Bernard Joseph Leddy

United States District Court for the District of Vermont district Retired 1972 · served 1966–1972 Appointed by Lyndon B. Johnson (Democratic) 15 signed orders read

Judge Leddy no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

How Judge Leddy decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

In due-process challenges, he tested whether the government's proxy actually tracked the risk it claimed to regulate; accident involvement alone could not substitute for a hearing on possible fault.

“Yet there can be no meaningful basis for this presumption unless and until it is established that there is at least a reasonable possibility that the person was at fault in the accident.”

In selective-service review, he searched the administrative record for affirmative evidence rather than accepting suspicion or unsupported classification choices.

“A careful search of the record reveals absolutely no evidence or basis in fact to support the IA classification which the Local Board assigned to defendant”

Procedural preferences

He approached antitrust summary judgment cautiously when defining a geographic market required economic and factual judgment better developed at a hearing.

“Summary judgment in antitrust actions should be used with great caution.”

In voting cases, he treated an applicant's sworn domicile statement as meaningful evidence and required a heavy showing before disenfranchisement.

“the Board must bear in mind that election laws are to be liberally construed and that a very heavy burden of proof must be met if' persons are to be disenfranchised.”

Cautions

Military authorities retained discretion, but their decisions still had to follow governing regulations and rest on a proper factual basis.

“jurisdiction and order that petitioner be discharged unless, in the alternative, the Army authorities discharge him or decide in accordance with applicable regulations and on a proper factual basis to retain him.”

A nonresident fiduciary did not manufacture diversity jurisdiction merely because federal access influenced the appointment; the court examined whether that was the sole or dominant purpose.

“Because I find that the creation of jurisdiction was not the sole or even dominant purpose behind the appointment of Mr. Farrell, the defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Patterson v. Stancliff
330 F. Supp. 110 · 1971-08-13
Motions to dismiss (respondents) Denied

“For the reasons stated above, the motion to dismiss is hereby denied”

Habeas petition (petitioner) Granted in part

“That unless within forty-five days the respondents discharge petitioner Patterson, or, in accordance with applicable regulations and on a proper factual basis determine that he should be retained, the petitioner will be discharged by this Court from the custody of respondents.”

Shivelhood v. Davis
336 F. Supp. 1111 · 1971-12-30
Class certification (plaintiffs) Granted

“That the above action be permitted to proceed as a class action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(1)(A) and 23(b) (2), that the named plaintiffs be permitted to maintain this action on behalf of all students physically residing in the Town of Middlebury who desire to register and vote therein”

Preliminary injunction (plaintiffs) Granted

“The members of the Middlebury Board of Civil Authority are hereby preliminarily enjoined from refusing to place the names of Edwina Shivelhood, Richard Brooke Roberts, Lawrence M. Becerra, and John Phillip Abbott on the voter check list for the Town of Middle-bury by the date the check list is to be closed for the January 7, 1972, special election.”

United States v. County National Bank of Bennington
330 F. Supp. 155 · 1971-07-28
Summary judgment (defendant banks) Denied

“Accordingly, the defendants’, intervenor’s and Government’s motions for summary judgment are hereby denied.”

Summary judgment (intervenor) Denied
Summary judgment (government) Denied
Smith v. United States
319 F. Supp. 1359 · 1970-12-03
Section 2255 motion (petitioner) Denied

“That petitioner’s motion to vacate and set aside judgment of conviction pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C., Section 2255, filed on August 3, 1970, be and the same hereby is denied.”

Cabrera v. Smith
308 F. Supp. 389 · 1969-12-10
Habeas petition (petitioner) Denied

“To summarize, I find petitioner’s application for writ of habeas corpus without merit and the same is hereby denied.”

Zahn v. International Paper Co.
53 F.R.D. 430 · 1971-09-30
Motion to certify interlocutory appeal (plaintiffs) Granted

“Accordingly, plaintiffs’ motion is granted.”

Farrell v. Ducharme
310 F. Supp. 254 · 1970-02-20
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Denied

“Because I find that the creation of jurisdiction was not the sole or even dominant purpose behind the appointment of Mr. Farrell, the defendant’s motion to dismiss is denied.”

Marra v. Bushee
317 F. Supp. 972 · 1970-09-14
Motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict (defendant) Denied

“It is hereby ordered, based on the above, that defendant’s motions for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial be and the same hereby are denied.”

Motion for new trial (defendant) Denied
Lewis v. Vermont
289 F. Supp. 246 · 1968-09-10
Summary judgment (State of Vermont) Granted

“Accordingly, the motion of the defendant, State of Vermont, for summary judgment is hereby granted for lack of jurisdiction and the motion of the Town of New Haven for such judgment is hereby denied.”

Summary judgment (Town of New Haven) Denied
Viens v. ANTHONY COMPANY
282 F. Supp. 983 · 1968-03-18
Motion to dismiss third party complaint (Iroquois Manufacturing Co., Inc.) Granted

“to dismiss the third-party complaint be and the same hereby are granted.”

Motion to dismiss third party complaint (New England Telephone and Telegraph Company) Granted
Motion to dismiss third party complaint (Raymond J. Quesnel) Granted
Motion to dismiss third party complaint (Richard A. Monroe) Granted
Motion to dismiss third party complaint (Carleton J. Hanley) Granted
United States v. Pelensky
1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8473 · 1969-06-13
Motion to suppress (defendant) Granted

“Accordingly, because of the failure of the arresting officers in this case to inform the defendant of his right to counsel prior to requesting the revolver and the absence of any mitigating circumstances, the motion to suppress must be granted.”

United States v. Pedersen
1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12589 · 1969-06-27
Motion to suppress (defendant Pedersen) Granted

“Since Fitzgerald had no reasonable suspicion that Pedersen and VanSchaik were engaged in illegal activities, the search he conducted was illegal and the evidence gained from that search must be suppressed.”

Motion to suppress (defendant VanSchaik) Granted

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

No case-level docket record was returned for this 1966-1972 tenure. The profile therefore makes no claim about caseload mix, case duration, administrative dispositions, or motion timing.

A historical record

Judge Leddy no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.