Christina Clair Reiss
How Judge Reiss decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On dismissal motions, keeps closely related but legally distinct claims (e.g. a statutory retaliation claim alongside common-law contract theories) alive individually rather than dismissing a complaint wholesale -- claims fail or survive on their own doctrinal footing, not by association with weaker co-pleaded claims.
“the court GRANTS Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and wrongful termination in violation of public policy; and ... DENIES Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claim for retaliation in violation of VOSHA.”
On preliminary-injunction motions, requires concrete evidence of irreparable harm and a likelihood of success, not just sympathetic facts; will find the equities in equipoise rather than granting relief on an incomplete record.
“Because Plaintiffs do not satisfy the exacting standards for an "extraordinary remedy" of preliminary relief ... the court DENIES their second motion for a preliminary injunction.”
Procedural preferences
Consistently grants self-represented plaintiffs leave to amend after a dismissal, even where the underlying pleading defects are substantial, consistent with Second Circuit guidance favoring at least one amendment opportunity for pro se litigants.
“Plaintiff may file an Amended Complaint on or before March 29, 2024. Failure to file an Amended Complaint by this deadline shall result in dismissal of the case.”
Cautions
Screens sovereign-citizen-style and other jurisdictionally deficient pro se filings promptly on a Rule 12(b)(1)/12(b)(5) footing rather than reaching the merits.
“In the absence subject matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the case. Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) (Doc. 9) is GRANTED.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant's motion to dismiss (Doc. 12) and GRANTS Plaintiff leave to amend its Complaint within twenty (20) days.”
“For the reasons stated above, Defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. 9) is GRANTED because the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff may file an Amended Complaint on or before March 29, 2024.”
“Because Plaintiffs do not satisfy the exacting standards for an "extraordinary remedy" of preliminary relief ... the court DENIES their second motion for a preliminary injunction. (Doc. 84.)”
“The court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendant's motion to dismiss (Doc. 3) as follows: (1) the court GRANTS Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and wrongful termination in violation of public policy; and (2) the court DENIES Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claim for retaliation in violation of VOSHA.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the motions to dismiss (Docs. 36, 37) filed by D40 and the Town are GRANTED.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the court DENIES Medline's motion to dismiss. (Doc. 40.)”
“For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Legarde's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction (Doc. 10) is DENIED.”
“For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs have failed to establish VF's minimum contacts with Vermont for the purposes of specific personal jurisdiction, and their claims against VF must be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE on that basis.”
“VF Outdoor, LLC's motion to dismiss the Vincis' individual claims against it is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART (Doc. 11): Counts I and III are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; VF Outdoor, LLC's motion is DENIED with respect to the Vincis' individual claims against it in Counts II and IV.”
“The court therefore GRANTS summary judgment for Defendants Gagne, Recore, Swanton, and Stell.”
“The court thus DENIES Defendant's motion to dismiss Count Seven on the basis that it is duplicitous.”
“The court therefore DENIES Defendant's motion to dismiss Counts Five, Six, and Seven because §§ 2251(a), 2252(a)(2), and 2256 are not void for vagueness.”
“For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff's motion to reverse the decision of the Commissioner (Doc. 9) is GRANTED, the Commissioner's motion to affirm (Doc. 10) is DENIED, and the case is REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this Opinion and Order.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the State Defendants' motion to dismiss (Doc. 23) and DENIES GMCB's motion to dismiss (Doc. 50).”
“For the reasons stated above, GMCB's motion to dismiss on the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity must be DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.”
Put Judge Reiss's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Reiss actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Reiss's own signed orders and cites them.