After the Reed v. Town of Gilbert ruling on content-based sign regulations, does Arizona need to amend its political sign statute (A.R.S. § 16-1019)?

Plain-English summary

In June 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Reed v. Town of Gilbert, an Arizona case in which a small church challenged Gilbert's sign code for treating event-direction signs (the church's category) more strictly than political and ideological signs. The Court held that any regulation distinguishing speech "because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed" is content-based and subject to strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny is a standard that few sign rules survive.

Senator John Kavanagh asked the AG whether Reed forces Arizona to amend A.R.S. § 16-1019, which deals with political signs.

AG Brnovich's answer: no. The reasoning rests on what § 16-1019 actually does. It is a protective statute, not a restrictive one. The original 1962 law made it a misdemeanor for anyone to remove, alter, deface, or cover political signs. The 2011 amendments added provisions limiting local governments' authority to remove political signs from public rights-of-way during specified periods (60 days before a primary through 15 days after a general election), subject to public-safety carve-outs and tourism-zone exceptions. Because § 16-1019 doesn't itself restrict speech, Reed's strict-scrutiny analysis doesn't apply.

The opinion does deliver one important caution. § 16-1019(F) authorizes municipalities to designate "commercial tourism, commercial resort and hotel sign free zones" within which political signs can be removed. After Reed, those local ordinances must be read narrowly. A sign-free zone that targets political signs only would itself be a content-based restriction subject to strict scrutiny, and § 16-1019(F) cannot insulate it. To be valid, tourism-zone ordinances must apply to all signs of a similar type using neutral time, place, and manner criteria.

The other two Arizona statutes touching political signs (§§ 33-1261 and 33-1808) limit what HOAs can do to political signs in private community contexts. They are also protective in form and don't trigger Reed.

Justice Alito's concurrence in Reed identified examples of content-neutral sign rules that survive: size, illumination, off-premises placement, and number of signs. Localities operating under § 16-1019 can rely on those categories.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2015. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Background and statutory framework

A.R.S. § 16-1019 has gone through significant evolution since 1962. The 2011 amendments are the most relevant for the Reed analysis:

• Subsection (A): Misdemeanor penalty for tampering with political signs.
• Subsection (C): Prohibits local governments from removing campaign signs from public rights-of-way during the protected window unless the sign creates a public hazard, obstructs vision, or violates ADA accessibility requirements; meets size limits; and includes contact info.
• Subsection (E): Allows relocation of signs that constitute a true emergency.
• Subsection (F): Authorizes municipalities to designate "commercial tourism, commercial resort and hotel sign free zones" with restrictions.
• Subsection (G): Lets local governments prohibit signs on government structures.
• Time window: 60 days before primary to 15 days after general election (with limited exceptions).

The Reed standard, summarized:
- Content-based regulations face strict scrutiny.
- Strict scrutiny: government must show a compelling interest, narrowly tailored, least restrictive means.
- "Content-based" includes facial distinctions based on topic, idea, message, function, or purpose.
- Content-neutral time/place/manner restrictions remain permissible under intermediate scrutiny.

Common questions

Q: Can my city's tourism zone still remove political signs?
A: Under this opinion, only if the zone applies to all signs neutrally, not specifically to political signs. After Reed, a tourism zone targeting only political signs is constitutionally vulnerable.

Q: Does this opinion mean political signs can never be regulated?
A: No. Content-neutral rules about size, illumination, distance from intersections, total number of signs, and similar criteria remain permissible. Reed only requires those rules to apply across the board, not just to political signs.

Q: What time window does § 16-1019 protect?
A: The protected period under subsection (C) generally runs from 60 days before a primary election through 15 days after a general election.

Q: Can a homeowners association ban political signs?
A: A.R.S. § 33-1261 (condominium) and § 33-1808 (planned community) limit what HOAs can do. Generally, HOAs may restrict but not categorically ban political signs.

Q: Has anyone successfully challenged § 16-1019 since this opinion?
A: This opinion was issued in 2015. Verify current law and any subsequent litigation.

Citations and references

Statutes:
- A.R.S. § 16-1019 (political signs; interference)
- A.R.S. § 33-1261 (condominium signs)
- A.R.S. § 33-1808 (planned community signs)

Cases:
- Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015)
- Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015)

Local ordinances cited:
- Fountain Hills Resolution No. 2012-31
- Paradise Valley Resolution No. 1241

Source

• Landing page: https://www.azag.gov/opinions/i15-011-r15-013
• Original PDF: https://www.azag.gov/sites/default/files/2025-06/I15-011.pdf

Original opinion text

To:

Senator John Kavanagh

Arizona State Senate

Question Presented

What legal impact does the recent United States Supreme Court ruling in Good News Presbyterian Church v. Town of Gilbert have on Arizona Statutes regulating political campaign signs? In particular, does the Supreme Court ruling require an amendment to Section 16-1019, Arizona Revised Statutes, in order to comply with the Court's mandate?

Summary Answer

The Supreme Court's decision does not directly impact any Arizona statutes regulating political campaign signs. It does not require an amendment to Section 16-1019 because nothing in that statute restricts speech.

Background

In 1962, the Arizona Legislature adopted House Bill 198, which provided misdemeanor penalties for anyone to "remove, alter, deface, or cover any political sign." Laws 1962, Chapter 124 (HB 198) [codified as A.R.S. § 16-1312(A) (1962)]. At the time, the provision did not apply to "signs placed on private property with or without permission of the owner thereof, or signs placed in violation of state law, or county, city or town ordinance or regulation." Id. [§ 16-1312(B)].

Since 1962, the statute has been amended a number of times. Its original function, imposing misdemeanor criminal penalties for tampering with political signs, has remained unchanged. In 2011, the Legislature significantly amended the law by:

1. Clarifying that local governments generally lack the authority to tamper with political signs that support or oppose a candidate or ballot measure and exist in a public right-of-way as long as the sign:

a. does not present a public hazard, obstruct vision, or interfere with the Americans with Disabilities Act;

b. meets maximum size limitations; and

c. contains contact information for the candidate or campaign committee.

2. Allowing a local government to relocate signs deemed to be placed in a manner constituting an emergency, subject to certain requirements.

3. Limiting the liability of a public employee who does not remove or relocate a sign pursuant to the "emergency" provision.

4. As to the provisions in number 1, exempting "commercial tourism, commercial resort and hotel sign free zones as those zones are designated by municipalities" and setting restrictions for such zones.

5. Allowing local governments to prohibit the installation of signs on government structures.

6. Limiting the prohibitions described in number 1 above from 60 days before a primary to 15 days after a general election, in most cases.

7. Clarifying that the section "does not apply to state highways or routes, or overpasses over those state highways or routes."

A.R.S. § 16-1019. Acting under the authority of point four, municipalities have adopted ordinances creating tourism zones. See, e.g., Fountain Hills Resolution No. 2012-31 (adopted November 15, 2012); Paradise Valley Resolution No. 1241 (adopted October 13, 2011). These ordinances allow municipalities to remove political signs from the designated zones.

In June 2015, the United States Supreme Court decided Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015), clarifying the constitutional standard applicable to laws that restrict or limit speech based on its content. Specifically, the Court more clearly defined which laws are considered content-based and thus subject to strict scrutiny. A law subject to strict scrutiny is unconstitutional unless the government defending it can demonstrate that the law serves a compelling government interest and does so in the least restrictive manner possible.

Analysis

The Reed decision explicitly confirmed that any content-based government restriction of speech will be subject to the most rigorous level of review. Id. at 2227. Such restrictions will therefore most likely be found unconstitutional. See Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, (2015) (noting that only in "rare cases" will "a speech restriction withstand[] strict scrutiny"). While the Court has long required content-based restrictions to meet this very high bar, determining when a regulation is or is not content-neutral remained open until Reed resolved the question by classifying any differential treatment based on "topic" as content-based:

Government regulation of speech is content based if a law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed. This commonsense meaning of the phrase "content based" requires a court to consider whether a regulation of speech "on its face" draws distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys. Some facial distinctions based on a message are obvious, defining regulated speech by particular subject matter, and others are more subtle, defining regulated speech by its function or purpose. Both are distinctions drawn based on the message a speaker conveys, and, therefore, are subject to strict scrutiny.

135 S. Ct. at 2227 (internal citations omitted). Under this standard, courts must apply strict scrutiny to special restrictions for political signs. Reed did not, however, restrict the permissibility of traditional time, place, and manner restrictions.

There are only three state laws regulating political signs in Arizona. Two of them, A.R.S. §§ 33-1261 and 33-1808, limit the ability of homeowners associations to restrict placement of political signs. A.R.S. §§ 33-1261(E), 1808(H), (I). The third statute, A.R.S. § 16-1019, imposes criminal penalties for interfering with political materials, including signs, and incorporates the exceptions described above, which allow a local government to adopt regulations relating to political signs.

Because this statute explicitly references political signs, one might suppose that it runs afoul of the First Amendment based on Reed because it references a particular category of speech identified by its content. To the contrary, Reed does not invalidate Section 16-1019. Reed clarified the analytical framework applicable to sign regulations that restrict speech and thus present "the danger of censorship" at the heart of First Amendment concerns. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2229. But nothing in Section 16-1019 restricts speech or compels the regulation of signs. Instead, it establishes the limits, under Arizona law, of what local governments may do as they limit or regulate signs. For example, subsection (F) recognizes that municipalities may designate certain sign-free zones within which the municipality may remove political signs. While such local laws might fall within the scope of Reed's definition of content-based regulation, Section 16-1019 itself does not constitute content-based regulation.

A municipality desiring to enact rules specifically targeting political signs in violation of Reed cannot rely on Section 16-1019(F) to inoculate such rules against a First Amendment challenge. The state law must now be read in light of Reed, and should thus be read as permitting municipalities to engage in sign regulation through the designation of tourism zones only to the extent that they do so in a content-neutral manner. In other words, such zones may not solely target political signs, but must employ generally-applicable time, place, and manner restrictions. That reconciliation with Reed does not affect the validity of Section 16-1019.

Conclusion

Arizona state statutes referencing political signs do not restrict speech, so Reed does not have implications for our state statutes. Because Section 16-1019 does not itself restrict speech, it does not implicate the First Amendment and Reed does not, therefore, invalidate this state law. There is no need to amend Section 16-1019 because of the Reed decision.

Mark Brnovich

Attorney General

Justice Alito's concurring opinion in Reed provides a number of examples of rules that are not content-based. 135 S. Ct. at 2334 (listing, inter alia, restrictions on size, illumination, off-premises placement, and number of signs).