Franklin D. Burgess

How Judge Burgess rules, drawn from 14 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Judge Burgess no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled here.

Court
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington (Tacoma)
Position
District judge
Status
Deceased
Served
1994–2010
Appointed by
Bill Clinton (Democratic)
Commissioned
March 28, 1994
Education
Gonzaga University (B.A., Education, 1961); Gonzaga University School of Law (J.D., 1966)
Signed orders read
14

About Judge Burgess

Franklin D. Burgess was a judge of the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. Appointed by President William J. Clinton, Judge Burgess received a commission on March 28, 1994. Judge Burgess assumed senior status on March 9, 2005 and served until death on March 26, 2010.

How Judge Burgess decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Procedural preferences

In Bradley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Burgess granted summary judgment for the store in a slip-and-fall suit. The plaintiff had not shown that water made the floor dangerously slippery, that the store had notice of that risk, or that water was present where he fell.

“Bradley’s showing is insufficient to defeat Wal-Mart’s summary judgment motion. Bradley has failed to show [1] that water makes the floor dangerously slippery and [2] that the owner knew or should have known both that water would make the floor slippery and [3] that there was water on the floor at the time the plaintiff slipped.”

In Ashworth v. Roundup Co., Burgess granted summary judgment on the federal Title VII claims under a line of authority that was later superseded. With those federal claims dismissed and no diversity jurisdiction, he declined supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.

“the Title VII actions for sexually hostile work environment and retaliation were the only federal causes of action before this court and diversity does not exist between the parties. Therefore, the Court declines to assert supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs outrage and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.”

Cautions

In Eggleston v. Pierce County, Burgess stayed federal constitutional claims arising from a search and seizure because their factual and legal issues were intertwined with a pending state criminal appeal. He remanded a state inverse-condemnation claim and did not resolve the parties' cross-motions on the merits.

“I find that the factual and legal issues which have been presented regarding Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, and at least indirectly, Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment Takings claim, are inextricably intertwined with the state court criminal appellate proceedings.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Bradley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
C07-5150FDB · 2008-03-13
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. # 12] is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s cause of action against Wal-Mart is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk is directed to enter Judgment in favor of Wal-Mart and against Plaintiff Bradley.”

Christianson v. Leavitt
C06-5520 FDB · 2007-03-20
Preliminary injunction (plaintiff) Denied

“The Court, after having reviewed all materials submitted by the parties and relied upon for authority, is fully informed and hereby denies the request for preliminary injunction and grants the Defendants’ motions to dismiss.”

Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted
Tuttle v. Standard Insurance
C05-5271FDB · 2006-08-16
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT”

Summary judgment (plaintiff) Denied
Thermion, Inc. v. Thermion Metalizing Systems Ltd.
C05-5409FDB · 2006-03-21
Preliminary injunction (defendant) Granted in part

“ORDER GRANTING CERTAIN PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIVE RELIEF TO DEFENDANT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION”

Preliminary injunction (plaintiff) Denied
Moline v. City of Castle Rock
C04-5704FDB · 2005-12-14
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“The Motion of Defendants Brandon McNew, James Queen, and Kyle McCoy for Summary Judgment [Dkt. # 14] is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s claims against them are DISMISSED with prejudice.”

Cadet Manufacturing Co. v. American Insurance
C04-5411FDB · 2005-10-05
Summary judgment (plaintiff) Granted

“The Court, finding that these legal issues may be decided upon the written briefs and evidence submitted by the parties, and having considered the motions, cross-motions, opposition briefs, summary judgment evidence, and balance of the record, finds that Cadet’s motions for partial summary judgment should be granted.”

Summary judgment (defendant) Denied

“ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING DUTY TO DEFEND, ‘TWO PREMISES LOCATION,’ INSURANCE LIMITS, and DENYING CROSS-MOTION ON NUMBER OF OCCURRENCES”

Woodyer v. United States
C02-5192FDB · 2004-03-17

High-profile admiralty negligence trial involving a whaling-protest boat, the TIGER, which twice collided with Coast Guard vessels after repeatedly refusing warnings to stay clear of a federally protected Makah tribal whale hunt off Neah Bay, Washington, in 2000. After a trial without a jury, the court found that the Coast Guard's minimal-force intervention was a discretionary, non-negligent law-enforcement response and that the protesters' conduct was the sole proximate cause of any injury, entering judgment for the United States. This was a bench-trial verdict rather than a ruling on a party motion.

Cline v. First Nationwide Mortgage Corp. (In re Cline)
C01-5570FDB · 2002-07-11
Bankruptcy appeal (debtors/creditor (cross-appeals)) Granted in part

“ORDER AFFIRMING IN PART & REVERSING IN PART BANKRUPTCY COURT’S ORDER”

Mt. St. Helens Mining & Recovery Ltd. Partnership v. United States
C99-5687FDB · 2001-11-07
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT”

Summary judgment (plaintiff) Denied
Eggleston v. Pierce County, Wash.
C98-5563 FDB · 2000-06-05
Summary judgment (both) Moot / procedural

“Having reviewed the briefs of the parties, this court is not persuaded that there are severable issues which can be resolved without violating federal and state comity. ... (1) That Plaintiffs claims pursuant to the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution are STAYED pending the disposition of the state court criminal appeal of Brian Eggleston; ... (3) That Plaintiffs claims pursuant to the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution are STAYED pending the adjudication of plaintiffs state inverse condemnation claim;”

Motions to remand (plaintiff) Granted

“That Plaintiffs inverse condemnation claim pursuant to article I, section 16 of the Washington State Constitution is REMANDED to state court for adjudication;”

Frick v. U.S. Bancorp
C99-5554FDB · 2000-06-15
Summary judgment (plaintiff) Granted

“ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING DEFENDANT MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT”

Summary judgment (defendant) Denied
City of Auburn v. U S West Communications, Inc.
C98-5595FDB · 1999-11-16
Summary judgment (plaintiff) Granted

“(1) That the plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED;”

Summary judgment (defendant) Denied

“(2) That the defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment of Dismissal is DENIED;”

Summary judgment (plaintiff) Moot / procedural

“(3) That the plaintiffs’ Motions for Partial Summary Judgment to Undergrounding and Municipal Regulation of Rights of Way are DENIED as unripe;”

Judgment on the pleadings (defendant) Moot / procedural

“(4) That the defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on the Counterclaims is DENIED as unripe;”

A historical record

Judge Burgess no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled here. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.