M. Hannah Lauck
How Judge Lauck decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
She resolves cases on the plain text of the governing statute and, for remedial statutes, construes ambiguity in favor of the protected party -- holding that an insurer must supply matching uninsured-motorist coverage absent an explicit rejection, because the UM statute 'is to be applied liberally in order to accomplish its intended purpose of affording relief to injured persons.'
“For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant Santens's cross motion for summary judgment and will deny Progressive's cross motion for summary judgment.”
In election-law challenges she applies the Anderson-Burdick balancing framework and demands concrete evidence of burden; speculation about voter confusion or 'backlash' will not carry a facial or as-applied challenge, and a facial challenge to a duly enacted statute is disfavored.
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (EOF No. 29) and will deny Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 31).”
Procedural preferences
She enforces the Local Civil Rules strictly -- especially Local Rule 56(B), which requires a summary-judgment movant to set out the undisputed material facts with record citations. A movant who scatters citations and omits the required statement (and who also files unverified interrogatories under Rule 33(b)(5)) risks having its motion denied outright or its 'disputes' struck. Practice point: on summary judgment before her, file a proper Local Rule 56(B) statement of undisputed facts and make sure discovery responses are sworn.
“Courts in the Eastern District of Virginia, including this one, weigh adherence to procedural rules seriously. In response to a movant's blatant violation of Local [Civil] Rule 56(B), the Court may deny a motion for summary judgment outright.”
When she grants a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal at the pleading stage she tends to grant leave to amend rather than dismiss with prejudice, giving plaintiffs a chance to cure -- here dismissing ERISA-preempted state-law claims but expressly allowing the plaintiff to replead.
“For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny the Motion to Remand, grant the Motions to Dismiss, and grant Rollins leave to amend.”
On a preliminary injunction she holds the movant to the full Winter 'clear showing' standard and will deny relief when the record lacks evidence of a likelihood of success -- a single witness who cannot identify any actually-burdened person beyond the named plaintiffs is not enough.
“The circumstances of this case do not allow for a remedy as extraordinary as a preliminary injunction because Plaintiffs provide no evidentiary support for their claims showing a likelihood of success on the merits.”
Cautions
This record is a THIN first slice (N=10 motions across 5 published opinions, 2014-2017) for a high-volume, high-profile ACTIVE judge who is now the Chief Judge of the E.D. Va. Do NOT read the counts as a grant rate or a merits tendency. The slice does have unusually good posture diversity for an EDVA published-opinion sample (plaintiff MSJ wins in Wood and Santens balance the defendant MSJ win in Marcellus), but N is small. A step-5 deepen toward the ~25-40 floor is recommended (more dispositive MTD/MSJ rulings; her more recent and criminal docket).
“For the reasons that follow, the Court denied Credit One's Motion for Summary Judgment, granted Wood's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and granted Wood's Motion to Exclude.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Summary judgment N = 6 |
Granted: 3Denied: 3 | counts only |
| Motions to dismiss N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motions to remand N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Preliminary injunction N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to exclude N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant Santens's cross motion for summary judgment and will deny Progressive's cross motion for summary judgment.”
“For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant Santens's cross motion for summary judgment and will deny Progressive's cross motion for summary judgment.”
“For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny the Motion to Remand, grant the Motions to Dismiss, and grant Rollins leave to amend.”
“For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny the Motion to Remand, grant the Motions to Dismiss, and grant Rollins leave to amend.”
“The circumstances of this case do not allow for a remedy as extraordinary as a preliminary injunction because Plaintiffs provide no evidentiary support for their claims showing a likelihood of success on the merits. Accordingly, and for the reasons stated below, the Court will deny the Motion for Preliminary Injunction.”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (EOF No. 29) and will deny Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 31).”
“For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (EOF No. 29) and will deny Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 31).”
“For the reasons that follow, the Court denied Credit One's Motion for Summary Judgment, granted Wood's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and granted Wood's Motion to Exclude.”
“For the reasons that follow, the Court denied Credit One's Motion for Summary Judgment, granted Wood's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and granted Wood's Motion to Exclude.”
“For the reasons that follow, the Court denied Credit One's Motion for Summary Judgment, granted Wood's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and granted Wood's Motion to Exclude.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
From the reasoning-layer sample plus her public profile (NOT a counted distribution): Lauck's E.D. Va. docket (Richmond Division) spans insurance / UM coverage (Santens), ERISA (Rollins), election and voting-rights law (Marcellus ballot party labels; Parson 2016 GOP-primary affiliation statement), consumer / FCRA (Wood v. Credit One), and bankruptcy appeals (Mar-Bow Value Partners v. McKinsey -- the high-profile McKinsey Chapter 11 disclosure litigation; United States v. Copley). As Chief Judge (since 2025) she also handles court-administration matters.