C. Kailani Memmer

On a Rule 15(a)(2) motion for leave to amend filed after the defendants' motions to dismiss are already pending, Memmer denies leave where the proposed amendment does not cure the deficiencies raised in those motions -- she treats amendment as futile (and therefore properly denied) rather than let the case restart with fresh motions to dismiss on the same legal defects, reasoning that would 'only serve to increase the expense of litigation and delay the court's ability to render its opinion on those major issues.'

“Justice does not require the court to grant leave to amend when the amendment is futile and would unnecessarily delay the proceedings. ... the proposed Second Amended Complaint does not add anything to the case, such that justice does not require the court to permit another amendment.”

In a Social Security appeal, Memmer will recommend remand where she finds even part of the ALJ's decision unsupported by substantial evidence, without needing to find the whole decision defective.

“I find that a portion of the Commissioner's decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, and for the reasons detailed below, I respectfully recommend the presiding District Judge REMAND the Commissioner's final decision.”

On prisoner Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claims, Memmer applies the Fourth Circuit's strict line between a genuine disregard of a known risk and a mere disagreement over treatment: where the record shows a doctor consulted specialists and followed their recommendations, or a nurse deferred to a physician's medical judgment, she grants summary judgment even if the plaintiff still disputes the wisdom of that treatment. An isolated insensitive remark by medical staff does not by itself create a triable claim.

“[W]here the evidence shows that a decision was based on medical judgment, a jury may not find deliberate indifference, even if other professionals would have handled the decision differently. ... While this alleged comment ... is completely inappropriate, it is not alone sufficient to give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim.”

On a First Amendment retaliation claim, Memmer requires more than the defendant's mere knowledge of the plaintiff's protected filing; without additional evidence of causation, she treats more than about three months between the protected activity and the alleged retaliatory act as too remote to infer retaliation from timing alone -- here she dismissed a retaliation claim where the gap was over a year.

“[K]nowledge of protected First Amendment activity alone 'does not establish a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.' ... This length of time is too long to establish a causal connection by temporal proximity alone.”

On a motion to set aside a clerk's entry of default, Memmer follows the Fourth Circuit's stated preference for merits resolution: she will set aside a default without requiring the defaulting party to substantiate a 'meritorious defense' in detail, so long as the party acted reasonably promptly and no other factor cuts against relief.

“The Fourth Circuit has explained that Rule 55(c)'s 'good cause' standard ... is more forgiving of defaulting parties ... and that Rule 55(c) 'must be liberally construed in order to provide relief from the onerous consequences of defaults and default judgments.'”

On a second-or-successive federal habeas petition, Memmer enforces the AEDPA gatekeeping bar strictly: if an earlier 2254 petition attacking the same conviction was decided on the merits (including a procedural-default dismissal, which counts as merits for this purpose), a later petition is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction unless the petitioner first obtained Fourth Circuit authorization -- and she declines to transfer an unauthorized petition to the circuit where the petitioner's new evidence was always available to him at trial.

“Because Anderson has neither sought nor obtained authorization to file this successive Section 2254 petition from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the court lacks jurisdiction over this matter.”