Norman Kenneth Moon
How Judge Moon decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Reads pleadings for concrete factual specifics, not characterizations of what a defendant did wrong; a plaintiff who cannot say what conduct they found objectionable, even at the motion-to-dismiss stage, loses.
“As a practical matter, this means aggrieved employees must tell the court what they found objectionable about their employer's conduct.”
In premises-liability cases he applies Virginia's contributory-negligence bar strictly: a plaintiff who does not look down while walking loses even against a defendant's clear underlying negligence.
“no reasonable jury could conclude that Plaintiff did not have an opportunity to see the blue bed of the cart or that she would not have seen it had she made an effort to look where she was going”
Does not treat a defendant's promulgation of an anti-harassment policy alone as dispositive on summary judgment; he checks whether the plaintiff actually used it before crediting the employer's affirmative defense.
“proof that a plaintiff employee failed to follow a complaint procedure 'will normally suffice to satisfy the employer's burden under the second element of the defense.'”
Procedural preferences
On spoliation of electronically stored evidence, he will grant severe sanctions -- up to effectively ending a case -- once the moving party shows extensive, good-faith recovery efforts have failed to restore or replace the lost material, without requiring it to exhaust every conceivable avenue.
“the Court need not find that Liberty 'pursue[d] every possible avenue for replacing or restoring the ESI, but it must show that it has made some good-faith attempts to explore its alternatives before pursuing spoliation sanctions.'”
Declines to accept new evidence submitted for the first time with objections to a magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation; parties must give the magistrate their best case the first time.
“'[a]ttempts to introduce new evidence after the magistrate judge has acted are disfavored.' ... 'Parties must take before the magistrate, not only their best shot but all of their shots.'”
Splits a combined motion cleanly by ground when a defendant raises several theories (e.g., a TCPA count plus a personal-jurisdiction challenge to a nationwide class): each theory is granted or denied on its own footing rather than the motion being treated as all-or-nothing.
“The motion to dismiss Count One will be granted ... Defendant's motion will be denied [as to the nonresident class members]”
Cautions
Will not extend a party's preferred reading of a Supreme Court precedent (there, Bristol-Myers Squibb's limits on personal jurisdiction) beyond its actual holding merely because a novel argument has some out-of-circuit support.
“this Court holds, alongside the 'most of the courts that have encountered this issue,' that Bristol-Myers Squibb's holding and logic do not extend to the federal class action context.”
A pro se plaintiff's characterization of an at-will public employer's motive is not enough without well-pleaded facts; broad allegations of a conspiracy or malice among named officials must be supported by specifics, not the sequence of events alone.
“Because Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts to support these claims, Defendants' motions to dismiss are granted.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For these reasons, summary judgment in favor of the defendants will be granted in an order to follow.”
“For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss will be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court granted Defendants' Motion for Judgement on the Pleadings by order filed on February 26, 2007 (docket entry no. 74).”
“Defendants' motion regarding Count II of Plaintiff's Complaint (alleging violations of Plaintiff's First Amendment rights) is GRANTED and Count II is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE”
“Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (docket entry no. 51) is hereby DENIED.”
“For this reason, and because the allegations fail to set forth a plausible prima facie case of breach of contract, Parnell's Counterclaim fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted and will be dismissed.”
“I will grant Federal's Motion for Summary Judgment in a separate Order to follow.”
“Because the Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim for relief, the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss will be granted. However, the Plaintiff is granted leave to amend the Complaint within 15 days”
“For the reasons stated herein, the Court will grant Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.”
“In sum, Defendant is an instrumentality of the Commonwealth of Virginia and is therefore immune from suit under the ADEA. Accordingly, Defendant's motion to dismiss (docket no. 4) will be granted”
“Defendants' motion for summary judgment, as it concerns Dr. Huang's section 1983 claims, shall be granted, but as it concerns Dr. Huang's FCA claims, Defendant's motion shall be denied.”
“For the aforementioned reasons, Defendant's motion for summary judgment shall be granted.”
“The motion to dismiss Count One will be granted ... Because this Court does not believe Bristol-Myers Squibb upended years of class action practice sub silentio, Defendant's motion will be denied [as to the nonresident class members].”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median motion-to-ruling time: 101 days (N = 8).
Put Judge Moon's record to work
Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Moon actually rules, not a generic AI guess.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Moon's own signed orders and cites them.