James Parker Jones

U.S. District Court for the Western District of Virginia district Appointed by Bill Clinton (Democratic) 15 signed orders read

How Judge Jones decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

On a charitable-immunity defense, the judge looked past a defendant's broad claim of charitable purpose to ask whether the specific plaintiff, on the specific facts, had a beneficial relationship to that purpose -- mere presence at a fundraising event was not enough.

“Because Councill was not a beneficiary of the Fire Department's charitable services, she 'did not become a vicarious beneficiary' merely by participating in the Fire Department's fund raising activities.”

In a Section 2255 case, the judge required a habeas petitioner to show that rejecting a plea and going to trial would have been an objectively rational choice given the full weight of the government's evidence, not merely that the petitioner said afterward he would have done so.

“[T]o obtain relief on this type of claim, a petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances.”

On an ACCA sentencing challenge, the judge worked carefully through whether a state statute's listed alternatives were 'elements' or mere 'means' under Mathis v. United States, looking first to state case law and the statute's structure before considering the underlying charging documents.

“Based on the foregoing reasoning, along with the analysis applied in Graybeal, I find that the Virginia burglary statute to which Gambill pled guilty is indivisible.”

Procedural preferences

The judge treats a motion for reconsideration in multidistrict litigation as governed by law-of-the-case and MDL practice, and will not revisit a transferee court's ruling merely because the transferor court might apply a different circuit's standard.

“Mere suspicion that a prior decision is incorrect does not justify the costs incurred by revisiting issues already litigated.”

When a pro se plaintiff fails to keep the court apprised of a current address after being warned that failure to do so risks dismissal, the judge will dismiss without prejudice for failure to prosecute rather than let the case languish.

“Based on Ruley's failure to comply with the court's Order regarding the need to update his mailing address, the court will dismiss the action without prejudice for failure to prosecute.”

On a renewed dispositive motion by one defendant after an earlier motion was denied as to all, the judge separates out the movant whose showing succeeds, dismissing that defendant alone and sending the remaining defendants and claims to a jury.

“Following a Scheduling Conference, the case shall be set for jury trial in the Charlottesville Division of this Court as to the claims of excessive force against the remaining defendants.”

Cautions

In screening pro se prisoner civil-rights complaints, the judge requires specific, personal factual allegations against each named defendant; a supervisor cannot be held liable merely for an inadequate post-incident response or investigation.

“Neither Harris nor his mother had a constitutional right to a particular response or investigation by Smith as to their complaints or to have the alleged wrongdoer punished.”

On a habeas petition raising claims never presented to state court, the judge holds that an actual-innocence gateway argument requires new, reliable evidence of factual innocence, not merely impeachment material about a witness's credibility.

“Just as the Court in Sawyer determined that new evidence used for impeachment purposes does not alone satisfy the petitioner's burden, I conclude the same here, particularly where there was unimpeached eyewitness testimony presented at trial.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

United States v. Purdue Frederick Co.
1:07CR00029 · 2013-08-05
Preliminary injunction (defendant) Denied

“For the reasons that follow, I will deny Purdue's request for an injunction.”

Teleguz v. Kelly
· 2011-08-01
Habeas corpus 2254 (petitioner) Denied

“After a careful review of the record, I find that Teleguz's claims are without legal merit and accordingly deny his petition.”

Musick v. Dorel Juvenile Group, Inc.
1:11CV00005 · 2012-03-22
Motion for new trial (plaintiff) Denied

“Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial (ECF No. 307) is DENIED.”

Councill v. Damascus Volunteer Fire Department, Inc.
· 2015-06-01
Summary judgment (defendant) Denied

“Therefore, it is ORDERED that the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 14) is DENIED.”

Unum Life Insurance Company of America v. Witt
· 2015-01-06
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“For these reasons, it is ORDERED that Defendant First Sentinel Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 34) is GRANTED.”

Hamilton v. Boddie-Noell Enterprises, Inc.
· 2015-02-23
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted in part

“The Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss of Defendant Boddie-Noell Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Hardees (ECF No. 3) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The causes of action under the VCPA and for gross negligence are DISMISSED”

Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“The Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss of Defendant CKE Restaurant Holdings, Inc. (ECF No. 5) is GRANTED and said defendant is DISMISSED as a party hereto”

Motion for leave to amend (plaintiff) Denied

“Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint (ECF No. 11) is DENIED.”

Creech v. Virginia Fuel Corp.
· 2014-11-24
Motion to strike jury demand (defendant) Granted

“For these reasons, it is ORDERED that the defendant's Motion to Strike Jury Demand (ECF No. 33) is GRANTED.”

Adair v. EQT Production Co.
· 2017-03-29
Class certification (plaintiff) Granted in part

“In summary, I grant certification, at least in part, for the Hale, Adair, and Adkins classes, and deny certification for the Addison and Kiser classes.”

Latson v. Clarke
· 2017-04-20
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted in part

“The defendants have moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint on numerous grounds. For the reasons that follow, I will grant in part and deny in part the Motion to Dismiss.”

Goodman v. Astrue
· 2008-03-21
Social security appeal (claimant) Granted

“Upon de novo review, I accept the report and recommendations of the magistrate judge and remand the case for further proceedings.”

United States Ex Rel. Staley v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp.
· 2008-11-23
Motion for reconsideration (plaintiff) Denied

“Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Motion to Reconsider (# 16) is DENIED.”

United States v. Caro
· 2015-05-04
Habeas 2255 (defendant) Denied

“Therefore, I will summarily deny relief on his Sec. 2255 claim under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Sec. 2255 Proceedings and terminate as moot the Motion to Dismiss this action as untimely filed.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

Median motion-to-ruling time: 84.5 days (N = 6).

The sampled dockets spanned prisoner civil-rights suits under Section 1983 (many resolved at screening or on a defendant's motion to dismiss), Social Security disability appeals (frequently resolved by consent remand or by adopting a magistrate judge's report and recommendation), state and federal habeas corpus petitions, and general civil litigation including ADA claims. Several sampled prisoner cases ended in a sua sponte or screening dismissal rather than a ruling on a party motion, consistent with a docket that includes a heavy volume of pro se filings.

Put Judge Jones's record to work

Ezel drafts and answers grounded in this exact profile: how Judge Jones actually rules, not a generic AI guess.

Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer is grounded in Judge Jones's own signed orders and cites them.