Can the same person serve as a director of both a groundwater management district and a fire protection district whose boundaries overlap in California?

Plain-English summary

The Mono County Tri-Valley Groundwater Management District manages groundwater in the Benton, Hammil, and Chalfant valleys. The White Mountain Fire Protection District provides fire and emergency services covering some of the same territory in the Benton and Hammil valleys. Mono County asked the Attorney General whether one person can sit on both boards at once.

The AG said no. California's incompatibility-of-office statute, Government Code section 1099, prohibits one person from simultaneously holding two public offices when there is a "possibility of a significant clash of duties or loyalties between the offices." A clash does not need to actually occur, and the offices need not be in routine conflict. It is enough that the two offices, viewed in the abstract, have powers that could realistically pull a single person in opposing directions.

Both boards meet the threshold of "public office" because they perform public functions, exercise sovereign powers, and have continuing tenure. The clash arises from how their powers interact:

• The groundwater district can sell water, set water rates, and limit groundwater extraction. The fire district may need to buy water or acquire water-supplying property to deliver fire protection. A single board member sitting on both boards would face split loyalties any time those decisions touched both districts.
• The two districts could compete to acquire the same water sources or facilities.
• The fire district has authority to order anyone, including the groundwater district, to fix fire or life hazards on its property. The groundwater district has authority to impose spacing rules on extraction wells used by anyone, including the fire district.
• The groundwater district can sue to block water uses it views as unreasonable, even outside the district. That includes water uses by a fire district during mutual-aid responses.

Because Government Code section 1099 says "only one potential significant clash of duties or loyalties is necessary to make offices incompatible," the cumulative possibility here is more than enough. No statute compels or expressly authorizes serving on both boards together, so the general rule applies.

The opinion also addresses the nonvoting "ex officio" seat on the groundwater district board, which is reserved for a Mono County supervisor. Even assuming that nonvoting seat is not itself a "public office" within section 1099, the supervisor occupying it cannot also sit on the fire district board, because supervisors and fire district directors hold incompatible offices on their own (county supervisors set Proposition 172 sales tax allocations to fire districts and can lend county funds to them).

Practical consequence: a person who already holds one of these seats and is then appointed or elected to the other automatically forfeits the first seat upon accepting the second. The county registrar of voters will need to treat any candidate whose election would create this dual-office situation accordingly.

What this means for you

If you are a director of the Mono County Tri-Valley Groundwater Management District or the White Mountain Fire Protection District

You cannot accept appointment or election to the other board without giving up your current seat. The forfeiture is automatic on acceptance of the second office; you do not get a chance to fix it after the fact. If you are considering running for or being appointed to the other board, plan to resign your current seat before taking the oath of office for the second.

If you are a county counsel or registrar of voters in a county with overlapping water and fire districts

When a candidate files for one of these boards while sitting on the other, raise the section 1099 issue at the candidacy stage rather than after the appointment. The opinion is squarely on point for any pair of agencies where one supplies or regulates water and the other delivers fire protection in shared territory. The same logic also bars a county supervisor from simultaneously sitting on a fire protection district board within that county.

If you are running for a special district board in California

Check whether you currently hold any other public office, then look at how the two agencies' powers interact. The relevant question is not whether you personally would handle conflicts well, but whether the two offices, looked at abstractly, have "principal and important duties" that could clash. Water-fire pairs, water-water pairs, fire-services pairs, and any pair where one body can audit, fund, or regulate the other typically fail this test.

If you are a special district board administrator drafting policies on board service

If your board has historically allowed members to serve on overlapping local boards, audit those arrangements. The AG opinions on incompatible offices have grown substantially since 2014, and the threshold for "significant clash" is lower than many districts assume. A member who quietly accepts a second seat does not create dual offices that ratify themselves over time; they create a forfeited first seat plus a second seat with disputed validity.

Common questions

What is "incompatibility of office" in California?

Government Code section 1099 says you cannot simultaneously hold two public offices when (1) one office can audit, overrule, remove, or supervise the other; (2) there is a possibility of a significant clash of duties or loyalties between them; or (3) public policy considerations make it improper. Only one of those needs to apply. The rule is structural: it is not about whether you personally would behave well, but about whether the offices' powers are at risk of pulling in opposite directions.

What happens if I accept a second incompatible office?

You forfeit the first office on acceptance of the second. The first seat becomes vacant and must be filled under the normal vacancy rules for that body. You do not get to choose which one to keep after the fact.

Does the rule apply only to elected offices?

No. It applies to elected and appointed members of governmental boards, commissions, and committees. It does not apply to civil-service or other employment positions, and it does not apply to bodies with only advisory powers. The seat must involve some exercise of sovereign power, like setting policy, levying fees, or acquiring property.

What if a state law specifically authorizes the dual service?

Then you can hold both offices. Section 1099 expressly carves out "simultaneous holding of the particular offices" that "is compelled or expressly authorized by law." The Legislature has done this in narrow circumstances, but it has to be express and statewide. A local ordinance or resolution cannot create the exception.

Can a county supervisor sit on the groundwater district's nonvoting seat reserved for a supervisor?

Yes, that arrangement is created by statute. But the supervisor in that ex officio seat cannot also sit on the White Mountain Fire Protection District board, because supervisors and fire district directors hold incompatible offices independently of the groundwater district question.

Do I need a quo warranto action to remove someone holding two incompatible offices?

That is the standard enforcement path. Under Government Code section 1099(b), the prohibition is enforced through a quo warranto proceeding under Code of Civil Procedure section 803. The Attorney General's leave to sue is required for a private party to bring the action. Because forfeiture happens automatically on acceptance of the second office, the quo warranto action is typically about confirming and enforcing the forfeiture, not creating it.

Background and statutory framework

How section 1099 came together

California's incompatibility-of-office doctrine started as a common-law rule and was codified at section 1099 in 2005 (Stats. 2005, ch. 254). The codification preserved the existing common-law analysis: courts and the AG continue to look to "judicial and administrative precedent concerning incompatible public offices developed under the common law" when applying section 1099, including the long line of AG opinions interpreting the doctrine.

The "significant clash of duties or loyalties" test in subdivision (a)(2) is the most frequently litigated branch. The AG's office has explained that "significant" means a clash "that is not trivial and is more certain than mere chance." The clash does not need to be inevitable or even probable; the possibility of clash, evaluated in the abstract from the powers granted to each office, is enough. As the AG has put it, "it is not a question of the use of the powers that creates incompatibility, but the possibility of such use through the possession of inconsistent functions."

The Mono County Tri-Valley Groundwater Management District

The Legislature created this district in 1989 (Stats. 1989, ch. 844) to manage groundwater basins in the Benton, Hammil, and Chalfant valleys. Its board has seven voting members elected at large from district residents who own real property in the district, plus one ex officio nonvoting member appointed by the Mono County Board of Supervisors from its own members. At least three of the seven voting members must be involved in extracting large volumes of groundwater for agricultural or other non-domestic use.

The district's powers are unusually broad for a groundwater agency: it can buy and sell water, set water rates, regulate exports through permits and fees, suspend extractions in a basin overdraft, impose well-spacing rules, and bring suit to enjoin "unreasonable uses or methods of use of water" affecting the basins, including uses outside the district. The Sustainable Groundwater Management Act recognizes the district as the exclusive groundwater agency in its statutory boundaries.

The White Mountain Fire Protection District

This district is governed by the Fire Protection District Law of 1987 (Health & Safety Code section 13800 et seq.). Its five-member board, elected at large, has authority over fire protection, rescue, EMS, hazardous-materials response, ambulance service, and any other service "relating to the protection of lives and property." It can acquire property, including water facilities, by any means including eminent domain; enter mutual-aid agreements; and order property owners to correct fire hazards.

Why these two agencies clash

The opinion identifies clashes flowing from three different intersections of authority:

1. Water sales and water acquisition. The groundwater district can sell water at rates it sets; the fire district can buy water for fire protection. A board member on both bodies would be on both sides of any such transaction. The same problem appears if both districts want to acquire the same water source or facility.

2. Regulation of water use. The fire district uses water to fight fires inside and outside its territory through mutual aid. The groundwater district can suspend extractions in overdraft conditions, impose spacing requirements on extraction wells, and sue to block "unreasonable" water uses anywhere those uses affect district groundwater. Those powers can cut directly against fire district operations.

3. Hazard regulation. The fire district can order any property owner, including the groundwater district, to correct fire or life hazards. The groundwater district can impose well-spacing requirements on any new extraction facility, including ones serving the fire district. Each agency has authority that runs against property and operations of the other.

Why no statute saves the dual service

For an exception to section 1099 to apply, a state statute must "compel or expressly authorize" the dual service. The Fire Protection District Law does not. The 1989 Mono County district statute does not authorize voting directors to serve on any other agency's board. When the Legislature reserved one ex officio seat on the groundwater district board for a Mono County supervisor in 1989 and amended the provision in 2018 (Stats. 2018, ch. 111), it did not authorize that supervisor to hold any third office. The Legislature has been silent for over thirty years despite the obvious overlap with the pre-existing fire district. That silence is not a green light; it is the absence of the express authorization section 1099 requires.

Citations

The AG's analysis draws on a long line of California incompatibility-of-office authority:

• Moore v. Panish (1982) 32 Cal.3d 535 establishes the foundational test for "public office" and undergirds the conclusion that water and fire district directors hold public offices for section 1099 purposes.
• People ex rel. Lacey v. Robles (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 804 clarifies what counts as "compelled or expressly authorized by law" exception to the incompatibility rule.
• Public Water Agencies Group v. Consolidated Fire Protection Dist. (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 695 holds that water agencies are not required to supply emergency fire-protection water free of charge, supporting the AG's view that fire-water transactions can be pricing decisions where dual board members would be conflicted.
• 97 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 50 (2014) (Hornbrook) is the closest factual analog, finding incompatibility between a fire protection district and a community services district that supplied water in overlapping territory. The 24-702 opinion mirrors the Hornbrook clash analysis.
• 86 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 205 (2003) establishes that county supervisor offices have a long history of incompatibility findings against various local public offices.
• 87 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 1 (2004) and 86 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 38 (2003) address Proposition 172 funding allocations, which the AG uses to show that supervisor and fire district director are incompatible offices independent of the groundwater question.

Source

• Landing page: https://oag.ca.gov/opinions/yearly-index
• Original PDF: https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/opinions/pdfs/24-702.pdf

Original opinion text

TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
State of California
ROB BONTA
Attorney General

OPINION
of
ROB BONTA
Attorney General
RYAN B. McCARROLL
Deputy Attorney General

No. 24-702
May 5, 2026

The HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER BECK, COUNTY COUNSEL, COUNTY OF MONO, has requested an opinion on a question relating to the legal compatibility of public offices.

QUESTION PRESENTED AND CONCLUSION

May a person simultaneously serve as a Director of the Mono County Tri-Valley Groundwater Management District and as a Director of the White Mountain Fire Protection District?

No. A person may not simultaneously serve as a Director of the Mono County Tri-Valley Groundwater Management District and as a Director of the White Mountain Fire Protection District because the two offices are legally incompatible under Government Code section 1099.

BACKGROUND

The question presented here involves two public agencies that have overlapping boundaries in the Tri-Valley region of Mono County. The Mono County Tri-Valley Groundwater Management District (Groundwater District) generally includes the Valleys of Benton, Hammil, and Chalfant. The White Mountain Fire Protection District (Fire District) includes some, but not all, of the same territory located in the Valleys of Benton and Hammil.

Our requestor asks whether it would be lawful for a person to serve on the governing boards of both the Groundwater District and the Fire District at the same time. He asks specifically about the rule in Government Code section 1099(a) that a person "shall not simultaneously hold two public offices that are incompatible" with each other "unless simultaneous holding of the particular offices is compelled or expressly authorized by law." The rule "is not based on a personal conflict of interest on the part of the office holder, but upon the potential for conflicts that may arise from the nature of the duties of each office, regardless of the good faith, honor, or integrity of the incumbent."

For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that section 1099(a) would prohibit a person from serving simultaneously on the governing boards of both the Groundwater District and the Fire District. Specifically, the offices are legally incompatible under section 1099(a)(2) because, "[b]ased on the powers and jurisdiction of the offices, there is a possibility of a significant clash of duties or loyalties between the offices."

ANALYSIS

To determine whether Government Code section 1099 prohibits a person from sitting on the governing boards of two public agencies at the same time, we begin by summarizing the statutory authority under which the agencies operate. We then follow a three-step process to determine (1) whether the seats are "public offices," (2) whether they are "incompatible" with each other, and (3) whether sitting on both boards simultaneously "is compelled or expressly authorized by law."

About the Mono County Tri-Valley Groundwater Management District

The Groundwater District is one of several "agencies created by statute to manage groundwater" in particular parts of California. As its name suggests, the Legislature created the District for the purpose of managing the groundwater basins located in the Valleys of Benton, Hammil, and Chalfant. The District is responsible for "preserving the waters of the basins and, to the extent there becomes a surplus of groundwater, approving the terms and conditions of any sale of the surplus and equitably allocating the proceeds of that sale."

The District is governed by a Board of Directors (Groundwater District Board) that consists of seven voting members. It also includes "a county supervisor appointed by the board of supervisors as an ex officio, nonvoting member." Each of the seven voting members "shall be elected at large from the district." They "shall be residents of the district who are the owners of record of real property located within the district." And at least three of them must also be involved in extracting large volumes of groundwater for agricultural or other non-domestic use.

The Legislature has specified that the Board may adopt ordinances to acquire, store, and sell water. Specifically, the Board may "[a]cquire water and water rights within or outside of the district." The Board may similarly "[p]urchase and import water into the district." It may "[s]tore water in and recapture water from surface reservoirs or groundwater basins within the district." And it may "[e]xchange" or "sell water and water rights at rates determined by the board."

The Board may also regulate the use of groundwater by third parties. For example, anyone seeking to export groundwater from within the district must obtain a permit from the Board and pay a fee based on the amount of water to be exported. The Board may "reduce or suspend extractions by exporters" when there is "evidence of overdraft, or threat of overdraft," to the groundwater basins. And, if conditions do not improve, the Board "may limit or suspend extraction by district users." But the Board may grant an exemption to "any operator who extracts a minimum amount of groundwater as specified in an ordinance adopted by the board after notice and hearing."

The Board also has the power to address disputes between groundwater users on a case-by-case basis. For example, the Board "may impose spacing requirements on new extraction facility construction to minimize well interference." And it may issue remedial orders if it determines that "the legal rights of [a] complaining water user have been infringed through well interference by the extractions of any other operator within the district." The Board may also "prosecute actions to enjoin unreasonable uses or methods of use of water within the district or outside of the district to the extent those uses or methods of use affect the groundwater supplies within the district."

About the White Mountain Fire Protection District

The Fire District is governed by a Board of Directors (Fire District Board) that consists of five members, each of whom is elected at large. The Board has "broad statutory authority" under the Fire Protection District Law of 1987 to provide "fire protection services, rescue services, emergency medical services, hazardous material emergency response services, ambulance services, and other services relating to the protection of lives and property." It may also order third parties "to correct or eliminate a fire hazard or life hazard."

The District may "exercise all rights and powers, express or implied, necessary to carry out the purposes and intent of [the Fire Protection District Law]." So, for example, it may "acquire any property, including water facilities for providing fire protection, within the district by any means." It may likewise "acquire by eminent domain any property necessary to carry out any of its powers or functions." And it may "enter into and perform all necessary contracts." So too may it "enter into mutual aid agreements with any federal or state agency, any city, county, city and county, special district, or federally recognized Indian tribe."

The Directors of These Agencies Hold Public Offices

As mentioned, Government Code section 1099(a) prohibits a person from holding two "public offices" that are incompatible with each other, except as compelled or expressly authorized by law. By its terms, the statute applies to any "public officer, including, but not limited to, an appointed or elected member of a governmental board, commission, committee, or other body." But it "does not apply to a position of employment, including a civil service position." Nor does it apply to "a governmental body that has only advisory powers."

To determine whether a seat on a particular board is subject to section 1099, we consider "judicial and administrative precedent concerning incompatible public offices developed under the common law." For example, we consider whether "the incumbent performs a public function for the public benefit and exercises some of the sovereign powers of the state." These sovereign powers "include statutorily imposed duties related to the exercise of state police powers; power to dispose of public property; power to incur financial obligations on the part of the government; and power to act in business or political dealings between individuals and the public."

Here, there is little if any question that the members of the Fire District Board hold public offices within the meaning of section 1099. As mentioned, they are elected by the voters to exercise sovereign powers for the benefit of public health and safety throughout the district. The same is true regarding the voting members of the Groundwater District Board. These members are elected by the voters and entrusted with sovereign powers for the purpose of "carrying out . . . functions of statewide importance." Indeed, they perform a public function for the public benefit by "preserving the waters of the basins," which might otherwise "become overdrafted, thereby depleting supplies for domestic uses, curtailing reasonable growth, endangering the economic viability of agriculture, and otherwise adversely affecting the environment and economy of the area."

As for the nonvoting seat on the Groundwater District Board, the question presented does not require us to determine whether the seat is a public office within the meaning of section 1099. This is because, even assuming without deciding that the nonvoting seat does not qualify as a public office by itself, section 1099 would still prohibit its holder from simultaneously serving on the Fire District Board. As mentioned, the Legislature has reserved the nonvoting seat on the Groundwater District Board for "a county supervisor appointed by the board of supervisors," who shall serve as an "ex officio" member of the Groundwater District Board. And, as discussed below, the respective powers and duties of the Mono County Board of Supervisors and the Fire District Board are sufficient by themselves to preclude service on both boards simultaneously. In other words, the prohibition on simultaneous service applies to every member of the Board of Supervisors, including the individual supervisor who has been appointed to serve as a nonvoting, ex officio member of the Groundwater District Board.

These Public Offices Are Incompatible with Each Other

We next consider whether simultaneous service on both the Groundwater District Board and the Fire District Board is "incompatible" within the meaning of Government Code section 1099. As relevant here, public offices are incompatible under section 1099(a)(2) if, "[b]ased on the powers and jurisdiction of the offices, there is a possibility of a significant clash of duties or loyalties between the offices." Although section 1099(a)(2) does not define a "significant" clash of duties or loyalties, we have "construed the term to mean a clash that is not trivial and is more certain than mere chance." For example, offices are compatible if they have "only infrequent dealings not involving the core functions of the two offices." But they are incompatible if the potential clash would involve their "principal and important duties."

We have also explained that, because section 1099(a)(2) refers to the mere "possibility" of a significant clash of duties or loyalties, such a clash "need not actually be realized to render two offices incompatible. Rather, incompatibility is determined by the functions of the two offices in the abstract and there need not be a showing that an officeholder's loyalties actually have been tested, or that it is inevitable they will be tested, for the offices to be incompatible." "In other words, it is not a question of the use of the powers that creates incompatibility, but the possibility of such use through the possession of inconsistent functions."

We have previously applied these standards to relationships between public agencies that are similar to the current relationship between the Groundwater District and the Fire District. In 97 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 50 (2014), for example, we identified three significant clashes that might arise between the Hornbrook Fire Protection District and the Hornbrook Community Services District. These potential clashes were largely based on the fact that the Community Services District had been formed to provide water in areas of Hornbrook that were served by the Fire District.

We explained, first, that if the Fire District decided to purchase water from the Community Services District, then the latter "would set water rates for the Fire District as well as control the amount of water that the Fire District could use during any shortage." Second, the districts might be drawn into competition with each other if they decided "to acquire the same water facilities." Third, the Fire District might "issue written orders to eliminate fire hazards on the [Community Services] District's property," which could affect the latter's "property value or insurance" and lead to "a misdemeanor citation from the Fire District."

In our view, the same clashes of duties or loyalties might arise between the Groundwater District and the Fire District at issue here. Although we have received no indication that there is currently a buyer/seller relationship between the Fire District and the Groundwater District, the Legislature has given the Groundwater District the power to "sell water and water rights at rates determined by the board." And the Groundwater Board's decision whether to exercise this power could be influenced by the needs of the Fire District. Even if the Groundwater Board never exercises this power, it could still be drawn into competition with the Fire District if they both attempt to acquire the same water or water facilities.

There are also regulatory and enforcement disputes that might arise between these districts. For example, the Fire District has the authority to order the Groundwater District "to correct or eliminate a fire hazard or life hazard." Likewise, the Groundwater District "may impose spacing requirements" on new groundwater extraction facilities used by the Fire District. So too might the Groundwater District disagree with particular ways in which the Fire District uses water within the Tri-Valley region or while providing mutual assistance outside of the region, especially if the groundwater basins are overdrawn. And those disagreements might cause the Groundwater District to bring an action against the Fire District "to enjoin unreasonable uses or methods of use of water within the district or outside of the district to the extent those uses or methods of use affect the groundwater supplies within the district."

As in the Hornbrook opinion, "[o]ther instances of conflict may be envisioned based upon the statutory power" of the Groundwater District and the Fire District. But "only 'one potential significant clash of duties or loyalties is necessary to make offices incompatible.'" Given the significant potential clashes that we have identified, we conclude that simultaneous service as a voting member of both the Groundwater District Board and the Fire District Board is incompatible under section 1099(a).

We likewise conclude that a member of the Fire District Board cannot simultaneously occupy the nonvoting seat on the Groundwater District Board. As mentioned, this seat is reserved for a member of the Mono County Board of Supervisors. And section 1099 prohibits serving simultaneously on the Board of Supervisors and the Fire District Board due to the possibility of divided loyalties. We have previously explained that, for example, a county board of supervisors has discretion to adjust the amount of sales tax revenue that an independent fire protection district, like the one at issue here, receives under the Local Public Safety Protection and Improvement Act of 1993 (Proposition 172). So too does a county board of supervisors have discretion to lend county funds to a fire protection district "in order to enable the district to perform its functions and meet its obligations" or "for the acquisition of real or personal property and the construction of structures needed for district purposes."

As these examples illustrate, there is a possibility of a significant clash of financial duties and loyalties between members of the Fire District Board and members of the Mono County Board of Supervisors. Section 1099 therefore prohibits serving simultaneously on the Board of Supervisors and the Fire District Board. As a result, the member of the Board of Supervisors who occupies the nonvoting seat on the Groundwater District Board may not serve simultaneously on the Fire District Board.

There Is No Applicable Exception to the General Rule Against Holding Incompatible Offices

Finally, we must consider whether simultaneously serving on the governing boards of the Groundwater District and the Fire District "is compelled or expressly authorized by law" within the meaning of Government Code section 1099(a). This language refers to a situation in which simultaneous service is compelled or expressly authorized by state law rather than by a local ordinance or resolution. Indeed, the legislative history of section 1099 indicates that "the Legislature intended to occupy the field on a matter of statewide concern and preclude 'local loopholes.'"

Here, we are not aware of any state law that authorizes simultaneous service on the governing boards of the Groundwater District and the Fire District. For example, the Fire Protection District Law does not compel or expressly authorize a person to serve on the governing boards of a fire protection district and another public agency. Likewise, when the Legislature reserved a seat on the Groundwater District Board of Directors for a member of the Mono County Board of Supervisors, it did not compel or expressly authorize the occupant of this seat to serve on the governing board of a third agency. Nor did it authorize any of the voting members of the Groundwater District Board of Directors to serve on the governing board of another agency. These omissions are notable because, when the Legislature created the Groundwater District in 1989, the Fire District had already been operating in the Tri-Valley region for several years. And the Legislature has not amended the Groundwater District Act in the ensuing decades to compel or expressly authorize simultaneous service on the governing boards of these particular agencies.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we conclude that a person may not simultaneously serve as a Director of both the Mono County Tri-Valley Groundwater Management District and the White Mountain Fire Protection District.