Pedestrian Accident Complaint - New York

PEDESTRIAN ACCIDENT COMPLAINT — NEW YORK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Caption
2. Parties
3. Jurisdiction and Venue
4. Relevant Statutory Framework (No-Fault and the Serious-Injury Threshold)
5. General Allegations (Accident Facts)
6. First Cause of Action — Negligence (Against Driver-Defendant)
7. Second Cause of Action — Negligence Per Se (Against Driver-Defendant)
8. Third Cause of Action — Statutory Owner Liability / Respondeat Superior (Against Owner-Defendant)
9. Damages
10. Comparative Fault, Serious-Injury Threshold, and Insurance Allegations
11. Jury Demand
12. Prayer for Relief
13. Signature Block
14. Verification
15. New York Practice Notes
16. Sources and References

1. CAPTION

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

COUNTY OF [COUNTY]

Index No.: [________________]

VERIFIED COMPLAINT (PEDESTRIAN COLLISION)

Jury Trial Demanded

Plaintiff, by [his/her/their] attorneys, [LAW FIRM NAME], complaining of the Defendants, alleges upon knowledge as to Plaintiff and Plaintiff's own acts, and upon information and belief as to all other matters, as follows:

2. PARTIES

1. At all relevant times, Plaintiff [PLAINTIFF NAME] ("Plaintiff") was and is a resident of the County of [COUNTY], State of New York, and at all material times was lawfully traveling on foot as a pedestrian upon the public ways of this State.

2. Upon information and belief, Defendant [DRIVER NAME] ("Driver-Defendant") was and is a resident of the County of [COUNTY], State of [STATE].

3. Upon information and belief, Defendant [OWNER / EMPLOYER NAME] ("Owner-Defendant") [is a resident of / is a business entity organized under the laws of] the State of [STATE] with its principal place of business at [ADDRESS], and at all material times owned, maintained, and/or controlled the vehicle operated by Driver-Defendant and/or employed Driver-Defendant.

3. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

4. This Court has jurisdiction over the Defendants pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 301 and § 302 because the Defendants reside in, transact business in, and/or committed a tortious act within the State of New York.

5. Venue is proper in this County pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 503 because one or more parties resided in this County when the action was commenced. [If no party then resided in New York, plead Plaintiff's county designation; check special venue statutes.]

6. The amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts that would otherwise have jurisdiction.

4. RELEVANT STATUTORY FRAMEWORK (No-Fault and the Serious-Injury Threshold)

7. This action arises from a motor-vehicle collision and is governed by New York common-law tort principles, the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law, and the No-Fault Law (Ins. Law art. 51).

8. At all material times Plaintiff was a pedestrian struck by a motor vehicle. Under N.Y. Insurance Law § 5102(j), a pedestrian injured through the use or operation of a motor vehicle is a "covered person." As a covered person, Plaintiff is entitled to first-party (no-fault/PIP) benefits under Ins. Law § 5103 from the insurer of the vehicle that struck [him/her/them], up to the statutory basic-economic-loss limit, regardless of fault.

9. Because Plaintiff is a "covered person," Plaintiff may maintain this action for non-economic loss (pain and suffering) only upon a showing that Plaintiff sustained a "serious injury" within the meaning of N.Y. Insurance Law § 5102(d), as required by § 5104(a). Plaintiff alleges that [he/she/they] sustained a serious injury, as set forth in Paragraph 17 and Section 10 below.

5. GENERAL ALLEGATIONS (Accident Facts)

10. On [__/__/____] at approximately [TIME], Plaintiff was lawfully crossing [ROADWAY] [within a marked crosswalk / within an unmarked crosswalk at the intersection with [CROSS STREET] / with the WALK signal at the intersection of [STREETS]], in [CITY/TOWN], County of [COUNTY], State of New York (the "Collision").

11. At the same time and place, Driver-Defendant was operating a [YEAR, MAKE, MODEL, PLATE NO.] [passenger vehicle / pickup truck / SUV / commercial vehicle] ("Defendant's Vehicle"), owned by Owner-Defendant, traveling [DIRECTION] on [ROADWAY].

12. Traffic, lighting, and weather conditions were [describe — e.g., clear, dry, daylight; dusk; nighttime with street lighting], and Plaintiff was [plainly visible / within the driver's unobstructed line of sight / had the pedestrian right of way].

13. Defendant(s) operated, maintained, and controlled Defendant's Vehicle negligently, carelessly, and recklessly, and the Collision occurred when Driver-Defendant [SELECT / DESCRIBE THE MANNER OF COLLISION — e.g., failed to yield the right of way to Plaintiff crossing in the crosswalk; turned left or right across the crosswalk into Plaintiff's path while Plaintiff had the walk signal; failed to keep a proper lookout for pedestrians; was traveling at an excessive or unsafe speed; was distracted; failed to stop or slow despite Plaintiff being plainly visible] and struck Plaintiff.

14. Although Plaintiff was plainly visible and crossing with the right of way, Driver-Defendant "looked but failed to see" Plaintiff, failed to slow down or stop, and failed to exercise the due care required of a driver to avoid colliding with a pedestrian.

15. Plaintiff was crossing in a lawful and prudent manner and was exercising due care for [his/her/their] own safety at all material times.

16. As a direct and proximate result of the Collision, Plaintiff — an unprotected pedestrian with no vehicle structure, restraint system, or crumple zone to absorb the forces of impact — was struck, thrown, and/or dragged, and sustained severe, painful, and permanent personal injuries.

17. Plaintiff sustained a "serious injury" within the meaning of N.Y. Insurance Law § 5102(d), including but not limited to [SELECT THE APPLICABLE § 5102(d) CATEGORY/CATEGORIES — e.g., a fracture; significant disfigurement; permanent loss of use of a body organ, member, function or system; permanent consequential limitation of use; or significant limitation of use of a body function or system], consisting of [LIST INJURIES — e.g., traumatic brain injury, skull and orthopedic fractures, spinal cord injury, internal organ injuries, crush and degloving injuries, and disfiguring scarring].

18. Plaintiff received emergency care at [HOSPITAL / EMS PROVIDER] and has since undergone [SURGERIES / HOSPITALIZATION / REHABILITATION / ONGOING TREATMENT], and will require future medical care.

6. FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION — NEGLIGENCE (Against Driver-Defendant)

19. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each of the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

20. Driver-Defendant owed Plaintiff a duty to operate Defendant's Vehicle in a reasonably safe manner, in compliance with applicable statutes, regulations, and the common law, to yield the right of way to a pedestrian crossing within a crosswalk, to keep a proper lookout for pedestrians, and to exercise due care to avoid colliding with any pedestrian.

21. Driver-Defendant breached that duty by, among other things:

• Failing to yield the right of way to Plaintiff, a pedestrian crossing within a crosswalk;
• Failing to keep a proper and careful lookout for pedestrians, including Plaintiff;
• Failing to exercise due care to avoid colliding with a pedestrian as required by law;
• Failing to slow down or stop when need be to yield to and avoid striking Plaintiff;
• Turning across the path of, or into, the crosswalk occupied by Plaintiff;
• Operating Defendant's Vehicle at an unlawful and/or unsafe speed for the conditions;
• Driving while distracted or inattentive;
• Failing to sound the horn or give warning when necessary; and
• Failing to maintain proper control of Defendant's Vehicle.

22. Driver-Defendant's negligence was a direct and proximate cause of the Collision and of Plaintiff's resulting injuries and damages.

7. SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION — NEGLIGENCE PER SE (Against Driver-Defendant)

23. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each of the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

24. The New York Vehicle and Traffic Law imposes specific duties on Driver-Defendant for the protection of pedestrians lawfully using the roadway, including Plaintiff. These include, as applicable to the manner of the Collision:

• VTL § 1151(a) — when traffic-control signals are not in place or not in operation, the driver of a vehicle shall yield the right of way, slowing down or stopping if need be to so yield, to a pedestrian crossing the roadway within a crosswalk on the roadway upon which the vehicle is traveling;
• VTL § 1151(c) — when a vehicle is stopped at a marked or unmarked crosswalk to permit a pedestrian to cross, a driver approaching from the rear shall not overtake and pass the stopped vehicle;
• VTL § 1146 — every driver of a vehicle shall exercise due care to avoid colliding with any pedestrian upon any roadway, and shall give warning by sounding the horn when necessary; and
• VTL § 1111 / NYC Traffic Rules § 4-04 (where applicable) — a driver turning on a green or steady signal shall yield the right of way to a pedestrian lawfully within the crosswalk.

25. Plaintiff is within the class of persons the foregoing statutes were enacted to protect — pedestrians upon the roadway — and the Collision is precisely the type of harm those statutes were designed to prevent.

26. Driver-Defendant violated [CITE THE SPECIFIC SECTION(S) APPLICABLE], and was issued a summons for [TRAFFIC CITATION, IF ANY]. Under New York law, an unexcused violation of a statute imposing a clear legal duty (such as the Vehicle and Traffic Law) constitutes negligence per se, and such violation was a direct and proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries and damages.

8. THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION — STATUTORY OWNER LIABILITY / RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR (Against Owner-Defendant)

27. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each of the foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

28. At all relevant times, Owner-Defendant was the owner of Defendant's Vehicle within the meaning of VTL § 388(1), and Driver-Defendant operated Defendant's Vehicle with the express or implied permission and consent of Owner-Defendant.

29. Pursuant to VTL § 388, Owner-Defendant is vicariously liable for the negligence of any person operating Defendant's Vehicle with permission, including Driver-Defendant.

30. Alternatively, at the time of the Collision Driver-Defendant was acting within the course and scope of [his/her/their] employment with Owner-Defendant, rendering Owner-Defendant liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

31. Owner-Defendant's statutory and/or vicarious liability was a direct and proximate cause of Plaintiff's injuries and damages.

9. DAMAGES

32. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' negligence, Plaintiff has sustained and seeks recovery of:

• Past and future medical, hospital, surgical, rehabilitative, and related expenses (to the extent not constituting basic economic loss recoverable as no-fault benefits, and including economic loss in excess of the basic-economic-loss limit);
• Future medical and life care — anticipated surgeries, therapy, assistive devices, and long-term and attendant care, to be proven at trial;
• Past and future loss of earnings and impairment of earning capacity (including loss in excess of the no-fault limit);
• Physical pain, suffering, and mental anguish — past and future (non-economic loss, predicated on the serious injury alleged in ¶ 17);
• Permanent personal injury, physical impairment, and disfigurement, including scarring from impact and surgical intervention;
• Loss of enjoyment of life; and
• Property damage to clothing, mobility devices, and personal effects.

33. Except as may be limited by N.Y. Ins. Law § 5104(d) (a narrow $100,000 non-economic-damages cap applicable only where the injured claimant is at fault and was uninsured/impaired/committing a felony), no other statutory cap limits Plaintiff's damages under current New York law.

34. Pursuant to C.P.L.R. § 3017(c), Plaintiff does not state a specific dollar amount but alleges that the damages sought exceed the jurisdictional limits of all lower courts that would otherwise have jurisdiction.

10. COMPARATIVE FAULT, SERIOUS-INJURY THRESHOLD, AND INSURANCE ALLEGATIONS

35. Any culpable conduct attributable to Plaintiff, including comparative fault, is governed by N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1411 and, to the extent Plaintiff's culpable conduct is not greater than the culpable conduct of Defendant(s), shall diminish the recovery only in proportion to such fault, without barring recovery.

36. Plaintiff has sustained a "serious injury" within the meaning of N.Y. Insurance Law § 5102(d), and Plaintiff's claim for non-economic loss is properly maintained under § 5104(a). (See ¶¶ 9, 17.)

37. Where the at-fault driver was uninsured or unidentified (including a hit-and-run), or the available liability coverage is inadequate, Plaintiff has complied with, or will comply with, all conditions precedent applicable to any claim against the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (MVAIC) under N.Y. Insurance Law art. 52, and/or to any uninsured/underinsured/supplementary uninsured motorist (SUM) coverage available to Plaintiff under any policy under which Plaintiff is an insured, and reserves all rights against the applicable carrier and/or MVAIC.

11. JURY DEMAND

Plaintiff demands a trial by jury on all issues so triable as of right, pursuant to N.Y. Const. art. I, § 2 and C.P.L.R. § 4102.

12. PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against the Defendants, jointly and severally, as follows:

• A. On the First Cause of Action, for compensatory damages in an amount to be determined by a jury;
• B. On the Second Cause of Action, for compensatory damages as determined by a jury;
• C. On the Third Cause of Action (if pled), for judgment against Owner-Defendant under VTL § 388 and/or respondeat superior;
• D. For pre-judgment interest as permitted by law;
• E. For costs and disbursements of this action, including statutory fees; and
• F. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

13. SIGNATURE BLOCK

Dated: [CITY], New York

[__/__/____]

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ [________________________________]

[ATTORNEY NAME], Esq.

[LAW FIRM NAME]

Attorneys for Plaintiff

[STREET ADDRESS]

[CITY, NY ZIP]

Telephone: [NUMBER]

Email: [EMAIL]

14. VERIFICATION

STATE OF NEW YORK

COUNTY OF [COUNTY]

[PLAINTIFF NAME], being duly sworn, deposes and says: I am the Plaintiff in the within action; I have read the foregoing VERIFIED COMPLAINT and know the contents thereof; the same is true to my own knowledge, except as to the matters therein stated to be alleged upon information and belief, and as to those matters I believe them to be true.

[________________________________]

[PLAINTIFF NAME], Plaintiff

Sworn to before me this [____] day of [_______________], 20[____].

[________________________________]

Notary Public

15. NEW YORK PRACTICE NOTES

• Statute of limitations. Personal-injury actions must be commenced within three years of accrual. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). Wrongful-death actions (common in pedestrian fatalities) carry a two-year period (EPTL § 5-4.1). Claims against a municipality (e.g., a city-owned vehicle, or a dangerous-roadway/defective-crosswalk-signal claim) require a Notice of Claim within 90 days (General Municipal Law § 50-e) and a one-year-and-90-day limitations period.
• Comparative negligence — MODIFIED, not pure, for this claim. C.P.L.R. § 1411(a) states New York's general PURE comparative negligence rule (fault reduces but never bars recovery). However, because a struck pedestrian's claim is a personal-injury action subject to Insurance Law Article 51 (see below), CPLR § 1411(b) (added by Chapter 58, Laws of 2026, Part EE, eff. 5/26/2026) applies instead: Plaintiff's culpable conduct BARS recovery if greater than the culpable conduct of Defendant(s). Comparative fault remains an affirmative defense the defendant must plead and prove (C.P.L.R. § 1412). Confirm the accident/commencement date against the effective date. Pedestrian-fault arguments (mid-block crossing, against the signal, darting out) are relevant to this fault allocation.
• PEDESTRIAN IS A "COVERED PERSON" — NO-FAULT AND THE THRESHOLD (the central distinction; OPPOSITE of the motorcycle rule). A pedestrian struck by a motor vehicle is a "covered person" (Ins. Law § 5102(j)). The pedestrian (1) collects first-party no-fault/PIP benefits from the striking vehicle's insurer under § 5103 (basic economic loss up to $50,000), and (2) MUST clear the § 5102(d) "serious injury" threshold to recover non-economic damages (§ 5104(a)). Plead a § 5102(d) category (see ¶ 17). Effective May 26, 2026, only EIGHT categories remain (the 90/180-day category was repealed): death; dismemberment; significant disfigurement; a fracture; loss of a fetus; permanent loss of use; permanent consequential limitation; and significant limitation of use.
• Driver's crosswalk-yield duty. VTL § 1151 requires a driver to yield (slowing or stopping if need be) to a pedestrian crossing within a crosswalk when signals are absent or not operating, and prohibits overtaking a vehicle stopped at a crosswalk for a pedestrian. This is the primary negligence-per-se predicate.
• Driver's general due-care duty. VTL § 1146 imposes a duty on every driver to exercise due care to avoid colliding with any pedestrian and to sound the horn when necessary — the key predicate in mid-block and non-crosswalk cases. In New York City, NYC Traffic Rules § 4-04 imposes additional yielding duties (note: a municipal rule violation is "some evidence" of negligence, not negligence per se).
• Pedestrian's own duties. VTL § 1152 requires a pedestrian crossing outside a crosswalk to yield to vehicles, and VTL § 1151(b) prohibits suddenly leaving a curb into a vehicle's path. Anticipate these as comparative-fault arguments.
• Owner liability. VTL § 388 imposes vicarious liability on the owner of a vehicle for the negligence of a permissive user — a key avenue to reach an owner's coverage (e.g., a rental, fleet, or employer vehicle).
• MVAIC / hit-and-run. Where the striking vehicle was uninsured or unidentified and no household auto policy applies, a qualified pedestrian may pursue no-fault and bodily-injury recovery through MVAIC (Ins. Law art. 52); deadlines are short — act promptly.
• Procedure. Damages amount is not specified (C.P.L.R. § 3017(c)). Jury demand under C.P.L.R. § 4102; venue under C.P.L.R. § 503; verification under C.P.L.R. § 3020; commencement by filing (C.P.L.R. § 304); service under C.P.L.R. art. 3.

16. SOURCES AND REFERENCES

• McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York (CPLR; Insurance Law; Vehicle and Traffic Law) — https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws
• C.P.L.R. § 214 (three-year limitations); § 1411, § 1412 (comparative negligence); § 3017(c), § 3020 (pleading/verification)
• N.Y. Ins. Law § 5102 (definitions; "covered person" § 5102(j); "serious injury" § 5102(d)) — https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/ISC/5102
• N.Y. Ins. Law § 5103 (first-party no-fault benefits) — https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/ISC/5103
• N.Y. Ins. Law § 5104 (threshold for non-economic loss) — https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/ISC/5104
• N.Y. Ins. Law art. 52 (MVAIC — uninsured/hit-and-run)
• N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1151 (pedestrians' right of way in crosswalks) — https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/VAT/1151
• N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1146 (drivers to exercise due care); § 1152 (crossing other than at crosswalk)
• N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 388 (owner liability)
• N.Y. Pattern Jury Instructions — Civil (PJI) (Motor Vehicle; Comparative Fault; Serious Injury; Vehicle and Traffic Law violations)

Disclaimer: This template is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. An attorney licensed in New York must review and customize this document before filing. Laws, citations, and court rules change frequently; verify all authorities before use.