State Criminal Motion to Suppress - Indiana

IN THE [INSERT COUNTY] CIRCUIT/SUPERIOR COURT

STATE OF INDIANA

VERIFIED MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

Ind. R. Crim. P. 2.7(B); Ind. R. Evid. 104; U.S. Const. amend. IV; Ind. Const. art. 1, § 11

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction & Relief Requested
2. Jurisdiction & Procedural Posture
3. Statement of Material Facts
4. Issues Presented

5. Legal Argument
   5.1. Constitutional Violations (Fourth Amendment & Article 1, § 11)
   5.2. The Warrant (If Any) Was Facially and Substantively Deficient
   5.3. Inapplicability of the Statutory Good-Faith Exception (Ind. Code § 35-37-4-5)
   5.4. Exclusion of Fruits & Derivative Evidence

6. Request for Evidentiary Hearing

7. Conclusion & Prayer for Relief
8. Verification
9. Certificate of Service
10. Proposed Order (Exhibit A)

1. INTRODUCTION & RELIEF REQUESTED

Defendant, [DEFENDANT NAME] ("Defendant"), by counsel [COUNSEL NAME], respectfully moves this Court, pursuant to:

• the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution;
• Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution;
• Indiana Code § 35-37-4-5; and
• Indiana Rules of Evidence 401-403 & 602;

to suppress and exclude from evidence at all stages of these proceedings:

1. All physical evidence seized from [LOCATION] on [DATE];
2. All statements allegedly made by Defendant subsequent to the unlawful [stop/search/arrest]; and
3. All derivative evidence ("fruit of the poisonous tree") obtained as a result thereof.

2. JURISDICTION & PROCEDURAL POSTURE

1. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties under Indiana Constitution Article 7 and Indiana Code § 33-28-1-2.
2. The indictment/information charges Defendant with [LIST CHARGES] alleged to have occurred on [DATE].
3. Trial is presently set for [TRIAL DATE]. Under Indiana Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.7(B), Defendant is filing this motion at least ten days before the scheduled jury trial to facilitate judicial economy; Defendant further preserves the right to a timely trial objection under the same rule if any issue raised herein is not fully resolved before trial.

3. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS

1. On [DATE] at approximately [TIME], Officer [NAME] conducted a traffic stop of Defendant's vehicle at [LOCATION] for an alleged [INFRACTION].
2. Without obtaining Defendant's consent and absent a warrant, officers searched the vehicle, discovering [DESCRIBE ITEMS].
3. The search occurred prior to a canine sniff, and no exigent circumstances existed.
4. Defendant was subsequently arrested and transported to [FACILITY], where officers interrogated Defendant after invoking the right to counsel.
5. The seized items and Defendant's statements form the basis of the State's case-in-chief.

4. ISSUES PRESENTED

A. Whether the warrantless search of Defendant's vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, § 11 of the Indiana Constitution.
B. Whether any probable-cause affidavit supporting the later-obtained warrant failed to establish probable cause, rendering the warrant facially deficient.
C. Whether the good-faith exception codified at Indiana Code § 35-37-4-5 applies under the facts of this case.
D. Whether all evidence and statements obtained, as well as their fruits, must be suppressed.

5. LEGAL ARGUMENT

5.1. The Warrantless Search Violated Federal and State Constitutions

1. A warrantless search is per se unreasonable unless it falls within a specifically established and well-delineated exception. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
2. Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution uses language nearly identical to the Fourth Amendment, but Indiana courts apply an independent state-constitutional analysis that turns on the reasonableness of police conduct under the totality of the circumstances, not on a federal-style expectation-of-privacy test. See Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 359-61 (Ind. 2005). Under Litchfield, the court weighs: (1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has occurred; (2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen's ordinary activities; and (3) the extent of law enforcement needs. Id. at 361.
3. The State bears the burden of demonstrating that an exception to the warrant requirement -- such as consent, the automobile exception, plain view, or exigency -- justifies the intrusion, and separately of showing that the search was reasonable under the Litchfield totality-of-the-circumstances factors. Here, neither showing can be made:
   a. Consent was neither sought nor obtained.
   b. Officers lacked probable cause of contraband prior to the search.
   c. No exigent circumstances existed because Defendant was detained and the vehicle secured.

5.2. The Warrant (If Any) Was Facially and Substantively Deficient

1. Probable cause requires a nexus between the alleged criminal activity and the place to be searched. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
2. The affidavit relied on conclusory allegations without underlying facts, failing the Gates standard and Indiana's particularity requirements for search warrants under Ind. Code § 35-33-5-2.
3. Because the issuing magistrate lacked a substantial basis for concluding that contraband would be found, the warrant is void.

5.3. The Statutory Good-Faith Exception Is Inapplicable

1. Indiana Code § 35-37-4-5(b)(1) permits admission of evidence where officers obtained it pursuant to a search warrant properly issued upon a determination of probable cause by a neutral and detached magistrate, free from obvious defects other than nondeliberate preparation errors, and reasonably believed valid by the officer -- or pursuant to a statute, judicial precedent, or court rule later declared unconstitutional or invalidated. This statutory exception under Article 1, § 11 is analytically distinct from, though generally consistent in result with, the federal good-faith exception recognized in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); counsel should brief each independently rather than assuming the two are interchangeable.

2. Good faith under either the federal Leon standard or Ind. Code § 35-37-4-5 fails when:
   a. The warrant is based on knowing or reckless falsehoods;
   b. The issuing magistrate acts as a mere rubber stamp; or
   c. The affidavit is so lacking in indicia of probable cause that belief in its existence is objectively unreasonable.

3. Given the glaring deficiencies outlined above, no reasonably well-trained officer could rely on the warrant; therefore, neither the statutory nor the federal good-faith exception saves the evidence.

4. Alternatively, if no warrant existed, § 35-37-4-5 does not apply at all, mandating suppression.

5.4. Exclusion of Fruits and Derivative Evidence

1. Under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, all evidence obtained by exploitation of the initial illegality, as well as the products thereof, must be suppressed. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963).
2. Defendant's post-arrest statements stem directly from the unlawful search and must also be excluded.

6. REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING

Pursuant to Indiana Rule of Evidence 104 and Indiana Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.7(B), Defendant respectfully requests an evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed factual issues and to allow examination of the officers involved.

7. CONCLUSION & PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Defendant prays that the Court:

1. Grant this Motion and suppress all evidence seized on [DATE] and all derivative evidence;
2. Suppress any and all statements allegedly made by Defendant that stem from the unlawful conduct;
3. Order the State to refrain from introducing such evidence at trial or any other proceeding; and
4. Grant all other just and proper relief.

Respectfully submitted,

_________________________________
[ATTORNEY NAME], # [BAR NO.]
[LAW FIRM NAME]
[ADDRESS]
[PHONE] | [EMAIL]
Counsel for Defendant

8. VERIFICATION

I, [DEFENDANT NAME], swear (affirm), under penalty of perjury as specified by Ind. Code § 35-44.1-2-1, that the foregoing representations are true, pursuant to the sworn-document form authorized by Ind. Code § 35-34-1-2.4.

_________________________________
[DEFENDANT NAME]
Date: ___________

9. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on [DATE], a copy of the foregoing Motion to Suppress was served via [E-FILING / HAND-DELIVERY / FIRST-CLASS MAIL] to:

[PROSECUTOR NAME]
[OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR ADDRESS]

_________________________________
[ATTORNEY NAME]

10. PROPOSED ORDER (Exhibit A)

IN THE [INSERT COUNTY] CIRCUIT/SUPERIOR COURT, COUNTY OF [____], STATE OF INDIANA

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS

The Court, having reviewed Defendant's Motion to Suppress, the State's response, the evidence presented, and the arguments of counsel, now finds as follows:

1. The warrantless search of Defendant's [vehicle/residence/person] on [DATE] violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution.
2. The good-faith exception under Ind. Code § 35-37-4-5 does not apply.
3. All evidence seized during the search, together with any statements or derivative evidence obtained thereafter, is inadmissible.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant's Motion is GRANTED. The State shall not introduce the suppressed evidence at any stage of this proceeding.

SO ORDERED this ___ day of __________, 20__.

_________________________________
Judge, [INSERT COUNTY] Circuit/Superior Court

Distribution:

• [Defense Counsel]
• [Prosecutor]