon him or her residing upon a particular parcel of farmland. Instead, the language of these statutes plainly contemplates residency within Kentucky as sufficient. Interpreting the language of KRS 150.170(4) to require farmland owners to live upon a particular parcel would impose a parcel-specific residency requirement not required by the statutory text.

For these reasons, it is the opinion of the Office of the Attorney General that a bona fide owner of farmland in Kentucky, who is a resident of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, is not required to live on the farmland in order to qualify for the licensure exemption provided by KRS 150.170(4). To the extent that OAG 63-14 or OAG 79-127 are inconsistent with this conclusion insofar as they apply to owners of farmland, they are overruled.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, this Opinion is not intended to discourage owners of farmland from voluntarily purchasing hunting and fishing licenses. License purchases are a critical source of support for KDFWR's work, which has included historic wildlife recovery successes—like the creation of the largest elk herd east of the Rocky Mountains, the recovery of the white-tailed deer herd, and the restoration of wild turkeys to every county in the Commonwealth—as well as many valuable conservation and educational programs "for the purpose of furnishing sport and recreation for the present and for the future residents of this state." KRS 150.015.

Russell Coleman
Attorney General

J. Christopher Bowlin
Assistant Attorney General

[1] KDFWR stated that it had not performed an exhaustive review of historical practices on the subject due to the expedited time frame in which the Office requested input, and it expressly reserved the right to supplement or amend its response upon further review or if additional records come to light.