Michael Stefan Nachmanoff
How Judge Nachmanoff rules, drawn from 19 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
How Judge Nachmanoff decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
Textualist on jurisdictional/preclusion statutes: he reads the FTCA judgment bar's plain language to preclude a same-conduct Bivens claim, and (per Brownback) treats a scope-of-employment FTCA dismissal as a merits judgment that triggers the bar.
“Put simply, the plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 2676 could not be clearer: this action cannot proceed.”
For noncitizens long present in the United States, he treats § 1226(a) as the default detention framework and requires a bond hearing focused on danger and flight risk; where continued detention lacks that process, he has ordered release pending the hearing.
“Because Petitioner has been present in the United States for roughly twenty-nine years, and because § 1226(a) sets forth ‘the default rule’ for detaining and removing noncitizens ‘already present in the United States,’ Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 303 (2018), his detention is governed by § 1226(a).”
Procedural preferences
He resolves facial 12(b)(6) sufficiency challenges before allowing discovery: a plaintiff cannot use discovery to manufacture a claim that the complaint, as pleaded, fails to state. Expect a discovery motion filed to defeat a pending MTD to be denied.
“Discovery should follow the filing of a well-pleaded complaint. It is not a device to enable a plaintiff to make a case when his complaint has failed to state a claim.”
As a magistrate he flagged threshold venue / personal-jurisdiction defects early and recommended dismissal where the suit had no connection to Virginia, rather than reaching the parties' default-related motions.
“Plaintiff's Complaint does not allege that Defendant has any ties to Virginia or that the alleged conduct occurred within Virginia. The alleged violations took place in Chicago, Illinois, where UICCOM is located.”
Cautions
On the procedural posture of multi-suit litigation: a plaintiff who pursues both an FTCA claim and a Bivens claim on the same facts risks losing the Bivens claim entirely once any FTCA judgment is entered.
“a plaintiff who pursues both remedies ‘runs the risk that [the] constitutional claim will be subject to the FTCA's 'judgment bar' provision.’”
Seven reasoning-layer outcomes concern the same 2025-2026 immigration-detention dispute over §§ 1225 and 1226. Six grants and one procedural order in that cluster should not be treated as independent evidence about unrelated civil or criminal motions.
“For all the reasons stated above, the Petition (ECF 1) is GRANTED.”
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“plaintiff's motion for discovery will be denied, and defendants' motions to dismiss will be granted.”
“Accordingly, the Court will deny plaintiff's motion for discovery and proceed to assess defendants' Motions to Dismiss, which question the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint.”
MAGISTRATE-ERA Report & Recommendation (a recommendation to the district judge, NOT a final ruling, and from his prior magistrate role, so EXCLUDED from district motion stats; recorded for the pattern layer + as an order read). Pro se Title IX / defamation suit by a former University of Illinois Chicago medical student against a UIC dean. On a plaintiff's motion for default judgment and a defendant's motion to set aside default, Nachmanoff (then a U.S. Magistrate Judge) recommended the complaint be DISMISSED for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue, all events occurred in Chicago, Illinois, with no Virginia ties. Adoption by the district judge not verified. (In the public archive, this E.D. Va. recommendation was indexed under an unrelated district's records.) Grounding quote: 'the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff's Complaint against Defendant be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.'
APPELLATE panel opinion AUTHORED by Nachmanoff sitting by designation on the Fourth Circuit (joined by Judges Agee and Richardson): not a district-court motion ruling, so EXCLUDED from district motion stats; recorded for the pattern layer. A federal inmate brought parallel Bivens and FTCA suits over alleged FBOP sexual abuse; after a merits judgment dismissed the FTCA claim, the panel held the FTCA judgment bar (28 U.S.C. 2676) precludes the still-pending Bivens appeal arising from the same conduct, and dismissed the appeal. Shows his textualist reading of the judgment bar and his treatment of a jurisdictional FTCA dismissal as a 'judgment on the merits' under Brownback. Grounding quote: 'Put simply, the plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 2676 could not be clearer: this action cannot proceed.'
“ORDERED that the Petition be and is filed; and it is further ORDERED that on or before 5:00 pm on Tuesday, September 9, 2025, Respondents show cause why the Petition should not be granted.”
“ORDERED that Mr. Lopez-Sanabria be released from custody no later than 4:00 pm on Friday, October 3, 2025, with all his personal property, once he has posted the $1,500 bond set by the Immigration Judge; and it is further ORDERED that Respondents...along with their officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, successors, and assigns, and all persons acting in concert with them be and are ENJOINED from rearresting Mr. Lopez-Sanabria unless he has committed a new violation of any federal, state, or local law, or has failed to attend any properly noticed immigration or court hearing.”
“ORDERED that the Petition (ECF 1) is GRANTED, and it is hereby ORDERED that to the extent that Petitioners seeks release from detention, Petitioners file a motion requesting a bond hearing or custody redetermination as soon as practicable; and that Federal Respondents provide Petitioners with a standard bond hearing before an IJ pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within 7 days of the date of that motion; and it is further ORDERED that Federal Respondents are ENJOINED from denying bond to Petitioners on the basis that they are detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).”
“ORDERED that the Petition (ECF 1) is GRANTED, and it is hereby ORDERED that to the extent that Petitioner seeks release from detention, Petitioner files a motion requesting a bond hearing or custody redetermination as soon as practicable; and that Federal Respondents provide Petitioner with a standard bond hearing before an IJ pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within 7 days of the date of that motion; and it is further ORDERED that Federal Respondents are ENJOINED from denying bond to Petitioner on the basis that he is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).”
“ORDERED that the Petition (ECF 1) is GRANTED, and it is hereby ORDERED that to the extent that Petitioners seek release from detention, Petitioners file a motion requesting a bond hearing or custody redetermination as soon as practicable; and that Federal Respondents provide Petitioners with a standard bond hearing before an IJ pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within 7 days of the date of that motion; and it is further ORDERED that Federal Respondents are ENJOINED from denying bond to Petitioners on the basis that they are detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).”
“ORDERED that the Petition (ECF 1) is GRANTED, and it is hereby ORDERED that to the extent that Petitioner seeks release from detention, Petitioner file a motion requesting a bond hearing or custody redetermination as soon as practicable; and that Federal Respondents provide Petitioner with a standard bond hearing before an IJ pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within 7 days of the date of that motion; and it is further ORDERED that Federal Respondents are ENJOINED from denying bond to Petitioner on the basis that he is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).”
“ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment re 22, is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Motion is GRANTED as to Count III of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint re 18, and claims in Count II of the Amended Complaint related to Plaintiff's suspension without pay on June 18, 2025. The Motion is otherwise DENIED as to Counts I, II, and IV. ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment re 32, is DENIED. ORDERED that Count III of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is DISMISSED.”
“ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment re 32, is DENIED.”
“MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Denying Plaintiff's Rule 56(d) Motion (ECF 74); Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF 69); and Dismissing Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (ECF 43).”
“ORDERED that the United States's Partial Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 20) is GRANTED; it is further ORDERED that the claims asserted against Defendants Cain and Parker are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and it is further ORDERED that all claims asserted by Plaintiff J.L. are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Median motion-to-ruling time: 27 days (N = 11).
The sampled Alexandria civil docket includes immigration-agency review, naturalization mandamus, insurance declaratory judgment, contract, prisoner civil rights, and § 2255 matters. Mid-2026 assignments are heavily concentrated in alien-detainee petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This is a qualitative description of the reviewed cases, not a counted population distribution.
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