Albert Wheeler Coffrin

United States District Court for the District of Vermont district Retired 1993 · served 1972–1993 Appointed by Richard Nixon (Republican) 19 signed orders read

Judge Coffrin no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled.

How Judge Coffrin decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

In statutory-benefits cases, he tested agency rules against congressional design and invalidated a regulation when the legislative history showed that compensated boarders could remain outside the food-stamp household.

“The House Report makes clear that Congress intended that “anyone” who pays reasonable compensation for meals should be treated as a boarder, and is excludable from the food stamp household.”

In personal-jurisdiction disputes involving corporate officers, he focused on the officers' own alleged participation in conduct intentionally directed at the forum, rather than relying on jurisdiction over the corporation alone.

“Rather, defendants’ personal participation in the actions which caused plaintiff harm provides a distinct basis for this court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over them.”

Procedural preferences

He allowed a narrowly missed service deadline where the governing state rule presented an unresolved question and counsel had relied in good faith on a reasonable reading.

“In reviewing the circumstances of this case, we find that plaintiff’s neglect was excusable.”

In international discovery, he balanced sovereign interests but would not permit a late, largely hypothetical conflict to impose additional months of delay.

“Finally, we emphasize that in the interests of the parties and sound judicial administration generally, we should not tolerate further unnecessary delay in discovery in this case.”

Cautions

A federal court could not review an administrative Social Security attorney-fee award without a statutory jurisdictional basis or a colorable constitutional claim.

“The court finds that the Secretary’s attorney’s fee award may not be reviewed for want of subject matter jurisdiction.”

Rule 60(b) did not rescue a party that missed the appeal deadline and later offered a substantive argument that could have been raised earlier.

“The court determines that the proper procedure which plaintiffs should have followed would have been to appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals, Rule 60(b) not being a substitute or alternative procedure for appellate review.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Gorman v. Dartmouth Savings Bank (In Re Gorman)
82 B.R. 253 · 1987-04-17
Bankruptcy appeal (debtors/appellants) Denied

“For all the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the final order of the bankruptcy court below sustaining Appellees’ objections to the homestead exemptions claimed by Appellants in certain real property known as the Ledges Apartments.”

Ouellette v. International Paper Co.
666 F. Supp. 58 · 1987-08-03
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Denied

“Based on the foregoing discussion, we DENY defendant’s motion to dismiss the “Second Cause of Action”, but will apply New York law in hearing plaintiffs’ state law claims concerning air pollution.”

Chitty v. Walton
680 F. Supp. 683 · 1987-04-15
Summary judgment (defendants) Granted in part

“B. GRANT defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiff's claims that (1) the deliberately false parole report submitted by defendants Alexander and Dooley to the Vermont Parole Board violated plaintiff’s fourteenth amendment rights; (2) plaintiff’s six-hour administrative segregation violated defendant’s fourteenth amendment rights; and (3) the use of urinalysis testing results during plaintiff’s prison disciplinary proceeding violated plaintiff’s fourteenth amendment rights; and *687 C. DENY defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs claims that (1) Bellini’s and Turner’s failure to protect plaintiff from the threats of other inmates violated plaintiff’s eighth and fourteenth amendment rights; and (2) defendant’s failure to call plaintiff’s requested witnesses at his prison disciplinary hearing violated plaintiff’s fourteenth amendment rights.”

General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Lefevre
38 B.R. 980 · 1983-10-11
Bankruptcy appeal (debtors/appellants) Denied

“In light of the foregoing, the Bankruptcy Court’s order dismissing the debtors’ counterclaim and lifting the automatic stay is affirmed.”

Poulos v. Wilson
116 F.R.D. 326 · 1987-06-24
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Denied

“Based on the foregoing discussion, we DENY Raven’s motion to dismiss the complaint against it, and GRANT plaintiff’s motion pursuant to V.R.Civ.P. 6(b)(2) to enlarge the time in which to serve defendant by one day.”

Motion to enlarge time (plaintiff) Granted
Mulliss v. American Protection Insurance
653 F. Supp. 685 · 1987-02-04
Motion for partial summary judgment (plaintiff) Granted

“For all the forgoing reasons, plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment is GRANTED. Defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment is DENIED. We also GRANT plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery.”

Motion for partial summary judgment (defendant) Denied
Motions to compel (plaintiff) Granted
Foster v. Celani
683 F. Supp. 84 · 1987-07-01
Summary judgment (plaintiffs) Granted

“We therefore adopt the magistrate’s recommendation that plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment be GRANTED but for reasons different than those stated in the magistrate’s report. Defendants are enjoined within this district from enforcing the challenged regulations. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED.”

Summary judgment (defendants) Denied
Palmer v. Coons
581 F. Supp. 1160 · 1984-03-05
Motion for attorney fees (defendants) Granted in part

“The amount of fees requested is approximately twelve thousand dollars, including approximately three thousand dollars spent in response to plaintiff’s appeal to the circuit. The court finds that two thousand five hundred dollars is an appropriate fee award in this case, including the costs of appeal.”

Noreault v. United States
621 F. Supp. 818 · 1985-09-13
Termination assessment review (plaintiff/taxpayer) Granted in part

“In sum, this court concludes that the government has satisfied its burden of proof that the termination assessment is “reasonable under the circumstances.” The court, however, also concludes that the taxpayer has met his burden of proof that the amount is inappropriate.”

Stuart v. Federal Energy Systems, Inc.
596 F. Supp. 458 · 1984-11-14
Motions to dismiss (defendants) Denied

“Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that defendants Yost and Williams’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is denied.”

Carver v. Heckler
568 F. Supp. 301 · 1983-07-12
Motions to dismiss (defendant Secretary) Granted

“The court finds that the Secretary’s attorney’s fee award may not be reviewed for want of subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Secretary’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) is hereby granted.”

Bell v. U-32 Board of Education
630 F. Supp. 939 · 1986-03-17
Summary judgment (defendants) Granted

“We GRANT defendants’ motion for summary judgment,. DENY plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, and direct that JUDGMENT be entered FOR DEFENDANTS on all claims.”

Summary judgment (plaintiffs) Denied

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

A randomized sample of ten completed cases filed from 1986 through 1992 includes contracts, civil rights, product liability, land, labor, bankruptcy, and statutory matters. The sample supports case durations and administrative closing descriptions, but its pre-electronic entry streams are empty and provide no motion timing.

A historical record

Judge Coffrin no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.