Leonie M. Brinkema
How Judge Brinkema decides
Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.
What persuades
On a motion to dismiss she separates the viable theory from the doomed ones rather than dismissing or sustaining a complaint wholesale -- in a First Amendment challenge she let the facial-challenge and vagueness counts proceed while dismissing the overbreadth count, and in a Title IX/1983 suit she dismissed nearly everything but preserved a single gross-negligence claim against the individual defendant.
“defendants' motion to dismiss will be denied as to Counts I and II and granted as to Count III.”
Where a case turns on a pure, undisputed question of law she resolves it decisively on summary judgment -- here holding that withholding-only immigration detainees are detained under 8 U.S.C. 1226 and therefore entitled to bond hearings, and certifying a class to settle the question court-wide.
“petitioners' motions will be granted and respondents' motion will be denied.”
In immigration habeas she reads a constitutional reasonableness limit into the mandatory-detention statute (8 U.S.C. 1226(c)) and squarely places the burden on the GOVERNMENT to justify continued detention by clear and convincing evidence -- granting bond hearings to long-detained noncitizens and refusing the agency framework that would shift the burden to the alien.
“respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 6] will be denied, petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 15] will be granted”
She grants post-conviction (28 U.S.C. 2255) relief when an intervening Supreme Court vagueness ruling undercuts the conviction -- here vacating 18 U.S.C. 924(c) firearm counts in the high-profile 'Virginia Jihad Network'/Lashkar-e-Taiba case -- but enforces 2255's limits against opportunistic collateral attacks (rejecting a Prop-64-redesignation challenge to a 841 enhancement in Ramos).
“For the reasons that follow, Chapman's motion will be granted.”
Procedural preferences
When an outcome-determinative question of STATE law is genuinely unsettled, she will certify it to the state's high court rather than guess -- declining to decide a Rule 12(c) motion on whether Arkansas recognizes conversion of electronic data and sending the question to the Arkansas Supreme Court.
“the Court will move the Arkansas Supreme Court to answer one question of law because the remaining claim in this litigation presents an unresolved question of Arkansas law that may be determinative of this pending civil action.”
She extends procedural leeway to pro se litigants (considering an improperly filed surreply out of deference to pro se status) but still holds them to the substantive pleading standard and will dismiss when the claims fail.
“Although plaintiff has also improperly filed a surreply without first seeking leave of court, ... the Court has considered it out of deference to plaintiffs pro se status. For the reasons that follow, defendant's Motion to Dismiss will be granted.”
On a Title IX disciplinary-bias claim she will find the investigation procedurally flawed yet still grant the school summary judgment where the plaintiff cannot show a 'particularized causal connection' to gender bias or a similarly-situated comparator -- separating procedural deficiency from the element the claim actually requires.
“Although plaintiffs have demonstrated ways in which the investigation and subsequent hearing were flawed, satisfying the first element, they have not produced sufficient evidence to establish a "particularized causal connection" between gender bias and the flawed investigation and outcome”
She resists being knocked off a case: a 28 U.S.C. 455(a) recusal motion based on her diversified mutual-fund losses was denied under the 455(d)(4)(i) safe harbor, and she warned against letting parties manipulate recusal for 'judge shopping.' She also declines to adjudicate on speculation -- denying the Assange unsealing application as unripe rather than guessing whether charges existed.
“Farkas' § 455 Motion will be DENIED by an appropriate Order to be issued with this Memorandum Opinion.”
Cautions
DEEPENED 2026-06-08 to N=18 motions across 14 published opinions (2014-2019) + 7 docket docket_motions = 25 classified across both layers, clearing the ~25-40 floor. Still do NOT read the counts as a population grant rate or merits tendency: the published-opinion sample is posture-skewed (it over-represents cases that reached a written dispositive ruling). The slice is genuinely mixed -- defense Rule 12/MSJ wins (Stewart, Graham, Doe, Cousin, Murr) alongside petitioner/plaintiff wins in immigration habeas (Diaz, Portillo) and a granted 2255 (Chapman). It does not proportionally represent her enormous criminal/national-security trial docket (Moussaoui, Daniel Hale, Manning contempt), which rarely surfaces as a discrete classifiable 'motion' outcome here.
“For the reasons that follow, defendant's Motion to Dismiss will be granted.”
Motion outcomes
Counted from classified signed orders only. Percentages are shown only where the sample is large enough to be meaningful; smaller samples are reported as raw counts.
| Summary judgment N = 7 |
Granted: 4Granted in part: 1Denied: 2 | counts only |
| Motions to dismiss N = 4 |
Granted: 2Granted in part: 2 | counts only |
| Motion to vacate 2255 N = 2 |
Granted: 1Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion for judgment on pleadings N = 1 |
Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
| Class certification N = 1 |
Granted: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to alter or amend judgment N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to unseal N = 1 |
Moot / procedural: 1 | counts only |
| Motion to recuse N = 1 |
Denied: 1 | counts only |
A "1 of 1" is one ruling, not a tendency. Treat small samples as illustrative, not predictive.
Signed rulings
A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.
“For the reasons stated below, defendants' motion to dismiss will be denied as to Counts I and II and granted as to Count III.”
“the School Board's motions will be granted in their entirety; ... and all counts of plaintiffs' complaints except for the gross negligence claims against Howard will be dismissed.”
“Howard's motions will be granted in part and denied in part; and all counts of plaintiffs' complaints except for the gross negligence claims against Howard will be dismissed.”
“the Court will move the Arkansas Supreme Court to answer one question of law because the remaining claim in this litigation presents an unresolved question of Arkansas law that may be determinative of this pending civil action.”
“Before the Court is petitioners' Motion to Certify Class [Dkt. No. 11] and Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 16] as well as respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 21]. For the reasons that follow, petitioners' motions will be granted and respondents' motion will be denied.”
“petitioners' motions will be granted and respondents' motion will be denied.”
“petitioners' motions will be granted and respondents' motion will be denied.”
“For the reasons that follow, defendant's Motion to Dismiss will be granted.”
“defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 100] will be granted by an appropriate Order to be issued with this Memorandum Opinion.”
“Before the Court is defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons that follow, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part.”
“Defendants have filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 51] to which plaintiff has responded. For the reasons that follow, the motion will be granted.”
“petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 15] will be granted, and petitioner's Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus [Dkt. No. 1] will be granted in part and denied in part”
“respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment [Dkt. No. 6] will be denied”
“respondents' Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment [Dkt. No. 17] will be denied by an Order to be issued with this Memorandum Opinion.”
“Until there is a sufficiently certain disclosure that charges have in fact been filed, the Committee's common law and First Amendment claims are premature. ... the Committee's application will be denied without prejudice by an appropriate Order”
“Before the Court is movant Seifullah Chapman's ("movant" or "Chapman") Motion to Vacate Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 [Dkt. No. 813]. For the reasons that follow, Chapman's motion will be granted.”
Caseload & timing
From public federal docket records for this judge.
Reassignment observed: Lewis v. Wal-Mart (1:21-cv-00709) was reassigned to Brinkema from Judge Liam O'Grady on 2022-01-24 after O'Grady's judicial-disqualification notice -- confirming the runbook caveat that assigned_judge is the currently-assigned judge, which can differ from the signer of a given order.