Joseph K. Reeder
How Judge Reeder rules, drawn from 15 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
How Judge Reeder decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In a diversity motor-vehicle case, he denied summary judgment on the core negligence claim because dash-cam video created a genuine jury question about who caused the collision, even while granting judgment on a related negligent-entrustment theory the plaintiff had no evidence to support: he separates a claim's strongest and weakest legal theories rather than ruling on a case as a whole.
“Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant Lamkin initiated or completed the passing maneuver in a manner that was unsafe under the circumstances.”
On a motion to dismiss, he found that a plaintiff need not plead the precise legal label for a theory of liability (there, respondeat superior) so long as the underlying facts plausibly support it: he reads pro se and represented pleadings alike for their substance, not their labels.
“Federal pleading rules do not require plaintiffs to employ particular legal terms where the factual allegations plausibly support the theory of liability.”
He denied a motion to seal medical-related briefing in a pro se civil-rights suit because the proposed sealed material added little beyond facts the plaintiff himself had already put on the public docket: he applies the presumption of public access even when the party invoking confidentiality is a defendant, not the person whose records are at issue.
“The materials in question provide little information, or, at most, benign information, beyond what Plaintiff has already publicly revealed in his complaint and amended complaint.”
Procedural preferences
In Social Security disability appeals, when the Commissioner concedes the case should be remanded, he moves quickly to a sentence-four remand and final judgment rather than waiting out the full briefing schedule: several of his consent Social Security rulings issued within days to a few weeks of the Commissioner's own remand motion.
“Because a sentence four remand essentially 'terminates the litigation with victory for the plaintiff,' the court enters a final judgment dismissing the case and removing it from the court's docket.”
On Social Security Section 406(b) fee petitions, he applies the Gisbrecht contingency-fee framework rather than a lodestar hourly-rate calculation, and has approved effective hourly rates above $1,100 where the contingent-fee agreement was within the 25% statutory cap and counsel caused no delay.
“The Court does not determine the fee by strictly multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. Instead, the Court begins with the contingent fee agreement and then performs an independent check to ensure that the resulting fee is reasonable and does not constitute a windfall.”
Faced with a self-represented plaintiff who missed a response deadline once, he declined to treat the lapse as grounds for an unopposed dismissal, distinguishing that case from ones where a litigant ignored a court's explicit warning, but in a separate case where a pro se plaintiff had gone silent for months after multiple court notices, he recommended dismissal for failure to prosecute. He appears to calibrate leniency to whether the litigant has already been warned.
“Given his pro se status, and because he has not yet failed to comply with any order of the court, the undersigned FINDS that dismissal for failure to prosecute is not warranted at this time.”
Cautions
His screening recommendations do not always survive de novo review intact: in one case the district judge adopted his ultimate recommendation to dismiss a pro se suit but expressly rejected his reasoning on both the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and judicial immunity, dismissing on narrower grounds instead. Litigants should not assume his Reports and Recommendations are rubber-stamped.
“The Magistrate Judge erred, however, in applying judicial immunity.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“The Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 406(b) (ECF No. 14) and ORDERS that the previously awarded EAJA fee in the amount of $4,700.00 be deducted from the Section 406(b) award.”
“the Court reverses the final decision of the Commissioner; grants Defendant's MOTION for Remand and dismisses this action from the docket of the Court.”
“The Court REVERSES the final decision of the Commissioner; GRANTS the Motion for Remand, (ECF No. 7); REMANDS this matter pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. Section 405(g) for further administrative proceedings consistent with this opinion; and DISMISSES this action from the docket of the Court.”
“Defendant's Motion to File Under Seal Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of His Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint and Other Supporting Documents. (ECF No. 9). The motion is DENIED for the following reasons.”
“Therefore, the undersigned FINDS that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted in Counts I and III of the amended complaint and respectfully RECOMMENDS that Defendant's motion be granted as to Counts I and III and those counts be dismissed.”
“the undersigned FINDS that Plaintiff pleads sufficient facts, which construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, states a plausible claim that Defendant violated his rights by administering forced medications. Therefore, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Defendant's motion to dismiss be denied concerning Count II.”
“the undersigned respectfully RECOMMENDS that the Court DENY Defendant's motion to designate his motion to dismiss as unopposed and dismiss the complaint for failure to prosecute, (ECF No. 14).”
“For the above reasons, the undersigned DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Admissions, (ECF No. 16).”
“It would be premature to dismiss Plaintiff's allegation that ATS and Garcia were engaged in a joint venture before Plaintiff has had the opportunity to investigate and provide any support for the asserted relationship. Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's allegations regarding joint venture.”
“Pursuant to those standards, Plaintiff asserts plausible claims of gross negligence and/or willful, wanton, or reckless conduct... at this time, the Court DENIES Defendants' motion to dismiss Count II of the complaint.”
“it would be premature to dismiss Plaintiff's claims without any benefit of discovery... The Court DENIES Defendants' motion to dismiss Counts III and IV.”
“The Court DENIES Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's prayer for punitive damages.”
“Defendants do not demonstrate the very high threshold of immateriality, impertinence, and prejudice necessary to sustain a motion to strike under Rule 12(f). Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendants' motion to strike paragraph 13 of the complaint.”
“The Court GRANTS the motion to strike from paragraph 14 of the complaint the allegation that Defendants ‘negligently fail[ed] to properly maintain the subject ATS tractor-trailer.’”
“Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 39), is DENIED AS MOOT.”
“Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's negligent entrustment claim.”
“because genuine disputes of material fact remain as to Defendant Lamkin's alleged negligence and causation, summary judgment on Plaintiff's negligence claim is not appropriate.”
“For those reasons, Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, (ECF No. 46), is DENIED.”
“the undersigned respectfully PROPOSES that the presiding District Judge confirm and accept the foregoing findings and RECOMMENDS that the complaint be DISMISSED, without prejudice, and this action be removed from the docket of the court.”
“the undersigned FINDS upon initial screening of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(e)(2) that Plaintiff fails to assert a plausible federal claim... the undersigned DENIES Plaintiff's Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Costs, (ECF No. 1), and respectfully PROPOSES... RECOMMENDS that this civil action be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(e)(2) and that Plaintiff's pending motions, (ECF Nos. 5, 6, 7), be DENIED AS MOOT.”
“the Court finds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated good cause for permission to file electronically at this time... Plaintiff's Motion for Permission to Electronically File... (ECF No. 11)... [is] DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.”
“concerning Plaintiff's Emergency Motion for Order Requiring Proper Service on Plaintiff, (ECF No. 14), the Court notes that the Notices of Electronic Filing associated with the filings in this matter reflect that Plaintiff is receiving notice ‘by other means.’ The Court is therefore satisfied that emergency relief is not warranted at this time.”
“Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's request for attorney's fees in the amount of $20,956.00 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 406(b). Counsel was previously awarded $5,250.00 in EAJA fees. Therefore, the Court ORDERS that the amount of the EAJA award be deducted from the Section 406(b) fee, resulting in a net payment of $15,706.00 to counsel.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
- His identifiable caseload so far spans four areas: (1) two full-consent diversity motor-vehicle personal-injury cases in which he presides start to finish; (2) a substantial consent Social Security disability-appeal docket, mostly uncontested remands followed by attorney-fee litigation under 42 U.S.C.
- Section 406(b); (3) general civil matters referred to him by the district judges for a Report and Recommendation, including a pro se civil-rights suit over involuntary psychiatric commitment, a pro se suit against participants in a state child-neglect proceeding, and a pro se prisoner habeas petition; and (4) a large and growing volume of criminal duty-magistrate matters (search-warrant applications, initial appearances, petty offenses) and, as of 2026, a cohort of immigration-detention habeas petitions referred to him, most of which the presiding district judges have been resolving on an expedited basis before a recommendation from him issues.
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