Timothy B. Tomasi
How Judge Tomasi rules, drawn from 30 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Tomasi
Timothy B. Tomasi has served as a Vermont Superior Court judge since his appointment in 2010. He previously served in the Vermont Attorney General’s Office and as an assistant U.S. attorney for the District of Vermont. He earned degrees from Columbia College and Columbia Law School.
Judge Tomasi's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Tomasi's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
How Judge Tomasi decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In Paige's challenge to a Vermont statute, Tomasi held that the Legislature could not dispense with the injury requirement for standing under controlling state precedent.
“The standing doctrine is one of the fundamental mechanisms by which the separation of powers among the branches is mediated. ... the Court does not believe the Vermont Supreme Court would depart from its past precedent on the issue that matters here and permit the Legislature to waive the injury requirement altogether.”
In Duran's medical-center suit, Tomasi rejected the plaintiff's proposed chain of inferences about Patricia's preferences because the record provided virtually no evidence for it.
“Plaintiff’s argument that Patricia wanted to see a medical doctor exclusively ... has virtually no evidentiary support and is wholly speculative. Such a trail of conjecture goes well beyond the realm of permissible inference and enters into pure speculation.”
In Protect Our Wildlife's rulemaking challenge, Tomasi found the agency's rule made a targeted effort to reduce conflicts with landowners, even though it did not eliminate them.
“The Court does not presume that, by omitting any standard, the Legislature intended the most scrutinizing standard possible... the Rule now is effective, and it imposes many carrots and sticks that should help to reduce or minimize conflicts with landowners.”
In R.W. v. J.M., Tomasi rejected an issue-preclusion defense based on a prior child-protection proceeding because the earlier litigation had different interests and might not have given the parties a full and fair chance to contest the issue.
“[B]ecause the litigation controlled by DCF and with very different interests at play may not have afforded R.W. a full opportunity to contest the issue, and because the Court is not convinced that it would be fair to bind R.W. and A.M. to that prior determination, issue preclusion does not apply in this instance.”
In Johnson's records-access case, Tomasi denied dismissal of a novel mandamus claim so the parties could develop evidence bearing on the unresolved legal question.
“Under Vermont’s dismissal standard, the wiser course at present is to deny dismissal so that Ms. Johnson’s claim may be ‘explored in the light of facts as developed by the evidence.’”
Procedural preferences
In Wood's discovery dispute, Tomasi denied both sides' motions without prejudice because counsel had not conferred meaningfully before seeking court intervention.
“Generally, the Court expects that counsel will ‘converse, confer, compare views, consult and deliberate’ ... in advance of seeking court involvement. ... Usually, one or even a few unproductive letters do not meet the requirement that counsel confer.”
In R.W. v. J.M., Tomasi narrowed an overbroad document request to relevant material, granted one motion to compel and granted another only in part.
“Accordingly, the motion to compel is granted as to requests 41 and 42 but limited to ... Plaintiffs’ requests are virtually guaranteed to produce an enormous volume of irrelevant records on the vague hope that something relevant might get reeled in as well.”
In Mountainside's insurance-arbitration case, Tomasi confirmed the supplemental interest award but refused to add interest the arbitrators had already considered and rejected.
“The Court has only a limited scope of review on an issue that was before the arbitrators and on which they issued a decision. ... Mountainside’s request for an award of interest seeks relief that the arbitrators have already rejected.”
Reconsideration is reserved for overlooked controlling authority, material facts, or manifest error; it is not a second opportunity to present arguments that were available before the original ruling.
“A party may not wait for reconsideration to ‘wheel out all its artillery.’”
Cautions
In Osman v. Vermont Parole Board, Tomasi denied the petitioner’s summary-judgment motion because the parole revocation process had not reached a final decision and the administrative process had not been exhausted.
“Generally, when an administrative process is under way, it must come to a final resolution before appellate review in court may be available. ... Mr. Osman has not exhausted the administrative process.”
In the State Auditor's fee dispute with the Attorney General, Tomasi denied fees after finding the Auditor had not pleaded the claim in the underlying case and had shown no other basis for the award.
“Not until now has the Auditor argued that the AG is directly responsible for paying the Auditor’s attorney fees ... A review of the complaint, though, reveals no such claim for fees.”
In Stephens v. Gilmour, Tomasi granted a motion to strike in part and sealed filings containing embarrassing personal allegations unrelated to the issues before the court.
“It is clear that the offensive allegations are irrelevant to the substance of the filings in which they appear ... they have no apparent function other than to embarrass or anticipatorily attack Ms. Stephens’ credibility.”
In Stephens v. Gilmour, Tomasi denied permission for an interlocutory appeal because immediate review would delay an efficient resolution of the parties’ dispute.
“Both parties are entitled to a ‘just, speedy, and inexpensive’ determination of this case. Interlocutory review now would seriously undermine those interests.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment against Defendants Longe, Murray, Lavoie, Merriam, and Stover is denied. Plaintiff shall have thirty days from the date of this order to effectuate service upon those Defendants.”
“the State’s Motion to Dismiss relative to Defendants Lillicrap, and Jensen is granted. It is denied without prejudice as to Ms. Hamel.”
“the Court concludes that the Plaintiff does not prevail on its CFA claim. On the remaining claims, as noted at hearing, it is entitled to damages in the amount of $59,959.74.”
“Future Planning’s motion to dismiss is granted to the extent that the Court determines that Plaintiffs are not real parties in interest to this case. The case will be dismissed in 30 days unless real parties in interest join this litigation as parties plaintiff.”
“In light of the foregoing, the motion for summary judgment is denied.”
“Defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted, in part, and denied, in part. Plaintiff may amend the complaint within 30 days.”
“Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on these misrepresentation-based claims, including Count 11 ... and Count 15 ... Defendants are further entitled to summary judgment on Counts 2, 3, and 4 (medical malpractice) but only to the extent that those counts include misrepresentation framed as an item of medical malpractice.”
“Plaintiff’s motion to compel is denied, except as to the request for native format evidence, which is denied without prejudice.”
“Because Mr. Paige has not alleged any personal injury as demanded by the standing doctrine, he lacks standing, and this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case. Dismissal is warranted.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction is denied.”
“the Court confirms the arbitrators' supplemental award granting Mountainside prejudgment interest in the amount of $510,905. The Court denies Mountainsides request for additional interest and attorneys' fees.”
“The Court denies Mountainsides request for additional interest and attorneys' fees.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Osman’s motion for summary judgment is denied, and the State’s motion is granted. This case is remanded to the Parole Board for continued revocation proceedings.”
“In light of the foregoing, the Auditor’s motion is denied.”
“This motion is denied.”
“Ms. Stephens’ motion to dismiss counterclaims is granted, in part, and denied, in part. Ms. Gilmour’s IIED and defamation counterclaims are dismissed. Her warranty of habitability, retaliatory eviction, and abuse of process claims are not dismissed.”
“Ms. Stephens’ motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied.”
“Ms. Stephens’ motion to strike is granted, in part and denied, in part. The Court will seal the filings identified above.”
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