David G. Estudillo
How Judge Estudillo decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Strict plain-meaning statutory construction: Estudillo gives statutory terms their ordinary meaning, cross-references parallel uses of the same phrase elsewhere in the same Act, and resists reading a provision as merely 'procedural' when its text states a substantive prerequisite.
“The language 'shall not be considered to be' as used in Section 15(b)(1) ordinarily means that whatever is identified preceding such language is not that which is identified after such language. This conclusion is supported by other sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act that use the exact same language.”
Procedural preferences
Tribal-sovereignty heavy docket (W.D. Wash. at Tacoma): in two of four sampled merits cases Estudillo applied binding 9th Cir. doctrine treating a federally recognized tribe as a required/indispensable party or routing the dispute to tribal court. Counsel litigating against tribal interests in this court should expect Rule 19 / tribal-court-jurisdiction defenses to be taken seriously.
“the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that tribes are necessary parties in third party suits challenging federal agency actions where the suits may negatively implicate tribal economic or sovereign interests.”
Cautions
On a Rule 12(b)(6) statutory-tort claim, Estudillo will dismiss where the named defendant does not fit the statute's defined actors AND where injury is inadequately pleaded -- pleading both the statutory 'who' and a concrete injury matters.
“Because an infotainment system installed in a vehicle sold by Ford is not an individual, partnership, corporation, association, or the State of Washington ... and because Plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient injury, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Motions to dismiss N = 3 |
Granted: 3 | counts only |
| Summary judgment N = 2 |
Granted: 1Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding the 1986 amendment's proviso language limits Plaintiff's mother's U.S. national status to the date it was conferred and that such status is not retroactive to Plaintiff's mother's date of birth.”
“the Court finds that Shoalwater is a required party that cannot be joined and therefore GRANTS Shoalwater's motion.”
“because Plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient injury, Plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. ... Accordingly, Ford's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.”
“Defendant-Intervenor's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 52) is GRANTED and Plaintiff's motions for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 54) is DENIED. ... This case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and shall proceed under the jurisdiction of the Suquamish Tribal Court.”
“Defendant-Intervenor's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 52) is GRANTED and Plaintiff's motions for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 54) is DENIED.”