Timothy B. Tomasi
How Judge Tomasi decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On standing, he applies the injury-in-fact requirement rigorously even where a statute's text does not expressly mention it -- a plaintiff cannot escape the constitutional injury requirement just because a cause-of-action statute lists other qualifications instead.
“The standing doctrine is one of the fundamental mechanisms by which the separation of powers among the branches is mediated. ... the Court does not believe the Vermont Supreme Court would depart from its past precedent on the issue that matters here and permit the Legislature to waive the injury requirement altogether.”
In a reliance-based claim (misrepresentation, consumer protection), he holds plaintiffs to the actual evidentiary record rather than a plausible narrative -- a chain of inferences about what someone must have believed, however sympathetic, will not survive summary judgment without direct evidence of the belief and the reliance on it.
“Plaintiff’s argument that Patricia wanted to see a medical doctor exclusively ... has virtually no evidentiary support and is wholly speculative. Such a trail of conjecture goes well beyond the realm of permissible inference and enters into pure speculation.”
Reviewing an agency rulemaking, he reads a legislative directive to 'reduce' or 'minimize' a harm as calling for meaningful mitigation, not elimination -- an agency's rule need not adopt every possible protective measure to satisfy legislative intent, so long as it makes a genuine, targeted effort.
“The Court does not presume that, by omitting any standard, the Legislature intended the most scrutinizing standard possible... the Rule now is effective, and it imposes many carrots and sticks that should help to reduce or minimize conflicts with landowners.”
On an issue-preclusion defense grounded in a prior child-protection proceeding, he looks closely at whether the earlier tribunal's procedural posture, incentives, and scope of evidence actually match the current case before treating its findings as conclusive -- a broadly worded prior finding will not automatically foreclose a claim that is procedurally and evidentiarily different.
“[B]ecause the litigation controlled by DCF and with very different interests at play may not have afforded R.W. a full opportunity to contest the issue, and because the Court is not convinced that it would be fair to bind R.W. and A.M. to that prior determination, issue preclusion does not apply in this instance.”
Procedural preferences
On discovery motions, he expects counsel to have genuinely conferred in good faith before filing, not just exchanged a token letter or email -- a motion to compel or for a protective order filed without that meaningful back-and-forth is likely to be denied without prejudice rather than decided on the merits.
“Generally, the Court expects that counsel will ‘converse, confer, compare views, consult and deliberate’ ... in advance of seeking court involvement. ... Usually, one or even a few unproductive letters do not meet the requirement that counsel confer.”
He narrows overbroad discovery requests to what is genuinely relevant and proportional rather than denying them outright, and will shift costs and fees onto a party who simply ignores a discovery request and the resulting motion altogether.
“Accordingly, the motion to compel is granted as to requests 41 and 42 but limited to ... Plaintiffs’ requests are virtually guaranteed to produce an enormous volume of irrelevant records on the vague hope that something relevant might get reeled in as well.”
Before entertaining a request to enforce an award beyond what arbitrators actually decided, he confirms the request was not already presented to and rejected by the arbitrators themselves -- courts have very limited power to expand on an arbitration panel's own resolution of an issue.
“The Court has only a limited scope of review on an issue that was before the arbitrators and on which they issued a decision. ... Mountainside’s request for an award of interest seeks relief that the arbitrators have already rejected.”
Cautions
A party that seeks emergency relief mid-way through an ongoing administrative proceeding, rather than waiting for a final decision, will generally be turned away regardless of the constitutional flavor of the underlying claim -- exhaustion and finality doctrines apply with real force even to due-process arguments.
“Generally, when an administrative process is under way, it must come to a final resolution before appellate review in court may be available. ... Mr. Osman has not exhausted the administrative process.”
A request for attorneys' fees or other relief raised for the first time late in the case -- in a reply brief, or after judgment, without having been pled -- draws a skeptical eye and is likely to be rejected as untimely on top of any substantive defect.
“Not until now has the Auditor argued that the AG is directly responsible for paying the Auditor’s attorney fees ... A review of the complaint, though, reveals no such claim for fees.”
Filings that include gratuitous, embarrassing personal material about an opposing party -- unrelated to any live issue in the case -- will be struck and sealed even where the filer says it was offered in good faith.
“It is clear that the offensive allegations are irrelevant to the substance of the filings in which they appear ... they have no apparent function other than to embarrass or anticipatorily attack Ms. Stephens’ credibility.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment against Defendants Longe, Murray, Lavoie, Merriam, and Stover is denied. Plaintiff shall have thirty days from the date of this order to effectuate service upon those Defendants.”
“the State’s Motion to Dismiss relative to Defendants Lillicrap, and Jensen is granted. It is denied without prejudice as to Ms. Hamel.”
“the Court concludes that the Plaintiff does not prevail on its CFA claim. On the remaining claims, as noted at hearing, it is entitled to damages in the amount of $59,959.74.”
“Future Planning’s motion to dismiss is granted to the extent that the Court determines that Plaintiffs are not real parties in interest to this case. The case will be dismissed in 30 days unless real parties in interest join this litigation as parties plaintiff.”
“In light of the foregoing, the motion for summary judgment is denied.”
“Defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted, in part, and denied, in part. Plaintiff may amend the complaint within 30 days.”
“Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on these misrepresentation-based claims, including Count 11 ... and Count 15 ... Defendants are further entitled to summary judgment on Counts 2, 3, and 4 (medical malpractice) but only to the extent that those counts include misrepresentation framed as an item of medical malpractice.”
“Plaintiff’s motion to compel is denied, except as to the request for native format evidence, which is denied without prejudice.”
“Because Mr. Paige has not alleged any personal injury as demanded by the standing doctrine, he lacks standing, and this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case. Dismissal is warranted.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction is denied.”
“the Court confirms the arbitrators' supplemental award granting Mountainside prejudgment interest in the amount of $510,905. The Court denies Mountainsides request for additional interest and attorneys' fees.”
“The Court denies Mountainsides request for additional interest and attorneys' fees.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Osman’s motion for summary judgment is denied, and the State’s motion is granted. This case is remanded to the Parole Board for continued revocation proceedings.”
“In light of the foregoing, the Auditor’s motion is denied.”
“This motion is denied.”
“Ms. Stephens’ motion to dismiss counterclaims is granted, in part, and denied, in part. Ms. Gilmour’s IIED and defamation counterclaims are dismissed. Her warranty of habitability, retaliatory eviction, and abuse of process claims are not dismissed.”
“Ms. Stephens’ motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied.”
“Ms. Stephens’ motion to strike is granted, in part and denied, in part. The Court will seal the filings identified above.”
Put Judge Tomasi's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Tomasi actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Tomasi's own signed orders and cites them.