Lonny R. Suko

How Judge Suko rules, drawn from 26 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Court
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington
Position
District judge
Status
Senior status
Appointed by
George W. Bush (Republican)
Commissioned
July 16, 2003
Education
Washington State University (B.A., 1965); University of Idaho College of Law (J.D., 1968)
Signed orders read
26

About Judge Suko

Lonny R. Suko is a judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington. Appointed by President George W. Bush, Judge Suko received a commission on July 16, 2003. Judge Suko assumed senior status on November 1, 2013.

Judge Suko's practices and standing orders

The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Suko's own (checked October 9, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).

Standing orders for every case in this court

Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 9, 2026).

Key rules from these orders · The court's local rules ↗

How Judge Suko decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

In a First Amendment retaliation claim by a state employee over a salary reduction, the judge treated statements made pursuant to an employee's official job duties as categorically unprotected, applying Garcetti v. Ceballos to end the claim regardless of the employee's motive for speaking.

“We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”

Denying summary judgment on a disability-discrimination claim, the judge found that without a precise line between an employee's essential and non-essential job duties, the reasonableness of an employer's proposed accommodation could not be decided as a matter of law and had to go to trial.

“Without a precise delineation between essential functions and non-essential functions, the court cannot rule at this time, as a matter of law, whether the eight hour a day limitation offered by the Defendant was a reasonable accommodation.”

Reviewing a Social Security disability denial, the judge required the ALJ to do more than restate a step-two severity finding when discounting a medical opinion's consistency with the record: a generic cross-reference to an earlier finding does not satisfy the regulation's separate consistency analysis.

“The ALJ references her step two findings that Plaintiff's PTSD was not severe and her PRT findings that all four areas in the PRT had no more than mild limitations ... this hardly raises to the level of discussing consistency.”

In Stephanie G. M. v. Bisignano, Suko ordered an immediate benefits award after repeated administrative proceedings because uncontradicted mental-health opinions supported disability and another hearing would serve no useful purpose.

“the record as a whole indicates that Plaintiff was disabled.”

Procedural preferences

In Riley v. Buchmann, Suko granted an unopposed summary-judgment motion after the plaintiff failed to respond. He cited the local rule permitting a court to treat non-response as consent and found that the undisputed facts showed the officers had not used excessive force.

“A failure to timely file a memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to any motion may be considered by the court as consent on the part of the party failing to file such memorandum to the entry of an order adverse to the party in default.”

In Murdoch v. Edgar, Suko entered default judgment as a discovery sanction after the defendant failed to comply with a compel order and did not respond to the sanctions motion. The earlier order had expressly warned that default judgment was possible.

“Defendant was expressly cautioned that failure to comply with that order might result in the imposition of one or more of the sanctions specified in Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A), including default judgment. The entry of default judgment is appropriate.”

Cautions

In Hoisington v. Williams, Suko dismissed a federal habeas petition as untimely under AEDPA and rejected equitable tolling based on the petitioner’s self-represented status and claimed lack of notice of the filing deadline.

“A petitioner's pro se status, ignorance of the law, and lack of representation during the applicable filing period do not constitute extraordinary circumstances justifying equitable tolling because such circumstances are not extraordinary.”

In Stephens v. City of Spokane, Suko denied class certification because the proposed class did not satisfy numerosity or typicality; one proposed representative had paid a fine under the challenged ordinance and the other had not. He also granted the defendants summary judgment on the underlying claims.

“Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy the numerosity requirement, and the requirement that the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims and defenses of the class since one representative paid a fine and the other one did not.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

United States v. Pollock
2:13-cr-02115-LRS · 2015-04-23
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“Before the Court is the Defendant's unopposed Motion to Dismiss the Information with Prejudice (ECF No. 14). For the reasons set forth in the motion, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion (ECF No. 14) is GRANTED.”

Entler v. Clark
2:12-cv-05076-LRS · 2012-09-07
Motion for reconsideration (plaintiff) Denied

“At this time, IT IS ORDERED Plaintiff's Motion for Revision, ECF No. 9, is DENIED.”

Riley v. Buchmann
2:06-cv-00233-LRS · 2008-03-03
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment (Ct. Rec. 26) is GRANTED. The undisputed facts reveal that Defendants did not use excessive force against the Plaintiff.”

United States v. Sjodin
2:09-cr-00080-LRS · 2009-08-12
Motions to dismiss (plaintiff) Granted

“Plaintiff's ‘Motion For Order Granting Leave of Court to Dismiss Indictment Without Prejudice’ (Ct. Rec. 34) is GRANTED. The Indictment is DISMISSED without prejudice.”

United States v. Zack
2:10-cr-02130-LRS · 2011-09-21
Motion for reconsideration (defendant) Denied

“Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration, ECF No. 78, is respectfully DENIED.”

Carrie D. v. Kijakazi
1:20-cv-03227-LRS · 2022-06-06
Social security appeal (plaintiff) Granted in part

“Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 18, is GRANTED, in part, and the matter is REMANDED to the Commissioner for additional proceedings. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 23, is DENIED.”

Vander Houwen v. United States
2:09-cv-03019-LRS · 2009-05-08
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“the State Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment (Ct. Rec. 7) is GRANTED and they are DISMISSED from this action. 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 claims against the State Defendants are DISMISSED with prejudice ... State law tort claims against the State Defendants are DISMISSED without prejudice.”

Jenkins v. Campose
4:14-cv-05111-LRS · 2016-03-03
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment (ECF No. 37) is GRANTED and Defendants are awarded judgment on all of the claims pled in Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 9).”

Carroll v. State of Washington (DSHS)
2:04-cv-00361-LRS · 2008-01-11
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“IT IS ORDERED Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Ct. Rec. 46, filed December 3, 2007 is GRANTED. Plaintiff's claims and this lawsuit are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”

Murdoch v. Edgar
2:08-cv-03057-LRS · 2009-05-12
Motion for sanctions (plaintiff) Granted

“Plaintiffs' Motion For Sanctions (Ct. Rec. 17) is GRANTED. ... The District Executive is directed to enter a default judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs and against the Defendant in the sum of $443,772.00.”

Summary judgment (plaintiff) Moot / procedural

“Plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment (Ct. Rec. 22) is DISMISSED as being moot due to the entry of default judgment as a sanction for Defendant's failure to comply with the ‘Order Granting Motion To Compel.’”

Sliman v. Boise Cascade, L.L.C.
2:06-cv-00320-LRS · 2008-01-22
Summary judgment (defendant) Denied

“Defendant's ‘Supplemental’ Motion For Summary Judgment (Ct. Rec. 34) is DENIED”

Motions to strike (plaintiff) Denied

“Plaintiff's Motion To Strike Affidavit Of William Schroeder (Ct. Rec. 47) is DENIED.”

Evenson v. Knezovich
2:08-cv-00288-JPH · 2008-11-17
Class certification (plaintiff) Denied

“IT IS ORDERED the Motions for Class Certification (Ct. Rec. 4) and for Appointment of Counsel (Ct. Rec. 5) are DENIED.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

  • As a senior judge since 2013, his current caseload (2021-2024 filings) consists almost entirely of Social Security disability and SSI appeals from the Yakima, Richland/Pasco, and Spokane divisions, reviewed on cross-motions for summary judgment or a stipulated remand.
  • His earlier active-tenure docket (reflected in the published-opinion set above) was a broader general district docket: civil rights, employment, habeas corpus, products liability, insurance, and criminal cases.

Pending matters in the official report

Reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act, as of March 31, 2026.

Motions pending more than six months0
Bench trials submitted more than six months0
Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months0
Social Security appeals pending more than six months0
Civil cases pending more than three years0
ReportMotions over six monthsCases over three years
Mar 202600
Sep 202501
Mar 202501
Sep 202401
Mar 202400
Sep 202300
Mar 202300
Sep 202200
Mar 202200
Sep 202100
Mar 202100
Sep 202000

A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.

How long civil cases take in this court

For the whole of U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, not for Judge Suko: median time from filing to disposition of the civil cases the court closed in the 12 months ending September 30, 2025, as reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.

CasesMedian time
All civil cases closed6206.2 months
Closed with no court action564.6 months
Closed before pretrial5546.3 months
Closed during or after pretrial3not reported
Closed during trial7not reported
12 months endingCases closedMedian time
Sep 20256206.2 months
Sep 20247007.2 months
Sep 20236948.2 months
Sep 20228908.3 months
Sep 20218529 months
Sep 20209637.4 months
Sep 20199549.4 months

The table leaves out prisoner petitions, land condemnations, deportation reviews, recovery of overpayments and enforcement of judgments, and reports no median for fewer than 10 cases. A district that closed a large multidistrict litigation in the period shows very large counts and long medians for that year. Source: Table C-5, U.S. District Courts (spreadsheet).

Draft for Judge Suko with the record in hand

Ezel grounds your drafting and research in this profile: what has persuaded Judge Suko, and what has not, cited to the signed orders.

Opens in Ezel Pro.

  • Grounded in Judge Suko's own signed orders
  • Cites every source it relies on, so you can verify it
  • Chat, drafting and research in one workspace