Samuel Frederick Biery Jr.

How Judge Biery rules, drawn from 28 signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

Court
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas
Position
district
Appointed by
Bill Clinton (Democratic)
Commissioned
1994-03-11
Education
Texas Lutheran College (B.A., 1970); Southern Methodist University School of Law (J.D., 1973)
Signed orders read
28

How Judge Biery decides

Patterns drawn from this judge's own signed orders. Every observation links to the order it came from.

What persuades

In the reviewed foreclosure dispute, the express non-preclusive status of a Texas Rule 736 order meant that it was not a final state judgment for purposes of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

“Based on the explicit language of Rule 736, the Court finds the Home Equity Foreclosure Order does not constitute a final state court judgment as contemplated under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.”

In the reviewed insurance case, an undisputed contributing cause outside coverage triggered the policy’s anti-concurrent-causation provision and supported judgment for the insurer.

“As a result, ‘any damage is excluded under the Anti-Concurrent Causation Clause’ as discussed in the Memorandum and Recommendation, and plaintiff has not objected to the application of that policy provision.”

A voluntary promise of future notice did not moot the reviewed claims where the amended statute itself imposed no requirement that notice be given to the affected class.

“At this early stage in the proceedings, and in the absence of an imperative imposed by the amendments to Chapter 33, the Court declines to find that plaintiffs' claims are moot or that plaintiffs lack standing based on defendants' voluntary assurance that all members of the proposed class will receive notice of HB-1762.”

Procedural preferences

The reviewed preliminary-injunction decision treated every element of the four-part test as mandatory; failing to carry any one of them defeated preliminary relief.

“In order to prevail, Plaintiffs must carry the burden on all four elements.”

Cautions

An owner who exercised employer control could not participate in the employee tip pool in the reviewed FLSA case, which disqualified the business from using the tip credit.

“Because Garcia was an employer, which defendant does not dispute, he could not participate in a tip pool. Accordingly, Tavern is disqualified from its ability to utilize the tip credit provision under these circumstances.”

Signed rulings

A grounded sample of orders signed by this judge, with the verbatim dispositive language.

Beleno v. Lakey
SA-09-CV-188-FB · 2009-09-17
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted in part

“defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) should be granted in part and denied in part”

Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted in part

“defendants' motion to dismiss or for summary judgment based on mootness should be granted in part and denied in part”

Reyna v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co.
SA-11-CV-1031-FB · 2012-09-24
Motions to remand (plaintiff) Denied

“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion to Remand to State Court (docket # 8) is DENIED.”

Motions to dismiss (defendant) Moot / procedural

“IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Deutsche Bank's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Original Petition (docket # 3) is DENIED AS MOOT WITHOUT PREJUDICE to refiling in light of the filing of Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint.”

35 Bar & Grille, LLC v. City of San Antonio
SA-13-CV-130-FB · 2013-04-29
Preliminary injunction (plaintiff) Denied

“Accordingly, the request for preliminary injunction is DENIED.”

Bilotto v. Allied Property & Casualty Insurance Co.
SA-13-CV-650-FB · 2015-01-16
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“it is hereby ORDERED that the Memorandum and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge ... is ACCEPTED such that Defendant Allied Property and Casualty Insurance Company's Motion for Summary Judgment (docket # 34) is GRANTED and plaintiffs claims and causes of actions are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.”

Ruman v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
· 2018-09-28
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action Under Rule 12(b)(1) (docket # 10) ... GRANTED such that plaintiff's second cause of action is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as barred by the administrative exhaustion requirement of FIRREA. The dismissal is without prejudice to plaintiff seeking administrative relief if such relief is still available.”

Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“and Defendant Mortgage Contracting Services, LLC's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) (docket # 24) are GRANTED such that plaintiff's second cause of action is DISMISSED for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as barred by the administrative exhaustion requirement of FIRREA. The dismissal is without prejudice to plaintiff seeking administrative relief if such relief is still available.”

Bansci v. Nielsen
· 2018-08-10
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“Upon consideration, Respondents' Motion to Dismiss (DE 16) is GRANTED; Petitioners' Section 2241 Petition (DE 1) is DISMISSED”

Motion for emergency hearing (plaintiff) Moot / procedural

“and Petitioners' Motion for Emergency Hearing (DE 2) and Young's Motion to Appear Pro Hac Vice (DE 17) are DENIED AS MOOT.”

Jasper v. Thaler
SA-08-CA-735-FB · 2011-01-19
Habeas corpus 2254 (plaintiff) Denied

“Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that: 1. All relief requested in petitioner's federal habeas corpus petition, filed July 31, 2009, docket entry no. 10, is DENIED.”

Bartee v. Quarterman
· 2008-08-06
Habeas corpus 2254 (plaintiff) Denied

“Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that: 1. All federal habeas corpus relief requested in petitioner's pleadings herein is DENIED. 2. Petitioner is DENIED a Certificate of Appealability on all claims presented in his pleadings herein.”

Marsh v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
· 2012-08-29
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss (docket #3) is GRANTED, such that plaintiffs' claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, and plaintiffs' requests for injunctive and declaratory relief are DENIED.”

Tello v. United States
· 2009-03-19
Motion to alter or amend judgment (plaintiff) Denied

“Plaintiffs' motion to alter or amend the Judgment is denied.”

Motion to alter or amend judgment (defendant) Granted in part

“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiffs' Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (docket no. 43) and motion to strike (contained within plaintiffs' response to defendant's motion to alter or amend, docket no. 47) are DENIED.”

Smith v. Rush Retail Centers, Inc.
· 2003-07-01
Motions to dismiss (defendant) Granted

“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation (docket no. 15) filed in this cause is ACCEPTED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 636(b)(1) such that plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction; and defendant's counterclaim is DISMISSED for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction, or, in the alternative and to the extent a pendent state law claim may have been alleged, because the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the counterclaim.”

Wells Fargo Equipment Finance v. Rodriguez
· 2010-04-14
Summary judgment (defendant) Granted

“IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the decision of the Bankruptcy Court is REVERSED and this matter is REMANDED to the Bankruptcy Court with instructions to grant Wells Fargo's motion for partial summary judgment.”

Caseload & timing

From public federal docket records for this judge.

The reviewed dockets provide a limited view of Judge Biery's caseload rather than a complete census.

Draft for Judge Biery with the record in hand

Ezel grounds your drafting and research in this profile: what has persuaded Judge Biery, and what has not, cited to the signed orders.

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