Michael Francis Urbanski
How Judge Urbanski rules, drawn from 20 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
About Judge Urbanski
Michael Francis Urbanski is a judge of the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia. Appointed by President Barack Obama, Judge Urbanski received a commission on May 13, 2011. Judge Urbanski assumed senior status on July 4, 2024.
Judge Urbanski's practices and standing orders
The court's website lists no individual practices or standing orders of Judge Urbanski's own (checked October 9, 2026), so the court's local rules and general orders are the place to look (court page ↗).
Standing orders for every case in this court
Orders the court applies to all of its cases, whichever judge has them, as published on the court's website (checked October 9, 2026).
How Judge Urbanski decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In an Establishment Clause challenge to a county board's practice of opening meetings with sectarian prayer, the court gave weight to the consistency and specificity of the religious content over time, rather than treating a single prayer or generic invocation as the relevant unit of analysis.
“the Board's consistent practice of opening its meetings with sectarian prayers led by Board members violates the First Amendment”
On a renewed motion for compassionate release, the court found that a later, non-retroactive change in how prior drug convictions are treated under the career-offender guideline created a meaningful sentencing disparity, and treated that disparity itself, not any claim that the original sentence was wrongly calculated, as the extraordinary and compelling reason for relief.
“the 14-month disparity between Coley's current sentence and the sentence he would likely be given for the same conduct today meets the threshold discussed in McCoy, and the change in career offender status is an ‘extraordinary and compelling’ reason to warrant a sentence reduction”
On an exhaustion defense, conflicting sworn accounts about whether a prisoner completed the grievance appeal process create a credibility issue that cannot be resolved on summary judgment.
“In light of the conflicting sworn statements submitted by the parties, Dotson is not entitled to summary judgment on the exhaustion defense.”
In Vance v. Wells Fargo, Urbanski held that the borrowers could sue under the mortgage-servicing early-intervention regulation because it was promulgated under a RESPA provision that supplied a private right of action. He denied dismissal of that claim while dismissing others without prejudice.
“Because the Bureau promulgated Section 1024.39 under the authority of RESPA Section 6 and Section 6 confers a private right of action, Section 1024.39 authorizes a private right of action.”
In United States v. Stanback, Urbanski rejected the government’s speculative account of what charge might have been brought under a later statutory scheme. He found Stanback eligible for First Step Act relief and reduced the sentence to time served.
“The retroactive assumption suggested by the government simply is too speculative a basis on which to determine Stanback's eligibility for a sentence reduction.”
On remand in Bermeo’s civil-rights suit, Urbanski declined to dismiss unlawful-seizure and related claims on qualified-immunity grounds at the pleading stage after accepting allegations of a coerced confession and arrest without probable cause.
“Counts One, Two, Six, and Seven are not subject to dismissal based on qualified immunity.”
Procedural preferences
In J.S. v. Winchester Pediatric Clinic, Urbanski declined to decide whether Virginia’s malpractice damages cap was constitutional before liability had been established. He denied declaratory relief without prejudice because the issue was not ripe.
“the issue of the constitutionality of the Virginia medical malpractice damages cap does not present a case or controversy suitable for determination under Article III of the United States Constitution”
In Anderson v. Roop, Urbanski considered whether a pro se prisoner’s allegations could support a malicious-prosecution claim during initial screening, then dismissed that claim for failure to state a claim.
“To the extent Anderson's allegations can be construed as a malicious prosecution claim, the claim fails.”
In Downs v. Winchester Medical Center, he distinguished FMLA retaliation from interference because the employee received the requested leave and alleged prejudice from later adverse treatment.
“any prejudice resulted from retaliation, not interference.”
Cautions
In Abdul-Ali v. Dyer, Urbanski dismissed a habeas petition without prejudice because Abdul-Ali had not exhausted administrative remedies.
“the court DISMISSES Abdul-Ali's petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies”
In Seymour v. Southwest Virginia Regional Jail Authority, Urbanski considered both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment medical-care standards because the plaintiff’s detention on a probation violation left his status unresolved. He dismissed the claims without prejudice after finding the allegations about medication and a second drug test insufficient under either standard, and allowed amendment.
“fails to state an Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
As magistrate judge, the court found the defendant guilty at a bench trial of two federal regulatory violations for carrying a firearm and ammunition onto Veterans Administration hospital property, and not guilty of a rubbish-disposal charge; a $50 fine was imposed. This is a criminal verdict, not a ruling on a party motion.
“plaintiff Martinsville Cable's motion for partial summary judgment is DENIED”
“defendants Time Warner and Comcast's joint motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and this case is dismissed”
“Hudson's motion for summary judgment GRANTED, and a Permanent Injunction Order entered”
“the Board's motion for summary judgment must be DENIED”
“Kimberli Coley, Randy Coley and East Coast Cablevision, LLC's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. # 163) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part”
“DIRECTV LLC's motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. # 165) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part”
“plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. # 170) is DENIED; plaintiffs are DISMISSED from this action”
“the Denisars' Motion for Stay / Injunction (Dkt. # 8) is DENIED, the oral order staying execution of the writ of possession (Dkt. # 11) is VACATED, and this bankruptcy appeal is DISMISSED”
“the court DENIES Brevard's motions for summary judgment as to all constitutional claims, finding genuine disputes of material facts for the jury to resolve”
“The court DENIES Brevard's motions for summary judgment on the state law claims of negligence and gross negligence”
“GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Brevard on the intentional infliction of emotional damages claim, finding insufficient evidence of severe emotional harm”
“the court finds no active case or controversy and GRANTS Brevard's motion for summary judgment as to declaratory relief”
“the court DENIES Brevard's motion to preclude the testimony of Dr. Vassallo”
“The court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Brevard's motion to exclude the testimony of Eric L. Clark and Kovari's motion to exclude the testimony of Charles Hildebrand”
A follow-on order quantifying collateral security and damages, and setting document-access obligations, after the court's earlier July 2020 partial summary judgment for the surety on its indemnity claim against an immigration bond company. This order implements an already-decided ruling rather than deciding a new motion, so it is not counted toward motion stats.
“the court DENIES Cottman's motion for compassionate release”
On initial review of an amended pro se prisoner civil-rights complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915A, the court dismissed the malicious-prosecution and equal-protection claims without prejudice for failure to state a claim.
“the court will grant respondent's motion to dismiss, dismiss the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and deny a certificate of appealability”
“the court declines to consider the constitutionality of the statute at this time and DENIES without prejudice J.S.'s request for relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act”
“the court will GRANT Coley's motions for compassionate release, ECF Nos. 122, 126, and 133. Coley is sentenced to a term of 37 months, or time served, whichever is greater”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
The sampled records include prisoner civil-rights cases, state and federal habeas petitions, Social Security disability appeals, ERISA and insurance disputes, employment and consumer claims, and criminal matters. New cases continued to be assigned after senior status, and the February 2026 summary-judgment ruling confirms an active, ongoing caseload rather than a closed docket.
Pending matters in the official report
Reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts under the Civil Justice Reform Act, as of March 31, 2026.
| Motions pending more than six months | 1 |
| Bench trials submitted more than six months | 0 |
| Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Social Security appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Civil cases pending more than three years | 5 |
| Report | Motions over six months | Cases over three years |
|---|---|---|
| Mar 2026 | 1 | 5 |
| Sep 2025 | 0 | 2 |
| Mar 2025 | 0 | 3 |
| Sep 2024 | 0 | 3 |
| Mar 2024 | 0 | 2 |
| Sep 2023 | 0 | 3 |
| Mar 2023 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2022 | 2 | 1 |
| Mar 2022 | 3 | 3 |
| Sep 2021 | 0 | 1 |
| Mar 2021 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2020 | 0 | 0 |
A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.
How long civil cases take in this court
For the whole of United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, not for Judge Urbanski: median time from filing to disposition of the civil cases the court closed in the 12 months ending September 30, 2025, as reported by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
| Cases | Median time | |
|---|---|---|
| All civil cases closed | 517 | 9.2 months |
| Closed with no court action | 48 | 6.9 months |
| Closed before pretrial | 447 | 9.3 months |
| Closed during or after pretrial | 14 | 13.1 months |
| Closed during trial | 8 | not reported |
| 12 months ending | Cases closed | Median time |
|---|---|---|
| Sep 2025 | 517 | 9.2 months |
| Sep 2024 | 535 | 9.5 months |
| Sep 2023 | 511 | 11 months |
| Sep 2022 | 610 | 14.1 months |
| Sep 2021 | 655 | 11.1 months |
| Sep 2020 | 588 | 10.9 months |
| Sep 2019 | 618 | 11.3 months |
The table leaves out prisoner petitions, land condemnations, deportation reviews, recovery of overpayments and enforcement of judgments, and reports no median for fewer than 10 cases. A district that closed a large multidistrict litigation in the period shows very large counts and long medians for that year. Source: Table C-5, U.S. District Courts (spreadsheet).
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