Clarence Addison Brimmer Jr.

United States District Court for the District of Wyoming district Retired 2014 · served 1975–2014 Appointed by Gerald Ford (Republican) 32 signed orders read

Judge Brimmer no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

How Judge Brimmer decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

He followed binding circuit and Supreme Court precedent even when a different limitations theory was urged.

“The Court must not ignore the clear and binding precedent before it.”

He declined to extend a novel employment theory beyond the state supreme court's decisions.

“out of respect for the Wyoming Supreme Court’s right to decide novel issues of Wyoming law, the Court is reluctant to, and will not, unilaterally extend liability under this claim to individual supervisors or employees.”

He confined contract interpretation to the written agreement when its language was unambiguous.

“When the contract is clear and unambiguous, a court’s inquiry into the parties’ intent is limited to the four corners of the contract.”

Procedural preferences

At the pleading stage, he assessed legal sufficiency without weighing evidence that might later be presented.

“The court’s function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not to weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at trial, but to assess whether the plaintiffs complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted.”

He required a concrete Rule 19 showing before dismissing for failure to join absent parties.

“the defendant has not made a showing that the absent parties should be joined under Rule 19(a).”

He applied the forum-defendant restriction when evaluating diversity removal.

“Removal jurisdiction based on diversity is allowed only where the defendant is not a citizen of the forum state.”

Cautions

He struck down an employment rule that swept too broadly across protected personal associations.

“The McKinney anti-association rule must be struck down as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.”

He declined Rule 11 sanctions where the record did not show vexatious conduct by a pro se litigant.

“this is not a case of vexatious litigation where sanctions are appropriate, particularly against a pro se litigant.”

In institutional litigation, he permitted further discovery and delayed an automatic stay to ensure continued attention to prison conditions.

“the need to ensure that the Defendants continue to address conditions at the WSP”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Torres v. Grunkmeyer
· 1984-05-17
Motions to dismiss (defendants) Denied

“ORDERED that the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss be denied, without prejudice to the rights of the defendants to raise those issues by motion for summary judgment.”

Dunn v. McKinney
· 1985-11-22
Motion for partial summary judgment (plaintiff) Granted

“ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, granted.”

MacLaird v. Werger
· 1986-03-28
Motion for attorney fees (lead counsel) Granted

“ORDERED that lead counsel’s motion for attorney fees be, and the same hereby is, granted in the amount of $27,648.69, which includes a one-third enhancement of $6,406.99. It is further”

Motion for attorney fees (local counsel) Granted

“ORDERED that local counsel’s motion for attorney fees be, and the same hereby is, granted in the amount of $375.00. It is further”

Motion for costs (plaintiff) Granted

“ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for costs be, and the same hereby is, granted in the amount of $4,097.62, and that this matter is hereby dismissed with prejudice.”

United States v. Tarver
· 1986-09-04
Summary judgment (plaintiff) Granted

“ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, granted and that civil penalties in the amount of $500.00 be assessed against the defendant. It is further”

Motion to dismiss counterclaim (plaintiff) Granted

“ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the counterclaim be, and the same hereby is, granted.”

Motion for sanctions (plaintiff) Denied

“ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for sanctions against the defendant be, and the same hereby is, denied.”

Dworkin v. L.F.P., Inc.
· 1986-11-18
Motions to remand (plaintiffs) Granted

“ORDERED that the plaintiffs’ motion to remand to state court be, and the same hereby is, granted, and that this case is remanded to the District Court of Teton County, Wyoming, Ninth Judicial District.”

Geving v. United States
· 1986-12-24
Bankruptcy appeal (debtors) Denied

“ORDERED that the Bankruptcy Court’s order granting summary judgment for the IRS and denying summary judgment for the debtor, the Gevings, be, and the same hereby is, affirmed.”

Stockhouse v. Hines Motor Supply (Wyoming), Inc.
· 1987-06-01
Summary judgment (defendants) Granted

“ORDERED that defendants’ motion for summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, granted and that plaintiff’s claim be dismissed on the merits.”

Bussell v. Stahl
· 1987-08-10
Motion to dismiss and strike (defendants) Denied

“ORDERED that the defendants’ motion to dismiss and to strike the remaining claims be, and the same hereby is, denied.”

Greco v. Halliburton Co.
· 1987-12-02
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“ORDERED that summary judgment be, and the same hereby is entered for defendant Halliburton Company, and that the plaintiff’s complaint be, and the same hereby is, dismissed with prejudice.”

Wallace v. United States
· 1989-08-02
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“ORDERED that the Proposed Findings and Recommendations of Magistrate William C. Beaman, dated June 7, 1989, be, and the same hereby are, adopted, with the above-noted corrections to two clerical errors. Defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted with prejudice.”

Ezell v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co.
· 1989-11-16
Motions to dismiss (defendants Lidstrom and Bromley) Granted

“ORDERED that defendants Lidstrom and Bromley's motion to dismiss be, and hereby is, GRANTED. It is further ordered that this action be, and hereby is, DISMISSED.”

Ackerley v. United States
· 1990-05-11
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Denied

“ORDERED that the defendant’s motion to dismiss be, and the same hereby is, DENIED.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

Median motion-to-ruling time: 96 days (N = 9).

The located records include Social Security, post-conviction, prisoner civil-rights, environmental, contract, bankruptcy, employment, and tort matters. The distribution reflects searchable assigned-case records rather than the judge's complete career caseload.

A historical record

Judge Brimmer no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.