Pamela Meade Sargent
How Judge Sargent rules, drawn from 19 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
Judge Sargent no longer sits on this court. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled here.
About Judge Sargent
Pamela Meade Sargent served as a U.S. magistrate judge for the Western District of Virginia from December 1997 until her September 2026 retirement. She sat in the Abingdon Division and practiced law in Abingdon before joining the bench.
How Judge Sargent decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
An ALJ cannot simply say a medical opinion is 'not supported' without engaging its substance, especially when reviewing psychologists and examiners all agree on the direction of the limitation.
“I find that the ALJ substituted his own judgment for that of mental health professionals by finding that Owens's impairments did not meet or equal the criteria of Section 12.04.”
Crediting a state-agency opinion 'great weight' while ignoring the specific marked or moderate limitations that opinion actually assessed is reversible: weight assigned in name only does not satisfy the substantial-evidence standard.
“While the ALJ noted that he was giving great weight to the state agency psychologists' opinions because they were consistent with the objective evidence of record, he failed to address the marked and moderate limitations assessed by them.”
An opinion formed without the benefit of later, more complete medical evidence (a new MRI, a new clinical finding) does not outweigh a treating or examining source's opinion just because its bottom line looks more consistent with earlier exam findings.
“the opinions of the state agency physicians, who did not have the benefit of the entirety of the medical evidence, do not constitute substantial evidence to support the ALJ's finding as to Coffey's residual functional capacity”
In Powers's Social Security appeal, Sargent remanded because the ALJ discussed consistency but did not explain whether the medical opinions of Dr. Brown and Dr. Kumar were supported by their own findings.
“the ALJ's evaluation of Dr. Brown and Dr. Kumar's opinions is devoid of any explanation whether he considered the supportability factor in evaluating the persuasiveness of their opinions”
Procedural preferences
In Gardner v. Saul, Sargent remanded a Social Security appeal at step two because the ALJ’s own discussion suggested shoulder restrictions might be warranted while concluding that the claimant had no severe impairment.
“the ALJ's very next sentence is, '[h]owever, [Gardner] has no medically determinable severe impairments that would support these limitations as set forth hereinabove.'”
In Barrett v. Barnhart, Sargent affirmed the denial of benefits after finding that the claimed disabling symptoms lacked objective support and could be controlled with treatment.
“‘If a symptom can be reasonably controlled by medication or treatment, it is not disabling.’ Gross v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1163, 1166 (4th Cir. 1986).”
Cautions
In Barrett v. Barnhart, Sargent affirmed the Commissioner because the treating and examining sources’ disabling assessments were unsupported by the objective medical evidence.
“the ALJ correctly noted that Dr. Rhinehart's findings that Barrett suffered from disabling back pain and disabling depression are not supported by the objective evidence of record”
In Slagle v. Kijakazi, Sargent affirmed the ALJ’s residual functional capacity finding in part because the claimant’s reported activities undercut her asserted limitations.
“Slagle reported she performed various activities, including taking care of her grandparents; running errands; attending a concert; working part-time on a paper route; and changing a tire.”
A provider's bare statement that a claimant is unable to work is not a regulatory medical opinion when it does not identify specific work abilities or restrictions imposed by the claimant's impairments.
“the record contains no statement from Dr. Baluyot or Templeton that meets the regulatory definition of a medical opinion in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(a)(2), 416.913(a)(2), as they never addressed any particular abilities or restrictions that were imposed by Hubbard’s impairments.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the foregoing reasons, Barrett's motion for summary judgment will be denied, the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment will be granted and the Commissioner's decision to deny benefits will be affirmed.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment will be denied, the Commissioner's decision denying benefits will be vacated and this case will be remanded to the Commissioner for further development.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment will be denied, the Commissioner's decision denying benefits will be vacated, and the case will be remanded to the Commissioner for an award of benefits.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment will be denied, Bush's motion for summary judgment will be granted, the Commissioner's decision denying benefits will be vacated, and Bush's claims will be remanded to the Commissioner for an award of benefits.”
“Based on the above, I find that substantial evidence does not exist in the record to support the ALJ's rejection of the opinions of Jarrell regarding the effects of Livesay's mental impairments on her work-related abilities. Therefore, I find that substantial evidence does not support the Commissioner's decision to deny benefits, and I will remand the case to the Commissioner for further consideration.”
“Therefore, while the ALJ might have been justified in disregarding Dr. Joshi's opinions, the opinions of the state agency physicians, who did not have the benefit of the entirety of the medical evidence, do not constitute substantial evidence to support the ALJ's finding as to Coffey's residual functional capacity. Therefore, I will vacate the Commissioner's decision denying benefits and remand for further development consistent with this Opinion.”
“Based on the above, I do not find that substantial evidence exists to support the ALJ's finding that Gardner did not suffer from a severe impairment. An appropriate Order and Judgment will be entered remanding Gardner's claim to the Commissioner for further development.”
“While the ALJ noted that he was giving great weight to the state agency psychologists' opinions because they were consistent with the objective evidence of record, he failed to address the marked and moderate limitations assessed by them. ... Based on my review of the record, I cannot find that substantial evidence exists to support the ALJ's mental residual functional capacity finding.”
“Based on this, I find that substantial evidence exists to support the ALJ's consideration of the medical evidence and his residual functional capacity finding. An appropriate Order and Judgment will be entered.”
“Based on this, I cannot determine that substantial evidence exists to support the ALJ's finding that Hess had the residual functional capacity to perform medium work. ... An appropriate order will be entered remanding this case to the Commissioner for further consideration.”
“Based on this, I cannot find substantial evidence exists to support the ALJ's consideration of the medical evidence and his residual functional capacity finding. An appropriate Order and Judgment will be entered.”
“Based on the above, I find that substantial evidence exists to support the ALJ's weighing of the medical evidence and his residual functional capacity finding. An appropriate Order and Judgment will be entered.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median motion-to-ruling time: 263.5 days (N = 6).
- Her civil docket at consent jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. 636(c)) runs from 1994 through at least 2022 and is dominated by Social Security disability appeals (DIB/SSI/DWIB, nature-of-suit codes 863-865), reflecting the disability-heavy caseload of rural coal-country Virginia; a smaller, mostly-1990s cohort of consent civil cases covers prisoner civil-rights suits, a patent case, contract and product-liability diversity suits, and a bankruptcy-withdrawal matter.
- Recent Social Security appeals often took roughly a year or more to reach a final decision; the latest located cases were filed in 2022 and resolved in late 2023 and early 2024.
- Her newer docket is otherwise dominated by petty-offense and misdemeanor criminal matters, the routine magistrate criminal duty for the Abingdon Division, which rarely produces the kind of written, quotable dispositive rulings this record tracks.
Pending matters in the official report
Reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act, as of March 31, 2026.
| Motions pending more than six months | 0 |
| Bench trials submitted more than six months | 0 |
| Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Social Security appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Civil cases pending more than three years | 0 |
| Report | Motions over six months | Cases over three years |
|---|---|---|
| Mar 2026 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2025 | 0 | 0 |
| Mar 2025 | 1 | 0 |
| Sep 2024 | 0 | 0 |
| Mar 2024 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2023 | 2 | 0 |
| Mar 2023 | 2 | 0 |
| Sep 2022 | 0 | 0 |
| Mar 2022 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2021 | 0 | 0 |
| Mar 2021 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2020 | 0 | 0 |
A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.
A historical record
Judge Sargent no longer sits on this court. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled here. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.