Kenneth Keller Hall

How Judge Hall rules, drawn from 24 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Judge Hall no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

Court
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia
Position
district
Status
Elevated to a higher court
Served
1971–1976
Appointed by
Richard M. Nixon (Republican)
Commissioned
1971-12-06
Education
West Virginia University College of Law, J.D. (1948)
Signed orders read
24

How Judge Hall decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

A silent historic record could not establish a knowing waiver of the constitutional right to counsel.

“Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible.”

Disputed inferences and allegations of intentional or wanton conduct prevented summary judgment on emotional-injury claims.

“the defendant here has not sustained its burden and that doubts must be resolved accordingly.”

Procedural preferences

Recusal turned on whether sworn facts could cause a reasonable person to perceive bias, not the judge's own assurance of impartiality.

“The issue, however, is not whether I have biases and prejudices against these defendants, but whether the affidavits recite sufficient facts to support the allegations of bias and prejudice.”

A live individual dispute did not persist as a class controversy after relief was obtained when no class had been certified.

“Due to the lack of class certification, under the facts alleged in this case, this Court does not feel that there now exists: ‘. . .a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests’”

Cautions

Strict statutory filing language controlled a benefits appeal even when the complaint was only one day late.

“Though only one day late in filing, the plaintiff herein has placed this Court in the position of not having the jurisdiction to review his claim.”

Failure to give timely written insurance notice remained dispositive absent proof of waiver, estoppel, incapacity, or another excuse.

“No factors, conditions or circumstances are found in the record constituting waiver of the notice, estoppel or excuses for non-compliance with the notice of claim requirement of the policy.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Nell v. United States
· 1972-05-19
Motion to vacate conviction (petitioner) Granted

“the conviction and sentence of petitioner, Richard Nell, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Huntington, in the case of United States of America v. Richard Nell, No. 5594, on March 4, 1932, be, and the same are hereby, voided, vacated and held for naught.”

Albert v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc.
· 1972-06-05
Summary judgment (defendants) Granted

“there is no genuine issue as to any material fact necessary to a decision of this action and that defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

United States ex rel. Mullenax v. Blankenship
· 1972-06-14
Petition for habeas corpus (state prisoner) Denied

“the petition of Vonda Jean Mullenax for a writ of habeas corpus be, and it is hereby, denied”

Garland v. True Temper Corp.
· 1973-02-09
Motions to dismiss (defendant employer) Denied

“the motion to dismiss will be denied.”

Corey v. Bache & Co.
· 1973-03-12
Summary judgment (plaintiff investor) Denied

“plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment be, and it is hereby, denied, and that defendant’s motion for summary judgment be, and it is hereby, sustained.”

Summary judgment (defendant broker) Granted
Snider v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
· 1973-06-21
Motions to dismiss (defendant insurers) Denied

“the motions of defendants, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company and The Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, to dismiss the action be, and each of them is hereby, denied”

Summary judgment (plaintiff administrator) Granted

“the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment against both defendants be, and it is hereby, granted.”

Duffield v. Memorial Hospital Ass'n of Charleston
· 1973-07-17
Motions to dismiss (hospital defendants) Granted

“Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint will be granted.”

Motion to amend (plaintiff physician) Denied

“Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint will necessarily be denied”

Request for injunction (plaintiff physician) Denied

“Likewise plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary and permanent injunction will be denied.”

Nunnery v. Barber
· 1973-10-30
Motions to dismiss (state official) Granted

“defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint be, and it is hereby, granted.”

Whittington v. Sewer Construction Co.
· 1973-12-18
Motions to dismiss (defendant contractor) Granted

“defendant’s motion to dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction in the Court must be granted.”

United States v. Quicksey
· 1974-02-25
Motion for bail pending appeal (criminal defendant) Denied

“the motion of the defendant for bail and release pending appeal be, and it is hereby, denied”

Prince v. Pittston Co.
· 1974-05-13
Summary judgment (defendant company) Denied

“the motion of the defendant, The Pittston Company, for partial summary judgment as to the personal injury claims of the 33 plaintiffs in the action, as filed on April 1, 1974, be, and it is hereby, denied.”

Hubel v. West Virginia Racing Commission
· 1974-05-24

The court reviewed the racing commission's suspension procedure, but the retained disposition does not state a party-motion outcome suitable for classification.

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

Hall's reported Southern District of West Virginia decisions include civil rights, employment, insurance, securities, criminal, habeas, benefits, education, transportation, and tort matters. The sampled case shells do not support a quantified caseload estimate.

A historical record

Judge Hall no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.