Thomas Selby Ellis III
How Judge Ellis rules, drawn from 23 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
Judge Ellis no longer hears cases. This profile is preserved as a historical record of how they ruled here.
About Judge Ellis
Thomas Selby Ellis, III was a judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Appointed by President Ronald Reagan, Judge Ellis received a commission on August 6, 1987. Judge Ellis assumed senior status on April 1, 2007 and served until death on July 30, 2025.
How Judge Ellis decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
In National Carriers’ Conference Committee v. Georgiana, Ellis held that the ERISA plan’s reimbursement language did not reach a recovery from the participant’s employer because the plan, as written, covered a third-party tortfeasor.
“Although it may have been wiser to write the Plan to reach those kinds of recoveries so that the Plan was not paying medical expenses that were also covered by third parties, this Plan, as written, does not cover those circumstances.”
In Antekeier v. Laboratory Corp., Ellis held that brief, de minimis work-related calls during FMLA leave did not amount to actionable interference.
“actionable FMLA interference does not include de minimis work-related contact, such as a telephone call to request client contact information or a call to update an employee about news in the workplace.”
In Crawford v. Pearson, Ellis granted a juvenile-sentencing habeas petition after applying Miller’s retroactive rule and concluded that Crawford had to be resentenced with his youth taken into account.
“because Miller is retroactive and applicable here, a writ must issue entitling Crawford to be resentenced so that his youth can be taken into account.”
In Liverett v. Torres Advanced Enterprise Solutions, Ellis read 26 U.S.C. § 7434(a) to cover information returns that willfully misstate payment amounts, rejecting the pleaded misclassification theory.
“7434(a) must be read to provide a private cause of action only where a defendant willfully files information returns that misrepresent the amount of payments made.”
In Murnan v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., Ellis vacated part of his earlier partial summary judgment for Murnan and granted partial summary judgment to Stewart Title on the title-policy exclusion.
“the October 30, 2008, Order ... granting Murnan, as Trustee, partial summary judgment is VACATED IN PART ... summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART to Stewart Title”
Procedural preferences
In Zaletel v. Prisma Labs, Inc., Ellis transferred a case to Delaware after finding no personal jurisdiction over the defendant in Virginia and concluding that transfer served the interests of justice.
“district courts generally favor transfer over dismissal, unless there is evidence that a case was brought in an improper venue in bad faith or to harass defendants.”
In Kitbar Enterprises v. Liberty Insurance Underwriters, Ellis observed that a Rule 68 offer of judgment could have limited the impact of the opposing party’s refusal to settle.
“Liberty could have limited the impact of O'Hagan's refusal to settle by making an offer of judgment pursuant to Rule 68, Fed. R. Civ. P.”
In National Carriers’ Conference Committee v. Georgiana, Ellis described the local rule requiring a summary judgment movant to list undisputed material facts in numbered paragraphs.
“Pursuant to Local Rule 56(B) and the Rule 16(b) Scheduling Order issued in this case, a motion for summary judgment must contain a separately captioned section listing in numbered-paragraph form all material facts as to which the movant contends no genuine dispute exists.”
In Gatekeeper's suit against Singapore defendants, Ellis analyzed specific jurisdiction claim by claim. He allowed the Virginia-connected contract claim to proceed but dismissed the tortious-interference claim based on acts in Singapore.
“absent general jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction must be established for each alleged claim; failure to do so for any alleged claim requires ... dismissal or transfer of that claim.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“In conclusion, in the interests of justice, the matter is appropriately transferred to the District of Delaware pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1406 and 1631.”
“Crawford’s petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 must be granted ... this matter must now be remanded to the Prince William County Circuit Court for resentencing”
“defendant's motion for summary judgment must be *690granted with respect to plaintiff's FMLA interference claim and denied with respect to plaintiff's FMLA retaliation claim, and plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on mitigation must be denied.”
“plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on mitigation must be denied.”
“It is hereby ORDERED that O'Hagan's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART (Doc. 64). It is DENIED with respect to O'Hagan's request for prejudgment interest. It is GRANTED in all other respects.”
“It is further ORDERED that Liberty's motion for sanctions is DENIED (Doc. 73).”
“In sum, defendant has not recovered from a third party tortfeasor; he recovered from his employer. Accordingly, summary judgment must be granted in favor of defendant and against plaintiff.”
“summary judgment must be granted in favor of defendant and against plaintiff.”
“because this case is not ‘exceptional,’ plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees must be denied.”
“USClS's motion for summary judgment must be granted, and Yemer's motion must be denied.”
“Accordingly, for the reasons stated here, plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment must be denied.”
“For the reasons stated below, defendant's motion must be denied.”
“For the foregoing reasons, defendants', motion to dismiss must be denied.”
“a bench ruling issued answering this question in the affirmative, and an Order issued denying the motion for judgment on the pleadings.”
“For the reasons stated in this Memorandum Opinion, the Union's claim must be submitted to arbitration. Accordingly, WMATA's motion to dismiss will be granted by separate order.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
The sampled 2019 dockets span personal injury, insurance and contract, franchising, prisoner civil rights, Social Security, and trademark matters. A separate 2023 group consists largely of immigration and naturalization actions. These selected matters do not represent his full caseload.
Pending matters in the official report
Judge Ellis was last listed in the Civil Justice Reform Act report as of March 31, 2024.
| Motions pending more than six months | 0 |
| Bench trials submitted more than six months | 0 |
| Bankruptcy appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Social Security appeals pending more than six months | 0 |
| Civil cases pending more than three years | 0 |
| Report | Motions over six months | Cases over three years |
|---|---|---|
| Mar 2024 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2023 | 0 | 0 |
| Mar 2023 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2022 | 0 | 0 |
| Mar 2022 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2021 | 0 | 0 |
| Mar 2021 | 0 | 0 |
| Sep 2020 | 0 | 0 |
A snapshot on that date: matters listed may since have been decided or reassigned. A motion referred to a magistrate judge is counted for both judges. Motions in multidistrict litigation, section 2255 cases and Social Security appeals are not counted, and a very large three-year count is generally a multidistrict docket. Source: Appendix A of the report (PDF); about the report.
A historical record
Judge Ellis no longer hears cases. This profile stays available as a record of how they ruled here. If you're preparing for a matter, start from the court's current bench.