Fred I. Parker
Judge Parker no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Parker decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
He favored arbitration where a broad collective-bargaining clause facially covered the dispute, leaving procedural objections and waiver defenses for the arbitrator rather than deciding them as merits barriers.
“In addition, the issue of whether UPI’s failure to follow the grievance procedure barred arbitration is a question of “procedural arbitrability” that should be submitted to the arbitrator.”
He allowed fraud-related claims to survive pleading review when the complaint alleged concrete facts showing knowledge or reckless disregard and substantial assistance, but required RICO predicate acts to be pleaded with particularity.
“The motion to dismiss as to Count IV is accordingly GRANTED, with leave to amend the complaint or supplement the pleadings, should plaintiffs choose to pursue the RICO count.”
Procedural preferences
He enforced removal rules from the face of the complaint. A defendant could not create federal jurisdiction by pointing to possible federal theories when the plaintiff chose state causes of action.
“In short, a plaintiff “may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law.””
On venue, he reduced the weight given to the plaintiff's chosen forum when the operative events, witnesses, and proof had no meaningful connection to Vermont.
“Aside from plaintiff’s present residence in this state, Vermont has no connection to the action.”
Cautions
He enforced scheduling orders against late motions. A party seeking amendment or more discovery after the deadline needed a concrete showing of good cause, not only the general policy favoring amendment.
“The Motion was filed untimely, and plaintiff has not shown good cause why the motion should be allowed out of time.”
Warranty pleading had to match the alleged defect. Attacking counseling or an overall diet program did not state a goods-warranty claim without alleging that the food itself was unwholesome or unsafe.
“Plaintiffs do not allege that the goods themselves — the food items — were unwholesome or unsafe for human consumption.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Defendant’s motion, insofar as it requests a transfer of venue, is GRANTED.”
“Defendants’ motion to dismiss. and for summary judgment (Paper # 17 in the Court’s docket) is GRANTED.”
“Plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment (Paper # 24) is DENIED.”
“The matter is remanded to state court and costs are awarded to the plaintiffs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).”
“Defendant has also moved to dismiss the action for failure to state a claim. That motion is denied in light of the remand order.”
“Defendant’s motion to Dismiss plaintiffs’ breach of warranty claims is GRANTED.”
“Insofar as the complaint states a claim for payment of fees pursuant to the Burlington Street Franchise Fee Ordinance, NET’s motion to dismiss is granted.”
“We agree that the present action should be stayed on abstention grounds in deference to the pending Florida state court action and accordingly GRANT the motion to stay.”
“Therefore, defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.”
“The Board’s decision is upheld, and defendant is entitled to summary judgment.”
“Defendants in these companion cases each moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ lender liability actions. The motions were consolidated, converted to motions for summary judgment, and heard by the Court on April 1,1991. Both motions are hereby GRANTED.”
“Defendant Dartmouth Bank’s motion to dismiss (docket # 24) is DENIED IN PART AND GRANTED IN PART. Counts IV and IX of the complaint are dismissed. Plaintiffs are given leave to file an amended complaint or supplemental pleadings on or before February 21,1992 with respect to those counts.”
“The present order renders consideration of Dartmouth’s Motion for Protective Order in the Nature of Stay of Discovery (docket #23) and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Continuance to Obtain Discovery (docket #33) unnecessary; said motions are accordingly DENIED as moot.”
“It is hereby ORDERED that defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Paper # 14) is GRANTED as to the state FEPA claim, and DENIED as to the federal Title VII claim.”
“It is further ORDERED that plaintiffs Motions to Amend Complaint (Paper # 23) and to Extend Discovery (Paper # 29) are DENIED.”
“Claimant’s Motion to Dismiss and for Return of the 1979 Cadillac Sedan Deville (Paper # 4) is hereby DENIED.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
A randomized sample of ten terminated cases filed during Parker's District of Vermont tenure includes insurance, labor, prisoner civil-rights and habeas, product-liability, fraud, defamation, and general personal-injury matters. The sample supports case-duration and administrative-disposition descriptions but not motion timing because the entry streams are empty.
A historical record
Judge Parker no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.