Can Connecticut's Governmental Accountability Commission evaluate or set expectations for the Office of Governmental Accountability's executive administrator, even though the statute doesn't say so expressly?

Plain-English summary

Connecticut consolidated several watchdog agencies (the Ethics Advisory Board, State Elections Enforcement, Freedom of Information, Judicial Selection, Board of Firearms Permit Examiners, State Contracting Standards Board, Judicial Review, Child Advocate, Victim Advocate) under the Office of Governmental Accountability, headed by an executive administrator and overseen by a Governmental Accountability Commission. The GAC's statutory power list (§ 1-301) includes recommending candidates for executive administrator and terminating that administrator's employment. It does not expressly include evaluating performance or setting goals.

Chairman Castagno asked whether the absence of express text meant the GAC lacked authority to evaluate. The AG concluded the GAC did have authority, by necessary implication. When the legislature gives an entity the power to terminate an employee, it must also have given the lesser power to evaluate whether termination is warranted. Otherwise the termination power would be unworkable. Southern New England Tel. Co. v. Dept. of Pub. Util. Control, 237 Conn. 1, 30 (2002), and Nelseco Navigation Co. v. Dept. of Liquor Control, 226 Conn. 418, 424 (1993), supply the implied-powers rule. Goldstar Medical Servs., Inc. v. Dept. of Social Servs., 288 Conn. 790, 803-04 (2008), supplies the rule against absurd or unworkable results.

The legislative history reinforced the conclusion. Senator Harp, speaking on the bill, said the GAC has "the power to evaluate and terminate the executive administrator." That confirms the legislature intended the implied power.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2013. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: What is the Office of Governmental Accountability?
A: A consolidation enacted in 2011 by Public Act 11-48 that brought together several previously independent watchdog and accountability bodies under one administrative umbrella. The intent was administrative efficiency, not substantive change to the underlying bodies' independence.

Q: Who serves on the GAC?
A: Chairpersons of the Citizen's Ethics Advisory Board, State Elections Enforcement Commission, Freedom of Information Commission, Judicial Selection Commission, Board of Firearms Permit Examiners, and State Contracting Standards Board; the executive director of the Judicial Review Commission; the Child Advocate; and the Victim Advocate (or their respective designees).

Q: What's the practical effect of the implied-powers ruling?
A: The GAC can lawfully implement an annual performance review process, set written goals, conduct a structured evaluation, and document performance issues. Without that ruling, the GAC's termination authority would have been politically risky to exercise without prior documented performance management.

Q: Why didn't the Legislature just say "evaluate" in the statute?
A: The opinion does not speculate. Implied-powers cases routinely deal with situations where the Legislature gave a top-line power (terminate, license, regulate) but did not enumerate every operational step.

Background and statutory framework

Public Act 11-48 created the Office of Governmental Accountability and its administrative head, the executive administrator. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1-300(a) places the executive administrator at the top of the OGA. Section 1-301(a) defines the GAC's makeup and lists its powers: meet to recommend executive administrator candidates to the Governor; meet for the purpose of terminating the administrator's employment.

The list does not mention performance reviews, goal-setting, or formal evaluations. The AG read those into the termination power as the necessarily implied means of exercising it lawfully. Goldstar directs against statutory readings that produce "nonsensical and unworkable" results. Senator Harp's floor remarks (54 Sen. Proc., at 4230 (June 1, 2011)) confirmed that the legislature understood "evaluate and terminate" as the package.

Citations and references

Statutes and acts:
- Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1-300
- Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1-301
- Public Act No. 11-48 (Connecticut, 2011)

Cases:
- Southern New England Tel. Co. v. Dept. of Pub. Util. Control, 237 Conn. 1, 30 (2002), implied lesser powers
- Nelseco Navigation Co. v. Dept. of Liquor Control, 226 Conn. 418, 424 (1993), same
- Goldstar Medical Servs., Inc. v. Dept. of Social Servs., 288 Conn. 790, 803-04 (2008), construe to avoid unworkable results

Source

• Landing page: https://portal.ct.gov/AG/Opinions
• Original PDF: https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/ag/opinions/2013/castagno_opinion2013_12_13-pdf.pdf?rev=6d0a89dcca414a6c97a3bcd0943225c6

Original opinion text

GEORGE C. JEPSEN
ATTORNEY GENERAT,

55 Elm Street
P.O. Box 120
Hariford, CT 06141-0120

Office of The Attorney General
State of Connecticut

December 13, 2013

Honorable Anthony J. Castagno

Chair

Governmental Accountability Commission
20 Trinity Street

Hartford, CT 06106

Dear Chairman Castagno:

You have asked for an opinion as to whether, under § 1-301 of the General
Statutes, the Governmental Accountability Commission (GAC) has “the authority
to periodically evaluate the Executive Administrator” and “to periodically set
goals and expectations for the Executive Administrator.” We conclude that the
GAC has such authority.

As part of the consolidation of various agencies and commissions under
the Office of Governmental Accountability (OGA), Public Act No. 11-48
established the GAC. It is comprised of the chairpersons of the Citizen’s Ethics
Advisory Board, the State Elections Enforcement Commission, the Freedom of
Information Commission, the Judicial Selection Commission, the Board of —
Firearms Permit Examiners, and the State Contracting Standards Board; the
executive director of the Judicial Review Commission; the Child Advocate; and
the Victim Advocate (or their respective designees). Conn. Gen. Stat. § 1-301(a).
The Public Act also created an executive administrator to serve as the
“administrative head” of the OGA. I/d., § 1-300(a). The GAC is statutorily
empowered to meet for the purpose of making recommendations to the Governor
for candidates for the OGA executive administrator and “for the purpose of
terminating the employment of the executive administrator.” Id., § 1-301(a).

Section 1-301 does not expressly authorize the GAC to set goals and
expectations for or to evaluate the OGA executive administrator. That of course
is not the end of the inquiry. When the legislature confers a power, that grant of
authority should be interpreted to include such lesser powers as are necessary to

Honorable Anthony J. Castagno
Page 2
December 13, 2013

achieve the legislature’s purpose. Southern New England Tel. Co. v. Dept. of
Pub. Util.Control, 237 Conn. 1, 30 (2002); Nelseco Navigation Co. v. Dept. of
Liquor Control, 226 Conn. 418, 424 (1993). The GAC has the authority to
terminate the employment of the executive administrator. Surely if the legislature
intended to confer the power to terminate, it must have meant to allow the GAC to
set expectations and to evaluate whether the executive administrator has met such
expectations before exercising its termination power. To conclude otherwise
would create a nonsensical and unworkable obstacle to the GAC’s exercise of its
termination authority, and statutes must be construed to avoid such results.
Goldstar Medical Servs., Inc. v. Dept. of Social Servs., 288 Conn. 790, 803-04
(2008). Moreover, the legislative history supports this sensible interpretation. 54
Sen. Proc., at 4230 (June 1, 2011) (remarks of Sen. Harp) (stating that GAC has
“the power to evaluate and terminate the executive administrator” (emphasis
added)).

We therefore conclude that the GAC has the authority to set goals and
expectations for and to evaluate periodically the exeputive administrator.

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thuly yours,

GEORGE JEPSEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL