Robert Stewart Ballou
How Judge Ballou decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In a Title IX/employment-discipline case, the judge finds a comparator adequately pled at the motion-to-dismiss stage even where the defendant argues the comparator's circumstances differed, holding that evidentiary comparisons over how similar a comparator really was are not appropriate to resolve on a motion to dismiss.
“UVA's argument is not persuasive in the context of a motion to dismiss. UVA may be correct that Roe was treated differently than Correa for non-discriminatory reasons. However, this evidentiary inquiry is not appropriate at the motion-to-dismiss stage.”
On a failure-to-exhaust defense in a prisoner case, the judge closely scrutinizes whether the prison's own grievance responses actually support the ground for rejection the defendants now assert, and will deny summary judgment where the prison's own paperwork contradicts its litigation position.
“It is defendants' burden to show a failure to exhaust, and they have not met it... It's simply not rational to repeatedly reject Montoya's regular grievances... for not indicating how he was affected personally or as a request for services.”
Procedural preferences
The judge reads Bivens narrowly and requires a plaintiff to plead facts distinguishing their case from the narrow set of Supreme Court-approved Bivens contexts; a Bivens excessive-force claim otherwise similar to recent, successful Fourth Circuit precedent still fails if the plaintiff has not alleged the specific fact (blocked access to the grievance process) that made the precedent's extension of Bivens appropriate.
“The Court's decision, however, was based upon one allegation that is not present in this case: The officers in Fields intentionally thwarted the plaintiff's access to the BOP's Administrative Remedy Program, cutting off his access to the alternative remedies that counsel against judicial extension of Bivens.”
On a post-verdict motion, the judge is careful to enforce the precise scope of what a jury actually found, declining to expand equitable relief (here, expungement) beyond what the verdict itself established, even where the plaintiff prevailed at trial.
“The jury's verdict cannot be read as an unqualified decision that no disciplinary charge was appropriate, only that defendant's decision to issue the charge was motivated by retaliation... An injunction requiring VDOC to expunge the charge from Carter's record would be overstepping the court's proper role under the circumstances of this case.”
The judge declines federal jurisdiction over disputes that are, in substance, an attempt to relitigate a state child-custody proceeding, even when the complaint is framed as a federal civil-rights claim.
“Although Wright brings her claims for retaliation and violation of due process under 42 U.S.C. 1983, each claim and request for relief seeks to relitigate her children's custody proceedings.”
Cautions
A motion to remand tied to a state statutory claim untested by any state court can be denied where the district judge predicts, based on the statute's own exclusive-remedy provision, that the state's highest court would not recognize a wrongful-discharge claim built on it -- a ruling the Fourth Circuit later vacated and remanded on appeal, illustrating the risk in this kind of Erie prediction on a novel state statute.
“No courts -- Virginia or federal -- have addressed the issue of whether this nascent statute may provide the basis for a Bowman claim. Thus, the Court must predict how the Virginia Supreme Court would rule on the issue.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
A pro se Virginia inmate sued the Virginia Parole Board under 42 U.S.C. 1983, arguing 'sovereign citizen' theories that Virginia law did not apply to him without his consent. The court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b)(1) and dismissed it as frivolous, noting the rhetoric bore the hallmarks of sovereign-citizen theory that courts nationwide have repeatedly rejected.
“For the reasons stated, I will grant the defendants' Motion to Dismiss and dismiss Vaughn's complaint. Because this fully disposes of the case, there is no need to address the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, which shall be dismissed as moot.”
“there is no need to address the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, which shall be dismissed as moot.”
“Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. 7, is DENIED; The Commissioner's Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. 13, is GRANTED; The decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED”
“The Court, having separately entered an Opinion and Order adopting the Report and Recommendation, denying Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, granting the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment, and affirming the decision of the Commissioner”
“The Motion for Injunctive Relief will be denied.”
“I will deny Allen's motions to vacate the prior judgment.”
“Defendants' motion is GRANTED as to Correa's claim for gender discrimination under Title VII, his claim under the Virginia Human Rights Act, his personal capacity claims against Defendants Hutson and Smith, and his request for damages under 18 U.S.C. 1983. The motion to dismiss is otherwise DENIED.”
“the non-medical defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED”
“the medical defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED and Montoya's claims against the medical defendants are dismissed with prejudice.”
“Because Wright's complaint in essence seeks review of her failed state court child custody claim, this Court must abstain from exercising jurisdiction.”
“I GRANT Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 32) and dismiss this action with prejudice.”
“Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Anilkumar Patel's Complaint (Case No. 7:21-cv-402, Dkt. 6) is DENIED, and these five cases will be set for trial.”
“I DENY Lambert's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 18), and GRANT the Commissioner's Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt. No. 16.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
As a newly-elevated district judge, Ballou's docket mixes a large volume of pro se prisoner civil-rights suits and habeas petitions (each referred to one of the court's three magistrate judges -- Joel C. Hoppe, Pamela M. Sargent, or C. Kailani Memmer -- for pretrial management), Social Security appeals, removed diversity and employment cases, and a smaller volume of civil forfeiture and criminal matters carried over from his Roanoke-division magistrate caseload. Because he was elevated mid-docket in March 2023, an unbounded case enumeration under his name would also surface cases inherited from his predecessor, Judge James P. Jones, filed and in some instances terminated before Ballou's own tenure began; the sample here is bounded to cases filed on or after his March 9, 2023 commission date to avoid that distortion.
Put Judge Ballou's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Ballou actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Ballou's own signed orders and cites them.