Franklin S. Billings Jr.
Judge Billings no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.
How Judge Billings decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In insurance-coverage disputes, he separated the insurer's broad duty to defend from fact-dependent indemnity questions: the possibility of coverage was enough to require a defense even though notice, occurrence, and other indemnity facts remained disputed.
“Given that none of the defendants has established that the government’s claims are excluded from coverage, the insurers have a duty to defend plaintiff.”
He treated substantial attainment of a decree's purpose and changed market conditions as sufficient grounds to end continuing judicial supervision, focusing on whether the original competitive threat still existed.
“Applying the standard to the facts of this case, the Court finds changed circumstances sufficient to warrant termination of the 1981 Consent Decree in its entirety.”
Procedural preferences
He applied exhaustion strictly in military-personnel litigation, requiring the service member to complete available internal corrective procedures before a civilian court would intervene.
“A plaintiff seeking review of a military promotion or retention decision must exhaust his or her military remedies before coming to the court.”
He enforced the well-pleaded-complaint rule at removal: federal issues raised only in a counterclaim did not support federal jurisdiction, and he awarded removal costs when the complaint itself presented no federal question.
“The case law clearly teaches that grounds for removal must inhere in the plaintiff’s claim, rather than in a defense or counterclaim.”
Cautions
Equitable tolling did not excuse delay after the obstacle ended. A claimant who timely filed a defective action still had to refile within the remaining limitations period once that case was dismissed.
“Even so, the limitations period was not tolled indefinitely, but began to run again once plaintiffs suit was dismissed on March 3, 1992.”
For preliminary trademark relief, speculation about overlap was insufficient; the applicant had to show likely consumer confusion and irreparable injury in the actual markets and services at issue.
“After considering each of these factors, the Court concludes that there is not a sufficient likelihood of confusion among consumers to find that a likelihood of irreparable harm exists.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the reasons herein stated, the 1981 Consent Decree is no longer warranted. Consequently, the Court hereby ORDERS it terminated.”
“Consequently, defendant’s motion to dismiss this action on the grounds that the statute of limitations period had expired is hereby GRANTED.”
“In light of this ruling, we need not consider defendant’s alternative motion to transfer this matter to the Western District of Oklahoma.”
“defendants’ motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED and Sherburne’s cross-motion for summary judgment DENIED.”
“defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice.”
“Based on the foregoing conclusions, the Court hereby GRANTS plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the duty to defend issue, DENIES all parties’ summary judgment motions regarding the duty to indemnify, and GRANTS defendants’ motion to strike with respect to paragraph. 3 of the Prindiville affidavit.”
“Finally, the Court adopts the Magistrate’s recommendation that Hartford’s and Liberty Mutual’s motion to strike be granted in part.”
“defendant’s motion for summary judgment is hereby DENIED, and plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED.”
“For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and the defendant is directed to make disbursements in the stated order of priority not to exceed the amount of the judgment, with interest.”
“Consequently, plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction is hereby DENIED.”
“Having found no basis upon which this case could be rightfully removed, we hereby REMAND this action to the state court and costs are awarded to plaintiffs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).”
“There being genuine issues of material fact still in dispute, the Court hereby DENIES plaintiffs and defendant’s motions for summary judgment.”
“As to plaintiffs motion to strike, the Court GRANTS it in part and DENIES it in part.”
“As to plaintiffs motion to enlarge time to file a motion to compel arbitration, the Court deems the motion premature and declines to rule on it at the present time.”
“plaintiffs’ motion to confirm the arbitration award and order judgment is hereby GRANTED. The arbitration award dated November • 16, 1991, is. hereby CONFIRMED”
“the Court hereby GRANTS plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and DENIES defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
A randomized sample of ten terminated cases filed from 1988 through 1991 shows a mixed historical docket: contracts, employment civil rights, bankruptcy review, personal injury, insurance, patent, and federal-program litigation. All ten cases predate electronic docket-entry coverage; the sample therefore supports case-duration and administrative-disposition descriptions, not motion timing.
A historical record
Judge Billings no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.