Pedestrian Accident Complaint - Vermont
PEDESTRIAN ACCIDENT COMPLAINT — VERMONT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
- Caption
- Parties, Jurisdiction, and Venue
- General Factual Allegations
- Count I — Negligence (Against Defendant Driver)
- Count II — Negligence Per Se (Crosswalk / Yield)
- Count III — Negligent Entrustment / Vicarious Liability (Against Defendant Owner)
- Damages
- Comparative-Fault and UM/UIM Note
- Prayer for Relief
- Jury Demand
- Reservation of Rights
- Signature and Service Blocks
- Initial Service of Process
- Vermont Practice Notes
- Sources and References
1. CAPTION
STATE OF VERMONT
SUPERIOR COURT, CIVIL DIVISION
[COUNTY] UNIT — DOCKET NO. [________]
| Party | Role |
|---|---|
| [PLAINTIFF'S FULL LEGAL NAME], | Plaintiff |
| v. | |
| [DEFENDANT DRIVER'S FULL LEGAL NAME], and | Defendant |
| [DEFENDANT OWNER / EMPLOYER'S FULL LEGAL NAME], | Defendant |
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES (PEDESTRIAN COLLISION)
JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
Plaintiff, by and through undersigned counsel, complaining of Defendants, alleges as follows:
2. PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE
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Plaintiff [PLAINTIFF NAME] ("Plaintiff") is an adult resident of [TOWN], [COUNTY] County, Vermont, and at all material times was lawfully present as a pedestrian upon or alongside the public highways of this State.
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Defendant [DRIVER NAME] ("Driver Defendant") is, upon information and belief, an adult resident of [TOWN / STATE] and may be served with process at [SERVICE ADDRESS] pursuant to Rule 4, V.R.C.P.
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Defendant [OWNER / EMPLOYER NAME] ("Owner Defendant") is [an individual / a corporation / an LLC] that, at all material times, owned, controlled, leased, and/or maintained the vehicle operated by Driver Defendant and/or employed Driver Defendant. Owner Defendant may be served at [SERVICE ADDRESS / REGISTERED AGENT].
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This action arises under Vermont common law and statute for personal injuries sustained when a motor vehicle struck Plaintiff, a pedestrian, in [COUNTY] County, Vermont, on [__/__/____].
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Subject-matter jurisdiction is proper in this Superior Court, Civil Division, pursuant to 4 V.S.A. § 31, as the claims sound in tort and the amount in controversy is within this Court's jurisdiction.
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Venue is proper in this Unit under 12 V.S.A. § 402(a) because [Plaintiff resides in this Unit / Defendant resides in this Unit / neither party resides in Vermont].
3. GENERAL FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
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On [__/__/____] at approximately [TIME], Plaintiff was lawfully crossing / walking [DESCRIBE — e.g., within the marked crosswalk at the intersection of ___ and ___; within an unmarked crosswalk at the intersection of ___; along the shoulder of ___ facing oncoming traffic], in [TOWN], Vermont (the "Collision").
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At the same time and place, Driver Defendant was operating a [YEAR / MAKE / MODEL] [passenger vehicle / pickup truck / SUV / commercial vehicle] owned by Owner Defendant, traveling [direction] on [ROADWAY].
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[Where applicable] A traffic-control or pedestrian-control signal [displayed "WALK" in Plaintiff's direction of travel / displayed a green light for Plaintiff / was not in operation], and Plaintiff had the right-of-way and was crossing within the crosswalk.
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Traffic, lighting, and weather conditions were [describe — e.g., clear, dry, daylight; or dusk / nighttime, with Plaintiff in or near a marked crosswalk].
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The Collision occurred when Driver Defendant [SELECT / DESCRIBE THE MANNER — e.g., failed to yield by slowing or stopping for Plaintiff in the crosswalk; turned left or right across the crosswalk into Plaintiff's path; failed to keep a proper lookout and struck Plaintiff; traveled at an excessive or unsafe speed; was distracted by a mobile device; passed a vehicle stopped at the crosswalk to let Plaintiff cross].
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Plaintiff was plainly visible to Driver Defendant, who failed to see Plaintiff in time, misjudged the situation, and/or failed to exercise the due care that Vermont law requires of every driver to avoid colliding with a pedestrian.
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Plaintiff was exercising reasonable care for Plaintiff's own safety at all material times. At no time did Plaintiff do, or fail to do, anything that proximately caused or contributed to the Collision.
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As a direct and proximate result of the Collision, Plaintiff — an unprotected pedestrian struck by the mass and force of a motor vehicle — sustained severe, painful, and permanent bodily injuries, including but not limited to [LIST INJURIES — e.g., orthopedic fractures, traumatic brain injury, spinal injury, internal injuries, degloving / road rash, and disfiguring scarring].
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Because a pedestrian has no structural protection, restraint system, or crumple zone, the forces of the Collision caused Plaintiff to suffer catastrophic injuries materially more severe than those typically sustained by occupants of vehicles.
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Plaintiff received emergency care at [HOSPITAL / EMS PROVIDER] and has since undergone [SURGERIES / HOSPITALIZATION / REHABILITATION / ONGOING TREATMENT], and will require future medical care.
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All injuries and damages alleged were the foreseeable, natural, and probable consequence of Defendants' conduct.
4. COUNT I — NEGLIGENCE (Against Defendant Driver)
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Plaintiff realleges and incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 17 as if fully set forth herein.
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Driver Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty to exercise reasonable care in the operation of a motor vehicle, to obey the Vermont rules of the road, to keep a proper lookout for pedestrians, to yield the right-of-way to a pedestrian lawfully within a crosswalk, and to refrain from conduct endangering pedestrians upon or near the highway.
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Driver Defendant breached that duty by, among other things:
- Failing to yield the right-of-way, by slowing down or stopping if necessary, to Plaintiff, a pedestrian crossing within a crosswalk;
- Failing to keep a proper and careful lookout for pedestrians;
- Operating the vehicle at a speed greater than was reasonable and prudent for the conditions and the presence of pedestrians;
- Driving while distracted, inattentive, or impaired;
- Failing to exercise due care to avoid colliding with a pedestrian and to sound a warning when necessary;
- Overtaking and passing a vehicle stopped at a crosswalk to permit a pedestrian to cross; and
- Failing to take reasonable evasive action to avoid striking Plaintiff.
- Each of the foregoing acts and omissions, separately and in combination, was a direct and proximate cause of the Collision and of Plaintiff's injuries and damages described in Section 7 below.
5. COUNT II — NEGLIGENCE PER SE (Crosswalk / Yield)
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Plaintiff realleges and incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 21 as if fully set forth herein.
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The Vermont rules of the road impose specific statutory duties on Driver Defendant for the protection of pedestrians such as Plaintiff. These include, as applicable to the manner of the Collision:
- 23 V.S.A. § 1051(a) — if traffic-control signals are not in operation, the driver of a vehicle shall yield the right of way, slowing down or stopping if necessary, to a pedestrian crossing the roadway within a crosswalk;
- 23 V.S.A. § 1051(c) — if any vehicle is stopped at a marked crosswalk, or at any unmarked crosswalk at an intersection, to permit a pedestrian to cross the roadway, the driver of any other vehicle approaching from the rear may not overtake and pass the stopped vehicle; and
- 23 V.S.A. § 1057 — whenever a pedestrian crossing or attempting to cross is guided by a guide dog or carrying a white (or white-tipped red) cane in a raised or extended position, the driver of every approaching vehicle shall bring the vehicle to a full stop and take such precautions as may be necessary to avoid injuring the pedestrian.
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Plaintiff is within the class of persons the foregoing statutes were enacted to protect, and the Collision is the type of harm those statutes were designed to prevent.
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Driver Defendant violated [CITE THE SPECIFIC SECTION(S) APPLICABLE], and was cited for [TRAFFIC CITATION, IF ANY]. Given Defendant's existing duty to Plaintiff, a violation of an applicable safety statute supplies a rebuttable presumption of negligence and shifts the burden of production to Defendant. Defendant's conduct directly and proximately caused Plaintiff's injuries and damages.
6. COUNT III — NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT / VICARIOUS LIABILITY (Against Defendant Owner)
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Plaintiff realleges and incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 25 as if fully set forth herein.
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Owner Defendant entrusted the subject vehicle to Driver Defendant when Owner Defendant knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that Driver Defendant was an incompetent, inexperienced, reckless, or otherwise unfit driver.
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Alternatively, at the time of the Collision, Driver Defendant was operating the vehicle as the agent, servant, or employee of Owner Defendant and within the scope of that agency or employment, rendering Owner Defendant vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
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Owner Defendant's negligent entrustment and/or vicarious liability was a direct and proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries and damages.
7. DAMAGES
- As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff has suffered and seeks recovery of the following:
- Past and future medical expenses — emergency, ambulance, hospital, surgical, diagnostic, rehabilitative, pharmaceutical, and physician care;
- Future medical and life care — anticipated surgeries, therapy, assistive devices, prosthetics, and long-term or attendant care, to be proven at trial;
- Lost wages and diminished earning capacity — past lost income and the permanent impairment of Plaintiff's ability to earn;
- Physical pain, suffering, and mental anguish — past and future;
- Permanent physical impairment and disfigurement, including scarring from road rash and surgical intervention;
- Loss of enjoyment of life; and
- Property damage to Plaintiff's personal effects, as applicable.
- Plaintiff pleads each category of damage separately and in the alternative.
8. COMPARATIVE-FAULT AND UM/UIM NOTE
- A pedestrian struck by a motor vehicle is an "insured" entitled to recover under the pedestrian's own (and a resident relative's) uninsured/underinsured-motorist (UM/UIM) coverage under 23 V.S.A. § 941 et seq., even though the pedestrian was not occupying a vehicle. UM coverage also responds to a hit-and-run / phantom vehicle. Plaintiff reserves all rights under any applicable UM/UIM coverage and will comply with the notice, consent-to-settle, and subrogation provisions of any such policy.
9. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully demands judgment against Defendants in the amounts and shares permitted by applicable law, as follows:
- A. Compensatory damages in an amount to be determined by the trier of fact;
- B. Pre-judgment and post-judgment interest as allowed by law;
- C. Costs of this action; and
- D. Such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
10. JURY DEMAND
Plaintiff demands trial by jury on all issues so triable as a matter of right, pursuant to Rule 38, V.R.C.P.
11. RESERVATION OF RIGHTS
Plaintiff reserves the right to amend this Complaint to add or substitute parties, to assert additional claims (including a claim of gross negligence under 23 V.S.A. § 1091 where supported by the evidence), and to conform the pleadings to the evidence as discovery proceeds. Plaintiff specifically denies any comparative negligence on Plaintiff's part.
12. SIGNATURE AND SERVICE BLOCKS
Dated at [TOWN], Vermont, this [____] day of [MONTH], 20[____].
/s/ [________________________________]
[ATTORNEY NAME] (ERN/Bar No. [________])
[LAW FIRM NAME]
Attorney for Plaintiff
[STREET ADDRESS]
[CITY, STATE ZIP]
Telephone: [NUMBER]
Email: [EMAIL]
13. INITIAL SERVICE OF PROCESS
Arrange service of the summons and this Complaint together on each Defendant under V.R.C.P. 4, using the authorized method applicable to that Defendant. Document completed service separately. The plaintiff, whether represented or self-represented, must also serve a blank Answer and blank Notice of Appearance for Self-Represented Litigant with the summons and complaint.
14. VERMONT PRACTICE NOTES
- Statute of limitations. Personal-injury actions in Vermont must generally be commenced within three years of accrual. 12 V.S.A. § 512(4). Confirm the accrual date and any tolling (e.g., minority, discovery rule) before filing.
- Modified comparative negligence — the central issue. Under 12 V.S.A. § 1036, contributory negligence does not bar recovery so long as the plaintiff's causal negligence is "not greater than" the causal total negligence of the defendant(s) — i.e., 50% or less. Damages are diminished in proportion to the plaintiff's share of fault. A plaintiff whose fault exceeds 50% recovers nothing. The defense bears the burden of proving comparative negligence. In a pedestrian case, fault allocation is often outcome-determinative; frame the plaintiff's lawful, careful crossing carefully. For allocation among multiple defendants, see Kilburn v. Simmon, 2025 VT 32, ¶ 41 (discussing the reach of § 1036 when the plaintiff is not comparatively negligent).
- Crosswalk / yield statutes — and the repealed due-care section. 23 V.S.A. § 1051 requires a driver to yield (slow or stop) to a pedestrian crossing within a crosswalk when signals are not in operation, and bars passing a vehicle stopped for a pedestrian; § 1057 requires a full stop for a pedestrian guided by a guide dog or carrying a white/white-tipped cane. The former standalone "drivers to exercise due care toward pedestrians" provision (23 V.S.A. § 1053) was REPEALED (2009, No. 114 (Adj. Sess.), § 8) — do not cite a current § 1053. The driver's general due-care duty toward pedestrians now rests on common-law negligence (Count I) and the negligent-operation statute, 23 V.S.A. § 1091. The reciprocal pedestrian duties — § 1051(b) (no sudden "dart out"), § 1052 (yield when crossing outside a marked crosswalk), § 1058 (obey traffic-control devices) — supply the defense's comparative-fault theory.
- Gross / negligent operation. Where the facts support it, plead the driver's conduct specifically; 23 V.S.A. § 1091 distinguishes negligent from grossly negligent operation. Gross negligence alone does not justify punitive damages. A punitive claim requires facts showing outrageously reprehensible conduct and malice; for reckless conduct, the driver must have consciously disregarded a known, substantial, and intolerable risk with knowledge that harm was substantially certain to result. Fly Fish Vermont, Inc. v. Chapin Hill Estates, Inc., 2010 VT 33, ¶¶ 17–18, 25.
- UM/UIM and hit-and-run. A pedestrian is an "insured" who may recover under their own (and a resident relative's) UM/UIM coverage under 23 V.S.A. § 941 et seq. and against a hit-and-run / phantom vehicle. Promptly identify and notify every applicable policy, preserve the UM/UIM claim, and comply with consent-to-settle / subrogation procedures before resolving the liability claim.
- Court and service. Civil tort actions are filed in the Superior Court, Civil Division. Service is governed by Rule 4, V.R.C.P.; out-of-state defendants may be served under Vermont's long-arm provisions (12 V.S.A. § 913).
15. SOURCES AND REFERENCES
- Vermont Statutes Online (Title 12 — Court Procedure; Title 23 — Motor Vehicles) — https://legislature.vermont.gov/statutes/
- 12 V.S.A. § 512 (limitations) — https://legislature.vermont.gov/statutes/section/12/023/00512
- 12 V.S.A. § 1036 (comparative negligence) — https://legislature.vermont.gov/statutes/section/12/027/01036
- 23 V.S.A. § 1051 (pedestrians' right of way in crosswalks) — https://legislature.vermont.gov/statutes/section/23/013/01051
- 23 V.S.A. § 1052 (crossing except at crosswalks); § 1057 (duty toward persons who are blind); § 1058 (duties of pedestrians)
- 23 V.S.A. § 1053 — REPEALED, 2009, No. 114 (Adj. Sess.), § 8 (former "drivers to exercise due care"; do not cite as current)
- 23 V.S.A. § 1091 (negligent operation; grossly negligent operation)
- 23 V.S.A. § 941 et seq. (uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage)
- Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules 4, 8, 38)
- Kilburn v. Simmon, 2025 VT 32, ¶ 41 — https://www.vermontjudiciary.org/media/19139
- Fly Fish Vermont, Inc. v. Chapin Hill Estates, Inc., 2010 VT 33, ¶¶ 17–18, 25 — https://www.vermontjudiciary.org/sites/default/files/documents/2007-476.pdf
Disclaimer: This template is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. An attorney licensed in Vermont must review and customize this document before filing. Laws, citations, and court rules change frequently; verify all authorities before use.
About this template
- Last updated
- October 28, 2026
- Jurisdiction
- Vermont
- Category
- Personal Injury
Legal authority
- 12 V.S.A. § 512(4) (three-year statute of limitations for injuries to the person)
- 12 V.S.A. § 1036 (modified comparative negligence; 51% bar)
- 4 V.S.A. § 31 (Superior Court jurisdiction)
- 12 V.S.A. § 402 (venue in civil actions)
- 23 V.S.A. § 1051 (pedestrians' right of way in crosswalks; driver to yield)
- 23 V.S.A. § 1052 (pedestrian crossing except at crosswalks to yield)
- 23 V.S.A. § 1057 (driver's duty toward persons who are blind)
- 23 V.S.A. § 1058 (duties of pedestrians — obedience to traffic-control devices)
- 23 V.S.A. § 1091 (negligent operation; grossly negligent operation)
- 23 V.S.A. § 941 et seq. (uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage)
Personal injury cases are brought by people who were hurt because of someone else's carelessness: car crashes, slip and falls, defective products, and more. Demand letters, settlement agreements, and court filings in these cases have to document the injuries, the medical treatment, the lost income, and the exact legal basis for holding the other side responsible. Well-prepared paperwork is what drives higher settlements and forces insurers to take the claim seriously.
Not legal advice
This template is provided for informational purposes. We recommend having an attorney review any legal document before signing, especially for high-value or complex matters.
Checked against the law it cites
The statutes this template relies on are listed under Legal authority.
Sheldon v. Ruggiero, 2018 VT 125, ¶¶ 24–25 (checked October 30, 2026): "Where a party has an existing legal duty to another, a safety statute may serve as rebuttable evidence that the defendant breached the applicable standard of care, thereby shifting the burden of production to the defendant."
12 V.S.A. § 1036(a) (checked October 28, 2026): "Where recovery is allowed against more than one defendant, each defendant shall be liable for that proportion of the total dollar amount awarded as damages in the ratio of the amount of the defendant’s causal negligence to the amount of causal negligence attributed to all defendants against whom recovery is allowed."
Fly Fish Vermont, Inc. v. Chapin Hill Estates, Inc., 2010 VT 33, ¶¶ 17–18, 25 (checked October 26, 2026): "Despite defendants’ generally reckless violation of the permit conditions imposed for the protection of plaintiffs’ pond, we agree the record cannot support a punitive award given the absence of outrageously reprehensible conduct and the lack of actual or legal malice towards plaintiffs."
Kilburn v. Simmon, 2025 VT 32, ¶ 41 (checked October 24, 2026): "Our case law suggests that § 1036 may not apply where, as here, the plaintiff is not alleged to be contributorily negligent."
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