Byron Browning Conway
How Judge Conway decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On a 12(b)(6) motion a plaintiff need only state ONE plausible theory to carry the claim past the pleading stage -- the court will not pick off individual legal theories. Pleading negligence AND negligence per se, where the defendant attacks only the per se theory, leaves the claim standing.
“The plaintiffs having presented one plausible theory to sustain their wrongful death claim, the court's analysis ends.”
Procedural preferences
Jurisdiction first, always: resolves subject-matter jurisdiction before reaching the merits (Osman -- 8 U.S.C. 1252(g); Schmidtknecht -- 28 U.S.C. 1332).
“The court begins, as it must, with the question of jurisdiction.”
Claim-vs-theory discipline at the pleading stage: a 12(b)(6) motion may dismiss only whole claims, not parts of claims or particular legal theories; theory-narrowing belongs at summary judgment (BBL v. City of Angola).
“at the motion to dismiss stage the court may dismiss only claims. The court cannot dismiss parts of claims or particular theories. Summary judgment is the procedure for narrowing claims or foreclosing theories.”
Reads ERISA preemption narrowly where the claim rests on an independent legal duty (here, a PBM's failure to give notice of a coverage change) rather than a denial of benefits.
“A claim that a PBM was negligent because it failed to provide a beneficiary with notice that his prescription would no longer be covered ... does not implicate any of the policies underlying preemption.”
Defers to administrative processes / exhaustion: declines to make a determination (here, prima-facie TPS eligibility) that an agency is positioned to make in the first instance.
“nothing in the text or history of the statute or the structure [of] immigration law generally suggests that prima facie eligibility is a determination for a federal district court ... the assumption is that matters are first addressed administratively.”
Cautions
A motion-to-dismiss win on preemption may be provisional -- Conway expressly invites the defense to be re-raised at summary judgment on a developed record.
“depending on the specific facts, ERISA may nonetheless ultimately preempt the plaintiffs' claim ... But such questions are not properly before the court on a motion to dismiss.”
Only 3 classified orders -- these are early signals from a brand-new judge (~19 months on the bench), not established tendencies. Do not read any of them as a rate.
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Habeas petition N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Default judgment N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to dismiss N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Temporary Restraining Order (ECF No. 6) is vacated, Saad Osman's petition for a writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) is denied, and this action is dismissed.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs' Motion for Entry of Default Judgment is GRANTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of plaintiffs ... and against Defendant BMD Concrete Innovations LLC in the amount of $257,020.26 together with interest at the rate allowed by law.”
“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Optum Rx's motion to dismiss the amended complaint is denied.”