Franklin D. Burgess
Judge Burgess no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Burgess decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
Procedural preferences
Rigorously applies the Celotex/Matsushita summary-judgment burden -- repeatedly grants a defense summary judgment where the nonmovant offers only speculation, an unsigned declaration, or contradicts their own deposition testimony, rather than crediting a bare prima facie showing.
“Bradley’s showing is insufficient to defeat Wal-Mart’s summary judgment motion. Bradley has failed to show [1] that water makes the floor dangerously slippery and [2] that the owner knew or should have known both that water would make the floor slippery and [3] that there was water on the floor at the time the plaintiff slipped.”
Once the sole federal claim in a case is dismissed, declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims rather than resolving them on the merits.
“the Title VII actions for sexually hostile work environment and retaliation were the only federal causes of action before this court and diversity does not exist between the parties. Therefore, the Court declines to assert supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs outrage and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.”
Cautions
Where a related state criminal appeal shares the same operative facts as a federal civil claim, stays the federal claim (and remands any pendent state claim) rather than adjudicating cross-motions for summary judgment on the merits -- a case can sit stayed rather than resolved on a first pass.
“I find that the factual and legal issues which have been presented regarding Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, and at least indirectly, Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment Takings claim, are inextricably intertwined with the state court criminal appellate proceedings.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. # 12] is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s cause of action against Wal-Mart is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk is directed to enter Judgment in favor of Wal-Mart and against Plaintiff Bradley.”
“The Court, after having reviewed all materials submitted by the parties and relied upon for authority, is fully informed and hereby denies the request for preliminary injunction and grants the Defendants’ motions to dismiss.”
“ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT”
“ORDER GRANTING CERTAIN PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF TO DEFENDANT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION”
“The Motion of Defendants Brandon McNew, James Queen, and Kyle McCoy for Summary Judgment [Dkt. # 14] is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s claims against them are DISMISSED with prejudice.”
“The Court, finding that these legal issues may be decided upon the written briefs and evidence submitted by the parties, and having considered the motions, cross-motions, opposition briefs, summary judgment evidence, and balance of the record, finds that Cadet’s motions for partial summary judgment should be granted.”
“ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING DUTY TO DEFEND, “TWO PREMISES LOCATION,” INSURANCE LIMITS, and DENYING CROSS-MOTION ON NUMBER OF OCCURRENCES”
High-profile admiralty negligence trial involving a whaling-protest boat, the TIGER, which twice collided with Coast Guard vessels after repeatedly refusing warnings to stay clear of a federally protected Makah tribal whale hunt off Neah Bay, Washington, in 2000. After a trial without a jury, the court found that the Coast Guard's minimal-force intervention was a discretionary, non-negligent law-enforcement response and that the protesters' conduct was the sole proximate cause of any injury, entering judgment for the United States. This was a bench-trial verdict rather than a ruling on a party motion.
“ORDER AFFIRMING IN PART & REVERSING IN PART BANKRUPTCY COURT’S ORDER”
“ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT”
“This Court has reviewed the pleadings filed in support of and in opposition to the parties’ cross motions for partial summary judgment and the file herein. ... the facts are not sufficiently defined to warrant either defendants or plaintiff being granted judgment as a matter of law.”
“That Plaintiffs inverse condemnation claim pursuant to article I, section 16 of the Washington State Constitution is REMANDED to state court for adjudication;”
“ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING DEFENDANT MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT”
“(1) That the plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED;”
“(2) That the defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment of Dismissal is DENIED;”
“(3) That the plaintiffs’ Motions for Partial Summary Judgment to Undergrounding and Municipal Regulation of Rights of Way are DENIED as unripe;”
“(4) That the defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on the Counterclaims is DENIED as unripe;”
A historical record
Judge Burgess no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.