Joseph K. Reeder
How Judge Reeder rules, drawn from 15 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Reeder
Joseph K. Reeder became a United States Magistrate Judge for the Southern District of West Virginia in January 2025 and sits in Huntington. He previously served as a West Virginia circuit judge in Putnam County and practiced law in the Charleston area. He earned undergraduate and law degrees from West Virginia University.
Judge Reeder's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Reeder's own (checked October 9, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 9, 2026).
How Judge Reeder decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Caudill v. Apollo Express, Inc., Reeder denied summary judgment on a negligence claim because dash-cam video left a jury question about the truck driver's conduct and causation. He granted summary judgment on a separate negligent-entrustment theory that lacked supporting evidence.
“Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant Lamkin initiated or completed the passing maneuver in a manner that was unsafe under the circumstances.”
In Caudill v. Apollo Express, Inc., Reeder denied the surviving defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings. He held that the complaint's factual allegations plausibly supported respondeat superior even though the plaintiff had not used that legal label.
“The absence of specific terminology such as ‘employer,’ ‘employee,’ or ‘scope of employment’ in the complaint does not alter this conclusion, as federal pleading rules do not require plaintiffs to employ particular legal terms where the factual allegations plausibly support the theory of liability.”
In Monti v. Ajayi, Reeder denied a physician-defendant's request to seal motion-to-dismiss materials in a civil-rights suit. The materials added little beyond information the plaintiff had already placed in the public complaint, so the request did not overcome the presumption of public access.
“The materials in question provide little information, or, at most, benign information, beyond what Plaintiff has already publicly revealed in his complaint and amended complaint.”
Procedural preferences
In Fields-Harper v. Bisignano, Reeder granted the Commissioner's motion to remand a Social Security appeal under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). He entered final judgment and dismissed the case from the court's docket.
“Because a sentence four remand essentially 'terminates the litigation with victory for the plaintiff,' the court enters a final judgment dismissing the case and removing it from the court's docket.”
In Adkins v. Bisignano, Reeder granted a Section 406(b) fee request after reviewing the contingency agreement for reasonableness. The requested fee yielded an effective hourly rate of $1,180.82, and he found no indication that counsel had caused delay.
“The Court does not determine the fee by strictly multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by a reasonable hourly rate. Instead, the Court begins with the contingent fee agreement and then performs an independent check to ensure that the resulting fee is reasonable and does not constitute a windfall.”
In Monti v. Ajayi, Reeder recommended denying a request to dismiss an amended complaint for failure to prosecute. The self-represented plaintiff had expressed interest in pursuing the case and had not failed to comply with a court order.
“Given his pro se status, and because he has not yet failed to comply with any order of the court, the undersigned FINDS that dismissal for failure to prosecute is not warranted at this time.”
Cautions
In Miller v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, the district judge adopted his recommendation to dismiss a screened pro se complaint but rejected his judicial-immunity analysis and used narrower grounds for dismissal.
“The Magistrate Judge erred, however, in applying judicial immunity.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“The Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney Fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 406(b) (ECF No. 14) and ORDERS that the previously awarded EAJA fee in the amount of $4,700.00 be deducted from the Section 406(b) award.”
“the Court reverses the final decision of the Commissioner; grants Defendant's MOTION for Remand and dismisses this action from the docket of the Court.”
“The Court REVERSES the final decision of the Commissioner; GRANTS the Motion for Remand, (ECF No. 7); REMANDS this matter pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. Section 405(g) for further administrative proceedings consistent with this opinion; and DISMISSES this action from the docket of the Court.”
“Defendant's Motion to File Under Seal Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of His Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint and Other Supporting Documents. (ECF No. 9). The motion is DENIED for the following reasons.”
“Therefore, the undersigned FINDS that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted in Counts I and III of the amended complaint and respectfully RECOMMENDS that Defendant's motion be granted as to Counts I and III and those counts be dismissed.”
“the undersigned FINDS that Plaintiff pleads sufficient facts, which construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, states a plausible claim that Defendant violated his rights by administering forced medications. Therefore, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Defendant's motion to dismiss be denied concerning Count II.”
“the undersigned respectfully RECOMMENDS that the Court DENY Defendant's motion to designate his motion to dismiss as unopposed and dismiss the complaint for failure to prosecute, (ECF No. 14).”
“For the above reasons, the undersigned DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Admissions, (ECF No. 16).”
“It would be premature to dismiss Plaintiff's allegation that ATS and Garcia were engaged in a joint venture before Plaintiff has had the opportunity to investigate and provide any support for the asserted relationship. Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's allegations regarding joint venture.”
“Pursuant to those standards, Plaintiff asserts plausible claims of gross negligence and/or willful, wanton, or reckless conduct... at this time, the Court DENIES Defendants' motion to dismiss Count II of the complaint.”
“it would be premature to dismiss Plaintiff's claims without any benefit of discovery... The Court DENIES Defendants' motion to dismiss Counts III and IV.”
“The Court DENIES Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's prayer for punitive damages.”
“Defendants do not demonstrate the very high threshold of immateriality, impertinence, and prejudice necessary to sustain a motion to strike under Rule 12(f). Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendants' motion to strike paragraph 13 of the complaint.”
“The Court GRANTS the motion to strike from paragraph 14 of the complaint the allegation that Defendants ‘negligently fail[ed] to properly maintain the subject ATS tractor-trailer.’”
“Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, (ECF No. 39), is DENIED AS MOOT.”
“Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's negligent entrustment claim.”
“because genuine disputes of material fact remain as to Defendant Lamkin's alleged negligence and causation, summary judgment on Plaintiff's negligence claim is not appropriate.”
“For those reasons, Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, (ECF No. 46), is DENIED.”
“the undersigned respectfully PROPOSES that the presiding District Judge confirm and accept the foregoing findings and RECOMMENDS that the complaint be DISMISSED, without prejudice, and this action be removed from the docket of the court.”
“For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned DENIES Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Costs, (ECF No. 1), and respectfully RECOMMENDS that the District Court:”
“the Court finds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated good cause for permission to file electronically at this time... Plaintiff's Motion for Permission to Electronically File... (ECF No. 11)... [is] DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.”
“concerning Plaintiff's Emergency Motion for Order Requiring Proper Service on Plaintiff, (ECF No. 14), the Court notes that the Notices of Electronic Filing associated with the filings in this matter reflect that Plaintiff is receiving notice ‘by other means.’ The Court is therefore satisfied that emergency relief is not warranted at this time.”
“Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's request for attorney's fees in the amount of $20,956.00 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 406(b). Counsel was previously awarded $5,250.00 in EAJA fees. Therefore, the Court ORDERS that the amount of the EAJA award be deducted from the Section 406(b) fee, resulting in a net payment of $15,706.00 to counsel.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
- His identifiable caseload so far spans four areas: (1) two full-consent diversity motor-vehicle personal-injury cases in which he presides start to finish; (2) a substantial consent Social Security disability-appeal docket, mostly uncontested remands followed by attorney-fee litigation under 42 U.S.C.
- Section 406(b); (3) general civil matters referred to him by the district judges for a Report and Recommendation, including a pro se civil-rights suit over involuntary psychiatric commitment, a pro se suit against participants in a state child-neglect proceeding, and a pro se prisoner habeas petition; and (4) a large and growing volume of criminal duty-magistrate matters (search-warrant applications, initial appearances, petty offenses) and, as of 2026, a cohort of immigration-detention habeas petitions referred to him, most of which the presiding district judges have been resolving on an expedited basis before a recommendation from him issues.
Pending matters in the official report
Reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act, as of March 31, 2026.
| Motions pending more than six months | 0 |
| Bench trials submitted more than six months | 0 |
| Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Social Security appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Civil cases pending more than three years | 0 |
| Report | Motions over six months | Cases over three years |
|---|---|---|
| Mar 2026 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2025 | 0 | 0 |
| Mar 2025 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2024 | 0 | 0 |
A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.
How long civil cases take in this court
For the whole of U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, not for Judge Reeder: median time from filing to disposition of the civil cases the court closed in the 12 months ending September 30, 2025, as reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
| Cases | Median time | |
|---|---|---|
| All civil cases closed | 470 | 10 months |
| Closed with no court action | 16 | 3 months |
| Closed before pretrial | 441 | 10.1 months |
| Closed during or after pretrial | 10 | 19.5 months |
| Closed during trial | 3 | not reported |
| 12 months ending | Cases closed | Median time |
|---|---|---|
| Sep 2025 | 470 | 10 months |
| Sep 2024 | 469 | 10.6 months |
| Sep 2023 | 473 | 11.1 months |
| Sep 2022 | 471 | 11.4 months |
| Sep 2021 | 939 | 14.9 months |
| Sep 2020 | 3,013 | 62.7 months |
| Sep 2019 | 41,342 | 53.9 months |
The table leaves out prisoner petitions, land condemnations, deportation reviews, recovery of overpayments and enforcement of judgments, and reports no median for fewer than 10 cases. A district that closed a large multidistrict litigation in the period shows very large counts and long medians for that year. Source: Table C-5, U.S. District Courts (spreadsheet).
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