Ronald Bruce Leighton
Judge Leighton no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Leighton decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
He treated an express federal claim on the face of the complaint as sufficient for removal, without weighing whether state law predominated.
“The propriety of removal does not turn on whether an asserted federal claim ‘pre-empts’ state law claims. And it does not weigh whether the claim is ‘based primarily on state law.’”
He separated an insured's motive from the intent shown by conduct when applying an intentional-loss exclusion.
“Crawford’s argument conflates motive with intent.”
He enforced unambiguous insurance language according to its stated aggregate limit across victims and policy periods.
“The subject policy language is not ambiguous, and is not susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.”
Procedural preferences
He narrowed pre-certification discovery to a representative sample when broader production would impose undue burden.
“Permitting such sweeping discovery at this phase in the litigation would be unduly burdensome.”
He allowed a forfeiture complaint to proceed when the amended pleading supplied facts that raised the claim above speculation.
“The United States has pled sufficient facts in its second amended complaint to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
Cautions
A summary-judgment record leaving a genuine dispute about an insured's knowledge remained for the jury.
“Whether Mr. Barker knew his testimony about the purchase place of the camera was false is a question for the jury.”
He distinguished evidence that may establish a pattern from conduct for which the plaintiff could actually recover damages.
“even though plaintiff may be entitled to rely on the evidence to establish a pattern does not mean that he can recover damages for the time-barred conduct”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“IDS’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. # 22) is GRANTED”
“Crawford’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. # 31) is DENIED.”
“Diana Nemes’ Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.”
“Defendant’s Motion to Amend the Order of October 10, 2008 is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.”
“Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint [Dkt. # 57] is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.”
“Defendant’s Motion to Return Property [Dkt. # 32] is DENIED.”
“Plaintiffs Motion to Compel [Dkt. # 79] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.”
“the defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. # 33] is GRANTED.”
“The plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. # 32] is DENIED”
“the matter is therefore REVERSED and remanded to the Commissioner for payment of benefits.”
“Defendant’s motion to dismiss on the pleadings is GRANTED.”
“PIIC’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.”
“PIIC's Motions to Strike the Dolbow [Dkt. #81] and LePlay [Dkt. # 82] Declarations are DENIED.”
“For the reasons stated above, IDS’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. # 9] is DENIED.”
“the Court GRANTS IN PART defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. # 30).”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 307.5 days (N = 12).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 20.5 days (N = 14).
The twelve sampled matters form a bounded January 2014 cohort and should not be read as the judge's career-long caseload mix.
A historical record
Judge Leighton no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.