Benjamin D. Battles
How Judge Battles rules, drawn from 24 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Battles
Benjamin D. Battles joined the Vermont Superior Court in 2023. Before becoming a judge, he served as Vermont’s solicitor general and led the Attorney General’s general counsel and administrative law division. He previously clerked for federal district and appellate judges and practiced civil litigation.
Judge Battles's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Battles's own (checked October 11, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 11, 2026).
How Judge Battles decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In a summary-judgment fight over a landowner's affirmative defense, he looks past the bare fact of a recorded lien or mortgage to whether it was ever actually enforced against the party claiming injury: an encumbrance that sits dormant in the land records for years does not, by itself, start a limitations clock.
“Given that the mortgage appears to have sat in the land records from 2008 until the Newberrys inquired about it sometime prior to 2021, it does not appear to have been any type of active possession”
In MacEachern v. Mellett, Battles dismissed a slander-of-title counterclaim because the statements reported in a newspaper did not concern the defendants’ title.
“None of these statements concern defendants’ title.”
In Musty's challenge to Ryegate's road discontinuance, Battles upheld the town's weighing of quarry safety and limited public need against access to the discontinued roads.
“It was also within the Town's discretion to conclude that this concern, coupled with the general lack of public need for a town highway in the quarry, outweighed the public's interest in being able to use the discontinued roads”
Procedural preferences
In Mountain View Land Lease v. Avery, Battles vacated a writ of possession for a mobile home because two people with a direct stake in possession had not been joined as indispensable parties.
“The court concludes that in these circumstances, Ms. Kinsella and her daughter are indispensable parties, as a writ of possession for the mobile home cannot in 'equity and good conscience' be issued without joining them as parties to the case.”
In MacEachern v. Mellett, Battles struck a sur-reply and supporting affidavit that the defendants had filed without leave of court.
“The court declines to consider the sur-reply and supporting affidavit filed by defendants. ... The motion to strike the sur-reply is accordingly granted”
In Lafayette's anti-SLAPP fee dispute, Battles allocated time entries by how much work related to the compensable motion rather than awarding the entire fee request.
“the court will award defendants 100% of the 2/17 and 2/18 time entries ($4,032.88); 50% of the 2/16, 4/1, 4/2, and 4/3 entries ($2,358.32); and 33% of the 2/19, 2/26, 3/4, 3/5, and 3/6 entries”
In Seedway's pretrial discovery dispute, Battles denied a request to deem late-served requests for admission admitted because the discovery cutoff had not been reopened.
“The court accordingly denies Seedway’s motion to have the requests deem admitted. Northeast’s motion for a protective order is thus moot.”
Cautions
In Lafayette v. Abrami, Battles imposed a limited filing restriction after the plaintiff repeatedly submitted invented cases or misstated holdings despite warnings; the court found lesser sanctions inadequate.
“In this litigation, plaintiff has repeatedly presented the court with filings that misrepresent the holdings of existing cases or cite to nonexistent cases. ... no other sanction besides a pre-filing injunction would be adequate to protect the courts and other parties.”
In Lovell's public-records case, Battles found that disclosure of some requested materials could taint the local jury pool, but required release of the arrest and charging records expressly excluded from the exemption.
“the court concludes based on the summary judgment record that it is more likely than not that pretrial disclosure of the requested materials could taint the relatively small jury pool ... This provision unambiguously carves out from the Town's cited exemption records that merely reflect Mr. Lovell's initial arrest and subsequent criminal charge. These records must be made public.”
In Rodgers v. Town of Glover, Battles denied a preliminary injunction because the plaintiffs had not shown that maintaining the status quo until a decision on the merits would cause irreparable harm.
“Plaintiffs have not shown they will be irreparably harmed by a continuation of the status quo until the case is resolved on the merits.”
A contractual fee request should expose enough billing detail for a reasonableness review and remain proportionate to the result achieved; opaque entries and a modest recovery can support a substantial reduction even when fees are authorized.
“Attorney Simon's redactions make it difficult to analyze the reasonableness of his billings. And a fee award of approximately $14,000 following a judgment of less than $50 strikes the court as excessive.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“The motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART. The court grants Ms. Kinsella relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) and vacates the writ of possession issued by the court on August 28, 2024.”
“Accordingly, the court denies the motion to strike defendants' counterclaim under the anti-SLAPP statute.”
“Accordingly, the court grants the motion to dismiss defendants' counterclaim under Rule 12(b)(6).”
“Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on their nuisance claim is denied. ... Summary judgment on this issue is accordingly denied. ... Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on this claim is denied. ... Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on their quiet title claim is denied.”
“Defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs' timber trespass claim is granted.”
“the motion to dismiss the timber trespass claim is accordingly moot.”
“Plaintiffs' motion to strike defendants' sur-reply and affidavit (Motion 16) is GRANTED.”
“Defendants' motion to allow the sur-reply (Motion 17) is DENIED.”
“The motion for judicial notice (Motion 5) is DENIED.”
“The motions in limine (Motions 6 and 9) are DENIED.”
“The motion for summary judgment (Motion 7) is GRANTED IN PART.”
“The motion to quash the subpoena (Motion 11) is GRANTED.”
“The motion to amend the complaint is GRANTED.”
“The motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The motion is granted with respect to plaintiffs' claims for breach of warranty and slander of title but denied with respect to plaintiffs' claim for trespass.”
“The Town's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and Peter's cross-motion for summary judgment is DENIED.”
“The motion for a preliminary injunction is DENIED.”
“DCF's motion to dismiss (Motion 6) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The motion is granted with respect to Counts 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11. The motion is denied with respect to Counts 3 and 5.”
“Lund's motion to dismiss (Motion 8) is DENIED.”
“Copley's special motion to strike, or in the alternative, for judgment on the pleadings (Motion 13) is DENIED.”
“The motion for attorney's fees (Motion 8) is GRANTED.”
“The court additionally sanctions plaintiff by imposing a limited pre-filing injunction. Plaintiff is enjoined from filing any pleading, complaint, motion, letter or other document in the Lamoille Civil Division unless represented by an attorney ... unless plaintiff first obtains permission for the proposed filing from the assigned superior court judge.”
“The motions for summary judgment are GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART as set forth above (Motions 1, 2, 5).”
“Plaintiff's motions under Rule 56(h) are DENIED (Motions 6, 7).”
“The court did not err in denying petitioner’s motion to reconsider on this ground. ... The court appropriately concluded that petitioner sought to relitigate issues that had already been decided and acted within its discretion in declining to grant reconsideration on this basis.”
“The motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. Defendant Marie Rowden is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s negligence claim but not on plaintiff’s defamation claim.”
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