Robert C. Chambers
How Judge Chambers rules, drawn from 20 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Chambers
Robert Charles Chambers is a judge of the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia. Appointed by President William J. Clinton, Judge Chambers received a commission on September 18, 1997.
Judge Chambers's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Chambers's own (checked October 9, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 9, 2026).
How Judge Chambers decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Jimenez v. Barnett, Chambers rejected the government's mootness argument after immigration detainees were released subject to electronic monitoring and reporting conditions. He found the challenged restraints could recur, granted the habeas petition, and vacated the release conditions imposed from the disputed detention.
“The Court is not persuaded by the Government's argument that it cannot address continuous implications of the detention addressed by the Petition. Regardless of whether the Petitioners are currently experiencing electronic monitoring, the condition states they 'will be subject to electronic monitoring.'”
In Jimenez v. Barnett, he vacated electronic monitoring and reporting conditions imposed on released immigration detainees after the government provided no evidence of an individualized assessment, and barred reimposition without a pre-deprivation hearing.
“The Government provides no evidence that an officer made an evaluation before determining the necessity of electronic monitoring and reporting requirements.”
In Munsey v. Smith, he denied defense summary judgment on a pedestrian's negligence claim because the parties disputed where the pedestrian stood relative to the roadway and whether the driver kept a proper lookout.
“There is also dispute as to Plaintiff's positioning -- whether he was in the roadway or on the right side of the white line. And even though Defendant Smith was driving under the speed limit, this does not necessarily mean that he was not negligent ... These are issues of fact for the jury to decide.”
For a person first detained after the statutory removal period had already expired, the judge distinguished continued post-removal detention from a new detention and applied the provision requiring release under supervision.
“Petitioner Hernandez Garcia, who was not detained during the removal period and did not leave the country during the removal period, falls squarely within Section 1231(a)(3) which provides for release under supervision.”
Procedural preferences
On a Section 301 labor-contract suit filed before a new collective-bargaining agreement was reached, the judge read the contract requirement as non-jurisdictional and let the case proceed on a limited express-agreement theory rather than dismissing outright for want of a signed CBA.
“This Court finds that the contract requirement is not jurisdictional. ... Plaintiffs may not proceed on their implied contract theory, but they may proceed on their limited express agreement theory.”
In Davis v. Milton Police Department, he struck the plaintiff's late response under the local rule but proceeded to decide the defendants' dismissal motion on the briefing available.
“Over a month after Defendants filed their Motion, Plaintiff Andred Davis submitted a Response; pursuant to Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1(a)(7), the Court STRIKES it as untimely. ... Nonetheless, the issues have been adequately presented to the Court through Defendants' briefing and their Motion is ripe for resolution.”
Cautions
In Donahue v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, he dismissed a claim challenging a bankruptcy-court-approved settlement after the plaintiffs declined an opportunity to amend their complaint and explain why the suit was not a collateral attack.
“Although given the opportunity to amend and further explain their position, Plaintiffs did neither so the Court is left to resolve whether the original Complaint can survive the FDIC-Receiver's Motion to Dismiss.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Motion. ... the Court STRIKES it as untimely ... GRANTED IN PART the Motion, ECF No. 8, with respect to Counts Two, Three, and Ten; Counts One and Four solely as raised against the Milton Police Department; and Count Four to the extent it seeks to hold Bishop, Withers, and Adkins liable for punitive damages under federal law. Conversely, the Court DENIES IN PART the Motion with respect to Count One as raised against Bishop, Withers, and Adkins in their individual capacities; Counts Five through Nine in their entirety; and Count Four to the extent it seeks to hold Bishop, Withers, and Adkins liable for punitive damages under state law.”
“Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 20. For the following reasons, the Court DENIES this Motion. ... it appears to this Court that there are material issues of fact with respect to whether he was driving carefully given the narrow roadway and the darkness of the time of day.”
“Pending before the Court is Defendant West Virginia-American Water Company's Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 12. For the reasons herein, the Motion is DENIED. ... For the foregoing reasons the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED. The Court has jurisdiction over this action. Plaintiffs may not proceed on their implied contract theory, but they may proceed on their limited express agreement theory.”
“Pending before the Court is a Motion for Dismissal of All Claims by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as Receiver (FDIC-Receiver) for The First State Bank. ECF No. 7. ... For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED. ... the Court finds Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim and GRANTS the FDIC-Receiver's Motion to Dismiss.”
“For the reasons discussed below, the Government's objection is OVERRULED, and the Petition is GRANTED. ... Respondents are ORDERED to PROMPTLY RELEASE PETITIONERS in the Southern District of West Virginia, today, Monday, June 29, 2026.”
“Respondents filed a motion to dismiss for mootness ... because Petitioners were released from detention on May 11, 2026. ... Accordingly, Respondents' Motion to Dismiss will be denied.”
“Accordingly, Respondents' Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 6, is DENIED, and Petitioners' Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, ECF No. 1, is GRANTED. ... all conditions imposed pursuant to it -- including electronic monitoring, participation in U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Alternatives to Detention Program, and reporting obligations in Brooklyn, Ohio -- are VACATED.”
“MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting Petitioner's 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; directing Respondents to IMMEDIATELY RELEASE PETITIONER and to facilitate the prompt return of all property seized incident to Petitioner's detention, including legal documents; further directing that Respondents are PROHIBITED from re-arresting and detaining Petitioner pending further order of this Court and PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from imposing any conditions or restraints on Petitioner's liberty ... without an individualized assessment of the need for such restraints and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral and detached decisionmaker.”
“The Court AFFIRMS the Bankruptcy Court’s January 24, 2024 Memorandum Opinion & Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Defendant’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment.”
“For the previously stated reasons, the Petition, ECF No. 1, is GRANTED.”
“For the previously stated reasons, the Petition, ECF No. 1, is GRANTED.”
“For the previously stated reasons, the Petition, ECF No. 1, is GRANTED as it concerns Petitioners Centeno Pastrana, Ordonez Castillo, and Josue Mania.”
“Accordingly, Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 10, is DENIED, and Petitioner Perez Maradiaga’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, ECF No. 1, is GRANTED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
- The sampled caseload includes employment and personal-injury suits, consumer and TCPA/FDCPA claims, prisoner civil-rights and habeas matters, a labor-relations status-quo dispute, Social Security appeals, a bankruptcy appeal, and a current wave of 28 U.S.C.
- Section 2241 petitions challenging immigration detention and post-release conditions in 2026.
- Several school-district disability and personal-injury suits against the same county board of education recur in the sample.
Pending matters in the official report
Reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act, as of March 31, 2026.
| Motions pending more than six months | 0 |
| Bench trials submitted more than six months | 0 |
| Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Social Security appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Civil cases pending more than three years | 1 |
| Report | Motions over six months | Cases over three years |
|---|---|---|
| Mar 2026 | 0 | 1 |
| Sep 2025 | 1 | 1 |
| Mar 2025 | 0 | 1 |
| Sep 2024 | 0 | 1 |
| Mar 2024 | 0 | 2 |
| Sep 2023 | 0 | 3 |
| Mar 2023 | 0 | 1 |
| Sep 2022 | 3 | 2 |
| Mar 2022 | 0 | 2 |
| Sep 2021 | 0 | 0 |
| Mar 2021 | 0 | 3 |
| Sep 2020 | 0 | 0 |
A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.
How long civil cases take in this court
For the whole of U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, not for Judge Chambers: median time from filing to disposition of the civil cases the court closed in the 12 months ending September 30, 2025, as reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
| Cases | Median time | |
|---|---|---|
| All civil cases closed | 470 | 10 months |
| Closed with no court action | 16 | 3 months |
| Closed before pretrial | 441 | 10.1 months |
| Closed during or after pretrial | 10 | 19.5 months |
| Closed during trial | 3 | not reported |
| 12 months ending | Cases closed | Median time |
|---|---|---|
| Sep 2025 | 470 | 10 months |
| Sep 2024 | 469 | 10.6 months |
| Sep 2023 | 473 | 11.1 months |
| Sep 2022 | 471 | 11.4 months |
| Sep 2021 | 939 | 14.9 months |
| Sep 2020 | 3,013 | 62.7 months |
| Sep 2019 | 41,342 | 53.9 months |
The table leaves out prisoner petitions, land condemnations, deportation reviews, recovery of overpayments and enforcement of judgments, and reports no median for fewer than 10 cases. A district that closed a large multidistrict litigation in the period shows very large counts and long medians for that year. Source: Table C-5, U.S. District Courts (spreadsheet).
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