Venue for ERISA benefit claims

P/OPINION 75-133


                                                       502✓
                                                       502 (e)
                                                       514

                        October 15, 1975

Dear           :

I am writing in reply to your letter of September 11,
1975, in which you requested the views of the
Department of Labor with respect to a venue issue
raised in the above captioned case, which was originally
brought, in part, under the provisions of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). We
understand that plaintiff has filed an amended complaint
in an attempt to lay jurisdiction on the grounds of
diversity of citizenship.

The question whether the venue of this action may be
properly laid in the district of plaintiff's residence
(assuming that this is not a district in which the
plan is administered, where any defendant resides
or may be found, or where the breach took place or
the claim arose, as specified in 29 U.S.C. 1132 (e)(2)
or 28 U.S.C. 1391 (b)) involves inquiries as to the
source of the court's jurisdiction, the nature of the
claim asserted by the plaintiff, and the extent to which
federal law has preempted state law with respect to such
a claim.

As you know, section 502(a) of ERISA provides a broad
range of possible civil enforcement opportunities; and
section 502(e) contains the special jurisdiction and
venue provisions applicable to actions under Title I
of the statute. With respect to such Title I actions,
it is our view that the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 1391(a)
have no application, since in such a case the court's
jurisdiction could not be "found only on diversity
of citizenship" (emphasis added). The use of the
words "only" in section 1391 (a) and "solely" in
1391(b) imply to us that subsection (a) venue is limited
to claims based, or which at least plaintiff would be
free to base, upon State law. A pre-ERISA claim for
benefits from an employee benefit plan by an alleged
participant in the plan would no doubt be such a claim.
A post-ERISA claim would not, in our opinion.
2


P/OPINION 75-133


In enacting ERISA's section 514, Congress devised a
system of federal preemption of State law which is,
so far as we are aware, essentially without precedent.
While the scope of the phrase "insofar as they may…
relate to any employee benefit plan…" will no
doubt provide continuing opportunities for judicial
construction, we believe that federal preemption does
extend to participant claims against plans, and thus
we believe that any claim by a participant or alleged
participant for benefits from a plan (except such
claim arising before January 1, 1975) is now governed
exclusively by federal law.

The legislative history of ERISA seems to make this
conclusion unavoidable. In the Joint Explanatory
Statement of the Conference Committee on ERISA, it is
noted that although suits to "enforce benefit rights …
or to recover benefits under" a plan may not involve
application of the Title I provisions and may be
brought either in federal or in State courts of competent
jurisdiction, "all such actions in Federal or State courts
are to be regarded as arising under the laws of the
United States in similar fashion to those brought under
section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of
1947." 3 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News 5107 (1974).

In light of the foregoing, we have concluded that an
action to recover benefits or enforce benefit rights
under a covered employee benefit plan must be regarded
as arising under the laws of the United States and,
accordingly, will not meet the requirements of 28 U.S.C.
1391 (a).

I hope that these comments will be helpful. They are
intended to be in nature of an amicus curiae statement,
and we would have no objection if the Court wished to
transmit copies of this letter to the parties. If we
may be of further assistance to the Court, please
advise me.

Sincerely,