Roderick Charles Young
How Judge Young rules, drawn from 28 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
How Judge Young decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
Procedural preferences
Relies on magistrate judges for Social Security appeals and adopts their Reports & Recommendations: here accepting Magistrate Judge Speight's R&R in full (and overruling the plaintiff's partial objection) while still entering the recommended claimant-favorable remand. Direct your substantive SSA briefing to the magistrate's R&R stage.
“The 14 Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge is ACCEPTED and ADOPTED. Plaintiff's 9 Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Defendant's 11 Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.”
On an ancillary Rule 45 subpoena-enforcement motion he declines to reach the merits and instead transfers the dispute to the district overseeing the underlying litigation: treating subpoena fights as matters for the home court. Expect a transfer, not a merits ruling, on a miscellaneous subpoena action tied to out-of-district litigation.
“The Court hereby ORDERS that the Clerk TRANSFER this matter to the District Court for the Northern District of Florida.”
Manages his docket actively against stalled plaintiffs: when a case sits with no answer and no plaintiff activity he issues a show-cause order and then dismisses without prejudice for failure to prosecute. Keep cases moving or expect a sua sponte dismissal.
“ORDER that this action is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to prosecute.”
Cautions
The sample contains four classified motions across four matters and is limited by sparse docket-entry coverage; many terminated Richmond cases had no retained entries, and the Penn National insurance declaratory-judgment case retained only metadata. No published opinion bylined by Young was available. The represented postures are mixed, including a plaintiff Social Security win, a bankruptcy affirmance, and a procedural transfer, but the sample is too small to establish a grant rate or broader tendency. His work as a U.S. Magistrate Judge from 2014 through 2020 is excluded.
“Plaintiff's 9 Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“Plaintiff's 9 Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Defendant's 11 Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. The final decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED. This matter be REMANDED pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. 405(g) for further administrative proceedings ...”
“Plaintiff's 9 Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Defendant's 11 Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. The final decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED.”
“For the reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, the Court AFFIRMS the decisions of the Bankruptcy Court, in full. It is so ORDERED.”
“The Court hereby ORDERS that the Clerk TRANSFER this matter to the District Court for the Northern District of Florida.”
Young dismissed a Title VII employment-discrimination action without prejudice sua sponte for failure to prosecute after a show-cause order. The defendants had never answered, and the plaintiff took no action to advance the case. The disposition is grounded in the verbatim docket-entry order text and illustrates active docket management.
“Upon review, the Court finds that Plaintiff's filings are legally frivolous and fail to state a plausible claim for relief against Defendants... Thus, the Court further finds that it is mandated by 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii) to dismiss this action... For these reasons, Plaintiff's action will be DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii).”
“The Court will grant the Motion to Transfer but will deny it as to the proffered transferee location... the Court will direct the Clerk to transfer this civil action to the Alexandria Division of the Eastern District of Virginia and shall recommend that the same judge be assigned both this action and the Norfolk Action.”
“The Court disagrees with Plaintiff's hyper-technical argument. The motions were essentially filed simultaneously and, as such, Defendants have not waived their venue argument. Thus, the Court will deny Plaintiff's Motion to Strike.”
“The Court holds that the interest of justice prong weighs heavily in favor of transferring the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of California... Therefore, the Court will grant Defendants' Motion to Transfer... Given that the Court will grant the Motion to Transfer, the Court will deny the Motion to Dismiss as moot.”
“Accordingly, this action will be DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”
“Accordingly, based only on the facts alleged by Plaintiff and the documents attached to the Complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged facts that, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant's Motion to Dismiss as to Count I.”
“Because the source of duty and economic loss rules preclude Plaintiff's negligence claim, the Court grants Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and dismisses with prejudice Count II.”
“For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff has failed to state any claim under Title VII and amendment would be futile. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 3) will therefore be granted, and this civil action will be dismissed with prejudice.”
“For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff has failed to state any claim upon which relief may be granted. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 6) will therefore be granted, and this civil action will be dismissed with prejudice.”
“Because venue properly lies in the Newport News Division of the Eastern District of Virginia under the second prong of Section 1391(b), and because there is no basis for venue in the Richmond Division, the Court will exercise its discretion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1406 and transfer the case to the Newport News Division.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median case duration in the sampled dockets: 181.5 days (N = 14).
Median motion-to-ruling time: 189 days.
This is a qualitative description of the reviewed Richmond Division cases, not a counted population distribution. Because cases can be reassigned, each order is tied to Young through its signature rather than current assignment alone.
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