Pamela Pepper
How Judge Pepper decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On equitable remedies (Lanham Act disgorgement of profits) she anchors the award to a reasonable-royalty / balance-of-equities framework (Sands, Taylor & Wood v. Quaker Oats) rather than to gross profits, and will reject BOTH a windfall and an inadequate figure to set her own number. Practitioners seeking disgorgement should brief the Sands factors and apportionment, not just the infringer's sales.
“Nevertheless, the court finds that even the defendants' modified disgorgement request is excessive and would constitute a windfall.”
FDCPA / Wisconsin Consumer Act claims are rarely dismissable at the pleadings: the statute is near-strict-liability and the 'unsophisticated consumer' inquiry is fact-bound, so a thinly-but-plausibly pleaded false-representation claim survives Rule 12(b)(6) and defenses wait for summary judgment.
“Because the FDCPA inquiry is fact-intensive, and because 'district judges are not good proxies for the "unsophisticated consumer" whose interest the statute protects,' 'dismissal is typically not available under 12(b)(6).'”
She applies the Seventh Circuit's liberal notice-pleading standard for discrimination claims -- no heightened pleading, and she will not dismiss class allegations before any discovery where the alleged pattern is plausible.
“Title VII claims are not subject to a heightened pleading standard.”
Procedural preferences
Independently verifies the authority cited in briefs and will call out misrepresented or fabricated quotations on the record. Cite accurately to her: she reads the cases the parties cite, including the page cited, before relying on them.
“The plaintiff seems to have made up the 'quote' in his brief that purports to be from Swaffer. ... The court has read page 4 of Swaffer -- a decision by this court's colleague, Judge J.P. Stadtmueller -- three times and cannot find these words.”
Treats subject-matter jurisdiction (and standing in particular) as the threshold she resolves first; where jurisdiction is absent she will not reach the merits (12(b)(6)) or the requested injunctive relief.
“Standing is the sine qua non of subject matter jurisdiction.”
Cautions
Holds parties to consistent positions across the life of a case; she expressly notices and weighs against a litigant arguments that contradict the positions it took earlier in the same litigation.
“the arguments the plaintiff makes before this court regarding the appropriate award of disgorged profits are the opposite of the arguments it made before Judge Randa regarding liability.”
Writes with a plain, pointed voice and is candid about the limits of the federal forum; she frames over-reaching requests directly. A practitioner should read this as a signal she expects requests grounded in a court's actual authority.
“Federal judges do not appoint the president in this country. One wonders why the plaintiffs came to federal court and asked a federal judge to do so. ... But this federal court has no authority or jurisdiction to grant the relief the remaining plaintiff seeks. The court will dismiss the case.”
A contractual / statutory one-year suit-limitation on a fire-insurance policy is enforced strictly: absent a statutory appraisal/arbitration tolling or clear-and-convincing equitable estoppel (the insurer inducing the plaintiff to believe no suit was needed), a late-filed coverage suit is time-barred on summary judgment -- a granted extension is not a tolling agreement.
“The record does not support tolling or the doctrine of equitable estoppel in this case.”
On 2254 habeas she will grant the writ where the Seventh Circuit has already found prejudice (here, improper prosecutorial vouching going to witness credibility) and, after an evidentiary hearing, trial counsel cannot articulate a strategic reason for the deficient performance -- Strickland is then satisfied as a matter of law.
“the court must grant the petition on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 6 |
Granted: 3Granted in part: 1Denied: 2 | counts only |
| Summary judgment N = 3 |
Granted: 2Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Preliminary injunction N = 1 |
Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
| Temporary restraining order N = 1 |
Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for judgment N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for attorney fees N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Habeas petition N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“The court GRANTS Defendant Governor Tony Evers's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. Dkt. No. 51.”
“The court GRANTS Defendant Wisconsin Elections Commission and Its Members' Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. No. 53.”
“The court DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff's Corrected Motion for Declaratory, Emergency, and Permanent Injunctive Relief. Dkt. No. 6.”
“The court DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff's Amended Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction to be Considered in an Expedited Manner Dkt. No. 10.”
“Defendants' motion for judgment consistent with the Seventh Circuit's opinion GRANTED. Defendants AWARDED $232,000 in disgorged profits.”
“Defendant's motion for attorney fees GRANTED; defendants AWARDED $630,449.82 in attorney fees.”
“Plaintiff's motion to restrict GRANTED; Clerk of Court to RESTRICT document at dkt. no. 149-1 to court and case participants until further order of the court.”
“Court Minutes and Order RE: Proceedings held before Judge Pamela Pepper on 2/13/2019: GRANTING 8 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM filed by Michael Newman, Newman & Newman LLC without prejudice. (Amended complaint due by 3/22/2019).”
“the court denies the defendants' motion to dismiss, with two exceptions. First, the court dismisses the plaintiffs' claims under 1981 for national origin discrimination, because, as the plaintiffs have conceded, 1981 does not support such a claim. Second, the court dismisses Koehler and Parker's claims against IPS because, as the plaintiffs also have conceded, neither of them were employed by IPS or applied for employment with IPS.”
“the court denies the plaintiffs' summary judgment motions, grants the defendants' summary judgment motion, denies as moot other motions from the plaintiffs, and dismisses this case.”
“the court denies the plaintiffs' summary judgment motions, grants the defendants' summary judgment motion, denies as moot other motions from the plaintiffs, and dismisses this case.”
“The court DENIES Aurora Health Care Inc.'s motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 14).”
“The court also DENIES Americollect Inc.'s motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 21).”
“ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (DKT. NO. 1) AND ORDERING RESPONDENT TO RELEASE JORDAN FROM CUSTODY UNLESS THE STATE INITIATES PROCEEDINGS WITHIN NINETY DAYS”
“The court GRANTS the defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff's breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims. Dkt. No. 41.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 243.5 days (N = 20).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 117 days (N = 7).
Descriptive from search_dockets nature_of_suit/cause fields across the enumerated cohorts; not an exhaustive census.